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Abstract
This thesis explores various aspects of patent scope in the U.K. in an attempt to answer
two fundamental questions: First, what is the purpose of the patent system? And
second, what breadth of protection best serves that purpose? It consists of nine
Chapters spread over two Parts. Part I concerns historical and economic factors
affecting the scope of patent protection in the U.K. It examines the birth of the
English patent custom and the growth of the specification within it. The 'classical',
(primarily 'reward', 'incentive' and 'natural rights' theories) and 'post-classical'
justifications of the patent grant (including 'patent induced', 'prospect', 'race to invent'
and 'rent dissipation' theories) are considered as well. Part I also contains results of an
empirical study conducted by the author that looks into the claim drafting process from
the point of view of the patent attorney (i.e. the person drafting the claims). Part II
comprises three comparative studies and a review of recent case law in the U.K., with
recommendations for reform. The other systems under consideration are those of
America, Germany and Japan.
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Patent protection of inventions forms the keystone upon which multi-billion pound
industries are built across the World. Every patent application in the U.K. must contain
a specification, which comprises "a description of the invention, a claim or claims and
any drawings referred to in the description or any claim." 1
 Claims define the invention
for which protection is sought, and after grant their interpretation determines the scope
of the monopoly that the patent confers. 2
 Patents operate as a breakwater from
competition, due to this effect their scope is of critical importance to the patentee, their
competitors, and society at large.
In the United Kingdom, the principle at the core of the determination of patent scope is
that the claims define the outer boundary of protection. They are utilised by the Patent
Office in the determination of issues of patentability and by the Courts in matters of
validity and infringement. Their interpretation, specifically the tests used for such a
task, must therefore strike a delicate balance between the interests of the patentee and
those of third parties.
In an ideal world the claims would be so clear and unambiguous that no dispute over
their meaning would ever arise. But the world is not ideal; words are, by definition,
multifaceted and layered with meaning. Human beings, themselves far from perfect,
draft claims vhist attempting to navigate through the treacherous waters bordered by
the prior art. The words that they use to define the invention must be broad enough to
prevent unscrupulous copying, yet narrow enough to avoid encompassing anything that
has gone before. They describe an invention that may not be challenged for up to
twenty years after the application is fried, at which point the patent should, in the eyes
of the law, be as fresh as the day it was penned.
Against these obstacles it seems unfair that the patentee should be bound by the literal
meaning of the words used to describe their invention, especially where obvious
variants exist. The words in the claims are, however, all that the public and the
patentee's competitors have to inform them of the scope of the monopoly grant; as
such the interpretation that they enjoy must provide a degree of predictability in
deference to legal certainty. As we shall see, convincing arguments can be made for
Section 14(2) Patents Act 197 (hereinafter PA 1977).
2 Section 125(1) PA 1977.
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both broad and narrow interpretations of the claims when determining the scope of
protection of the patent. In the U.K. the Courts traditionally accept, some might say
only pay lip service to, the idea that the protection offered by a patent cannot be
restricted to the literal wording of the claims. They employ a single stage test in
infringement proceedings, using purposive construction 3 to tread the fme line between
fairness and certainty. Other jurisdictions utilise other means and their patents enjoy
other scopes, some broader and some narrower than that in the U.K.
This thesis therefore sets out to explore various aspects of the determination of patent
scope and to critically evaluate the current British position. It essentially asks two
questions: first, what is the purpose of the patent system - i.e. how can the award of
temporary monopoly to the creator of a new manufacture be justified? And second,
what scope of protection best serves this purpose? In seeking the answer to these
questions, the dissertation also asks whether the objective of harmonisation called for
by the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention,
and by international agreements such as TRIPs, is in fact misplaced. This author
considers that the real question should not be one of conformity but rather
predictability, and argues that this fundamental distinction is often overshadowed by a
pseudo-Imperialistic idea of what predictability actually means. In developing this line
of argument reference is made to historic, economic and comparative viewpoints, with
the aim of providing the reader with a strong contextual platform from which to
comment on the extant policy of claim interpretation in the U.K. and to provide a basis
for recommending improvement. The discussion is essentially divided into two parts:
In Part I we consider some of the historical and economic factors that have shaped the
British patent system and seek justification for its existence and explanation of its shape.
We begin, in Chapter I, by exploring the 'typical' British approach to claim
interpretation evidenced by decisions such as E.M.I. v Lissen,4 Van der Le5i v Bamfords,5
and Rodi & Wienenbeiger v Showe/1 6 in the period up to the genesis of 'purposive
Championed by Lord Diplock in Qitnic Components v Hi/I & Smith, 119821 RPC 183 and restated by
Hoffman J . in Improver v Remington, [19917 FSR 181.
-'(1939) 56 RPC23.
f1963J RPC61.
6 [19697 RPC 367.
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construction' in Catnic Components v Hill & Smith. 7 It establishes the position from
which the rest of the thesis then advances and aims to provide the reader with relatively
quick and easy access to the material developed in later Chapters. As such, it requires a
certain 'leap of faith', and the reader may only see the circle completed upon re-reading
it at the end. As noted, the real challenge with this Chapter was to set the scene as
rapidly as possible and, considering the potential volume of material, it was reasoned
that a more fact-based approach would be preferable to adopting true narrative style.
Therefore, the Chapter is arranged around a series of quotations from a number of key
cases, and as a consequence may appear a little 'extract heavy'. However, this approach
was adopted in order to deliver the maximum information in the least possible space,
and avoids inflating the Chapter out of all proportion to its place within the overall
argument. In addition to setting the scene Chapter I also poses what is often
considered to be the essential question when examining the determination of patent
scope - what is the purpose of the patent?
In Chapter II we begin to search for the answer to this question and cast our attention
back to the foundation of a patent custom in England. In doing so we seek the basis
upon which the modern system is built, and explore the origins of 'monopoly phobia'
arising from abuses of early grants. We therefore gain insight into the pedigree of the
restrictive practices discussed in Chapter 1. In addition, we consider the manner in
which the patent system has developed in the U.K. and, in doing so, provide a base
from which to argue that harmonised protection may not necessarily be in the best
interests of all States at every point in their evolution. This is a matter to which we
return in Part II during our comparative studies.
In Chapter III, we begin our exploration of patents within the market economy, and,
using the 'Anti-Patent' Debate of the midl9th century as our backdrop, discuss the
'Classical' justifications for the grant. Investigation of this period in British history also
enables further exploration of the drive against monopoly and the rise of the laissefaire
attitude that can be seen to colour early 20th century interpretation. This discussion also
enables identification of what may be termed the 'key' differences that we perceive
between the traditional British approach to claim interpretation and that which we see
when looking at the German position in Chapter VII.
See note 3, above.
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Chapter IV continues our exploration of the economics of the patent system,
incorporating the results of empirical research carried Out by this author into the
realities of claim drafting, and asks the question 'Does the philosophy fit the facts?' In
conducting this investigation we see some of the other determinants of patent scope,
separate from the courts' construction of the claims. This study enables us to evaluate
the potential effects of modifying the courts' approach, and is a topic to which we
return in the context of the comparative studies in Part II of the thesis.
In Chapter V we turn to look at some of the 'post-Classical' justifications that have
been utilised in an attempt to explain the system and suggest a template for its optimum
scope. In addition, we examine more closely the claim that all patents are monopolies,
and also study some of the basic economics of supply and demand that lie at the core of
the utility of the grant. In addition, a topology of invention is introduced that facilitates
deconstiuction of the argument that the patent system is good for all innovation, and
enables us to discuss how variation in the interpreted scope of a patent may impact
upon the type of invention that is encouraged. This, in turn, lays the foundation for a
discussion of whether the essential questions posed in Chapter I are, in fact, essential at
all. These are topics to which we return in Part II.
In Part II, we turn our attention to other jurisdictions in order to reflect upon wildly
differing traditions of interpretation within the classic trinity of developed patent
systems. Thus, in Chapter VI we begin this process by examining the U.S. approach to
determining patent scope, paying particular attention to the 'Doctrine of Equivalents' as
broadening the effect of the patentee's 'monopoly' from the literal wording of the
claims. The limits placed on the operation of the doctrine, particularly the application
of 'file-wrapper estoppel', are also considered in order that a full picture may be gained.
In Chapter VII, we move our focus a little closer to home and examine the German
patent system. The German approach to claim interpretation is traditionally perceived
to be diametrically opposed to that in the U.K., and therefore provides excellent
illustration of the tensions within the European Patent system, the second of our classic
three. It also enables us to question the impact of the Protocol on the Interpretation of
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Article 69, and to ask whether the idea of harmonisation is, in fact, desirable as an end
in itself.
To end our discussion of other systems, we move to Japan. Therefore, in Chapter VIII,
we note the nation's meteoric rise from technological obscurity in the midl9th century
to the electronic 'whiz-kid' of today, and explore the role that patents played in this
process.
Ultimately we return home, and in Chapter IX examine the post-Catnic approach to
claim interpretation in the U.K., assessing this position in the light of the foregoing
discussion, before finally concluding and suggesting that it may be time to 'correct'




The law of patents provides fertile ground for any researcher. The sheer breadth of
subject matter and size of the economic interests involved in the patent 'game' ensures
that study in this area is never free of controversy, disagreement and debate. However,
the starting point of any study is the selection of a topic, and then material, that is
considered to be manageable in relation to the proposed aims of the project. The
volume of sources, both primary and secondary, available to the researcher of the patent
system is truly vast, I therefore chose a topic that interested me and on which I felt that
I had strong opinions. During the course of the study my opinions changed as my
understanding grew, and the position taken in relation to the material that I consider
bears little relation to my original thoughts on this topic. Indeed, the final structure of
the thesis is almost completely detached from my original idea of how it would
progress.
The idea for this work grew from comments made by Brad Sherman in Patent Claim
Interpretation: The Impact of the Protocol on Inteipretation, (1991) 54 MLR 499, that "a detailed
theoretical, historical and empirical examination of patent interpretation" 1 was needed
in order to end speculation over the practices that led to the current shape of the law in
this area. It was originally my idea to look at theories and practices of claim
interpretation in the U.K. and America only, additionally considering the problem faced
by 'broad claims', particularly in the biotechnology industry.
I began by reading, casting my net purposefully wide in order to assess whether the
material that I perceived I would be dealing with would provide sufficient basis for the
formulation of a PhD. I therefore visited numerous libraries, most usefully the
Bodleian, and St. Peter's College Library in Oxford, the Library of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies and the British Library in London, and also utilised the services
of the Law Library in the University of Bristol. For the first few months of my study I
did little but read, and it soon became apparent that my initial approach would be both
over general and too narrow.
'At 509.
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The problem was two-fold: First, by limiting my study to the U.K. and America, I was
excluding two vety important (from both a comparative and economic point of view)
jurisdictions, Germany and Japan. Second, by extending to consider the problem of
broad claims I risked dilution of the core of the investigation. In addition, it was
apparent that adding Germany and Japan to the equation necessarily required some
degree of loss elsewhere in order that the project did not mushroom out of all control.
The decision was therefore taken to remove the issue of broad claims as a discrete entity
from the thesis. However, even at this early stage it was my intention to include
empirical work based on interviews with members of the claim drafting profession, and
it was considered that this would allow investigation of the issue of broad claims within
a manageable framework.
Therefore, with this new structure in mind I returned to the library. In addition, by
virtue of a new site subscription to Westlaw I was able to access far more material than
previously. This presented both benefits and disadvantages. The benefit was that I was
no longer reliant on indexes of legal periodicals, therefore avoiding being subject to
other peoples' classification of material, and now could conduct my searches in full text
online. However, the main disadvantage was the sudden increase in the volume of
material that I was faced with. By this time I was reasonably proficient at distinguishing
between good, bad and indifferent material, but the potential scope of the sources that I
was now faced with was a little daunting at times.
At this point in time, I had a reasonably well-formed idea of the content that I wished
to investigate, although not the structure that I wished to adopt. Therefore I set about
researching what I considered to be the most easily confmable and least changeable area
of the study, the History of the Patent System in the U.K. I began writing in the spring
of my first year, but at this time I was having significant problems contextualising the
Chapter, and seeing its position in the whole. I knew that the material within it was
important, but I could not yet see how to best structure it so as to fit in with other
Chapters. Therefore I moved to consideration of the American system. This piece was
to form the basis for my upgrade from LLM by Research to Ph.D.
Upon completion of the American Chapter, I moved to consider the economics of the
patent system, and found myself entangled once more in historical considerations of the
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nature and function of the patent grant. In the summer of my second year I began to
write what was initially intended to be a single Chapter on Patents within the Market
Economy. However, it soon became apparent that this topic was destined to fulfil a far
greater role in my overall thesis than originally imagined. Thus one Chapter became
three, and I was finally able to assess the eventual structure of the thesis. By breaking
the Chapter into three I was able to integrate the results of my empirical study 2 more
fully into the text by contrasting the theoretical aims, purposes and justifications of the
patent grant with the practical realities of the system in operation. This approach also
enabled me to place the historical Chapter in context, and upon completion of the three
economic Chapters I returned to rewrite the history in a manner that integrated more
fully with the thesis as a whole.
Therefore, with a clear structure in mind I was now able to focus on the comparative
aspects of the thesis. I was aware from the start how difficult it would be to access
materials in Japanese and German, as I speak neither of these languages. It was this
factor that first caused me to exclude these jurisdictions from my study, but during the
course of the interviews that I conducted with patent attorneys in relation to the
empirical part of the thesis, it quickly became apparent that they could not be ignored.
Therefore I bit the bullet and began collecting the material that I required. The
Japanese Chapter was, contrary to my expectations, relatively straightforward to
investigate. The Japanese Patent Office website provided a wealth of information and
additionally there are a number of English language publications and web sources that
deal with the material in which I was interested. I was also fortunate enough to be able
to discuss the practicalities of the Japanese system both with U.K. patent attorneys who
had significant experience of dealing with it, and also with Japanese patent attorneys
visiting the U.K. However, despite being relatively straightforward, it was nonetheless
very time consuming gathering the information required, and it was during this period
of research that I utilised the Inter-Library Loans Service most heavily.
The German material was far more difficult to access. The International Review of
Industrial Property and Copyright Law (the TIC) published by the Max Planck Institute
was most useful in the preparation of this Chapter. However, it was often the case that
translations of judgments would not appear until some years after the decision, this
2 The methodology of the empirical study is discussed fully below.
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necessarily hampered my investigation as I was constantly operating at least 12 months
behind current events. Other than this, a number of web sources and articles in
'mainstream' IP journals provided sufficient material for the completion of the Chapter.
The harmonisation effected by the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC,
and evidenced by a number of recent judgements of the Bundesgerichtshof that refer to
and apply the catnic test, rendered the investigation in this Chapter largely historic
anyway, thereby limiting the effect of late-coming judgment text.
The Empirical Study
During a number of conversations with Professor Gwynn Davies 3 before commencing
on the plan of the empirical study it was decided that given the subject matter under
consideration it would be more beneficial to proceed by way of interview rather than
questionnaire. The reasons for this were primarily two-fold. First it was considered
that the nature of the investigation was best effected by means of open questions,
designed to elicit opinion rather than knowledge per Se. In addition, the scope of the
study and intended outcomes were such that it was felt beneficial to let the subject talk
around the specific subject matter rather than providing specific answers to set
questions. Secondly it was feared that the possibility of a small response rate might
render the administration of a questionnaire both statistically and practically useless.
The patent attorney was selected as a subject primarily due to the close affinity that the
profession has with the creation of the patent claims, and therefore their connection
with the first stage in the determination of the scope of protection. The profession was
also chosen due to the strong, dipolar views held by certain members of the community,
primarily evidenced in their writings on the subject.
The website of the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA) was utilised in order
that a list of potential practices could be drawn up. Due to considerations of time and
expense the list was limited to attorneys in Bristol and London. An initial list was
created that contained 55 practices. In the first instance a letter, pro-forma and stamped
addressed return envelope were sent out to the practices on the list. 4 The letter
explained the context of the study. It stated that the traditional analysis of the
Professor of Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Bristol.
The letter is reproduced in Appendix A, below. The pro-firma is reproduced in Appendix B.
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construction of a patent completely was perceived to divorce the drafting from the ex
post flicto analysis of the Courts and therefore failed to take into account the crucial role
that the patent attorney performs in bridging the gap between the patentee and the
public. It gave an indication of the area of interest by virtue of a number of points
upon which clarification or explanation was sought. These points included an
investigation into the way in which a patent is put together covering the thought
processes and the procedures that are entailed in the drafting of the specification and
the wording of the claims. Further the thoughts of the agents were sought on the best
method of interpretation of the claims as they saw them, it was considered that this may
be different from the detached analysis placed upon claim interpretation by legal and
economic academics. The purpose of the letter was to both introduce the topic and to
provide a handle upon which to base the intended interviews.
The letter additionally asked whether the patent attorney in question would be prepared
to meet with the author in order to discuss the issues raised and to further explore the
subject of claim drafting. Confidentiality was assured.
A pro-fo.rrna included with the letter asked for the name of the agent with whom contact
should be made in order to arrange an interview, the number of partners/fee earners in
the firm and also for a contact number. In addition it asked for a description of the
area of technological expertise of the person with whom the interview may be arranged.
Of the 55 letters sent out replies were received in 28 cases, a percentage significantly
higher than expected. However 8 were to decline the possibility of an interview and 4
were letters stating that at present the firm in question was not in a position to take on
additional staff. 5 The remaining 16 replies were favourable. Due to travel and time
constraints it was decided that 8 of these would be approached for interview.
Over the following months 8 interviews were arranged with a variety of attorneys, some
in Bristol and some in London. The subjects were chosen from different sized firms
and with specialisation in different areas of technology ranging from computer software
The apparent inability of these recipients to actually read the letter sent to them did, in any case, not
bode well for the attention that they would have lavished on the drafting of the claims. Their timely exit
from the interview process was, perhaps, of no great loss.
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and biotechnology, through pharmaceuticals and general chemical to mechanical and
electrical engineering. The interviews lasted for between one and two hours. They took
place in the attorney's place of work, all were tape recorded and later transcribed. The








There are two, essentially binary, positions that can be adopted concerning the
significance that the claims are given in the determination of a patent's scope of
protection. These overarching classifications are often termed 'peripheral definition
theory' and 'central definition theory', and all subsequent interpretation is subordinate
to this primary categorisation of approach.1
The basic difference between the two lies in the role that the claim plays in defining
protection. Under 'peripheral definition theory' the claim(s) define the outer boundary.
They form the linguistic equivalent of 'fence-posts' penning in the monopoly territory
and marking its outer limits. The major advantage of this approach is that the scope of
protection is relatively clear to third parties, providing certainty to the grant. Under
'central definition theory', on the other hand, the scope of protection is determined by
finding the principle underlying the invention (the 'inventive idea') by looking at the
teaching in the specification as a whole. The claims may be the starting point for the
assessment, however courts are not strictly bound by their wording. This has the
advantage of providing a fairer degree of protection for the patentee (as patent scope is
decided based upon contribution to the art), but suffers in terms of certainty.
Typical examples of countries adopting the different forms of claim theory are,
respectively, Britain and Germany. For many years the latter treated the claims as
guidelines only, basing the scope of protection primarily on what the disclosure in the
description would have taught the skilled addressee. 2 The British approach typifies
peripheral definition theory, with claims staking the outer limits of protection. The
rationale for the adoption of the different approaches in these States is largely historical.
In Britain, it has been linked to the "niceties of the Chancery mind accustomed to the ex
These theories are given a fuller treatment in Chapter \TJ (below) when discussing the evolufion of the
American patent system. See also, Takenaka, Inte,'pretin Patent C/aims: The United States, Germa/!y and Japan,
Vol. 17 Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law (1995; Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich) (hereinafter Takenaka, Interpreting C/aims)
at 3-12.
2 See further Chapter VII, below.
3
post Jcicto analysis of conveyances, trusts and wills,"3 legal positivism also shares the
blame.4 In Germany, the more 'open' approach to interpretation has been attributed to
the influence of theorists advocating the Interessenjuriiprudenz, whereby it was argued that
the interpretation of documents should be carried out with the interests of the parties in
mind, here primarily the patentee. 5 In other words, the different approaches can be
traced back to critical differences between British and German legal thought. As we
shall see in later Chapters, the choice of theory is also affected by philosophical and
economic rationalisation of the justifications for the patent grant. 6 Although such
arguments initially operated to explain rather than give basis for the award of the patent
monopoly, their impact on the minds of the judiciary is clear. Therefore, German
courts often state that the primary justification for the patent system is that it gives 'just
reward' to the inventor,7
 whilst British courts have often stated that the grant is justified
on the basis that it provides incentive to invent. 8 The repercussions that this distinction
has for the scope of the patent are covered in more detail in later Chapters, however,
for the present it is interesting to note that the focuses of the two explanatory theories
lie on opposite parties in the grant. Therefore, whilst the 'reward theory' concentrates
on adequate remuneration for the patentee, the 'incentive theory' pays more attention to
the interests of society.
The Traditional British Approach
The traditional British approach to claim interpretation fmds its basis in s.5(5) of the
Patents Act 1883. This required that "a specification, whether provisional or complete,
must commence with the title, and in the case of a complete specification must end with
a distinct summary of the invention claimed." The practice of inserting a specification
Norman, Determinin& the Scope of the Patentee 'c Monopo!y: Purposive Construction Revisited, [19987 Anglo-American
Law Review 221 at 223.
Sherman, Patent C/aim Inte,p relation: The Impact of the Protocol on Interpretation, (1991) 54 MLR 499 at 508.
See Sherman, Ibid. See further, Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law (1978; Elsevier
North-Holland, New York).
See further, Chapters III, V and VII, below.
See, for example, text accompanying note 54 et seq. in Chapter VII below.
8 See, for example, the comments of Lord Oliver in Asahi Kasei Kogyo, [19917 RPC 485 at 523 where he
states that: "The underlying purpose of the patent system is the encouragement of improvements and
rnnovatlon."
4
detailing the claimed invention had been common practice since the mid-i 8 century,9
however the 1883 Act was the first to make the provision of claims a statutory
requirement. It is apparent, though, that this formal inclusion of claims in fact
prompted little, if any, change in the way in which specifications were drafted.'° Indeed,
as Lord Chelmsford had stated some seven years previously, the "office of a claim is to
define and limit with precision what it is which is claimed to have been invented and
therefore patented." Even before the passage of the 1883 Act, therefore, the British
approach to determining the scope of protection of a patent was based on the
'peripheral definition' theory, with the claims forming the outer boundary of protection.
The rules that were used to interpret the claims, and to decide whether an alleged
infringer operating on the periphery of the grant in fact fell within the scope of the
monopoly, were "very straightforward and very simple." 12 The starting point was the
principle of literal interpretation. The method to be undertaken was aptly summarised
by Lord Esher in 1894:
"[W]hen objection is taken to the claim, or to any one of several claims, it is
not using the true canons of construction to read that alone and to say that, without
regard to what there is in the rest of the patent, that means so-and-so, or that means
what is stated as the objection, and therefore, reading it in that way, you must hold the
patent is bad. You must look at the whole of the Specification, and then, having
looked at the whole, if it is an objection to the claim, see what the claim, on the true
construction of it is, having regard to the whole of the instrument."3
However, Romer U, later cautioned against over-use of the specification to alter the
clear and unambiguous meaning of a claim:
"One may, and one ought to, refer to the body of the Specification for the
purpose of ascertaining the meaning of words and phrases used in the Claims or for
the purpose of resolving difficulties of construction occasioned by the Claims when
read by themselves. But where the construction of a Claim when read by itself is plain
it is not in my opinion legitimate to diminish the ambit of the monopoly claimed
merely because in the body of the Specification the Patentee has described his
invention in more restricted terms than in the Claim itself."4
See further Chapter II, below.
See Kemp, C/aim Drafting: An Historical 5urvy, in Kemp (ed), Patent Claim Draftin,g and Interpretation,
(1983; Oyez Longman, London) (hereinafter Kemp, in Kemp) at 17.
" Harrison v Anderston Foundy Co., (1875-6) 1 Aim as 574 at 581.
12 Jacob, Interpretation of C/aims and Infringementi, in Vittoria (ed), The Patents Act 1977, (1978; Sweet &
Maxwell, London) at 65.
13 Edison Bell Phonograph c'orporation v Smith, (1894) 11 RPC 389 at 395.
" British Hartford-Fairmont Sjndicate Ltd o Jackson Bros nottingy) Lid, (1932) 49 RPC 495 at 556.
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For such practice "would not be to construe but to amend. Therefore, given that
claims formed the outer limits of protection, infringement could still depend on
whether their wording was broad or narrow, technical or general. 16 Particular problems
were caused by competitors 'inventing around' the patent by producing functional
equivalents to claim rntegers.
Under a literal interpretation, if one or more of the 'essential elements' of the patentee's
claims was omitted or replaced by mechanical equivalents then infringement would not
be forthcoming. The reason for limitations in the claim was unimportant, the principle
of legal certainty dictated that protection should be restricted to their precise wording
and no more.
This approach to construction is epitomised by the judgment of Lord Russell of
Killowen in Electrical and Musical Industries Ltd., v Lissen Ltd. 17 The following passage,
although not endorsed by a majority of the House in the case itself, is often recited as
an accurate statement of the law.18
"The Court of Appeal have stated that in their opinion no special rules are
applicable to the construction of a specification, that it must be read as a whole and in
the hght of surrounding circumstances, that it may be gathered from the specification
that particular words bear an unusual meaning, and that, if possible, a specification
should be construed so as not to lead to a foolish result, or one which the patentee
could not have contemplated. They further have pointed out that the claims have a
particular function to discharge. With every word of this I agree, but I desire to add
something further in regard to the claims in a specification.
The function of the claims is to define clearly and with precision the
monopoly claimed, so that others may know the exact boundaries of the area within
which they will be trespassers. Their primary object is to limit and not to extend the
monopoly. What is not claimed is disclaimed. The claims must undoubtedly be read
as part of the entire document and not as a separate document; but the forbidden field
must be found in the language of the claims, and not elsewhere. It is not permissible,
in my opinion, by reference to some language used in the earlier part of the
specification to change a claim which by its own language is a claim for one subject-
matter into a clam-i for another and a different subject-matter, which is what you do
when you alter the boundaries of the forbidden territory. A patentee who describes an
invention in the body of a specification obtains no monopoly unless it is claimed in the
claims. As Lord Cairns said, [in Duc-igeon v Thomson L77) 3 App Cas 34] there is no
such thing as infringement of the equity of a patent."19
15 Thorley (ed), Terre/i on the Law of Patents, (2000; Sweet & Maxwell, London; 15th Ed) (hereinafter Terrell)
at 6.37.
16 The factors influencing the intrinsic scope of the patent (i.e. the scope with which it is drafted) are
discussed more fully in Chapter IV, below.
17 E.M.I. u Lissen, (1939) 56 RPC 23. Lord Russell's speech can be found at pages 39 to 46.
I See similar assertions in Terrell, op cit. at 6.38. Also Kemp, in Kemp, op cit. at 19.
9) 56 RPC23 at 39.
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Pressing the point, he continued:
"I know of no canon or principle which will justify one in departing from the
unambiguous and grammatical meaning of a claim and narrowing or extending its
scope by reading into it words which are not in it; or which will justify one in using
stray phrases in the body of the specification for the purpose of narrowing or widening
the boundaries of the monopoly fLxed by the plain words of a claim.
A claim is a portion of the specification which fulfils a separate and distinct
function. It and it alone defmes the monopoly; and the patentee is under a statutory
obligation to state in the claims clearly and distinctly what is the invention which he
desires to protect."2°
Exceptions to the General Rule
However, Lord Russell's formulation clearly does not apply where the wording was not
"unambiguous", or where a literal interpretation would produce a manifestly foolish
result. This is certainly the interpretation placed on the case by Lord Evershed M.R. in
Rosedale AssodatedManzfacturers v Car/ton Jyre Saving Companji when he states:
"It is no doubt true and has been well established (see for example, the
speech of Lord Russell of Killowen in the E.M.I. case [citation omitted] that you must
construe the claims according to their terms upon ordinary principles, and that it is not
legitimate to confine the scope of the claims by reference to some limitation which
may be found in the body of the specification but is not expressly or by proper
inference reproduced in the claims themselves. On the other hand, it is clearly no less
legitimate and appropriate in approaching the construction of the claims to read the
specification as a whole. Thereby the necessary background is obtained and in some
cases the meaning of the words used in the claims may be affected or defined by what
is said in the body of the specification."21
In addition, as Kemp notes, Lord Russell's speech must be seen in the context of the
Patent Office's requirements that "the body of the specification... be consistent with
the claims thereby to render in general less chance for the specification... [to contain]
'stray phrases... for the purpose of narrowing or widening the boundaries of the
monopoly fixed by the plain words of the claim'."
The classic example that is utilised as an exception to the 'standard' approach advocated
by Lord Russell is the case of Henri/esen v Ta//on. 23 The dispute concerned a patent for a
ball point pen having a plug in contact with the ink at the open end of the tube. The
claims specified:
20 Ibid. at 41
21 [19607 RPC59 at 69.
22 Kemp, in Kemp, op *. at 19.
23 p19657 RPC 434.
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"a fountain pen of the ball tip type, comprising a tubular ink reservoir
provided at one end with a ball tip and at the opposite end with an air inlet, in which
there is disposed between the column of ink in the reservoir and the air inlet a liquid or
a viscous or paste-like mass which does not mix with the ink and forms a plug which
moves with the surface of the ink column and prevents air from contacting the sueface of the
in/c" 24 (emphasis supplied).
The alleged infringement contained a grease plug between the ink and air inlet that did
not mix with the ink to any appreciable extent, and which moved with the surface of the
ink column. However, expert evidence demonstrated that the defendant's plug only
prevented some 600/o of the air from contacting the surface of the ink. Therefore, the
question of construction that lay before the Court related to the interpretation of
"prevents" in the claims.
The House of Lords, unanimously considered that "prevents" in the patent claims must
be interpreted as meaning "prevents for all practical purposes", although Lord Guest
disagreed with the majority over whether the plaintiff had successfully proved that the
defendant's embodiment fulfilled this requirement. 25
 Lord Reid was the most forthright
of their Lordships, stating that:
"It is a general principle of construction that, where there is a choice between
two meanings, one should if possible, reject that meaning which leads to an absurd
result... It would be a very artificial construction of the claim to hold that, because an
infringer's plug is not very efficient though sufficient for commercial purposes,
therefore there is no infringement. That would simply be inviting infringers to take the
invention but make it work inefficiently."26
The 'Pith and Marrow'
In addition to these principles, it was clear that protection extended to so-called
'colourable', or immaterial, variations of the claimed invention. In deference, perhaps,
to the fact that "[o]utright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement,"27
 the doctrine of 'pith and marrow' grew up alongside the patent grant to
soften the effect of a purely textual interpretation. This 'mixed metaphor' appears to
24 Claim 1 of the patent.
25 See the final paragraph of Lord Guest's judgment (on page 453 of the report).
26 11965] RPC 434 at 443, 445.
27 Per Justice Jackson, delivering the leading judgment in Graver Tank v Linde Air Products, 339 Us. 605, at
607.
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have been coined by Lord Cairns, the Lord Chancellor, in Clark v Adie when he stated
that:
"The infringer might not take the whole of the instrument here described, but
he might take a certain number of parts of the instrument described; he might make an
instrument which in many respects would resemble the patent instrument, but would
not resemble it in all its parts. And there the question would be ... whether that which
was done by the alleged infringer amounted to a colourable departure from the
instrument patented, and whether in what he had done he had not really taken and
adopted the substance of the instrument patented. And it might well be that if the
instrument patented consisted of twelve different steps, ... an infringer who took eight
or nine or ten of those steps might be held by the tribunal judging of the patent to
have taken in substance the pith and marrow of the invention, although there were one,
two, three, four or five steps which he might not actually have taken and represented
upon his machine." 28 (emphasis supplied)
As Kemp notes: "While the metaphor has been criticised the principle enunciated in
Clark v Adie ... has been followed and applied in many cases". 29 Subsequent decisions
refined the principles laid down in the case and, in particular, made explicit Lord Cairns'
implicit reference to the doctrine of mechanical equivalency. Thus, in Marconi v British
Radio Telegraph and Telephone Cornpanj Ltd., Parker J referred to the doctrine of 'pith and
marrow' in the following terms:
"It is a well-known rule of Patent law that no one who borrows the substance
of a patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making
immaterial variations. From this point of view the question is whether infringing
apparatus is substantially the same as the apparatus said to have been infringed
where the Patent is for a combination of parts or a process, and the combination or
process, besides being itself new, produces new and useful results; everyone who
produces the same results by using the essential parts of the combination or process is
an infringer, even though he has, in fact, altered the combination or process by
oimtting some unessential part or step and substituting another part or step, which is,
in fact, equivalent to the part or step he has omitted."3°
Therefore, by the early 20th century it was firmly established that the patent grant
extended to protect against embodiments that, although they omitted certain features or
substituted equivalent means for them, nonetheless took the essence of the invention.
However, it was equally clear that this extension of protection was only available where
the variations or omissions were in respect of inessential features of the invention.
Therefore, the key issue in infringement proceedings became whether particular
limitations in the claims were of this nature or not.
28 (1876-7)2AN7 Cas3l5at 320.
29 Kemp, in Kemp, op cit. at 20. He continues, listing some of the cases in which favourable reference has
been made to 6'/ark vAdie.
30 191fl28C181 at 217.
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The importance, and difficulty, of making the distinction (as well as affirmation of the
existence of the doctrine, which Kemp notes had lain dormant since the decision of the
Privy Council in Pope v Spanish Rivcr) fmds ifiustration in comments of Lord Evershed
MR, in Birrningham Sound Rep roducers Ltd., v Collaro.
"In our judgment, it is not open to this court or the authorities to accept that
Sir Lionel's submission to the effect that the doctrine of 'pith and marrow' or
'substance' is dead. Nor do we propose to attempt any comprehensive definition of its
scope. We think it can, generally speaking, be taken to be confined to unessential
differences, though we appreciate that the distinction between that which is essential
and that which is unessential may be difficult to draw...
The invention with which we are now concerned is an invention consisting of
the selection of particular known mechanical members and the arrangement of them in
a particular way ... The individual parts of this apparatus are not claimed as inventions
and ... could not be so claimed. The basic idea which it carries out ... is not new.
Thus the essence of the invention resides wholly in the selection and
arrangement of the parts and the manner in which they interact when arranged in
accordance with the invention. It is therefore essential to the invention that it should consist of
the parti cu/ar parts described in the claim arranged and acting upon each other in the wqy described in
the claim.
The question therefore appears to be whether the allegedly infringing
apparatus consists of substantially the same parts acting upon each other in
substantially the same way as the apparatus claimed as constituting the invention. It is
not enough to find that the parts comprised in the Respondent's apparatus individually or
collectively perform substantially similar functions to those performed individually or
collectively by the parts comprised in the apparatus claimed as the appellant's
invention, or that the Respondent's apparatus produces the same result as the
Appellants' apparatus. It must be shown that the Re.spondentr selection and arrangement ofparts
is substantia//y the same as the Appellant 'c selection and arran ,gement of parts, for it is in such
selection and arrangement that the Appellant invention resides."32 (emphasis supplied)
Therefore, under the renewed doctrine little had changed: The courts still had to analyse
the patent in order to establish the essential elements, and then assess whether the
defendant's embodiment reproduced each of these. It was not enough to show
equivalent functionality, the doctrine required identity in essence, only inessential
elements could be substituted or omitted.33
Applying the Test
The potential for this approach to provide a narrow, almost literal, interpretation of the
claims, restricting the scope of protection to "dull and very rare" cases of "outright and
forthright duplication", is illustrated by two House of Lords Decisions of the 1960s.
' 1928) 46 RPC23. See Kemp, in Kemp, op cit. at 22.
32 [19567 RPC 232 at 244 and 245.
As will be seen, (in Chapter VI, below) this bears close resemblance to the 'all element rule' under U.S.
patent law.
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The first is Van der Ly v Barnfordi;34 which concerned a patent for a mechanical 'hay
rake' cum 'swathe turner'. The transformation from one function to the other was
facilitated by the "rake wheels situated hindmost in the direction of motion" being
"separately or jointly dismountable" and mountable "adjacent the foremost rake
wheels". 35 The crux of the infringement action related to whether, by specifying that
the hindmost wheels be dismountable, the patentee had limited the scope of their patent
to exclude situations where the foremost wheels could be removed and aligned adjacent
the hindmost rake wheels, achieving the same advantage.
At first instance, Lloyd-Jacob J had remarked:
"In the present case, no passage in the specification can be found to support
the suggestion that removal of any but the hindmost wheels was ever in the
contemplation of the inventor. Save for the ingenuity of the defendants in producing
their device, it is unlikely that any reader of the specification would have appreciated
that the transposition in Claim 11 of the words 'hindmost' and 'foremost' would be
required to identify the useful conversion of a particular raking device, and still less
that to suppose that the Patentee so intended."36
Therefore, when deciding the issue of infringement, he declined to depart from the
clear and unambiguous wording of the claim. Stating that:
"If the Patentee had in fact appreciated that a vehicular frame could be
devised which permitted conversion from side raking to swathe turning by retention in
position of the hindmost rake wheels of the original row, it is inconceivable that he would
have framed this claim in laniiage which epress/y Ca I/s for their removal." 37 (emphasis supplied)
By parity of reasoning, the majority in the Court of Appeal also refused to find that the
patent had been infringed, Upjohn U adding:
". . Why they so confined the claim it is not for us to speculate. The claim
could presumably have been safely drawn to cover dismountability of either group [of
wheels] ... but apparently the appellants did not appreciate this possibility... [T]here is
no escape ... we are bound to construe the words of the claim according to their clear
and unambiguous meaning."38
[19637 RPC61.
See Claim 11 of the patent, reproduced in Lord Reid's speech at page 74 of the report, ibid.
36 f19607 RPC 169 at 197.
Ibid.
p19617 RPC 296 at 313.
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The case was appealed to the House of Lords where the majority, once again, declined
to find infringement on grounds that the patentee had deliberately limited their claim to
dismountable hindmost wheels. We shall turn to examine the reasoning of the majority
on the issue of claim interpretation in due course, however, for the moment it is
interesting to examine the dissenting opinion of Lord Reid, standing alone in his finding
of infringement.
Lord Reid took a practical view of the invention. After stating that the defendant
clearly avoided textual infringement of the claim by providing dismountable foremost
wheels rather than hindmost wheels as required by the patent, His Lordship continued
to assess the scope of the doctrine of 'pith and marrow'.
"Copying an invention by taking its 'pith and marrow' without textual
infrmgement of the patent is an old and familiar abuse which the law has never been
powerless to prevent. It may be that in doing so there is some ifiogicality, but our law
has always preferred good sense to strict logic."39
He continued, explaining that this 'illogicality' arises due to the fact that the patentee is
strictly tied to the invention as claimed. Therefore, if another effects the same
improvement by other means this should not infringe. However, he also noted that:
". . . [I] t has long been recognised that there "may be an essence or substance
of the invention underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention, like every
other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form, and it will
be in every case a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance
and effect, or is a substantially new or different combination."4°
Therefore, what was critical in this case was the fact that the defendant was unable to
point to any mechanical reason for, or advantage to, making the foremost wheels
dismountable. "It is simply done to try to evade the claim." 41 He further commented
on the reasoning of the lower courts, stating that:
"It must be true ... that in framing their specification the appellants did not
appreciate that the same result could be achieved by moving the foremost wheels, for
otherwise they would have made their claim wide enough to cover this. But surely the
same must be true of most if not all cases where there is an attempt to avoid
infringement by the substitution of a mechanical equivalent: if the patentee had
foreseen that possibility he would have made his claim cover it. If that were a good
reason for refusing protection to the patentee against a person who later thinks of and
adopts the mechanical equivalent, it seems to me that there would be very little left of
this principle. Upjohn, L.J., said that the appellants "have deliberately chosen to make
[19637 RPC61 at 75.
° Ibid. Quoting from the judgment ofJames U in Clark vAdie, (1873) LR 10 Ch 667.
41 [19637 RPC61 at 75.
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an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost wheels should be detachable." If
by that he meant that there is something in the specification to show that they
dehberately refrained from including the foremost wheels or went out of their way to
make the hindmost wheels an essential feature I cannot find anything on which to base
such a conclusion. But I do not think that he meant that, because he went on to agree
with Lloyd-Jacob, J
.
, that apparently the appellants did not appreciate the possibility
that the foremost wheels might be moved. So I think that he must have meant that the
mere fact that they only mentioned the hindmost wheels was sufficient to make the
limitation to the hindmost wheels an essential feature of the claim. But if that were
right, then I cannot see how there could ever be an unessential feature or how this
principle could ever operate. And I think that the principle is very necessary to prevent
sharp practice."42
It is therefore apparent that Lord Reid considered the fact that the patentee failed to
mention any other embodiment as insufficient evidence that they therefore intended to
exclude other embodiments from the scope of protection. His construction is based on
what the patentee could validly have claimed. His Lordship appears to appreciate the
impossibility of drafting a claim that encompasses all potential variants from the outset.
This approach can be seen to match the scope of protection to the patentee's
contribution to the art. As such, it appears that Lord Reid adopts a reward-based
justification for the interpretation that he places on the claims. However, the integrity
of his approach is somewhat compromised by the fact that everything in his judgment
reflects His Lordship's opinion that the defendant had consciously sought to copy the
patentee's product whilst avoiding a textual infringement. This latter factor tends to
suggest that whilst intention of the patentee cannot be assumed from their choice of
limiting words, it may be assumed from the inability of the defendant to explain their
own choice of elements. A solution to this problem could be found by adopting the
position that the patent is assumed to cover all embodiments made obvious to the
skilled addressee in the light of the claims. However, this would come perilously close
to adopting central definition theory.
As noted, Lord Reid was in the minority on the issue of claim interpretation. The
majority held the view that the patentee had deliberately elected to limit the claim to
'clismountable hindmost wheels'. Therefore, even under the doctrine of 'pith and
marrow' there could be no infringement. Viscount Radcliffe explained that the
application of the principle:
is from first to last directed to the prevention of abuse of patent rights by
colourable evasion: it is not a special or 'benevolent' method of construing an
42 Ibid. at 76-77.
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uncertain claim ... fflhe basic duty of the patentee [is] to state clearly what is the
invention for which he seeks protection...
When, therefore, one speaks of theft or piracy of another's invention or says
that it has been 'taken' by an alleged infringer and this 'pith and marrow' principle is
invoked to support the accusation. I think that one must be very careful to see that the
inventor has not by the actual form of his claim left open to the world the
appropriation of just that property that he says has been filched from him by piracy or
theft. 4//er a/I, it is he who has committed himself to the unequivocal description of what he c/aims to
have invented, and he must submit in the first p/ace to bejuqged 4iy his own action and words.
If he is so judged, I cannot for my part see what inventive idea is claimed by
claim 11, regarded as a separate claim, except the idea of dismounting the hindmost
wheels and bringing them forwards to a position adjacent to and parallel with the
foremost wheels... I cannot, therefore, embark upon an enquiry whether the
dismountability of the hindmost wheels is an essential or unessential element of the
invention claimed, because it seems to me that the patentee himself has told us by the
way that he has drawn up claim 11 that this dismountability of the hindmost wheels is
the very element of his idea that makes it an invention. When one says, then, as has
been said by the majority of the Court of Appeal, that the appellants have "deliberately
chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost wheels should be
detachable," what one means is not merely that the wording of this claim has been
carefully selected, as has all the rest of the patent document, to put the appellants in as
strong a position as their expert advisers thought attainable or desirable, but also that
the appellants have stated clearly and without equivocation that the point of their
invention lies in its application to the hindmost wheels." 43 (emphasis supplied)
This reasoning is interesting as it exposes a rnindset in which the patent grant is seen as
an exception to be fought for. This is significant in that it necessitates a narrow view of
the deserved scope of protection. It is therefore the patentee's duty to clearly define the
scope that he desires from the outset, and, critically, only very limited latitude is to be given
for defects in this drafting process.W The effect is to reduce the scope of protection to
mere textual infringement. By reading all claim integers as essential, as the patentee
"must submit in the first place to be judged by his own action and words," the House
of Lords at once sidelines the application of a doctrine that it explicitly endorses. Thus,
a paradox is created in that 'pith and marrow' is "from first to last directed to the
prevention of abuse of patent rights by colourable evasion". Yet it cannot be invoked
where the meaning of the claim is unambiguous, for in this instance the patentee has
"committed himself to the unequivocal description of what he claims to have invented".
Furthermore, according to Viscount Radcliffe, it is not intended to provide "a special or
'benevolent' method of construing an uncertain claim". Therefore, as Lord Reid states,
it is difficult to "see how there could ever be an unessential feature or how this principle
could ever operate."45
° [19637 RPC 61 at 78.
The implausibility of producing perfect claims is considered in Chapter IV, below.
Ibid. at 77. Although, it should be noted that Viscount Radcliffe's interpretation was influenced by the
fact that the patent had been partially invalidated.
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Further illustration of the House of Lords' restrictive attitude to claim interpretation in
this period is found in Rodi & Wienevbe'ger v ShoweII. The patent claimed an "extensible
chain band, more particularly a wristwatch bracelet made of:" two layers of cylindrical
sleeves connected by a pair of "U-shaped" bows. The connecting bows were kept
"firmly in the sleeve" by a "spring plate" in "each sleeve". The defendant marketed two
similar products, in both the connecting bows in the upper sleeve were joined to form
an integral "C-shaped" link, the ends of which functioned as the U-shaped bows in the
patented article. In one embodiment ("Excalibur 59") leaf springs were included in
each sleeve to prevent the bows from lying loosely, however, they did not function to
hold the bows in place to prevent them falling out of the sleeve, as the shape of the bow
itself did this. In the other, ("Excalibur 60") the springs were dispensed with entirely,
the middle of the connecting bow being shaped so as to provide its own spring.
Three questions came before the House for consideration. First, did the defendant's
use of "C-shaped" bows infringe the patentee's "U-shaped" bows? Second, was it
essential that the spring plate functioned to keep the bows firnily in the sleeve, so that
where the bows were held in place by their shape alone (as in "Excalibur 59") this was
not an infringement? Finally, was it essential that a separate bow and leaf spring
comprising a bent spring plate be provided in each sleeve, or could the spring plate and
the connecting bow be combined?
A majority of the House thought that the defendant's products fell outside of the scope
of protection afforded by the patent. Lord Upjohn, adding that:
"... [I]he question of whether the relevant claim has been infringed ... is
purely a question of construction of the claim read as a matter of ordinary language, in
the light of the complete specification taken as a whole; but the claim must be
construed as a document without having in mind the alleged infringement. What is not
claimed is disclaimed. The claim must be read through the eyes of the notional
addressee, the man who is going to carry out the invention described."47
He continued, stating:
"... [W]hen the patentee claimed U-shaped connecting bows and then
described their insertion and mutual reaction he meant to refer to U-links or bows and
not to elongated Cinembers... As a matter of ordinary construction I think there is
only one answer... [the skilled addressee] would think the patentee was describing
4 f19697 RPC 367.
Ibid at 391.
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independent U bows at each end of a transverse sleeve and that was the extent of the
claim. I reach that conclusion upon the wording of the claim and without reference to
the drawings, though the latter do support that view. That was one of the essential
integers claimed in the claim."48
Therefore, by virtue of similar reasoning to His Lordship's decision in the Court of
Appeal in Van der Ley, Lord Upjohn effectively limited the scope of protection to a
literal interpretation of the claim. However, more significantly, he also made the
following statement of principle to justify this narrow approach:
"... [I]f the patentee has in his specification limited the essential features of
his claim in a manner that may appear to be unnecessary, it may be that the copier can
escape infringement by adopting some simple mechanical equivalent so that it cannot
be said that every essential integer of the claim has been taken; the Van der Lely case
(admittedly a border line case which led to a conflict of judicial opinion upon its facts)
affords a very good example. But it must be remembered that unlike a conveyance or
commercial document which is normally inter partes and must be interpreted,
frequently very broadly, so far as possible to give effect to what appears to have been
the intentions of the parties; apatent is a grant of a monopo/yforbiddin,g others to enter apart of
the ge,zeral commercial territoy open to all of Her Majesty 'c subjects and so in the interests of those
subjects that territoy must be marked out auth reasonable clarity 4y the claim, construing it fairly
in the light of the relevant art." 49
 (emphasis supplied)
Therefore, we are provided with an explicit statement of policy. The patent grant is a
monopoly, and as such it interferes with the rights of men to operate freely within the
general commercial territory. The subtext is therefore that it must be construed
narrowly in order to protect society from its abuse. Once more, it is an exception to the
sanctity of free trade.
Lord Reid, again offering dissenting judgment, was of the opinion that the claims
should be viewed with an eye to the intended recipient; the skilled addressee.
Therefore,
"... [The] claims are not addressed to conveyancers: they are addressed to
practical men skilled in the prior art, and I do not think that they ought to be construed
with that meticulousness which was once thought appropriate for conveyancing
documents."5°
Individual phrases should be read in the context of the claim as a whole, interpreted in
the light of the specification. As such, the interpretation that is placed on them should
take account of their function. Lord Pearce, also dissenting, added that:
Ibid. at 393-4.
Ibid. at 391-2
° Ibid. at 378.
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"Had the claim been a direction to a printer or a type-setter, the alphabetical
approach would seem to me correct, since the alphabet would clearly be relevant and
the identity and formation of a particular letter would probably be the essential
ingredient of the integer described. But the essence of the connector to anybody
thinking on mechanical rather than literary lines would be a bridge connecting two
parallel limbs which would lie in adjacent sleeves. That quality would be fulfilled
whether one described it as U-shaped bows, orJ-shaped links, or goal posts.
If one discards alphabetical niceties, there remains the more solid argument
that here, instead of the two U-shaped bows, one has running all through the sleeve
one continuous integer albeit having at each end (at the relevant point of
interconnection) a link which performs the same function as a U-shaped link in that it
acts as a bridge to join the adjacent sleeves and in that its limbs perform the pivotal
action against the leaf springs.
It is important that in construing a patent one should seek to find what it
means to the reasonable person who is reasonably versed in the matters of which it
speaks - in this case mechanical. It is directed to the workshop and the market place
rather than to the cloister. For that reason a plain straightforward construction is
generally to be preferred to one that is strained or literary or tortuous. And meticulous
niceties of construction which are wholly appropriate to a legal document may seem to
the practical man to have a flavour of pedantry if they so whittle away a patent that
they enable a copyist to avoid its ambit by means that seem to be concerned with
words rather than essentials."5'
Therefore, there is clear difference of opinion concerning the canons of construction
that are to be applied in any given case. The majority judgment suggests that the
patentee's choice of the phrase "U-shaped" automatically limits the claim to this, and no
other, shape of bow. This approach is significant, as it prompts the view that in order
to provide adequate protection scope the patentee should refrain from adding
restrictions to their claims. Their Lordships state that the reason for their narrow
approach is that it is in the interests of society that the patent marks out its territory
with reasonable clarity by the claim. Yet, the result of their narrow interpretation is that
the patentee is encouraged to introduce uncertainties in the hope of broadening their
protection.
Lord Upjohn's statement that the "patent is a grant of a rnonopo/y forbidding others to
enter a part of the general commercial territory open to all of Her Majesty's subjects", is
telling as it exposes a mindset (perhaps even prejudice) that has its origins in the abuses
of Crown grants under Elizabeth j52 In addition, by focussing on the rights of society,
rather than the rights of the patentee, the House may be criticised as loosing sight of the
real reason that we have patent protection at all. As Cole notes, there is a distinction
that exists "between the primary purpose of the Patents Acts and their secondary
purposes." The primary purpose is the "encouragement of manufacturing industry
' Ibid. at 387-8
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within the UK by granting to inventors a limited monopoly in their inventions." The
fact that the patentee is asked to define the scope of their invention in claims is "a
secondary object of the Act intended to allow the system to operate smoothly". Where
there is conflict between the two, the primary purpose should prevail.53
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the validity of these statements. In order to do
this we first look to the history of the patent system, and consider the origins of the
'anti-patent' attitude in which the grant is seen as an exception to the general
prohibition of monopoly.
52 Discussed in Chapter II, below.




History of the Patent System
The Canvas Prepared
Introduction
The exact origin of modern patent law is unknown. Legal academics and historians vie
to produce the definitive point of conception of the system, citing in turn the Greeks',
the Byzantines 2, the Italians3
 and the English4, amongst others, as having sown the first
seeds. It is impossible to tell which, if any, of these assertions is correct. 'What is clear,
however, is that the development of the patent model was by no means peculiar to
England, despite the occasional assertion to the contrary.5
The notion that there may be some kind of property in the fruits of intellectual labour
dates back to at least the time of Ancient Greece. However, it is apparent that any such
concepts, and attendant rights, were usually perceived in terms of the physical object or
teaching of the trade so protected. 6 Indeed, it is not until the end of the l8" century
that we begin to see widespread acceptance of the notion of property in the intangible
per se. 7 Furthermore, the roles of the patent system, and therefore the justifications that
can be used to rationalise its existence, have changed dramatically over time. We turn to
consider these issues more fully in Chapter III, for now it is sufficient to note that these
early customs bear little resemblance to the system of grants with which we are faced in
the modern commercial sphere.
See for example Merges, Intellectual Property in the New Technological A,ge, (1997; Aspen Law & Business,
New York) at 121.
2 Frumkin, Eariv History of Patentsfor Invention, (1947) 26 Trans. Newcomen Soc. 47 (hereinafter Frumkin, Ear/y
History).
Prager, A History of Intellectual Propertj 1545 to 1787, (19-14,) 26JPOS 711 (hereinafter Pager, Histoy).
' Price, The English Patents ofMonopo'y (1913; Oxford University Press, Oxford) (hereinafter Price).
° See for example Fox, Monop' /ies and Patents: A Studji of the History and Future of the Patent Monopo/y, (1947;
University of Toronto Press, Toronto), at 85; Price, ibid. at 7; and I-Iindmarch, A Treatise on the Law Relative
to Patent Privilegesfor the Sole use of Inventions (1846; Stevens, Norton & Benning, London) at 3.
Long, Invention, Authorship, 'Intellectual Properi," and the Ortgin of Patents: Notes toward a conceptual Histo,
[199fl 32 Technolo & culture 846, at 858.
7 Walterscheid, The Ear/y Evolution of the [Tinted States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I), (1994) 76 J1OS 697
(hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents 1) at 702-3. See also Bently & Sherman The Making of Modern
Intellectual Propery Law, (1999; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), passim.
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The Guild System: Alternative Monopoly
During the Middle Ages, the guild system was the prevalent form of monopoly extant in
Europe. 8 A guild was a group of craftsmen or merchants, defmed by their trade and
skills, which exercised control over their respective mystery by the use of monopoly.
They fixed the price and quality of goods and services and provided for the security of
their members. These monopolies were essentially of municipal and local character. If
a tradesman wished to practise his art then he would have to join the relevant guild or
else face rampant opposition from its members.
The guilds obtained by Charter the right of exclusive sale within the town of the goods
made by them. 9 Moreover, they were also granted the sole right of supervising and
regulating their trade within the area in which they operated. The right of market or fair
granted by Royal charter, or acquired by custom, served in many cases to constitute the
only exceptions to the guilds' control. 1 ° However, the privileges enjoyed by these
bodies were not individual rights, they were group monopolies within which there was
free competition. The privileges of the guild were confined to protection from the
competition of strangers, the regulation of the trade and the maintenance of price.
Their monopoly was not a restriction upon competition per se but merely upon the
number of competitors.
Early Monopoly Grants
Outside of the guilds there is little evidence to support any claim that there was a system
of monopoly grants that can be likened to a patent system until the Statute of Venice,
promulgated in 1474. Such grants as can be found are sporadic and disorganised,
however a number of claims deserve mention.
The importance of the merchants' guild, to which, as a general rule, all of the town's traders were
obliged to belong, has been chronicled by many. In particular Stubbs, The Constitutional Histoy of England
in its orlgin and development, (1880; Clarendon Press, Oxford; Library Ed.) Vol. I, states that "in the reign of
Henry II there can be little doubt that the ... merchant guild ... was in fact, if not in theory, the governing
body of the town in which it was allowed to exist." at 453. Quoted from Fox, op dt. at 33. For an
informative discussion of the Guild system in England see Fox, op t. at 30-41 and Price, op t. at 6-7.
'Brentano, On the Histo and Development of Gilds, and the Ongin of Trade-Unions, (1870; Trübner, London) at
xciii; See also, Fox, op cit. at 32.
' I\laitland, Domesdqy Book and Beyond: Three Essqys in the Ear/y Histoy of England (1897; Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge) at 193-4; See also, Fox, op t. at 32.
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Frumkin's assertion that such a system was evident in the semi-Byzantine kingdom of
Jerusalem in the l2 century," relies solely on the writings of a traveller, Benjamin of
Tuleda, who mentions an exclusive privilege for the dyeing of cloth to found his claim.
The authority of this account is dubious considering the unofficial nature and singularity
of his source, but Frumkin also mentions other early instances of grants including a
fifteen-year monopoly for the manufacture of cloth in Bordeaux in 1236. However
none can be said to show evidence of anything other than singular instances in which
privilege was conferred.
Kaufer refers his readers to a number of early mining patents 12 and Pohlmann states
that there are examples of 'proto-patents', as he terms them, in the German
principalities as early as 1378 but asserts that Germany's first patent of monopoly
privilege was granted in 1484 as part of a system that flourished until the thirty years
war.'3
The Statute of Venice
Historians generally accept that Italy provided the backdrop for the genesis of a modern
poIiv of monopoly grants - although there is a small bone of contention as to whether it
was the city-state of Venice or that of Florence that can lay claim to the title of creator.14
Whichever, if either, is responsible for the idea it was Venice that first marshalled its
custom into statutory form when, in 1474, it enacted what has come to be known as
'The Statute of Venice.' It reads:
'We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious
devices; and in view of the grandeur and virtue of our city, more such men come to us
every day from divers parts. Now, if provision were made for the works and devices
discovered by such persons, so that others who may see them could not build them
and take the inventor's honour away, more men would then apply their genius, would
"Frumkin, Ear/y History, op cit
12 Kaufer, The Economics of the Patent 3ystem, in Lesourne & Sonneschein (eds), Fundamentals of Purv and
Applied Economics (series), (1989; Harwood, New York) at 2.
Pohlmann, The Inventorc Ri,ght in Ear/y German Law, (1961) 43 JPOS 121. See also Greenstreet, Histo!J/ of
Patents in Liebesny (ed.), Main/y on patents. The Use of Industrial Property and its Literature (1972; Butterworths,
London) at 5.
'4 Most academics conclude Venice, but Bugbee, The Genesis of American Patent and copyrzght L.aw, (1967;
Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C.) asserts Florence's claim to the title, at 17.
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discover, and would build devices of great utility and benefit to our commonwealth.
Therefore:
BE IT ENACTED that, by the authority of this Council, every person who
shall build any new and ingenious device in this City, not previously made in our
Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare Board
when it has been reduced to perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being
forbidden to every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further
device conformrng with and similar to said one, without the consent and licence of the
author, for the term of ten years. And if anybody builds it in violation hereof, the
aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to have him summoned before and
magistrate the said infringer shall be constrained to pay him [one] hundred ducats; and
the device shall be destroyed at once. It being, however, within the power and
discretion of the Government, in its activities, to take and use any such device and
instrument, with this condition however that no one but the author shall operate jt."lS
The Venetian Statute contained all of the essential features of a modern patent law. It
provided that the devices must be novel (new and ingenious), 16 that they must be
reduced to perfection and not previously made in the Commonwealth. It gave a term
of protection (10 years), provided for the licensing of the invention and set out a
procedure for determining infringement and in addition provided a remedy.
Furthermore, it reserved the right of the State to take and use the invention for itself a
condition mirrored in the Crown use provision of the current United Kingdom Patents
Act. 17
 In all aspects it evidences a modern approach to patents.
The success of this Statute in stimulating invention is difficult to gauge, however, it is
evident that it was a profound success in terms of the number of State grants of
protection. In the 75 years before the enactment of the statute some 10 or 11 patent
grants are evidenced in Venetian reports, 18 compared to over 100 in the next 75•19
Ii Quoted from a translation in Mandich, Venetian Patents, (1948) 30 JPOS 166 (hereinafter Mandich,
Venetian Pate,zti) at 17 6-7.
16 Prager, The Ear!y Growth and Influence of Intellectual Propeqy, (1952) 34 JPOS 106 (hereinafter Prager,
Growth) at 139 and Mandich, Venetian Patents, ibid. suggest that the use of the term requires a level of
inventive merit above an obvious application of known technology; Prager goes as far as to say that this
phrase suggests a requirement of considerable inventive merit. Walterscheid Antecedents I, op cit., at 709
disagrees, saying that this seems to be an attempt to apply modern sensibilities concerning obviousness to
a law more than half a century old. 1-le states that it is questionable whether the concept of obviousness
was understood in the Venice of the 15th century.
17 s.55-s.58 Patents Act 1977.
18 Prager, Growth, op cit. Also Mandich, Venetian Orzgins of Inventors' Rights, (1960) 42 JPOS 378 (hereinafter
Mandich, Inventors' Rjhts.
19 \Iandich, Inventors' Rihts, ibid.
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The Spread of a Statute
With the discovery of sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope at the end of the 15th
century, which relaxed the Venetian grasp upon the highly lucrative trade routes
between Europe and the rest of the world, it was inevitable that the success and
prosperity that the Republic had enjoyed for so long must soon come to an end. This it
did, and with it came an exodus of craftsmen and artisans who took with them the
knowledge of the Venetian patent custom.2°
Knowledge from the Statue spread across Europe and found fertile ground. 21 France
has been described as an "obvious recipient" as the first French patent was granted in
1551 to an Italian from Bologna for "glassware according to the manufacture of
	
,	 3	 .	 thVenice. Price, often obtuse m his reasonmg, agrees that by the end of the 16
century a systematic use of patents had developed in France but argues, albeit
unconvincingly, that this may well have been in imitation of the already well developed
English custom. 24 The Germanic States also apparently benefited from the teachings of
the Venetian craftsmen and granted their first patents from approximately 1484,25 a
practice that crystaffised into a tradition that was to last until the 'Thirty Years' war. It
appears that the Netherlands was also influenced in this manner and established a
21) Greenstreet, op at. at pA. states that there is a strong suggestion inferred from records of early grants in
other countries that the idea of patent systems spread throughout Europe from Italy with emigrating glass
workers. MacLeod, Accident or Deszgn? Geoege Ravenscroft'.c Patent and the Invention of Lead C'stal Glass, (1987)
28 Tech & Culture 776 at 780-1, states that the patent custom was 'carried out' of Venice by glassmakers
seeking to obtain the same degree of protection from local competition that they had enjoyed in the
\Tenetian Republic.
2! MacLeod, I,wenting the Industrial Revolution: The EngIish Patent 4ystem 1660 - 1800, (hereinafter MacLeod,
Industrial Revolution (1988; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 11 comments that "EiI t is no
coincidence that the first recorded patents in many countries at this time were for glass making, a skill in
which the \Tenetians excelled." Also I\Iandich, Inventors' Rights, op cit. passim.
22 Mandich, Venetian Patents, op cit. at 206; and Prager, Histoy, op cit. at 723.
23 Price, op cit. at 5.
24 Price adduces no evidence to back this up, therefore it should be considered at least speculative. See
Walterscheid Antecedents I, op cit. at 711-3 for a brief discussion of the early French patent custom.
25 See Walterscheid, Antecedents I, op cit. at 711; Greenstreet, op cit. at 5; and Pohlmann op cit.
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patent custom in the middle of the 6' century. The Italian connection is, again,
evident.26
Early English Grants
In England, the earliest recorded example27 of a patent grant is that to John Kempe of
Flanders and his servants, apprentices, and other members of the Weavers' Mystery,
and the fullers and dyers who might wish to come to England; of "franchises as many
and as much as may suffice them." 28 Frumkin29 describes this as provision by Edward
III of a non-exclusive privilege for exporting woollen cloth. However, both Hulme3°
and Fox 31 make it clear that, far from being an export privilege, this grant had as its
object the instruction of the English in a new industry and further, according to
Hulme,32 was in line with an ordinance of 1326 designed to promote the textile industry.
The importance of this grant is not in the offer ofprotectionperse, but rather in the fact
that it contained a general promise to extend similar privilege to all foreign weavers. In
short, therefore, it was an overt declaration of a policy for the encouragement of
English industry through Crown protection.
The incentives offered by the Crown in the 14th and 15 centuries were diverse and not
necessarily restricted to sovereign protection. 33 Indeed, they could be anything from
fmancial benefits and favourable tax treatments, to the grant of franchises and
26 See Walterscheid Antecedents I, op 6it., at 714; see also Doorman, Patents for Inventions in the Netherlands
During the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries, (1942; Nijhoff The Hague) at 14-15; and Greens treet, op et. at 4.
27 That has been discovered and interpreted as such.
28 Pat 5 Edw. III I m. 25; Cal. Rot. Edw. III (1330-4)
29 Frumkin, Ear/y Histo, op dt. at 48.
30 See Hulme, The Histo0i of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law, (1896) 12 LOR 141
(hereinafter Hulme, Prerogative).
31 Fox op cit. at 43.
32 Hulme, The Eariy Histoy of the English Patent System, in Volume III of Sekct Essays in Anglo-American Legal
Histo?y (1909; Little, Brown & Company, Boston) 117 (hereinafter Hulme, AALH, at 119. This work is a
revised and condensed version of Hulme's four articles published in the LQR between 1896 and 1902.
Although in England this was crucially important when dealing with the importation of an industry by
foreign artisans, as they could not claim the protection and rights of the common law. Also foreigners
tended to be quite unpopular with the indigenous population, Crown protection often being critical to
protect them and their property from mob violence. See Holdsworth, A Histoiji of English Law (1932;
Methuen, London, 56i Ed) (hereinafter Holdsworth, English Law) Volume IV, at 335.
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exemption from the rigours of certain statutes. 34 However, the common thread that
flowed through all was the desire of the to promote native manifacture through the
importation of foreign knowledge, regardless of how it was obtained. This patent
custom, if it may be called such at this point, was evidently concerned with fostering
English industry and self-sufficiency by offering incentive to immigrate, in the hope of
rectifying the country's technological lag compared to the rest of Continental Europe.35
Thus, we see a grant in 1336 to two Brabant weavers to settle in York in consideration
of the value of industry to the Realm36; an invitation in 1368 to three clockmakers of
Delft to come to England for a short period 37; letters patent dated 1440 to John of
Schiedame for a process of making salt on a scale never before attempted in the
Realm38; and a grant in 1452 to the Bohemian miners, based upon their possession of
scientific methods in mining.3' All of which were designed to improve the knowledge
of the Realm and do not purport to protect the manufactures as inventions in
themselves.
As the conditions for life became more stable and the populace more tolerant of the
international character of these artisans, the need for protection gradually disappeared
and the necessity for adequate reward took its place.° Thus, slowly, these inducements
evolved into limited exclusive rights in areas of industry controlled by the State, hence
pointing the way to the birth of a true monopoly right.41
For a discussion of such early incentives see, for example; Prager, History, op t. at 714-5; and Growth, op
cit. at 118-26; Mandich, Venetian Patents, op cit. at 171; Holdsworth, Eng/ish Law, ibid. Volume IV, at 344-5.
3 Hulme, Prerogative, op cit. for example, states that " ... English society [at the time] was mainly that of a
pastoral and mining community, exchanging undressed cloth, wool, hides, tin and lead for the
manufactures of the continent and the produce of the East." Ic/em, at 142. See also, Hoidsworth, Eng/ish
Law, op cit. Volume IV, at 341, 344-6; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 10; and Fox, op ct. at 43-7.
36 10 Edw. III, Dec. 12.
42 Edw. III, p. I
18 Hen. VI, Franc. 18. m. 27.
' See Hulme, Prerogative, op cit. at 143 who asserts that this is "[t]he first example of a grant made to the
introducer of a newly-invented process ... ". Also Fox op cit. at 44.
° Fox op cit. at 45.
4! Walterscheid Antecedents I, op dt. at 707.
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It is unclear when the first English monopoly patent of invention issued to individuals
was in fact granted. The argument seems to lie between those backing 156142 and those
who consider 1552 to be the year in which the first issuance occurred. 43 A small
number of academics claim the correct date to be 1449,' but as one commentator
states, "John of Utynam's patent of 1449 stands solitary, detached, and inscrutable."45
Whatever the date of the first patent of invention, it is clear that the system took root
and flourished during the reign of Elizabeth I, for in the years between 1561 and 1600
in excess of 50 patents were granted.46
The shift from the sporadic and essentially ad hoc pre-Elizabethan grants is, once more,
presaged by the Italian factor. Commentators note a letter sent in 1537 to the King's
Principal Secretary, Thomas Cromwell, by a Venetian, one Antonio Guidotti, proposing
to bring Italian silk weavers to England in return for 15 to 20 years' control of the
production of silk in the Realm. 47 There is no evidence that Guidotti actually received a
grant, however, the letter provides proof that Venetian practice was at least known in
the Kingdom.
2 Including Hulme, Prerogative, op cit. at 145; Holdsworth, English Law, op cit. Volume IV, at 345; Hauhart,
The Origin and Development of the British and American Patent and Copyrzght Laws, (1983) 8 lVhitlier Law Review
£2 at 541; and Bugbee, op cit. at 174.
u See, for example, Davies, Further .Light on the Case of Monopolies, (1932) 48 LOR 394 (hereinafter Davies,
Further Light) at 396, a point he reiterates in The Ear/y History of the Patent Specification, (1934) 50 LOR 86
(hereinafter Davies, Ear/y Histoy) at 95; Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, (1959) 41
JPOS 615 at 629; Fox, op cit. at 60-1; and MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 11.
See Greenstreet, op cit. at 1, 5-6; also Gomme, Patents of Invention: Or/fin and Growth of the Patent Sjstem in
Britain (1946; Longmans, Green and Co., London) at 6-12. This number also includes the patent office,
see http://ww\v.patent.org.uk . The patent is discussed at length in Thorne, John Utynamc Patent AD.
14-19 and Medieval Common Law and Other Considerations of Related Interest, (1957) 27 Canadian Pat Rep 21.
45 Gomme, op cit. at 13. Also Klitzke, op cit. at 630.
46 Again there are disagreements between academics as to the correct number; Hulme, The Histo?y of the
Pate,zt 3ystem under the Prergative and at Common Law - A Sequel, (1900) 16 LOR 44 (hereinafter Hulme,
Sequei) at 52 states the number to be 51; Klitzke, op cit. at 635 cites Hulme for the proposition that 55
grants were made in this period; Fox, op cit. at one point states that 55 grants were made (page 50), but
later asserts that the number was fifty-one (pages 61-2); whilst Federico, Orifin and Ear/y History of Patents,
(1929) 11 JPOS 292 at 297, indicates that Elizabeth granted 20 patents in the first 10 years of her reign,
and 40 thereafter.
See, for example, MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 11; Klitzke, op cit. at 629; Gomme, op cit. at 8-9;
and Greenstreet, op cit., at 5-6.
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A New Policy of Monopoly Grant
The early years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I are marked by conscious acceleration
in the policy of stimulation of domestic industry in order that the 'technologically
backward' State might become self-sufficient. 48 Central to this was the acquisition of
superior technology, particularly in those areas that had previously "figured most
prominently on the list of imports - viz, alum, glass, soap, oils, salt, saltpetre, latten,
etc."49 It is to this end that we see patents issued by William Cecil (Lord Burghley),
Elizabeth's first minister.5'
The policy cultivated by Burghley made the provision of monopoly a natural
phenomenon. It broke away from the fetters of local custom and allowed for the
diversification and expansion of industry. 51 The system still aimed at the importation of
knowledge and skill from abroad and still sought to encourage the institution of new
manufacture. However, the grant of exclusive privilege was becoming accepted as a
cheap and effective method of improving the technological climate of the Realm, a
policy argument that is comfortably familiar to any student of the patent system today.
The only difference between the concept of the custom then and now 52 being that, as
yet, it was a matter of unquestionable prerogative power. However, events of the next
few years changed the way that society was to view these grants, and indeed the Crown,
perhaps forever.
Novelty and Consideration
Close interest was paid to ensuring novelty of the invention during the early years of
Elizabeth's reign, a fact that emphasises that technological improvement of the Realm was
a driving force behind the creation of the policy. The Crown was therefore careful to
consider the merits of petitions for new inventions and to avoid displacing established
industries. Employment of a native workforce was considered sacrosanct, and efforts
were made to avoid impinging upon their livelihoods. Thus the Chiddingford
48 See Walterscheid, The Ear/y Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), (1994) 76 JPTOS
849 (hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents II) at 855 and Getz, History of the Patentees Obligations in Great
Britain, (1964) 46 IPOS 62 continued at 21± at 69-71.
" Huirne, Prerogative, op rit. at 152; also MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 12.
° See Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op dt. at 855; and MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op rit. at 11.
See Price, op cit. at 6.
52 Procedure and subject matter aside.
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glassmakers were consulted to see if they could make Normandy window glass before a
patent for its production was issued to a group of foreign artisans. 53
 Similarly a grant
for the production of salt was refused in 1589 due to the fact that many native workers
were using similar techniques. The patenting of mere improvements to existing
inventions was also prohibited for the same reasons.
Clear and distinct expectations were developed, which, although the specifics varied
from grant to grant, were "nonetheless consonant with the basic premise of developing
new trade and industry within the Realm."54 In modern patent grants this role - the
consideration that the patentee must provide in return for the protection offered - is
satisfied by the provision of the specification, fried for public reference at the granting
Patent Office. However, it was not until the 18th century that such a requirement was
made of the patentee. 55 In Elizabethan times consideration was acquired by the
provision of requirements intended to ensure, not only the introduction and operation
of the new art, trade or industry, but also, and more importantly, its establishment
within the Realm.
The Working' Clause
Patentees would often voluntarily bind themselves to put the invention into practice by
words used in the petition and in the recitals of the patent. It was a well-known axiom
of English law, relating to all forms of Royal grant, that the "King must not be deceived
in his grant", the penalty for the contravention of this rule being the annulment of the
grant. 56 Englishmen were considered to know and respect this imperative, but
foreigners were "apt to plead ignorance of the English common law!" 57
 and could
therefore not be trusted. Thus, clauses were often,58 but not always,59
 worked into the
grants themselves in furtherance of this aim. The most basic of such clauses inserted
See MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op dt. at 12.
Walterscheid, Antecedents II op cit. 856-7.
5 See the text accompanying footnote 171 ci seq. below
For a number of authorities that state this rule see Davies, Ear/y History, op cit. at 100.
Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op cit. at 857.
58 See Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present; (1897) 13 LQR 313 (hereinafter
Hulme, Consideration) at 314.
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into grants of this period were those which required the patentee to 'work' the new art,
trade or industry within the kingdom; 6° frequently time limits would be placed upon
such 'working', the grant being void for lack of consideration if they were not adhered
to. Also prevalent at the time were clauses obligating the patentee to employ and train
native artisans to practice the trade covered by the grant. Walterscheid explains that this
type of requirement was usually only applied to foreign patentees in order to safeguard
the continuance of the industry should the patentee abscond before the term of his
patent expired: 61
 therefore accomplishing the same result as the 'working' requirement.62
Variations on this theme included limitations on the number of aliens that the patentee
might employ. In addition, clauses were sometimes introduced that required the
patentee to prove the novelty or efficacy of their invention within the specified period.
Evidence has been adduced to suggest that it was customary to bind foreign artisans in
this way.63 Further, the Crown often imposed requirements of a minimum standard of
quality and an obligation that the price be less than if the goods were imported in
consideration of the grant.
The Revocation Clause
As time went on, and the policy became more established, the 'working' clause was
gradually phased out in favour of a general revocation clause. This allowed the Crown
to revoke grants on grounds of their being "generally inconvenient", a simple but all
encompassing concept easily applicable to a failure to introduce the patented industry
within the specified time period. 64 Davies declares its first use as being in a grant of
1575 to Holmes and Frampton for African headwear.65
The revocation clause rose out of the fact that the grant of a patent was a matter of
Royal grace, and thus the hand that gave could also take away. Despite the potential
See Davies, Ear/y Histoy, op it. at 101-2 for a discussion of several grants not containing such clauses
but which were accompanied by complimentary indentures between the Crown and the patentee whereby
such requirements were inserted.
° As opposed to merely introducing it.
61 Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op dt. at 857.
62 An example of the use of this type of covenant can be found in the patent of Burchart Cranyce who
undertook to teach "the secrets of his arte" to Englishmen. See Walterscheid, ibid.
63 Davies, .Ear/y History, op cit. at 102.
64 Ibid. Also Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op dt. at 857.
30
breadth of the clause, it was mostly exercised in cases of non use, cases where the grant
was made on a false suggestion of novelty, and where the true inventor was discovered
to be other than the patentee. 66 It can be found in patents granted for the next two
hundred years.
The main object of the patent custom at this time was clearly the institution of new
manufacture. Its object was the technological improvement of the Realm, and the most
simple and effective method of doing this was the importation of knowledge from
abroad. In short, the patent system protected and stimulated innovation directly, and
invention (in the modern sense of the word) only indirectly if at all.
The Problem of 'Odious Monopolies'
In addition to the legitimate and unobjectionable grants discussed above, the
Elizabethan policy of monopoly reward carried with it a more shady countenance,
which arose out of subtle but significant departures from earlier practice.
Elizabeth's policy marked a departure from earlier mediaeval patents in two important
ways. First, as stated above, early grants usually took the form of offers of Crown
protection and not of monopoly privilege, although as noted there were a small number
of exceptions. Second, the 'new' system of monopoly grant relied far more heavily on
the representations of the patentee than did the old. This reliance caused a gradual, but
inexorable, devolution of responsibility for the introduction of new industry from the
Crown to the patentee.67
Under the old system, where the Crown had been the administrator of the privilege, the
grantee was essentially under Crown control. With the new system, however, it no
longer had this direct influence; the power to act under the grant was transferred to the
patentee who wielded and abused it as they pleased. Yet the jurisdiction for the
settlement of grievances remained with the Crown. Holdsworth accurately sums up the
position when he states that; "those who suffered [at the hands of monopoly grants]
Davies, Ear/y Histo0', op cit. at 102.
66 Ibid. at 103-4.
67 See Inlow The Patent Grant, (1950; Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore) at 20; Holdsworth,
Eng/ish I...aw, op cit. Volume IV, at 347 and Hulme, Prerogative, op t. at 151.
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naturally wished for a better remedy than an appeal to the authority from which they
emanated."68
It was inevitable that this transfer of power and responsibility should lead to abuse, and
grievances crept into the system early in its life. The Queen was quick to realise that the
granting of monopolies could be used to reward favourites without depleting the Royal
coffers. Courtiers saw that the policy could be exploited for their own personal gain,
the mere existence of a system of exclusive privileges being sufficient incentive to join
in the race for favours. 69 Drawn by licensing patents or lucrative new monopolies in old
industries, they left the more uncertain reward of patents for new inventions to the
"poor and often chimerical inventors" 70. Thus we see patents for the production of
salt,7 ' vinegar72 and starch73, all established industries, being granted to court favourites.
At "the hands of the corrupt courtiers the system of monopolies, designed originally to
foster new arts, became degraded into a system of plunder."74
Monopoly Classified
The contemporary definition of "inventor" and "invention", combined with a lack of
specifications, makes it impossible to clearly divide the grants of this era into those that
are novel and useful by modern standards, and those that would be considered abuses.75
However, Lipson, in his Economic Histoy of EngIand suggested the sub-division of
patents into four categories, which attracted varying degrees of objection at the time of
68 Holdsworth, Eng/ish Law, op t. Volume IV, at 347. See also Hulme, ibid. who states that; "to dispute
the Queen's licences before the Privy Council or in the Court of Star Chamber or in the Exchequer
constituted a risk which few individuals cared to run, as the Courts were apt to regard non-compliance
with the requirements of the patentee as evincing a want of respect for the Queen's authority."
69 See Price, op cit. at 16-17.
70 Ibid.
Pat 27 Eliz. Pt. 6. of September 1, 1585 to Thomas Wilkes.
72 Pat 26 Eliz. pt. 11. of March 23, 1584 to Richard Drake.
Pat 30 Eliz. Pt. 9. of April 15, 1588 to Young.
' Price, op cit. at 16-17.
7 See Fox, op cit. at 62. For a list of Elizabethan grants see Hulme, AALH, op cit. at 121-38; Also
Prerogative, op cit.; and Sequeic op 6it.
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Elizabeth. 76 His approach provides an exhaustive method of classification, 77 and can be
summarised as follows:
First, there are patents to which no exception could be taken. These are grants that that
provided protection for new industries, whether for inventions in the modern sense of
the word or technological know-how imported from abroad.
At the opposite end of the spectrum were those grants that gave control of an
established trade to an individual or group. These constituted a major grievance as they
took from the people the right to enjoy a liberty previously open to them. In addition
they were often bad for want of consideration moving to the public.
However, it is clear that these List two categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive
as the second may eventually result from the first. Thus, the soap monopoly of Groyett
and Le Leuiyer "to make white sope" as good and as fine as any in the "Sope house of
Triana or Syvile",78 which was unobjectionable when first granted in 1561, was relegated
to the second category by a series of additional grants issued long after the trade had
lost its novelty. So too with the monopoly for the production of Starch, originally
awarded to Young in 1588 and continued by grants to various others well into the mid
1660's.79
Lipson's third category, also disagreeable in nature, concerned grants conveying powers
of supervision over an established industry or trade.
Finally, of intrinsically less objectionable character, but under which grave abuses
nevertheless flourished, were those patents taking the form of licences relaxing the
austerity of the law in areas of import, export and the transport of certain commodities.
These grants arose because it was often more expedient to grant limited licences to
evade an unworkable law than to repeal the statute as a whole.
(Volume III) (1929; Messrs. Black Ltd., London) at 352-6. See also Davies, Further Light op cit. at 397
and Fox, op cit. at 62-5 from which the basis of the summary has been drawn.
Davies, Ibid. at 398.
78 Which Fox, op cit. at 61; states may be said "to have launched the policy of encouraging new
manufactures so vigorously pursued by Elizabeth and Burghley."
Fox, op cit. at 64.
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However, it was not simply the grant of patents in these objectionable areas that caused
problems; instrumental in the creation of these so-called 'odious monopolies' were the
powers of policing that accompanied the grant. The patentee was often provided with
full powers of supervision, search, seizure and arrest of infringers in addition to ability
to recover fines or penalties for infringement!1° Needless to say, this was an open
invitation to abuse.
Mounting Opposition
That the matter of abuses escaped serious opposition for most of Elizabeth's reign is
partly due to the (overall) cautious manner in which policy was conducted, but also to
the popularity of the Queen. The issue of odious monopolies was first raised in
Parliament in the 1571 session but was the subject of stern rebuke by the Queen as an
attack on the Royal prerogative. This sharp and damning attack on those who wished
to trim her "chiefest Flower" was effective in silencing her opponents for the next 25
years until, in 1597, the issue of odious monopolies once again reared its head,
prompted by the pressures of industrial depression.
Elizabeth was firm in her stance, and once more condemned those who attacked her.
However, seemingly aware that the problem would not just fade away she also promised
to "examine all patents and to abide the touchstone of the law," 81 but this time her
delaying tactics were not so effective.
On 20th November, 1601, a Bill was introduced to Parliament entitled "An Act for the
Explanation of the Common Law in Certain Cases of Letters Patent". It prompted
four days of debate, to which the Queen herself put an end by the issuance of a
statement through the Speaker. Thus, Elizabeth said, "she understood that divers
patents, that she had granted, were grievous to her subjects", 82
 but that she had never
assented to grant anything ma/urn in se.83 Furthermore, she doubted the wisdom of
simply repealing undesirable grants, stating that if the Bill were withdrawn she would
agree to submit her patents to trial according to the law.
80 Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op dt. at 864.
81 1 Pan Hist 906; quoted from Fox, op dt. at 75.
82 See Fox, op di. at 77.
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This concession was most significant as it shifted any blame for the abuses away from
the prerogative and onto the patentee. Moreover, as the courts' discussion of the
monopolies in question would inevitably turn on the facts of the individual cases, an in
depth criticism of the policy of monopoly grant and the role and nature of the
prerogative was deftly avoided.84
The picture to emerge from the continued abuse of monopoly grants is one of
increasing hostility and distrust of the monopoly as a barrier to free trade. The
monopoly system, designed to foster technological improvement within the Realm, to
make the Kingdom self-sufficient, was being defiled. The minds of the people, of
Parliament, and of the courts of the common law were therefore turned against the
system. The only thing that prevented an overt attack on the prerogative power was
deft manipulation of the situation by a powerful and, most importantly, popular Queen.
The problem of odious monopoly hangs like a fog shrouding the brilliance of the
innovation that such a policy of monopoly grants in fact represents. The main object of
the policy, the technological improvement of the Realm, was, after all, a resounding
success. There is no evidence that Elizabeth set out to grant monopolies harmful to the
State. Even where patents were issued in restraint of trade it i dear that the necessity
for supply was considered greater than the inconvenience caused. Thus, maintenance
of supplies of gunpowder and ordnance of sufficient quality and quantity for the needs
of the Realm was considered to outweigh the social cost of imposing a monopoly in its
production. Indeed, when Elizabeth came to the throne there was a frightening need
for ordnance;85 by 1591 English cannon were considered to be the best in Europe, and
even the Spanish attempted to buy them. 86 In short, it was "not the monopolies which
were bad, but only their abuse".87
83 Wrong in itself
See Holdsworth, Bn,g/ish Law, op cit. Volume IV, at 348-9; and Fox, op cit. at 78-9 for further discussion.
85 State Papers, Domestic. Ella. vii, 5.
86 State Papers, Domesc. Eliz. ccxliv, 116.
87 Fox, op cit. at 189.
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Judging Monopoly at Common Law
The most important consequence of Elizabeth's concessions in the 1601 Parliamentary
session was that the common law was called upon to settle the delicate constitutional
issue of how far the Crown could be allowed to go in the pursuance of a policy of
monopolies. The answer came in the infamous case of Dary v Al/in - The Case of
Monopolies and represents a decisive strike by the common law courts against odious
grants.
The monopoly in question was an exclusive privilege for the manufacture, import and
sale of playing cards within the Realm. The grant was first made in 1576,88 was reissued
twice89 and fmally came into Darcy's hands in 1598. By the beginning of the 17th
century it was wholeheartedly infringed, 9 and the Queen's proclamation of 1601 only
accelerated this practice. Indeed, Darcy complained in June 1602 that many people
took it for granted that the patent had been revoked and not just opened up to
judgernent by the law. The Privy Council stepped to his aid and issued an order
confirming that the patent was still valid and that it would be upheld until adjudged void
at law.
The case was tried in the Easter term of 1602, and judgment delivered shortly after
Elizabeth's death the following year. The court considered that the Queen had been
deceived in her grant, and the patent was proclaimed a dangerous innovation, contrary
to statute, common law and the commonwealth. However, rather than condemning all
monopolies, counsel for the defendant stated that:
where a man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or
invention doth bring any new trade into the Realm, or any engine tending to the
furtherance of a trade that never was used before: and that for the good of the Realm:
that in such cases the king may grant him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time,
until such subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring
by his invention to the commonwealth: otherwise not."91
88 To Bowes and Bedingfield. Pat 18 Eliz Pt. 1. ofJuly 28, 1576
89 In 1578 to Bowes and Bedingfield, and In 1588 to Bowes alone.
90 Davies, Further Light, op cit. at 399-403 notes at least eight actions taken by the previous owners against
infringers.
9111 Co Ri 84b, 77En p Rrt 1260 at 1263.
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The courts of common law confirmed this exception to the general illegality of
monopoly grants in the 1615 case of the Clothm'orkers of Ipswich,92 despite the fact that it
had nothing whatsoever to do with the facts being tried.
Battles of a King
James I acceded to the throne shortly before the decision in Dary v Al/in was handed
down. It may be for this reason that he began his reign on a note of caution concerning
monopoly grants, issuing a proclamation suspending them all until they could be
examined and assessed by the Privy CouncilY3
Despite such timid beginnings, James's reign is not notable for its stable and
conservative attitude to monopoly grants, quite the reverse. The years of 1603 to 1625
mark a period of vacillation between caution and excess.94
Thus, on 16 March 1604 James issued an apology to Parliament over the surfeit of his
grants, and promised to moderate his generosity, in addition he instigated the
Commissioners of Suits to examine the merits of all applications. However, by 1606
the situation concerning monopolies was so bad that the Committee on Grievances
presented a petition to the King at the close of the parliamentary session. 95
 He
undertook to revoke those patents of most concern, but in fact did nothing. In 1610
the Committee once again petitioned James, pointing to his lack of action and stating
that in addition he had "failed in his undertaking that the courts should consider and
judge of the validity of certain of the grants."96 Shortly after this petition, the King
issued what has become known as his Book of Bounty. This was a proclamation that all
monopolies were against the laws of the Kingdom, excepting those concerning
"Projects of new invention, so they be not contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the
State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or otherwise
inconvenient."97
92 Godbo/t 252; 78 Eng 1 147.
° Soc. Ant. Proc. Coil. May 7, 1603, summarised in Price, op dt. at 163.
' Coke stating in a debate in the House of Commons in 1620 that, "Monopolies are now grown like
Hydra-heads: they grow up as fast as they are cut off." 1 Parl. Hist. 1193— quoted from Fox, op ot. at 93.
State Papers, Domestic. Jac. I, xxiii, 66 and 67. The list is reprinted in Fox, op cit. at 329.
96 Fox, op cit. at 95; see also Price, op cit. at 27.
See Fox, op cit. at 330-335 for a complete reproduction of the proclamation.
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From Bounty to Statute
The wording of the Book of Boun'y makes it clear that James's advisors were familiar with
the opinions expressed in The Case of Monopolies - indeed, Coke stated that the case was
the principal motive behind the publication of the book. 98 The actual motivation of the
King is, however, unclear. Fox suggests that James wished to convince the public that
he had no intention of transgressing the principles of the common law and the limits of
the prerogative, but adds that "the suspicion is inescapable that James was doing so, to a
certain extent, with tongue in cheek, in an effort to lull the minds of the people into a
feeling of security and with no real intention of limiting his own use of this facile tool
for regulating trade."99
In the years immediately following publication of the Book complaints against
monopolies continued unabated. However, the situation noticeably worsened in 1617
when Bacon, subordinate to Buckingham, replaced Ellesmere as Lord Keeper."°
Whereas Ellesmere had been staunch opponent of improper grants, Bacon, under
Buckingham's piratic gaze,i)i was less particular. In the autumn preceding the 1621
Parliament, perhaps prompted by the growing unease with which his grants were being
viewed, James convened a Commission to investigate the question of monopolies. Fox
suggests that it was this act that forced the issue to a head the opening of the 1621
Session.'2
Parliament met on 30111 January and extensive debate on public grievances occasioned by
monopoly grants was undertaken. A Bill against monopolies was introduced to the
House in March whereupon it was passed by the Commons, but failed to gain approval
in the Lords.' 03 Prompted by the agitation, the King issued a proclamation akin to
Elizabeth's of 1601, stating that many privileges had been granted on false suggestions
98 Coke, Part III oft/ic Institutes of the Laws of Eng/and (1817; Clarke & Sons, London; reprint) (hereinafter 3
Institutes at 182.
Fox, op cit. at 97.
'°° See Price, op cit. at 30; Fox, op cit. at 100-101.
lOt 
"but Buckingham regarded [grants of patentsl ... as a means of enriching his own family and
providing for his dependents." Fox, op cit. at 101.
102 Fox, op cit. at 102.
'° Fox, op cit. at 106-7. Price, op t. at 33 states that their Lordships did not object to it in principle, but
considered the drafting to be unflattering to the King.
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of benefit to the Realm, and that others had been the subjects of abuse. He referred to
the Book of Boun'y saying that he had previously written of his dislike of such grants and
of those who seek to obtain them. He followed these comments by declaring 18
patents void, and opened up 17 others to trial by the common law, stating that:
if any subject should find himself grieved, injured, or wronged by reason
of any of the said grants, or any clause, article, or thing therein contained, may take
their remedy therefor by the common laws of the Realm, or other ordinary course of
justice, any matter or thing in the said grants to the contrary not withstanding."104
However, James was not the monarch that Elizabeth was, and in 1623 Parliament
renewed its onslaught. The Statute of Monopolies thus entered the statute books as
Chapter 3 of 1623.105
The Statute of Monopolies
On almost every level the Statute ofMonopolies merely restates the law as declared in Dary
v AIIm, the Book of Bounty, and the Clothworkers of Ipswich. 106 In s.1 all monopolies are
declared to be contrary to the law and utterly void. Section 2 states that all issues of
validity are to be determined at common law. Section 3 provides that no one may
'° Soc, Ant. Proc. Coil. July 10, 1621. Quoted from Price, op cit. at 168, the relevant portion of the
proclamation being reproduced at 166-8; See also Fox, op cit. at 112; and MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op
cit. at 15.
105 (1623) 21 Jac. I. cap. 3.
As ever there is academic disagreement as to the extent to which the statute was merely declaratory of
the common law. blow, op cit. at 31 concludes that the Statute introduced nothing new into the law:
MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 17-18 suggests that it was little more than declaratory of the
common law but "it converted previous prudential restraints into statutonly binding codes of practice":
Hulme, Sequel, op cit. declared, at 55, that the Statute did little to alter the limitations already assigned by
the common law except to provide a restriction of the term of the patent grant. See also Boehm, The
British Patent System: I Administration, (1967, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 17. Fox, op cit.
appears confused, stating at 125 that "{tjhe Statute of Monopolies was nothing more than a declaration of
what the common law had always been.", but at 118 he states that the Statute marks a departure from the
common law with respect to the limitation of the term of the grant and also concerning the forum in
which the grant could be contested; and Holdsworth, English Law, op cit. Volume IV, at 353-4, similarly
states that, in addition to the restriction of patent term, the Act gave new jurisdiction to the "common
law courts to deal with disputes connected with these grants . . ." However, as Walterscheid, Antecedents
II, op cit. points out, at 875, the previous decisions of the common law in Dary vAllin and the Clothworkers
of Ipswich provide evidence that the jurisdiction given to the common law courts was not new under the
Act.
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exercise any monopoly right previously granted. In s.4 remedies are detailed for any
party judged by the courts of common law to be aggrieved by a monopoly. Sections 5-
14 contain exceptions to s.1; the most famous of which is s.6, which provided the only
statutory basis for English patents granted during the next 200 years. 107 The section
states:
any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patent
and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years and under, hereafter to be made,
of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this Realm,
to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the
time of making such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as also they be not
contrary to law, nor mischievous to the State
Section 5 similarly exempted grants previously made, providing they satisfied similar
requirements and did not extend beyond 21 years.
Commentary
Sir Edward Coke provides contemporary commentary on the Statute his Institutes on the
Laws of EngIand.' 08 He lists 7 properties that a patent must possess to be valid under s.6.
The first five - the grant must not exceed 14 years; it must be made to the first and true
inventor; it must be for those manufactures "which any other at the making of such
Letters Patent did not use"; it must not be contrary to law; and it must not raise prices
of conimodities and therefore be "mischievous to the State" - are taken from the Statute
itself. The final pair - the patent must not hurt trade; and that it must not be generally
inconvenient although not mentioned in the Statute are consonant with Elizabethan
policy. He then states that where such criteria are fulfilled, the grant of a patent will be
good in law as "the inventor bringeth to & for the Commonwealth a new manufacture
by his invention, cost and charges, and therefore it is reason[able], that he should have a
privilege for his reward (and the encouragement of others in the like) for a convenient
time." 1 ' Thus, we see the first explicit policy justification for the patent grant.
In addition, Coke asserted that "[i]t appeareth by the Preamble of this Act (as a
judgement in Parliament) that all grants of monopolies are against the ancient and
fundamental laws of this kingdom", and that all "monopolies are against the ancient and
197 And interestingly still resides on current statute books.
lH 3 Institutes, op th at 181-2.
109 Ibid. at 184; See also Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op dt. 877.
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fundamental laws of the land." 11° The latter phrase has served to colour the patent
grant ever since. However, it is cleat from both Dary v Al/in and the C/othivor/eers of
Ipswich that the right of the Crown to grant monopolies of new trades or manufactures
to those responsible for their introduction to the Realm (whether by importation of skill
or ideas, or by ctrn) was always recognised at common law as part of the
Crown prerogative. Nonetheless, as monopoly is the antithesis of the common right of
freedom of trade, which all men are to enjoy as their birthright, the prerogative right to
grant monopolies was, at least in theory, limited at common law to grants where
consideration moved to the public. Even where this transfer of consideration was not
in evidence, as long as a grant could be shown to be in the best interests of the Realm
its validity would be recognised. 111 Therefore, even after the ruling in Dar'y vA//in it is
clear that to omit the caveat relating to new invention and to condemn all monopolies
on the ground that they have ever been against the ancient and fundamental laws of the
land is an unsustainable argument.
The True Significance of the Statute
The Statute of Monopolies forms a handy legislative marker from which to hang a picture
of the neat and orderly growth of the modern patent system. As such it has been
embraced into the folklore of patents and hailed as marking the beginning of the
modern patent grant, a position of prominence that it does not deserve.112
The picture of a patent system caused, or even accelerated, by the Statute of Monopolies is
wrong for a number of reasons. First, it has been shown that not only was there a
controlled policy of patent grants in England before the passage of the Act, but also
110 3 Institutes, op cit. at 181.
See, for example, patents for the sole production of saltpetre and ordnance granted by Elizabeth and
continued under James which also gained exception to the general prohibition of monopolies in the
Statute of 1623 by virtue of s.10 of the same. See also Fox, op at. at 60.
112 It is evident that the folkloric transition occurred sometime during, or just after, the Patent
Controversy of the 19th century (see Chapter III, below) as in the Report of the Select Committee on
Patents of 1829 the Statute is treated roughly equally with An Act Containing the Censure given in
Parliament against Sir Francis Mitchell, Francis Viscount Saint Albane Lord Chancellor of England and
Edward Flood (18 Jac. J. cap. 1 (1621)) and An act to Confirm a Judgement given in Chancery for
Annulling Certain Letters Patent Granted to Henry Heron, for the Sole Privilege of Salting, Drying and
Packing of Fish within the Counties of Devon and Cornwall (21 Jac. I. cap. 11(1623)). See Bently &
Sherman, op at. at 208.
41
there is evidence of a statutory regime that predates it by approximately 150 years.113
Second, the Statute was for the most part merely declaratory of the common law; indeed
it receives derisory treatment on this very issue in the report of the 1829 Select
Committee on Patents. 114 Third, the Statute of Monopolies enjoys the peculiar distinction
of having almost no impact on the development of English patent law for the next 100
years. As Walterscheid states, "for all intents and purposes there was no development
in the common law relating to patents of invention during the next century."115
Seen in this light, the true significance of the Statute of Monopolies lies solely in its
prohibition of the unfair monopolisation of a known trade. The underlying policy of
Elizabethan grants is still evident and the general concept of encouraging the
implementation of new manufacture is never questioned. Indeed, the Statute can be
seen to stand apart from the adoption of any such policy, instead functioning to keep
guard for potentially unjustified and capricious barriers to free trade. Its primary
objective was, after all, to restrain a King gone wild in his grants in order that 'odious
monopoly' be avoided or nullified. It is therefore little more than enduring testament to
the sanctity of free market dealing.
A Legislative Aftermath
The Statute of Monopolies is a response to a llttle more than half a century of bad feeling
towards abuses of monopoly privilege. Its chief contribution was to clarify the existing
English law and to reinforce the position taken by the courts until this time. As Bugbee
states, "[w]hile only incidentally concerned with ... [patents of invention] ... the Statute
provided a firmer legal basis for clearing away the bad company with which [they] had
been forced to travel." 116 It did not create a new law of patents of invention; it merely
allowed them to continue to exist, saved from the stifling effect of the "weedlike growth
of monopolies."117
113 i.e. the Statute of Venice.
114 Report of the Select Committee on the Law Relative to Patents for Inventions (1829) Parliamentary
Papers III (Command Paper N' 332). See text accompanying note 112 above.
115 Walterscheid, The Ear/y Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 3), L995) 77JPTOS 771
(hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents 111 at 771.
Bugbee, op cit. at 39-40.
117 Ibid. at 40.
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However, the story of 'ic monopoly' does not end here. Such grants continued to
aggravate English politics for some decades after the Statute's enactment. The source of
contamination is, with hindsight, immediately recognisable when the Statute is examined,
for not only did it exempt patents of invention, but also significant other grants
concerning industries considered essential to the Realm, including saltpetre, alum,
ordnance, shot, and gunpowder. 118 Furthermore, in s.9 it was provided that grants made
to "any Corporations, Companies or Fellowships of any Art, Trade, Occupation, or
Mystery, or to any Companies or Societies of Merchants within this Realm, erected for
the maintenance, Enlargement or ordering of any Trade of Merchandize.. ." be similarly
excused from the wholesale condemnation of monopoly.
The effect of these provisions was to allow a financially insecure Crown to confer
favour and sell additional monopolies of these types without infringing the Statute.
Thus, monopoly abuse had been limited, but not extinguished by Parliament, and public
condemnation of such activities naturally spilled over onto the legitimate operation of
grants to inventors.
Issues of Jurisdiction
Further problems arose concerning uncertainty over the exact jurisdiction of the courts
of common law in matters concerning letters patent for invention. 119 The problem
arose because of the wording of s.6, which stated that "any declaration before
mentioned shall not extend" to patents of invention meeting the requirements set out
later in the section. The question that perplexed courts and scholars alike was whether
this meant that such patents were also excused from the requirements of s.2, which
provided that validity of any monopoly should be determined in accordance with the
common law.
If it was the object of the Statute to transfer jurisdiction for patents of invention to the
courts of the common law, it failed in spectacular fashion. Fox asserts that only one
patent case is reported at law during the rest of the
	
Century, and only one mote
118 Sections 10 and 11.
119 This incertitude also goes some way to explain the hiatus in development of the law concerning
patents for invention evident in the century after the enactment of the Statute. See further Walterscheid,
Antecedents III, op dt. at 771.
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appears in the period from 1700 until 1765.12w This period was not, however, devoid of
litigation concerning letters patent for invention, such matters were simpiy tried in
conciliar courts, as was common practice before the Statute. It was simpiy "not thought
fitting or consonant with the royal dignity that questions concerning [the] propriety [of
such grants] should be discussed and considered in ordinary courts of common law."121
In addition, it appears, at least in part, that grants were not turned over to the common
law at this time due to the interference of Parliament, which seems to have adopted the
habit of periodically reviewing the validity of patent grants.mn This practice seems to
stem from sustained concern over the issue of 'odious monopoly'. However, rather
than being seen as safeguarding the interests of society, the procedure served mainly to
further undermine trust in the system.
Another factor keeping the common law away from patents for invention was the fierce
territoriality of the Privy Council. Shortly after the passage of the Statute of Monopolies,
the Council made its views on the supposed common law jurisdiction very clear when it
intervened in a case concerning a challenge to Sir Robert Mansell's glass patent. Not
only did it state that there was to be no encroachment on Mansell's rights until a suit at
law had been decided, but more importantly, it later also removed the right of trial at
law. The Council pronounced: "The Lords declare that the patent sha[[ stand ... Thccj
think it of Dangerous consequence and trenching upon the prerogative that patents
granted on just grounds and of long continuance should be referred to the strict trial of
common law, wherefore they order that all proceedings be stayed.mn Given this clear
message, it is hardly surprising that there was little resort made to the courts of common
law in the following decades.
121) Fox, op cit. at 119. MacLeod is more cautious, stating that the "compilations of judicial precedents are
totally silent on patents for the period 1614 - 1766, except for a brief reference to [a 1691 case]",
however she continues to say that there is evidence to suggest that some cases may have gone unreported,
Industrial Revolution, op cit. it 6 8-9.
121 Fox, op cit. at 120.
122 See Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 773; also Fox, op cit. at 123.
123 State Papers, Domestic, December 6 1626; Quoted from Walterscheid, ibid. at 774.
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The break in the Privy Council's hold over matters patent came suddenly in 1756 when
it made a determination to divest itself of authority in issues of validity. 124 Finally the
con-rn-ion law was able to begin to establish law relating to patents of invention.
However, the going was far from smooth, common law judges being forced to "pick up
the threads of the principles of [patent] law without the aid of recent and reliable
precedents."25
The result was uncertainty as to the nature of patent law, as "few cases meant few
precedents, and few precedents generally meant uncertainty," 126 and distrust of a system
that appeared to be capricious from without. Failures, patents deemed unworthy of
protection when reviewed at law, were more famous and more frequent than successes,
and confidence in the system fell to a new low.'27
Pressure for Change
Thus, a picture of the system of the early-to-mid-I 8th century emerges. Monopoly had
maintained its 17th century 'odious' title. Patents of invention had failed to lose the
tainted moniker of monopoly, and were viewed with distrust and hostility. Abuses
continued, and for the first half of the new century, the Privy Council maintained its
jurisdiction over issues of validity. When at last release came, rather than improving the
situation, it made things worse as the change of jurisdiction created additional
uncertainty. The common law was forced to operate without precedent and became
viewed as 'hostile' by the patentee. Confidence in the system, always a precious
commodity, had ebbed slowly away. Furthermore, society was unsure of what the
patent law actually was. Dissatisfaction was rife.
124 See Walterscheid, ibid. Also Hulme, Prizy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Invention from the
Restoration to 1794, (1917) 33 LOR 63 continued at 180 (hereinafter Hulme, Privy Councii), at 194; and
Holdsworth, En8/ish Law, op cit. Volume XI, at 426.
12 Huime, Consideration, op cit. at 318. It should be noted that the doctrine of precedent, sacrosanct within
modern English law, was itself in its infancy. Case reports such as they were, were unofficial and could
be discounted by judges. Conflicting decisions could and did exist side by side. For a more in-depth
treatment of the doctrine of precedent see Kempin, Precedent and Stare Decisis: The c'ritical Years, 1800 to
1850, (1959) 3 AmJ Lei' Hist 28.
26 Dutton, T/,e Patent 3ystem and Inventive .ActiviOi During the Industrial Revolution 1750-1852, (1984;
Manchester University Press, Manchester at 70.
127 Dutton, ibid. at 79 states that during the period from 1750 to 1799 only 39% of common law cases
were decided in favour of the patentee.
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Concerns over the security offered by patent protection had conspired to produce an
essentially binary valuation of patent grants. Most patents were considered unsafe,
expensive and unattractive to the inventor. However the lure of certain patents,
specifically those regarded as being more secure - typically taking the form of a grant
that had survived challenge at common law - gave hope, and became incredibly
valuable. Prospective patentees were therefore given great incentive to invent methods
of making their grants more resistant to challenge. One such idea, which had been used
erratically and generally unsuccessfully in the 150 years following the formation of the
Elizabethan policy, was to accompany the petition with the enrolment of a manuscript
detailing the invention and the extent of protection desired. It was this concept of
specifying the subject matter of the grant that was eventually to gain favour with both
patentees and the courts, and to serve to accompany the patent grant through a
transition from object of Royal patronage into a bonafide tool of commerce.
Consideration Revisited - The Birth and Growth of the Specification
The requirement that patentee disclose their invention to the public in return for a grant
is a concept deeply ingrained in modern patent law. However, as has been shown, this
has not always been the case. Indeed, it took more than two centuries from the
crystallisation of Elizabethan patent policy for the pro vLsIon of a specification to be
required by the common law.
Under early English patent custom the consideration required to validate a grant in
opposition of free trade was usually promise that the subject matter would be
introduced into the Realm. The methods employed in furtherance of this aim included
using clauses obliging the patentee to 'work' the invention, others requiring the
employment of a certain number of native apprentices, and the all-encompassing
'revocation for inconvenience' clause. 128
 By the closing years of the 18th century, the
price that the patentee had to pay for the monopoly was the provision of a
specification. 129 Gone was the requirement to institute manufacture, and in its place
stood a far wider obligation to disseminate new skills to the public in general.13°
128 See text accompanying note 64 et seq. above.
129 See comments to this effect in B on/ton & Watt vBii// 2 H BL 463, 126 Enp F4 651 at 656.
130 Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 792.
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From Introduction to Explanation as the Price of Monopoly
There is a general consensus amongst commentators that the first enrolment of a
specification can be found in Nasmith's patent of 1711.131 However, there are a number
of earlier grants which, although they cannot be said to have gone as far as Nasmith,
nonetheless show that such a development was not as startling or original as some may
claim.
The earliest is an agreement between the Crown and Gerard Honricke, a German sea
captain, in which he promised that in return for £300 he would "teache perfectlie by
demonstraeon and practice with the hand without all manner of decipte and falsehood
the said arte of makinge salte peter in the moste perfecte sorte." 32 The pact between
the Crown and the German required that he should submit, within a specified time,
written directions for its production. This he did, and it is this document, reproduced
in the State Papers for 1561 under the title of "The trew and perfecte arte of the making
of Saltpeter to grow in Cellars, Barns, or in Lyme or Stone quarrees" 133 that Hulme
contends is the first example of a specification.' 34 However, as Davies notes, there are a
number of reasons why this cannot be so, the most important of which being the fact
that Honricke was never awarded a patent, indeed he never asked for one, he merely
offered to sell his knowledge.135
Fifty years after Honricke's recipe was published an even more important precursor of
the modern specification can be found in the publication of Simon Sturtevant's
'Treatise on Metallica.' It appeared in 1612 in accordance with a covenant made
between Sturtevant and the Crown in the application for a patent. Although more in
the way of an advertising prospectus than a specification, 136 it is of interest for
'' See MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 49; Dutton, op cit. at 75; Goinme, op cit. at 27; Davies, Bar/y
Histoy, op cit. at 87; Adams & Averley, The Patent Specification - The Role of Ijardet v Johnson.  (1986) 7 J
.
 Lg.
LiJrLi.I.6 at 158; and Walterscheid, ibid. at 782.
132 Quoted from Davies, Ear/y Histoy, op cit. at 263-4. See also Klitzke, op cit. at 640-41 and Hulme,
Prerogative, op cit. at 145.
133 State Papers (Domestic), Eliz., XVI, 29-31.
'3-' Hulme, AALH, op cit. at 142.
13 Rights under this bargain were later transferred to Cockeram and Barnes who were granted a ten-year
monopoly, but they didn't have to provide a specification.
'3 Davies, Ear/y History, op cit. at 266-7; also Price, op cit. at 108.
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Sturtevant's reasons for its provision. He explains that its provision was deemed
necessary so that:
"(1) ... it might appear his inventions were new, and of his own devising, and
not stolen from any other; (2) that the endeavours and inventions of other men, being
different from his own, might not be prevented by him; (3) that none other should
hereafter presume to petition His majesty for inventions identical with those described
by him; (4) that he was bound by the proviso (that he had caused to be inserted) in his
grant, whereas he was not tied to any time for the trial of his inventions."137
Thus it is clear that the ideas behind the provision of a specification were not new at the
time of Nasmith's patent, and had in fact been advanced some 100 years previously,
albeit in a climate not yet ready to accept such a change.138
Davies contends that five grants of James I requiring the submission of models 13' or
descriptions are more deserving of the title of first specification, although still not
enough for its award' 4 It is not known whether these requirements were made for the
benefit of the Crown, to enable the Law Officers to determine more exactly the nature
of the grant made, or for the benefit of the patentee, for their own protection. Indeed,
it is possible that it may have been both. However, it is significant that these grants all
occurred in the period between the Book of Bounty and the Statute of Monopolies, a time
marked by growing unease in the public perception of monopolies. Therefore, the
provision of models may also have been an attempt to assure the validity of such grants
in the eyes of the public by illustrating that they did not cross the line between
permitted and 'odious' monopoly. This view is reinforced by a resurgence the practice
under Charles I shortly before the civil war, 141 a time of great opposition to monopoly
policy.142
137 Davies, Ibid.
138 Thus, notwithstanding Sturtevant's admission that he was not tied to any time limit for the
introduction of his inventions due to the pubhcation of his treatise (point 4. of his reasons), his patent
was revoked in following year due to his outlawry and failure to work it.
139 Meaning designs or descriptions of structure.
140 Davies, Early History, op cit. at 268-9.
' Ibid. at 271.
142 Fox, op cit. at 128-9.
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In addition to these early17tt century examples, there are a number of references to the
annexation of models, schemes, drafts and discourses to patents after 1670.143
However, it is apparent that "these few precursors of the patent specification were
seeds that fell on rocky ground, for apart from them we have found no suggestion in
the patents of the seventeenth century of the coming of the novel provisions in
Nasmith's patent of 1711 which really originate the history of the modern patent
specificadon."
The Novelty of Nasmith.
It has been deduced from the wording of Nasmith's patent that the most likely
explanation for his provision of a specification is that it was for his own security and
protection, to make the scope of his grant more certain. 145 In support of this view is an
argument relating to concerns expressed over the corurnon practice at this time of
inventors entering caveats with the law officers to alert them of petitions in fields of
their interest.
Caveats were notices that could be entered onto a register at any time prior to the
sealing of a patent. They had the effect of preventing the grant until the objector's
arguments had been heard. When a request for a patent was made the caveat book
would be searched and a hearing would be held between the petitioner and the caveat
holder. The opposition would state the current art and his understanding of the work
in the field. The patentee would describe the exact nature of his invention. Based on
the information provided, the law officer would decide whether to go ahead with patent
or not. It was, in effect, a preliminary trial.
Caveats saw a lot of use, and it appears that there was widespread belief that the system
could be used to obtain knowledge of pre-grant patents and therefore provide an
' Of which, the most famous are those of Dud Dudley, who published "Metallum Martis" in 1665 -
reproduced in Price, op dt., at 108-111 - and the Earl of Worcester who issued a prospectus of his "most
stupendous Water-Commanding Engine in 1663, see Davies, Ear/y Histoy, op dt. at 272.
144 Davies, ibid.
145 See Hulme, Consideration, op di. at 317.
'° See Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 790; and Davies, Ear/y Histo0,, op cit. at 107.
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opportunity to steal the inventions before the patent could be issued. 147 This fear found
footing in the Statute of Monopolies, which stated that a grant would only be good for
manufactures "which others at the time of making such letters patent shall not use."148
Therefore, if anyone obtained knowledge and practised a patent before its grant, it
could be avoided through caveat opposition or through a writ of scriefacias. It was of no
consequence that the information was obtained by fair means or foul. 14° Nasmith's
statement that he "thinks it not safe to mention in what the New Invention consists
until we shall have obtained our Letters Patent" 15° clearly demonstrates that this fear
was at the fore of his mind when petitioning for protection.
However, detracting from the argument that the patentee introduced the specification
to make the grant more certain is the fact that the majority enrolled at this time were
hopelessly vague. 15 ' Davies also cautions against conclusions drawn from heavy reliance
on the exact language used in such patents as "examples could be given ... of
suggestions which emanated from the Crown being embodied in patents in language
which suggests that they were originally made by the patentee - or vice versa."152
Therefore, although compelling, it is impossible to state with certainty that the
specification was enrolled at Nasmith's request. Indeed, because its first mention
appears in the report of the law officer dealing with the petition it may be deduced that
the initiative came from the Crown; the officer requiring a better disclosure before he
would issue a favourable report. 153
 MacLeod states that it is likely a request of a
14 Dutton, op cit. at 35, 183; Davies, ibid. at 92, Gomme, op cit. at 23; 'Walterscheid, ibid. at 790; and
\IacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 43.
Section 6. Reproduced at note 107 above.
'° See Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 791.
ISo Quoted from Walterscheid, ibid.
151 See Adams & Averley, op cit. at 161; also MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 49, who states that the
specification, at this time, could be as informative or evasive as the patentee saw fit.
152 Davies, Ear/yHistoy, op cit. at 91.
153 See Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 788; and Gomme, op cit. at 33. The role played by the law
officers in the grant at this time was significant. Hulme, Sequei op cit. states, at 53, that their influence in
deciding patent grant policy began around the beginning of the 17th century. MacLeod, Industrial
Revolution, op cit. at 48 suggests that in the century after 1660 all modifications in the patent system were
made by them in the course of reporting on inventors' petitions. Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at
779 states that by the 17" century the participation of the law officers in deciding patent policy was
becoming standard practice.
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specification was made in many such cases to make discrimination between superficially
similar inventions easier.154
However, it is eminently possible that both views have a claim to the truth. The fear of
inventive theft was well grounded, and the path towards the specification had already
been explored in disputes akin to Can/I's case in the Privy Council in 1664155 and by
publications such as Sturtevant's 'Treatise on Metallica'. In the former, the injustice and
inconvenience caused by the lack of a description of the nature of the patentee's
invention was highlighted, and the enrolment of a specification after grant suggested.
As Davies states, although not taken up in the case, it forestalls Nasmith by 50 years.156
It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that Garnil's case paved the way and formed
a link in the chain of developments leading to present law. Furthermore, Sturtevant's
'Treatise' is clear evidence that the Crown would already have been aware of the
argument in favour of the enrolment of a specification.
More practical reasons for its late development can also be made. Most commentators
rely on the argument that it was not until the time of Nasmith's patent that inventions
were actually capable of being described in a specification. Hulme and Davies, for
example, state that before this time in essence what were being introduced were not
simple mechanical inventions but rather whole new industries, the description of which
"would have required a treatise rather than a specification." t57
 Hulme goes further,
stating that as long as the system was aimed at the introduction of new industries the
requirement of a specification would have "materially detracted from the concession
offered by the crown, besides constituting a precedent for which no sufficient reason or
authority could be adduced." 158 Gomme 159 and MacLeod16° state that technical literature
was in its infancy in the 18th century, and therefore imply that requiring a specification
154 MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 51.
155 This was a dispute heard in the Privy Council relating to a proposed patent to John Garill. For a fuller
account of Carl/I's dispute see Davies, EarLy History, op c-il. at 274.
156 Davies, ibid.
157 Hulme, Consideration, op cit. at 317; see also Davies, Early History, op cit. at 97 and 263; this is one of the
few points on which the two appear to agree.
158 Hulme, ibid.
159 Gomme, op cit. at 26.
loll I\IacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit. at 49.
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before this time, even if considered a desirable option, may have been beyond the scope
of the majority of patentee's talents.
Walterscheid, on the other hand, rebukes these arguments as too simplistic as, "many of
the Elizabethan grants cannot be said in any reasonable way to have encompassed the
introduction of whole new industries." 16t He continues, asking why "the nature of
inventions should have remained unchanged for more than 150 years and then suddenly
change sufficiently to require a formal disclosure of the invention in the
specification[?]" 62 Taking these points in turn: Whilst many Elizabethan grants were
not for entire industries, it is clear that the majority were for more than simple
mechanical inventions capable of straightforward description. In addition, it is
submitted that Walterscheid's second argument entirely misses the point, for it is not
suggested that the kind of invention that was patented changed overnight. Rather, that
by this point in time conditions were such that it was far less likeiy that protection would
be sought for the introduction of an entire industry. This argument is backed up by the
fact that even after the provision of a specification was made a routine condition of
grant there is at least one case in which exemption was granted.163
Walterscheid further argues that for as long as 'working' of the invention was the main
Crown priority the idea of a specification was of little importance. Therefore, the
rationale for not requiring one under early English patent custom came more out of a
"concern by the Crown and the patentee to avoid legal arguments about the propriety
of the grant than anything else." Moreover, not making the requirement was, in the
main, an attempt to protect the royal prerogative to its fullest extent.164
However, all of these arguments seemingly fail to appreciate that no 'one' reason can be
given for why the specification was not introduced at an earlier point in history. Rather,
a gradual change in the type of invention, the fact that 'working' clauses had been
removed, the use of the caveat system, and patentee's concerns to make their grants
more certain, amongst other reasons, all conspired to form an environment conducive
Waltersclieid, A,ztedwts 11, op cit. at 860.
162 Ibid.
163 See Davies, Ear/y History, op cit. at 90.
164 Walterscheid, Antecedents II, op cit. at 862.
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to the enrolment of a specification. It cannot be said that any one of these factors was
responsible for Nasmith's revolution. It was their combination in the social, political
and economic context of the day that formed what might be termed the "inventive
step" of the specification.
A Mark of Evolution
The uncertainty over the scope and substance of patent grants that had been evident
from before the Statute of Monopolies and that was to continue for decades after the
advances marked by Nasmith's patent is the inevitable result of an evolution within the
patent sphere and within society. The system had begun with grants that were semi-
contractual agreements between the patentee and the Crown, whereby protection was
offered in return for the introduction of new manufacture. This practice had evolved
into offers of exclusive privilege where the Crown, consonant with a policy of
improving the Realm, provided limited monopoly rights in exchange for the
introduction of new industry. In essence, "patents originally represented royal privileges
issued under the royal prerogative to achieve royal policy goals." 165 However, first Daiyy
v AIIm, then the Clothworkers of Ipswich, and most importantly the Statute of Monopolies, had
made tentative but significant steps towards containment of the Monarch's power in
this area. This necessitated a shift away from patents being seen as royal privileges and
towards their being viewed in the context of the common law and legal rights. In short,
patents at this time were slowly coming to be seen as tools of commerce within the
market economy.
A Practice Accepted
Nasmith's application was made in a period of confusion within the English patent
system. Time and civil war had muted the public furore over 'odious' monopolies,
leaving a general distrust in their wake. The requirement that the invention be
introduced to the Realm within a specified period had disappeared in practice.36°
'° Mossoff Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual Histo0i, 1550 - 1800, (2001) 52 Hastings L J.
1255 at 1274.
166 See Hulme, On the His/oy of the Patent Law in the Seventeenth and Ezghteenth Centuries, (1902)18 LQR 280 at
283 states that by about 1673 the "obligation institute the manufacture ... had disappeared from the
contract (unless voluntarily introduced by the applicant)". MacLeod further states that in the context of
Post 1660 grants that non-implementation "did not normally give cause for voiding an English Patent.",
Industrial Revolution, op di. at 21. See also Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op di. at 786.
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Moreover, the utilisation of 'non obstantibu? (notwithstanding) clauses meant that it was
not necessary to include a description of any kind with the patent, as the subject matter
receiving protection was that actually used by the patentee. 167 Furthermore, great
uncertainty had been injected by the unsettled issue of jurisdiction concerning patent
disputes, the courts of common law not yet having taken up position as sole arbiter of
the system as promised by the Statute of Monopolies. 168 With these issues in mind, it is
unsurprising that Nasmith's patent gave no actual guidance as to what a specification
should contain. Therefore, at this point in time, and for many years after "it is doubtful
whether patentees had any clear idea what the function of a specification was or how
full and accurate it ought to be."169
However, despite this uncertainty, the concept of bargaining for protection with a
written disclosure gained favour, both with patentees, possibly eager to make their
grants more certain, and with the law officers of the Crown, without whose favourable
report a patent would not be granted. The provision of a written specification detailing
the invention therefore became accepted as the price that the patentee should pay for
the privilege of protection from imitation. 17° Thus, the practice of requiring a
specification became customary in about 1734.171 However, it took the common law
another four decades to establish its grip on the system, and to openly accept the death
of the doctrine of introduction, instituting the requirement of a specification in its place.
167 See the opinion of Sir William Jones, Attorney General, in 1676 that the description of the article
within the patent was not necessary, it could be constructed as the patentee saw fit, but once set up and
used, that was the sole model protected by the patent. Referred to in MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op dt.,
at 62; and Walterscheid, ./lntecedents III, op dl. at 786.
168 It will be recalled that the Privy Council finally conceded authority in patent matters in 1756. See text
accompanying note 124 above.
169 MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op at., at 50.
170 Thus Hulme, Prizy Councii op dl. gives example of patent set aside in 1732 for failure of specification to
set forth nature of invention; at 188-9.
171 Hulme, (1902) 18 LOR 280 at 283 states that the first requirement for a specification can be found in a
patent of 1716, but that the practice was not uniform until about 1740; Davies, Ear4i Histoy, op cit. at 89
states that the practice was made customary in 1734 but that there are examples of the requirement being
made in 1712, three times in 1716, twice in 1717, twice in 1718 and that between 1720 and 1733 a further
15 specifications were required Gomme, op cit., at 34 says that between 1711 and 1734 (when the practice
became customary) 29 of 158 grants had a specification enrolled.
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Therefore, in 1778 Nasmith's small step was finally translated into a great leap for the
common law in the landmark case of Liardet vJohnson.172
Liardet vJohnson
Liardet v Johnson has been variously described as a "landmark in the history of English
patent law" 173 and dismissed as insignificant. 174 However, its status as the first reported
case in which the courts of the common law expressly required an enabling disclosure
marks it out for attention.
The patent in question concerned a new composition for stucco, a type of cement. It
was granted in 1773 with the, by then, usual proviso that a specification would be
enrolled, in this case within four months. 175 The patent was later assigned to the Adams
family who, in 1776, "reassigned it to Liardet so that he could seek an Act of Parliament
extending its term." 176 The term was subsequently extended to 18 years, on the
condition that Liardet enrol a further specification detailing improvements made to the
cement since the original grant. This was done in September 1776, and Adams,
although no reassignment of the patent had taken place, continued to use the protected
stucco.177
In May 1777, Liardet and four Adams Brothers filed a suit in equity against Johnson,
Downes and Bellman seeking an account and injunction. Johnson replied by producing
an affidavit implying, without expressly stating so, that Liardet's preparation was not
novel, and in addition that Johnson's composition was materially different from that
protected by the patent. In July 1777 an injunction was granted restraining Johnson
from making, using, or vending the composition, on the proviso that an action was
brought promptly at law.
172 Reports of the first trial were published in the Morning Advertiser and the Dai/y Post on 23rd February,
1778, and in the London Chronicle and the Dai/y Advertiser the following day. The second trial is reported in
the Morning Post and Dai/y Advertiser, The Gaetteer and the New Dai(y Advertiser on 2Otl July 1778. See
Adams & Averley, op cit. 174. The case is reported at (1780) 1 Y & CC 527.
173 Hulme, Consideration, op cit. at 317.
174 Adams & Averley, op cit.
175 It was enrolled on 3rd August 1773. Adams & Averley, ibid. at 162.
176 Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 795.
177 Both Adams & Averley, op cit. at 162, and Walterscheid, ibid. state that Liardet acquiesced in this use.
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Johnson replied to the injunction at the beginning of September 1777, stating that
Liardet was not the inventor of the composition, or any 'imaginary improvements' over
earlier stucco.' 78 He further denied that his invention infringed the Liardet patent, but
rather improved upon a known manner of manufacture by the addition of specific
ingredients, 179 and stated that he had inspected the second specification to make sure.
Liardet and the four Adams brothers then instigated action at common law. The case
was first tried before Lord Mansfield on Saturday 21st February, 1778. It lasted merely
six hours, the jury returning verdict for the plaintiff.
Unfavourable public comment, that Adams & Averley suggest may have been caused by
the fact that the plaintiffs had stuccoed His Lordship's house with the composition
some years earlier, may have prompted Mansfield to grant a new trial, despite the fact
that little, or no, new evidence was adduced. 18° The case was therefore resubmitted and
heard before Mansfield once more on the 18th July 1778.
It is Mansfield's charge to the jury in this, the second of the Liardet vJohnson cases, that
is of primary interest to our discussion of the evolution of patent law at this time.181
Three questions were asked. First, had the defendant used the composition? Second, if
he did use it, was the invention new or old within the definition given in the Statute of
Monopolies? Finally, was the specification such as to instruct others how to make the
composition? He continued:
"For the condition of giving encouragement is this: that you must specify
upon record your invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, when your term is
out, to make it - and to make it as well by your directions: for then at the end of the
term, the public shall have benefit of it. The inventor has the benefit during the term, and
the public have the benefit after... [Where the invention is a compositionj the
specification must state ... the proportions; so that any other artist may be able to
178 He cited entries in A new and Universal Dictionary of Arts and Liences published by John 1-linton in 1751,
and to the second edition of this work published by a I\Ir Owen in 1764, as well as Charles Rawlinson's
patent for a composition for slate on roofs, published in his own Directoy for Patent S/atin in 1772 in order
to substantiate such a claim.
179 Namely serum of ox blood.
181) Adams & Averley, op dt. at 164.
181 Although see Adams & Averley, ibid. at 171 who suggest that the novelty of the case lies in its reliance
on the testimony of expert witnesses.
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make it, and it must be a lesson and direction to him by which to make it. If the
invention be of any other sort, to be done by mechanism, they must describe it in a
way that an artist must be able to do jt."182 (emphasis supplied)
As Walterscheid astutely states, this was "one of the earliest statements by an English
judge of the modern requirement that a specification must be enabling." 183 (emphasis
supplied). However, he is quick to note at least one earlier case in which Mansfield
discussed the adequacy of the specification 184 - suggesting that Liardet vJohnson may not
be as novel as the foildore of patents would infer.
Conclusion
Novel, or not, Liardet v Johnson is, at least, evidence of an important step having been
taken in English patent law. It reminds the patentee of the importance of an enabling
disclosure and paints the patent grant as a contract with the public in which temporary
monopoly is exchanged for benefit accruing from the inventor's knowledge entering the
public domain. Further, the case was one of the first on such matters to receive
widespread coverage in newspapers and pamphlets. Thus it distributed the message to
the public at large, rather than simply to a small circle of interested parties.185
By the end of the 8 century, Liardet v Johnson was settled law, and the patent had
fmally started its separation from grants of Crown favour. It had entered the market
economy as an item of commerce, and the price was disclosure. 186 By this time it was
apparent that the patent should teach the operation of the invention without further
experimentation,' 87 such a defect being grounds for avoiding the grant. 188 The working
of the invention per se was no longer sufficient consideration for the award of a
182 Quoted from Hulme, (1902)18 LOR 280, at 285.
183 Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 797.
184 Ibid
185 See Mossoff op cit. at 1293; also Hulme, Consideration, op cit. at 284 where he lists some of the literature
in which the case can be found.
186 Bullet. J
.
 was therefore able to definitively state in 1795 that the "specification is the price that the
patentee is to pay for the monopoly." Boa/ton & Watt v Bu/1 2 H BL 463, 126 En glish RsporLt 651 at 654.
187 See, for example, Turnerv Winter, 1 YR 601, 99 Eig/ish Reports 1274 at 1276.
188 It should be noted that a specification could equally be defective if it included too much as if it
disclosed too little. This was especially the case if the superfluous material was thought to be included for
the purpose of misleading the public - see Walterscheid, Antecedents III, op cit. at 802 where he discusses R
vArk,vright, 1 Web. P. C 29 ommon Pleas 1785).
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monopoly. The function of the patent grant was therefore changing. Whereas
previously it was seen as an object of patronage, by the end of the 1700s we begin to see
it being discussed in connection with the promotion of invention.
So, finally, more than 200 years after the inception of a discrete policy of monopoly
grant for new manufacture, description of the subject matter had come to be required at
law. The hiatus that followed the enactment of the Statute ofMonopolies had been broken
and the courts of the common law had asserted their place as the sole arbiter of the
system of monopoly grant.
The foregoing discussion highlights some of the problems that the patent system has
experienced during its long history. In addition, consideration of the Elizabethan
practice has enabled us to begin to form a picture of the rationale for the grant. The
clear motivation behind the early system was the improvement of the Realm.
Considerations of the 'price' that the patentee should pay for the grant only really
became important when the object shifted from instituting new manufacture to
protecting invention in a modern sense of the word. As technology progressed, the
problems associated with the scope of the grant became more visible. This predicament
was compounded by the simple fact that the number of grants also increased. When
there were only 50 patents extant in the country it was relatively simple to decide issues
of infringement, however, as the custom evolved the numbers grew.
The problem of 'odious' monopoly is also significant for, as we have seen in Chapter I,
the traditional view of the courts in the UK is that the patent is an exception to the
principle of free trade. This view shares its roots with the Statute of Monopolies itself and
it is interesting to note the same arguments being raised against wide protection today as
were levelled at the abuses of Elizabethan policy. Seen within the historical context, the
introduction to the economics of the patent system in Chapter III reveals more than a
simple dry treatment of the subject would do.
The move away from viewing the patent as an instrument of Crown policy to a legal
right obtained by an inventor is consonant with the tightening hold of the common law
over the system. This is reflected in the grant's change of focus from the issuing body
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to the petitioner. Therefore we see the patentees in the period post-Nasmith taking a
more active role in the defmition of their own scope of protection.
The separation of the Crown from the grant is also significant as it enabled opponents
of the system to begin to voice their complaints, and competitors to challenge the
grants, without this being viewed as criticism of the Sovereign However, this did little
to address the general feeling of discontent that surrounded system. Patents still
maintained their association with 'odious' monopoly in the mind of the people, but the
system was gaining in popularity. Thus, the 22 patents granted in the first decade of the
century had become 647 in the last. 189 Moreover, the growing competitiveness of
patenting and the oft-hostile attitude of the courts 'generated a new concern for reform
among patentees themselves'."0 In addition, this period in history saw the birth and
popularisadon of the political economists such as Smith, Bentham and Mill. Their
comments and theories allowed the patent grant to be considered in a new light in their
revolutionary 'Market Economy'.
" MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op cit., at 150.
'9° Ibid. at 182.
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CHAPTER III







In this Chapter, we consider the administrative and legislative changes to the patent
system that occurred in, and around, the 'Anti-Patent' debate of the late century.
The philosophical arguments, both for and against the system, which appeared in the
popular press and the infantile arena of the political economists illustrates the early
rationalisation of the grant. This revelation of policy not only provides a backdrop to
the modern theories, discussed in Chapter V below, but also allows us to see the
manner in which economic theory began to be utilised in an attempt to both explain
and justify the system with varying degrees of success. In addition, our discussion
explores the effect on public perception at this time of the shadow of monopoly that
had dogged the grant since Elizabeth the First's reign, and still habitually raises its head
today.
This Chapter explores popular misgivings over the patent system and assesses their
impact. The fact that an 'Anti-Patent' debate could rage so furiously, and publicly, in
the late l9t1 century is testament, in itself, to the depth of bad feelings and the
importance of the issues at stake. This experience demonstrates more clearly than any
other that the publics' perception matters. It is not simply sufficient for a legal regime
to be fair if it is not also seen to be fair; and the patent system in evidence in late
Victorian Britain was ostensibly neither. However, despite damning criticism, the core
survived and important legislative and administrative changes were undertaken to
assuage the popular discontent. The patenting process and the quality of the grant were
greatly improved, and crucially, the claims and the specification assumed what is now
considered to be their proper place at the centre of the patent.
However, this is not all that the Victorian controversy did for the system, for, as we
shall see, it also galvanised economic debate on the justifications of the patent grant. As
a consequence, the philosophies of Bentham, Mill and Smith were revitalised and re-
energised, in turn enabling an economic agenda to begin to replace the ostensibly
pragmatic justifications of the past. It is important to note that these early, 'classical'
theories not only form the basis of much modern economic thought on the patent
system, but also are regularly advanced as justifications in their own right.
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However, before discussing the early economic theory in any depth, we begin with
general comments on the economic appreciation of the patent grant. In addition, we
consider the nature of the rights that the patent provides and explore some of the
problems that are associated with the creation of property in the intangible.
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Introduction
As we have seen, the patent system grew from seeds buried within the royal prerogative,
its roots stretching back through the Statute ofMonopolies and Elizabethan grants as far as
the City State of Venice and beyond. Patents are not a new invention, and yet
considered economic appreciation and analysis of them is a relatively modern concept.
The treatment of the patent system by writers such as Mill, Bentham and Smith is
discussed below, and shall not be pre-empted here, suffice to say that their handling was
brief mere paragraphs in treatises many hundreds of pages long. 1 This is not a criticism
of their approach, merely testament to the way in which patents were perceived at this
point in time; they were taken for granted, like them or not, and little thought was
directed to their justification as tools of commerce.
One of the most noteworthy features of the patent system that is evident throughout its
history is the knack that it displays for passing relatively unscathed amidst an avalanche
of criticism. Abuses rush to the fore, condemnation is piled high, but the core of the
system remains intact and slinks away to fight again. It is telling to note that Fox,
writing in 1947, stated when discussing patents for invention that "there has never been,
until the present time, any criticism of this type of exclusive privilege. It was always
recognised at common law as a proper subject for a prerogative grant, and the Statute
of Monopolies made no change in this conception." 2
 As we shall see, this statement
completely ignores wholesale condemnation that rained down upon the patent system
the midl9th century: how easily such a public debate was forgotten! Fox's comments,
however inaccurate, are testament to the fact that patents simply exist within the societal
I Mill, Princet/es of Political Economji (1929; Longmans, Green & Co., London; 2 Ed.), mentions
monopolies in connection with patents only once (at 932). Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1937; The
Modern Library, New York) similarly only extends discussion of the topic of monopoly to patents on one
occasion (at 712). However, it should be noted that Smith accords patents significantly more explicit
coverage in his Selected Essajs on Jurijprudence, (1978; Clarendon Press, Oxford) (Meek, Raphael & Stein
(eds.)), at 83 and 472. Bentham, of all of the early political economists, devotes the most time to
discussing the expediency of granting monopoly privilege for inventions, but even his treatment is limited
to a mere handful of pages in an extensive text. See Bentham, Manual of Political Economji, Part II - Proper
Measures, ch 19. In Stark, ed.,Jeremj, Bentham'c Economic Writings, (1952; George Allen & Unwin, London),
Volume I, at 260-65.
2 Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Study of the Histo0i and Future of the Patent Monopo'y, (1947; University of
Toronto Press, Toronto) at 178-9.
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mind, they are like the air, gravity or even invention itself; society takes them for
granted. Just as Mill, Bentham and Smith never once questioned the provision of
temporary monopoly as a reward to the inventor and, in the same vein, patents for
invention escaped the wrath of the Statute of Monopolies, so did they until relatively
recently evade the rigors of economic analysis.
An Economic Analysis of the Patent System - Hiatus
Despite a noisy attack launched by 'free-traders' in the mid19t century and subsequent
reforms of the patent system, discussions of patents largely avoided any in-depth
economic analysis until the first half of the 20th century. The consequences of
monopolistic distortion of the market economy were well known, clearly illustrated by
events of the late Tudor/early Stuart period leading to Statute of Monopolies. 3 Therefore,
it is hardly surprising that economists first concentrated their attention on abuses of
monopoly power rather than seeking, shaping or upholding justifications for the grant
of temporary monopoly in the case of new manufactures. This much is clear from the
works of Mill and Smith, who, despite long diatribes on the evils of monopoly, were
content to state that such bad blood did not extend to the provision of exclusive
privileges for a limited tune to the originator of an improved process. 4 Indeed, until
relatively recently "economic analysis of law was almost synonymous with economic
analysis of antitrust law". 5 Up to this point economists seemed to be content to leave
discussion of the exact scope of the patent right to the Courts while they analysed
business practices.6
Before proceeding to consider the economics of patent scope in detail, it is considered
beneficial to step back for one moment and to address some general economic
philosophical and practical issues that underlie the more complex analysis. This
discussion begins with consideration of the patent as an item of property.
See Chapter II, above.
See Mill, op ot. at 932, and Smith, op nt. at 712.
Posner, EconomicAnaiysis of Law (1992; Little, Brown and Company, Boston; 4th Ed) at 21. Antitrust law
is basically law forbidding all combinations in restraint of trade and primarily focuses on business
practices and abuses of monopoly power rather than looking at justifications of the patent system.
The foregoing is not to say that antitrust arguments have no relevance to the patent of invention,
however, an in-depth analysis of the abuses of monopoly power that would fall within the sphere of
antitrust is outside of the scope of this work.
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Property and Patents
It is now universally accepted that the patent right, as other categories of intangible
rights falling under the umbrella of 'Intellectual Property', creates a form of personal
property. This fundamental assertion is enshrined in statute by virtue of s.30 of the
Patents Act 1977. However, this has not always been the case. Indeed, it is only
recently that the patent has come to be appreciated as an entity distinct from an
instrument of Crown privilege. During the 'Anti-Patent' debate of the late 9h century,
for example, many proponents of the system were apt to refer to 'property in
inventions' (as opposed to property conferred by the patent right). Whilst it is now
accepted that the patent grant can create property rights, "the idea of property in an
invention is not taken seriously by modern economists." 7 Therefore, in order that the
nature and problems of the patent 'monopoly' be better understood it is helpful to
reflect upon its transition from prerogative to administrative grant. The following
discussion is, however, limited to consideration of the patent grant within the traditional
property sphere. Constraints of time and space render in-depth discussion of general
theories of property rights outside of the scope of this work.8
The Patent Grant: Transition
The patent for invention began as an object of Crown favour; a monopoly privilege
dispensed by application of the royal prerogative. A complicated history littered with
abuses led to it being tainted with the stain of 'odious monopoly'.' Focus on the nature
of the grant (as an instrument of Crown policy) necessarily restricted realisation of the
See Machiup, An Economic Review of the Patent Sjstem, Study No. 15 of the Sub-Conmiittee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 85"' Congress, 2" Session,
(1958; Washington) (hereinafter Machiup) at 26.
8 However, those interested in general discussion of the 'Rise and Decline of Property' are directed to;
Nozick, Anarchty State & Utopia, (1974, Blackwells, Oxford); Waidron, The Right to Private Properlji, (1988;
Clarendon, Oxford); Demsetz, Toward a Theoi of Property R,hts, (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347
also Armstrong, From the Fetishism of Commodities to the Regulated Market: The Rise and Decline of Propery,
(1987) 82 J\Torthwestern University Law Review 79 and the references given therein, specifically Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, in Pennock (Ed.), Property, (1980; New York University Press, New York);
Donahue, The Future Concept of Property Predictedfrom its Past in Pennock, idem; and Massey, Justice Rehnquist'c
Theory of Propertji, (1984) 9 Yale Law Journal 541. Also see Oakes, 'Pivper Rights" in 6onstitutionalAna!ysis
Todqy, (1981) 56 lVashin gton Law Review 583; and Honore, Ownershi)5, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
107 etseq. (1961; Oxford University Press, London) (A. Guest (Ed.)).
9 See text accompanying note 67 et seq. in Chapter II, above.
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patent within this context, as it was seen as a de facto brother of monopoly if not
monopoly itself. This, in turn, hindered its acceptance as an item of property and its
realisation as a separate category in the embryonic sphere of what is now known as
Intellectual Property Law. Therefore, whilst arguments that a property right existed in
the patent grant were being advanced as early as the beginning of the 1 8th century, 1 ° it
was not until the reforms of the midl9th1 century that the grant of a patent could finally
be seen as such.
The close association that the patent system maintained with the Crown until the late
19rh century was, in itself, a major stumbling block to reform. It hampered any thought
of improving the system as this "would have exploded the ancient theory that a patent
is a special direct grant from the Crown of certain valuable privileges, and that it is only
by Her Majesty's gracious favour that these privileges are granted at all." 11 It is
therefore unsurprising that it took a near-fatal bombardment of the system by
'abolitionists' in the 'Anti-Patent' debate to force the administrative and legislative
wheels into motion. 12 Once the debate had been settled, and public argument had
established that the patent custom was essentially valid yet in dire need of reform,
public faith in the idea of a patent system was able to grow. Such faith was vital to the
transition from instrument of the Crown to self-contained entity, as it enabled legal
reform to become a serious possibility. At the same time, bureaucratic failings of the
Patent Registry provided additional cause for complaint and added pressure for
administrative reform of the system.
Uncertainty over the requirements for (and exact nature of) the specification, coupled
with widespread ignorance of the state of the law, had lead to a perception that patents
See MacLeod, Inuenting the lndurtna/ Rico/ut/on: The English Patent System 1660 - 1800, (hereinafter
MacLeod, Industrial Revolution) (1988; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 198 for a discussion of
such early rationalisation of property.
' H. Truman Wood, The Patents for Inventions Bill 1877, (1877) 25 Journal of the Soc/vt-v of the Arts 342.
Quoted from Bently & Sherman, The Making of Modern Intellectual Proper Lan' (1999; Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge) (hereinafter Bently & Sherman) at 131.
12 It should be noted that neither side in the debate was in favour of preserving the status quo, the
argument was between those advocating reform and those in favour of abolition.
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granted at this time were practically worthless. 13 An inefficient filing and granting
system and petty disputes over who, patent attorneys or lawyers, had the standing to act
as agents for inventors for the purpose of obtaining patents, had corrupted public
perception of the system even further. Thus, a catalogue of reforms was introduced to
pull the system back from the shifting sands of bureaucratic inefficiency onto firmer
ground. These included the institution of indexes of granted patents arranged both
chronologically and alphabetically; 14
 the various offices, once scattered around the city
of London were moved into one building; and the post of examiner was placed onto
sounder footings by the institution of job specifications and clarification of pension
arrangements.' 5 However, the reform that had most impact on the promotion of the
patent as property (as opposed to privilege) was the introduction of a system of
registration by the 1851 Protection of Inventions Act.
Originally introduced as a temporary measure in connection with the Great Exhibition
(therefore consonant with a public event supported by the Queen and considered not
threatening to the role of the Crown in matters patent), it proved a sweeping success
and paved the way for more concrete legislative reforms. Therefore, in the 1852 Patent
Law Amendment Act, Parliament was able to introduce a more effective system of
registration whereby property arose in the invention from the date of application rather
than grant by the Crown. This change was of vital importance in the patent's evolution
as an item of property as it created bureauci-atic property in the grant enabling its
emergence from the shadow of the prerogative. 16 However, this change in the
administration of the patent system initially did little to quell the widespread distaste for
patents. 17 Indeed, problems with the registration system, combined with the continuing
13 See Bently & Sherman, op üt. at 131, who draw this conclusion from the speech of Lord Wolverton
(17tl
 November, 1902) 114 Hansardcols. 1099 ff.
14 As opposed to the purely chronological indexes of the past.
All administrative rather than strictly legal reforms. See Bently & Sherman, op ut, at 132-3.
16 See Webster's answer to Q.544 in Report of the Select Committee on Letters Patent, House of Commons
Papers 1871 (Command Paper N 368). Also Bently & Sherman, op üt. at 134.
17 The Economist reported on 5th June 1869 (some 18 years after the initial reform) that "it is probable that
patent laws will be abolished ere long. There is universal agreement that no patent law should cover all
the inventions which are now covered. It is for the general interest that patent laws should be abolished."
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uncertainty of the nature of the patent specification, added fuel to the abolitionists'
fire.18
The following discourse is therefore limited to consideration of the modern patent of
invention as an item of property, specifically the problems that this raises in respect of
the philosophical aims and justifications of the scope of patent protection. During the
ensuing discussion recourse will be had to arguments and theories posited during the
pre-modern era of patent law, however, the author is at pains to point out that these
references will only be made where they can be realistically carried into a contemporary
frame of reference.
The Problems of Patents as Property
The acceptance of the patent as an item of property is not something to which most of
those using the system will ever direct their thoughts. Statute dictates that patents are to
be treated as personal property for the purposes of assignment, mortgage, transfer upon
death, etc. Therefore patents are property. However, certain aspects of 'Intellectual
Property' in general, and patents in particular, render such a simple conclusion lacking
in substance, especially when the boundaries of this 'property' come to be considered.
The principal problem involved with viewing the patent as an item of property is also
one of its defming features: intangibility. As with any other proprietary right the patent
is capable of being trespassed upon; the rights of the owner can be infringed by the
commercial operation of another in the State(s) in which protection has been
obtained. 1 ' However, the fundamental difference between trespass upon the rights of
the owner of tangible property and the rights of the patentee is a factor of its
intangibility. Before matters of infringement can be concluded, the property itself, the
extent of the right, the boundaries of protection, must be decided upon. Herein lies our
problem.
8 See further Boehm, The British Patent .System: I Administration, (1967, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge) who states that "The 1860's and 1870's were also the period in which the patent system
sustained its severest opposition." at 29.
It is important to remember that the patent is essentially creature of territory, its power curtailed by the
territorial limits of Sovereignty. Therefore a patent granted in the UK is only effective within the UK,
however wider protection can be obtained by the acquisition of multiple patents in other States.
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The abstract nature of this monopoly makes the application of a traditional legal
analysis of property rights difficult, if not impossible. In cases of theft or trespass
concerning tangible property there is rarely, if ever, the need to enter into complex
debate about the boundaries of the property concerned. It may be that the rights
affected need some clarification, but in general if someone strays onto your land or
appropriates an item of personal property you can see his or her presence. Boundaries
are clear.
This is not the case with patents. Therefore, it is pertinent to inquire how their
existence as items of property can be justified, and indeed how the legal treatment of
patents can be intellectually separated from the treatment of other forms of 'Intellectual
Property' such as copyright or designs. Such an examination is rendered more pertinent
when determination of the scope of the patent right is taken into account.
The problem with a patent arises because of the way in which the scope of protection is
defined. A patent may be said to provide protection to the 'inventive idea' or 'subject
matter' that lies behind an invention. This is quite often wider than the projection or
expression of the idea in real space and, given its abstract nature, the only sensible way
in which this 'matter' can be contained is to pin it down in a net of words. The
accepted, indeed required, method of doing this is to write a series of claims, backed up
by drawings and a more verbose and descriptive specification detailing the background
of the invention, the problems that the inventor faced and the steps they took to
overcome them, and generally explaining things to one versed in the art. 2° However,
this is not the end of the matter, claims are used to define the invention but great care
must be taken not to make the definition too wide so as to encompass something that is
not new.21 To claim as subject matter that which is aiready known would be to
monopolise part of the public domain, a fundamental evil. Therefore it is the job of the
claim drafter to effectively enclose the invention without straying into the prior art and
2)) See s.14 Patents Act 1977.
21 On the issue of overly broad patent claims see, for example, Biogen v Medeva, [19977 RPC 1, where the
House of Lords held that the requirement that the claims be supported by the description means that
overly broad claims can be objected to on the basis that the disclosure is not adequate - thereby
importing s.14(5) into s.72(1)(c).
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without overly stretching the claim to encompass things that the inventor has not
actually invented, or not described.
Thus stated, it is clear that there are two main questions that need to be answered in
respect of the philosophical and legal justifications of patents for invention. First, and
most fundamentally, how is the grant of a bundle of property rights in the intangible
justifiable, i.e. on what basis does society rationalise the award of a temporary monopoly
to the inventor for her invention? Second and inextricably linked with the first
question, how large a bundle of rights should the inventor receive, i.e. how broad
should the monopoly granted actually be? In answering the latter of these questions
regard must be had to the extent to which the philosophical justifications of the patent
system permit expansion from the literal scope of the claims. This, in turn, opens the
debate to include a consideration of the factors that affect the intrinsic scope of the
patent as drafted (i.e. the reasons why the patent is drafted with the breadth that it is), a
point that relays us back to the justifications of the patent system. Armed with this
information, it will then be possible to critically appraise the economics of the patent
system and compare philosophical and economic conclusions on the desired breadth of
patent protection. However, before we consider the justifications of property in the
intangible it is necessary to examine two more facets of the nature of the property that
forms the subject of the patent grant, non-excludability and non-exhaustibility.
Free goods and public goods
We have already noted the potential conceptual difficulties associated with the
recognition of the intangible as property, no more need be said on this matter, however,
consequences of the nebulous nature of the property right pervade throughout any
economic discussion. The patent system creates property in invention by facilitating
and imposing control of the knowledge that defines the invention, therefore enabling
limitations to be placed on its supply and use. The patent system creates the idea of
property in an invention. As such, it cannot be justified on the basis that invention is
property, as without the patent system property in an invention does not exist. The
invention is property because of the patent system, because this imposes a structure of
scarcity.
Patents concern knowledge. They protect the ideas behind an invention as reduced to
practice. Knowledge is unlike physical property in that it cannot be exhausted by use.
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It is known as a 'free good'. Thus an mverition, once it has been made (the concept
plucked from the ether and reduced to practice) "can be regarded as a non-wasting asset
whose use involves no additional economic cost, beyond costs of communication and
leatnmg."
Thus, the social value of an invention is not lessened by its widespread use. Indeed, it
can be convincingly argued that the attendant benefit of use increases its value, as
society is able to enjoy the invention more fully. In short, it is wasteful to restnct its use.
Considered in this light it is a small step to state that where an invention results from a
spontaneous flash of insight, and therefore has no attendant cost of creation, it should
ideally command a zero price in order that its benefit be maxirnised. However, such a
bold statement ignores the costly reality of invention and innovation. Whilst it may be
true that the original inventive idea could be costless, it is seldom the case that it is so
simple and briffiant that it can be perfected or brought to the market without financial
burden. Moreover, in the research-intensive society in which we live, the costs
associated with the 'creation' of an invention may, without some form of compensation
or incentive, be proscriptively high.
However, as Taylor & Silberston state "[the real difficulty arises because many
inventions, like other types of knowledge, are not simply 'free' goods: they are to a large
extent 'public' goods as well." 23 That is to say, as well as their non-exhaustibility, many
inventions also suffer from non-excludability, so that once they are made available to
one, they are (absent legal protection) made available to all. Put another way, once
implemented, or otherwise disclosed they can be freely, and relatively costlessly, copied
by others.
Consequently, because of non-excludability and non-exhaustibility (sometimes termed
non-rivalness) there can be no market for a public good. In the absence of some sort of
protection once an invcntion has been created it is freely appropriable and therefore of
strictly lii-nited worth to its creator. It is, of course, worth an amount commensurate
22 See Taylor & Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent 4ystem, (1973; Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge) at 24; Quoting from Arrow, We//are Economics and Inventioe Activity, in the Rate and Direction
of Inventive Activity, (1962; NBER, Princeton).
23 ibid. at 25
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with the market value of the invention. However, if cosdessly copied, this value is
simply equal to the production cost, as competition will push the price down.24 The
invention itself cannot be sold, as it is freely appropriable by all. Therefore, in the
absence of some sort of proprietary right there is likely to be a disincentive to invest in
invention, as competition will make it impossible to recover sunken research and
developmental costs.
With these points in mind, we now turn to address the issue of justifying the creation of
property in the intangible.
Classical Justifications of Property in the Intangible - The Patent
During the 'Literary Property' and 'Anti-Patent' debates that raged consecutively from
the mid-I 8th to the latter half of the 19th centuries, a great deal of thought was directed
towards the justification and distinction, or isolation, of property rights in the intangible.
It is therefore unsurprising that this period marks an oasis for economic analysis of the
patent system in a desert otherwise relatively featureless until the 1920s.
Broadly four lines of reasoning in general circulation in the midI9th century can be
identified. These arguments form the basis of modern criticism of the patent system
and are still utilised by lawyers, economists and the courts today. Each category found
its own supporters and opponents within the debate and each can be argued, to some
extent, to form a basis for the patent grant. As ever, certain theories find more favour
than others do with contemporary critical thinkers and, as we shall see, different
justifications suggest different scope for the patent rights. It is obvious to say that no
one theory can attempt to provide a complete explanation of the system, however, the
reader is asked to bear this in mind when considering the remainder of this Chapter. It
is not the author's intention, nor would it be possible, to provide the definitive
justification for the patent grant, however, insight into these 'Classical' arguments is
considered a valuable diversion before the modern economic theory per se is discussed.
Each broad theory is dealt with in turn before considering the implications that they
have for the determination of patent scope. Any attempt to critically evaluate the
philosophical integrity of the various theories is outside of the scope of this work.
24 See further text accompanying note 3 in Chapter \T, below.
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Therefore, apart from drawing the reader's attention to popular criticisms of the various
justifications, the author makes no attempt to 'prove' or 'disprove' any of the
assumptions upon which these theses rely. Various academic writers including
Dutton25, Walterscheid26, Coulter27 and Machlup & Penrose 28 have covered these four
heads of reasoning in some detail. The following discussion is to a large extent based
upon their work.29
The 'Natural Right' Theory
The 'natural law' thesis is a moral justification based upon the assertion that the
individual has a natural property right in their ideas. By extension, therefore, they also
have a natural right to the sole exploitation of these machinations such that
unauthorised use by others without compensation must be condemned as theft. This
property is exclusive and personal, and therefore society (and thus the State) is under a
moral obligation to recognise and protect these rights. What, in the words of JR.
McCulloch, is more apt to be "called a man's exclusive property ... [than] that which
owes it's birth entirely to combinations formed in his own mind, and which, but for his
ingenuity, would not have existed"?3°
The thesis found frrm footing in the French patent law of 1791, the preamble to which
states:
"[I]hat every novel idea whose realization or development can become useful
to society belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and that it would be a violation
25 Dutton, The Patent .System and Inventive Activity Dunn8 the Industrial Revolution 1750-1852, (1984;
Manchester University Press, Manchester), (hereinafter Dutton), at 17-29.
26 Walterscheid, The Ear/y Evolution of the United States Patent Lan': Antecedents (Part 4), (1996) 78 JPTOS 77
(hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents IT/) at 104-106.
27 Coulter, Propey in Ideas: The Patent uestion in Mid-Victorian Britain, (1991; Thomas Jefferson University
Press, Kirksville) (hereinafter Coulter), particularly ch.3.
28 Machiup & Penrose, The Patent Controvery in the Nineteenth Century, (1950) 10 J Ec. Hist. 1 (hereinafter
Machlup & Penrose) at 10-26. See also Machlup, op czt. at 19-44.
29 Machiup, op cit. when discussing these points states at 22 ". . .These references serve only as samples,
since in most instances many writers have made the same points. Indeed, if one always cites only the
"first and true inventoc" of an argument concerning the patent system, one will rarely be able to cite an
author of the 20" century."
30 Scotsman, 26" May 1826;J.R. McCulloch, commercial Dictiona, 1832 at 817-8; Quoted from Dutton, op
cit. at 18.
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of the rights of man m their very essence if an industrial invention were not regarded
as the property of its creator."1
This approach accords to a Lockean labour theory analysis of property rights, whereby
labour functions as a determinant of tide. 32 Locke's core propositions have been
summarised as follows:
1. God has given the world to people in common.
2. Every person has a property right in his own person.
3. A person's labour belongs to him.
4. Whenever a person mixes his labour with something in the commons he
thereby makes it his own property.
5. The right of property is conditional upon a person leaving in the commons
enough and as good for the other commoners.
6. A person cannot take more out of the commons than they can use to
advantage.33
Therefore, when applied to the intellectual labours of invention, it is possible to argue
that the inventor should have a 'natural right' in their creation. At the time that Locke
was writing it is improbable that he entertained the notion of property in the intangible,
his philosophical musings being more likely directed to the explanation of corporeal
ownership. However, this did not prevent some proponents of the patent system in the
19t1
 century liberally applying his theories and concluding that "permanent and
inalienable" property rights existed in ideas. 34 One such legal writer was Turner,
barrister and author of a number of treatises on patent law, who justified the system on
31 Preamble to the French Patent Law of 1791 quoted from Machlup, op cit. at 22.
32 See further John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (1993; M.Goldie, ed.; Everyman, London; Original
published 1690) Chapter V, Book II. For a modern exploration of the philosophy of intellectual
property, which includes discussion of Locke's theories, see Drahos, /1 Philosophy of Intellectual Property,
(1996; Dartmouth, Aldershot (UK)) (hereinafter Drahos).
n Taken from Drahos, ibid. at 43.
' J obard, Nouvelle iconomie sociale on monautopoh industriel, artistique, commercial et littdraire (1 844; Paris) at 5,
130, 239 et seq. Quoted from Machlup, op cit. at 22.
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the basis that it was "simply the application of the natural principle of property as the
reward of labour."35
It is, however, a theory largely shunned by British and American historians, lawyers and
economists as having played no part in the evolution of a modern Anglo-American law
of patents. 36 This stance shares strong contemporary support, the Westminster Review,
for example, lambasted the idea by stating "to talk of natural rights of an inventor is to
talk nonsense." 37
 Further, it was argued that to allege theft of an idea is for a man to
complain "that something has been stolen which he still possesses, and he wants
something back which, if given to him a thousand times, would add nothing to his
possession." 38 Webster neatly summed up contemporary opinion when he stated that
"[t]hose who believe the inventor to have a natural right ... must have an entire
misconception as to what it is the inventor really achieves."39
The main criticisms of 'natural rights' as justification for the patent system stem from an
analysis of the substance of the property concerned and the actuality of the system as it
stood when the arguments were first advanced. 40 Thus, if property in ideas is a natural
right there is little logical basis for that right to be limited to a term of years, rather it
should be perpetual. In addition, it does not sit comfortably with either the concept of
knowledge as a non-exhaustible commodity, 4' nor with any criteria of patentability that
the inventor must satisfy before a patent is granted. Further, it suggests that the scope
of the right awarded should be tied to the actual effort, or degree of labour, exercised in
creating the invention, with more time equating to greater protection. This would not
only relegate flashes of inventive genius to receive little, if any protection, but would
Turner, Counsel to Inventors of Improvements in the Useful Arts, (1850; F. Elsworth, London) at 50; Also
Coulter, op üt. at 80.
36 See comments to this effect in Dutton, op cit. at 18; MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op di. at 197;
Walterscheid, The Ear/ Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), (1994) 76 JOS 697
(hereinafter Walterscheid, Antecedents]) at 715.
The Patent Laws, (1829) XXVI lVestminster Review 329.
Hermann Rentzsch, Geistiges Ezgenthum, Handwörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft (1866; Leipzig) at 334;
Quoted from Machiup, op cit. at 22.
' Webster, Law and Practthe of Letters Patent for Invention, (1841; London), at 3; Quoted from Dutton, op cit.
at 18.
'° And still stands today.
41 One whose stock is not depleted by use. See text accompanying note 22, et seq., above.
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also tend to favour complicated, expensive and time-consuming invention over elegant
solutions to problems. 42 Moreover, the Lockean approach would not justify the
provision of an exclusive monopoly where both copying and independent creation are
similarly prohibited.
It is therefore unsurprising that this theory finds little support in modern literature.43
Indeed, Machiup notes that it is "interesting to note that some French lawyers'
conceded that they preferred to speak of 'natural property rights' chiefly for propaganda
purposes, especially because alternative concepts, such as 'monopoly right' or 'privilege',
were so unpopular". 45 Therefore, we move to our next possible philosophical
justification for the patent system, the reward by monopoly thesis.
The 'Reward by Monopoly' Theory
By contrast to the 'natural right' theory, the 'reward theory' found strong support with
English economists during the 'Anti-Patent' debate. It calls for protection in the name
of fairness to secure the inventor their just reward, proportional to the usefulness of the
invention to society. As this reward cannot be guaranteed by reliance upon ordinary
market forces, State intervention is justified in the provision of temporary monopoly.
Smith, Mill and Bentham can all fmd support for the provision of the patent monopoly
under this banner. Smith noted that optimum economic conditions are often not those
found under natural, unregulated trade. He saw the law and the lawmaker as vitally
important players in ensuring that competition was maintained and resources efficiently
allocated. His support for the patent system therefore rests on two main points. First,
that the provision of temporary monopoly was "the easiest and most natural way in
42 Promoting so-called 'cargo-cult science'. See Feynman, Sure!5, You're Jokins Mr. Fynman (1992; Vintage,
London).
' The support that it does find is limited (as far as this author can discern) to one article (\'Iossoff,
Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual Histo0i 1550-1800; (2001) 52 Hastints Law Journal 1255),
which stresses the Lockean conception of 'social contract'. An argument more in line with the 'exchange
for secrets' theory than a strict interpretation of the natural rights thesis.
From whom we find most of the support for such a notion of natural rights in ideas.
Machlup, op it. at 23. Machiup names DeBouffler, reporting the Patent Bill to the French
Constitutional Assembly in May 1791, quoted by Augustin-Charles Renouard, Traitl des Brevets D 'invention
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which the state can [provide] recompense ... for hazarding a dangerous and expensive
experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit." 46 Further, "if the
legislature should appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventors of new machines, etc.,
they would hardly ever be so precisely proportiond (sic) to the merit of the invention as
[the patent monopoly] is." 47
 Second, that the grant of such a monopoly was
harmless to society as "if the invention be good and as such is profitable to mankind,
[the inventor] ... will probably make a fortune by it; but if it be of no value he also will
reap no benefit." He continues, talking also of copyright, "[t]hese two privileges
therefore, as they can do no harm and may do some good, are not to be altogether
condemned. But there are few so harmless." 48 Therefore, despite long diatribe on the
evils of monopoly, Smith was prepared to accept that the patent grant was not only a
necessary, but also an economically justifiable, means to an end.
I\'Iill, equally forthright in his support for rewarding invention by grant of a temporary
monopoly, states in his Principles of Political Econornj: "That ... [the inventor] ought to be
both compensated and rewarded ... will not be denied ... it would be a gross
immorality in the law to set everybody free to use a person's work without his consent,
and without giving him an equivalent." 4' He also notes that pecuniary grants have, in
some cases, been made to the inventor, but considers that "in general an exclusive
privilege, of temporary duration is preferable; because it leaves nothing to any one's
discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends on the invention's being found
useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is paid by
the very persons to whom the service is rendered, the consumers of the commodity."
Therefore, whilst recognising that "the present Patent Laws [i.e. those of the early-to-
(Paris; 3t Ed, 1865) at 103. Also, Vicomte Dubouchage in the debate on the new French Patent Law,
Chambre des Pairs, séance du 24 Mars, 1842. Le Moniteur Universel, N°. 84, March 25, 1843, at 542.
46 Smith, The 112'ea/th of Nations, op cit. at 712 - at this point Smith is actually talking about grants of
temporary monopolies to joint stock companies, but continues "A temporary monopoly of this kind may
be vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its
inventor. .
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, op dl. at 83.
-' Ibid.
.19 Miii, Pthzce/es of PoliticalEconomy, op dt. at 932-3.
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mid19th century] need much improvement" 50, Mill was eminently satisfied of their
conceptual legitimacy as just reward within the free market economy.
Bentham adopts similar reasoning to justify patents on the basis of reward. 51 He divides
labour into two distinct subcategories: The first being the bodily energy employed in the
production of an effect; and the second, the skill or mental power displayed in the
exercise of the bodily act. "Mere labour, exclusive of skill, cannot be copied without
equal labour... skill, on the other hand, ... is ... capable of being indefinitely imbibed
and diffused ... without any exertion of mental labour comparable to that ... [by] which
it was acquired... A man will not be at the expence (sic) and trouble of bringing to
maturity an invention unless he has had a prospect of an adequate satisfaction." 52 He
then considers the various guises that this satisfaction may take: Viz.; reputation, the
possibility that the invention may be reliably kept secret, and the provision of some kind
of pecuniary reward. However, he concludes that none of these are possible in all
situations. Preferable, therefore, is the provision of temporary monopoly so that "all
persons but the author of an invention [are] excluded for a certain time from the liberty
of practising it". 53
 As, "[a] patent considered as a recompense for the encrease (sic)
given to the general stock of wealth by an invention, as a recompense for industry and
genius and ingenuity, is proportionate and essentially just. No other mode of
recompense can merit either one or the other epithet."54
Arguments based on the reward theory embodying the ideas of Smith, Mill and
Bentham became stock-in-trade for virtually every writer on the subject by the late
1850s. 55 However, as Dutton notes, for the "classical economists patents were not a
burning issue," 56 therefore we see only modest treatment of the system in the
contemporary texts. Indeed, the Political Economy Club, formed in 1821, which often
discussed "major contemporary issues, did not debate patents until late 1 854."
° Ibid. at 933.
See Bentham, Manual of Po/iticalEconomy, op cit. at 260-6 5.
52 Ibid. at 260-1.
Ibid. at 263.
' Ibid.
See Dutton, op cit. at 20; Machlup, op cit. at 23; and Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 21.
Dutton, op cit. at 20.
Ibid. at 30-1.
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However, this 'settled' view, that the inventor deserved reward and that the patent
system was the most economical method of providing it, was not without criticism:
"Geniuses, just as stars, must shine without pay," was a Swiss comment on this point.58
Further, the moral argument that inventors deserved to be rewarded for their
contributions to the progression of human knowledge did not go unquestioned. One
popular, and forceful, criticism of patent 'rewards' found its basis in the 'social origin
theory' of invention. Thus, Machiup & Penrose quote Ricardo as insisting that "nearly
all useful inventions depend less on any individual than on the progress of society" and
that therefore there is no need to "reward him who might be lucky enough to be the
first to hit on the thing required." 59 This criticism is also arguably in line with Kitch's
prospect theory of the patent system, discussed below, 60 which effectively analogises the
patent system and the mineral claim system, suggesting that inventions are somehow
'waiting to be found'.
Other critics did not deny that the inventor had a moral right to be rewarded for their
efforts, but stated that this reward would flow naturally, without the need for legal
intervention. Thus Schãffle, whilst supporting the provision of temporary monopoly
for the protection of literary property, denied the need for the same in respect of
inventions. He reasoned that the head start that the first user of an invention gained
within the market would, as a general rule, provide sufficient reward for the inventor.
This was, however, not the case in the book publishing business, where the speed with
which pirated editions could enter circulation rendered 'lead time' insufficient reward in
58 Taken from Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 17. They state that this quotation was "[c]ited disapprovingly
by Wilhelm Roscher, iystem der Volkswirt.cchafi (1881; "Nationalökonomik des Handels und
Gewerbefleisses", Stuttgart), Volume III, at 758."
See Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 18, also see Macblup, op cit. at 23; John Lewis Ricardo MP, in the
hearings of the Select Committee of the House of Lords; reported by The Economist (London), July 26,
1851.
( See text accompanying note 72 et seq. in Chapter V, below. Also Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent Sjstem, (1977) 20 Journal of Law & Economics 265.
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itself. 61 This theory gained widespread support within the abolitionists' camp during the
'Anti-Patent' debate of the late-I 9th century.62
However, not all opponents of the system were willing to trust the head start gained by
the inventor as guaranteeing sufficient remuneration to justify embarking on the
inventive process. Indeed, Macfie, perhaps the most vocal of the critics of the patent
system during the midtolate19th century, was of the opinion that the open market
could not be trusted to secure sufficient reward to the inventor to compensate him for
his time and effort. He opposed patents on a number of grounds, including: that they
hurt free trade; that too many obvious inventions are patented; that under the patent
system rewards rarely go to those who deserve them, and are never in proportion to
their contribution to the state of the art; and that a great number of patents are based
on old ideas or are useless. 63 However, Macfle was of the opinion that some kind of
reward was needed to compensate for the speed with which competition would act to
wipe out any profit that could be made from the innovation. He therefore proposed a
system of monetary reward by prize or bonus determined according to the social utility
of the invention as the best method of providing for the inventor. 64 Similarly, The
Economist supported the abolition of the patent monopoly and suggested instigating a
system of direct monetary grant in its place, stating; "... what the community requires
is, that inventors be rewarded; that skillful (sic) men who contribute to the progress of
society shall be well paid for their exertions. The Patent Laws are supported because it
is erroneously supposed that they are a means to this end."65
6! See Schäffle, Die Nationalbleononomische Theorie der Ausschliessenden Absatverhältnisse, (1873; Tubingen) at
141 and 150. Distilled from Machiup & Penrose, op rit. at 18; and Machiup, op cit. at 23.
62 See comments to this end in Machiup & Penrose, op rit. at 18.
63 See Macfle, The Patent .Question under Free Trade: A Solution of the Dfflculties /,j Abolishing or Shortening the
Inventor's Monopa'y and Institnting National Recompenses, (1863; W. Johnson, London; 2h1d Ed); also Macfie,
Recent Discussions on the Abolition of Patentsfor Inventions, (1869; Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, London);
see also Oppenheim, Robert Andrew Mafie, Patents, Copyrzght, Libraries and Le,gal Deposit, [19987 IPQ 383; and
Machiup, op rit. at 23.
64 See especially Macfin, The Patent Question under Free Trade, ibid. Such a system is akin to that adopted
under Communist rule in the Eastern Bloc whereby the ownership of inventions was swapped for
inventor's certificates and a monetary reward.
65 The EconomisA (London),July 26, 1851. Quoted from Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 19.
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Despite rational and cogent dissent, Mill, Smith and Bentham's economic arguments
eventually won the day, 66 as it was considered that to reward the inventor with monetary
bonuses would inject partiality or even corruption into the mix by giving, in essence,
discretionary power to administrators. However, the simple fact that a proposal to
hand out money did not win huge support, and thus close the debate, adds little to the
argument that the provision of temporary monopoly can be justified on the basis that it
rewards the inventor. At best all that can be said is that such means are not less
favourable than a system of monetary grant. However, it should be clear from the
foregoing discussion that the provision of monopoly power as reward to the inventor
can be attacked on a number of fronts. Furthermore, the argument that a prize of any
kind was required found criticism on grounds that it was often not the person most
deserving of recompense that actually received it (whatever it may be) and that it was, in
actual fact, impossible to apportion reward accurately with respect to the services
rendered. 67 The patent system, as it stood, attracted further complaint, as it was
impossible to prevent injury being inflicted upon others by restriction of their right to
pursue inventive endeavours in areas protected by patents.68
The reward theory, as a justification for the patent system, also raises a number of
further questions that are difficult to answer and which potentially prejudice its validity.
First, if the inventor is being rewarded, what are they actually being rewarded for? What
is the rationale for being given monopoly privilege? If the patent is granted for their
labour then this returns us to the Lockean construct of property based on the natural
rights of the author, and, as has been noted, this is not a concept that many take
seriously. If the patentee is rewarded for having a good idea then this moves us to ask
why it is only the first to take their invention to the Patent Office that receives the
reward? What is there in the nature of invention that makes independent re-creation
less worthy than the initial creation? As Sir Roundell Palmer stated before the 1871
Select Committee: "The knowledge used by inventors is like air, or light, or whatever
else is universal and simultaneously capable of enjoyment by all."69 Therefore, why, if
66 Or at least did not lose.
67 See, for example, the speech of Lord Stanley (chairman of the Royal Commission that inquired into the
patent system in 1863-5) in the House of Commons, May 28, 1868. Reproduced in Macfie, Recent
Discussions on the Abolition of Patents for Inventions, op cit. at lii; Also Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 20.
68 Macfie, Ibid.
69 Report of the 1871 Select Committee, op cit. at 690.
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the knowledge is such a resource, should only the first person to come up with an idea
be rewarded for it? This collision between theory and reality within the system simply
did not make sense.
Therefore, as Machiup & Penrose state: "If the patent system could not be credited
with meeting the demands of distributive justice, it was still possible to defend it, not on
the ground of justice, but on the ground of its social usefulness." 70
 Thus we are
brought to our third possible justification for the patent system, the incentive to invent.
The 'Incentive to Invent' Theory
The 'incentive' thesis is primarily economic in its nature, and therefore lies independent
of the question of whether justice calls for inventors to be rewarded for their efforts.
Whilst the hope for a just reward can, in itse1f act as an incentive, it has been noted that
it is often the case that a simple reward will not be sufficiently attractive to promote
technological progress. 71 The 'incentive' theory therefore posits that in order for
inventive activity to be maximised it is necessary to offer bait as well as simple reward.
Its focus is therefore not on the inventor per Se, but rather on a series of assumptions
concerning the basic economics of the inventive process. The economic arguments
underpinning the creation and sustenance of a system of temporary monopoly in
inventions is a topic that is discussed more fully below, 72 the present discourse is
therefore limited to the more superficial elements of the logical analysis.
The apparent nexus between the patent system and economic development, which
paints patents as a "lever of industrial progress", 73
 has enchanted proponents of the
system since the theory was first advanced, and has undoubtedly been a factor in its
becoming "probably the most quoted argument in favour of patents." 74 Indeed,
Abraham Lincoln famously wrote, "the patent system added the fuel of interest to the
70 I'vlachlup & Penrose, op cit. at 20.
' See, for example, Machiup, op üt. at 23; Machiup & Penrose, op dt. at 21, and Dutton, op dt. at 21.
72 See Chapter V, below.
Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 21.
Dutton, op cit. at 20.
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fire of genius" 75 , and Chitty said that it was the most effective means of encouraging the
"production of GENIUS."76
The rapid industrialisation of England and the U.S.A. were often utilised as cases-in-
point to attest to the success of the patent system in promoting technical progression.77
The argument was simple. As a matter of historical fact, by the end of the Industrial
Revolution England had become the first global 'superpower' with Empire covering
close to a quarter of the planet. England had a patent system during this time and, it
was therefore but a short leap of faith to infer a causal relation between the two. Thus
Price, writing at the beginning of the 20th century was able to conclude that the
monopoly policy, which began under Elizabeth, had, despite its problems, produced a
"system of patents for the effective encouragement of invention."78
However, as with any theoretical justification of the patent system, the 'incentive'
argument attracted its share of criticism, not least that based on an equally logical
inference between the technological progression of Germany and Switzerland and the
fact that they respectively offered little or no patent protection at this time. 79 Indeed,
some commentators suggested that the development of English industry had occurred
in spite of the patent system, but remarked that this development was less than it would
have been in its absence.SU The accuracy of this, or indeed the contrary conclusion, is
Lincoln, Discoveries, Inventions, and Improvements (1859) In the Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln (1905;
Francis D. Tandy Co, New York; 3rd Ed.) Volume 5, at 113.
76 Chitty, A Treatise on the Laws of Commerce and Manufactures, and the contracts relatinS thereto, (1820-24; Henry
Butterworth, London) Volume I, at 6. Quoted from Dutton, op dt. at 21 (emphasis in source).
See Machiup & Penrose, op rit. at 21.
78 Emphasis added. See Price, The E,glish Patents of Monopo4' (1913; Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(Mass)) at 131.
See, for example, Böhmert, "Die Erfmdurigspatente nach volkswirtschaftlichen Grundsätzen und
Industriellen Erfahrungen: mit besonderer Rücksicht auf England und die Schwei", Vier/eljahrschnft für
Volkswirthschaft und Kultutgeschichte, Siebenter Jahrgang (1869) XXV, at 48. Taken from Machiup &
Penrose, op at. at 21.
° See Böhmert, op at. at 79. Taken from Machlup & Penrose, op t. at 21. See also the remarks of the
Times newspaper of 19th1 December 1850 "The more we investigate, the more certain will be our
conclusion and belief that we are a great and prosperous people, not in consequence but in spite of the
legal system under which we live." Quoted from Coulter, op cit. at 41.
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impossible to judge as both are based on a logical analysis of the facts as presented, the
gaps, as they are, filled with reasoned conjecture.
Whichever statement holds the greater grain of truth, the 'incentive' theory has
weathered the years well, often being uttered in the same breath as the reward theory as
an accepted justification underpinning the patent system. Despite having been criticised
as an overly simplistic analysis as far as the modern economics of the patent system is
concerned,81 it is an argument that is still routinely utilised to justify the system today by
Parliamentary Conmtittees, 82 academics,83 and the courts.84
When used as an explanation of the beneficial effects of patents, the theory balances
upon a number of assumptions, these can be succinctly summarised as follows. First,
i See, for example, Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and Patent Law, (1991)
5 Journal of Economic Persiectives 29 (hereinafter Scotchmer, Giants.
82 See The British Patent 3ystem: Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent Sjistem and Patent Law (The Banks
Committee), (July 1970) Cmnd. 4407 at 1, "The primary intention of the patent system is the
encouragement of new industries in the country."
83 See, for example Turner, The Patent Sjistem and Competitive Polii, (1969) 44 NYU L Rev. 451; Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent system, (1977) 20 Journal of Law & Economics 265; Taylor & Silberston, op dt.
Ch. 2; This argument is implicit in the treatment of the system by Merges & Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, (1990) 90 Colombia Law Review 839; Dam, The Economic Underpinnin,gs of Patent Law,
(1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247; and Maskus, Intellectual Propery Rtghts and Economic Development; (2000,)
32 Case Western Reserm Journal of International Law 471 at 473 to name but a few.
84 A brief perusal of recent cases provides ample support for this proposition. See, for example, the
comments of Lord Oliver in Asahi Kasei Koo, [1991] RPC 485 at 523 where he states that: "The
underlying purpose of the patent system is the encouragement of improvements and innovation."
Further the Court of Session (Outer House) has explained: "The primary purpose of the patent system is
to encourage the development and exploitation of new ideas." Goddin and Rennie's Application, p19961 RPC
141 at 161. The view of the Patent Office is strikingly similar. "The patent system has hitherto
constituted the best tool to encourage research." - in Research Corp's Supplementay Protection Cer4ficate,
[1994] RPC 387 at 398. Most recently, Jacob J has stated that ". . .patents are provided to encourage
research." - Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v Instituto Gentili SpA, [20031 FSR 498. American judicial
opinion is apt to voice this justification slightly more vociferously: "Strong patent protection is key to
encouraging innovation, economic growth, and American competitiveness" per Circuit Judge Linn in the
en banc decision of the CAFC in Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinoku Ko,gyo Kabushiki Co, 234 F.3d 558
(2000, CAFC, en banc) at 621. Further, see Loctite Corp. u. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (1985, CAFC) at 876-
7 "... the purpose of the patent system is to encourage innovation and its fruits." Quoted with approval
in Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (1999, CAFC) at 1362.
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that growth and industrial progress is socially desirable. Second, that invention is
necessary for this progress. Third, that the level of invention will be sub-optimal
without incentives, and finally that patents are the cheapest and most effective way in
which these incentives can be provided.85
The first two of these assumptions are wholly uncontentious, being readily accepted by
both sides in the 'Anti-Patent' debate. In this context, it should be noted that the
'abolitionists' never advocated a Luddite philosophy, but rather insisted that, far from
encouraging invention and economic growth, the system acted only to stifle
technological progress. Therefore, the opposition can be grouped into those who
disagreed with one, or both, of the latter assumptions.86
The argument that there will be sub-optimal levels of invention in the absence of
incentives can be traced to the policy behind the establishment of the Eli2abethan
patent custom. It will be recalled that the pro-activity of the Crown at this time was a
product of concern over securing improvement of the Realm, and that early grants of
patent privilege were aimed at those industries featuring most prominently on the list of
imports. 87
 The majority of abolitionists did not seek to contest this pedigree, conceding
that artificial incentives may well have been necessary in pre-industrial Britain.
However, times had changed, and by the mid19th century not everyone saw invention
as a creature in need of nurturing. As Coulter states: "Rather than deny the historical
utility of the patent grant altogether, they [the abolitionists] argued that patents had
served their purpose and now could safely be dispensed with." 88 Thus, Macfie is quoted
as saying that: "The wisdom of our ancestors is not discredited, when, now that
circumstances have completely changed, we abandon a system of restraint that is no
longer tenable."89
85 See Machiup & Penrose, op üt. at 21; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part IV,), op dt. at 105 omits the final
point in his list; Dutton, op cit. at 20, simply states that the theory "... assumes that the supply of
invention (which was also assumed to be a major cause of growth) would be less than it would otherwise
be if patents were not used to protect the inventor."
86 The legitimacy of these assumptions is considered in more detail in Chapters IV & V, below.
87 See further Chapter II, above. Also MacLeod, Industrial Revolution, op rit. at 12.
88 Coulter, op t. at 89.
89 Macfie, Patent Questions under Free-Trade, op it. at iv; see also Coulter, op rit. at 89.
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Therefore, some abolitionists, and even some supporters of the system who felt able to
justify it on different grounds, attacked the idea that there was a need to stimulate
mvention. Sir William Armstrong, president of the British Association for the
Advancement of Science in 1863 is reported as saying that "the seeds of invention exist,
as it were, in the air, ready to germinate whenever suitable conditions arise, and no
legislative interference is needed to ensure their growth in proper season." 9° A number
of contemporary patent agents, it seems, also shared this view. One is quoted as saying
that "A man of true genius can no more resist the exercise of his genius than he can
resist the growth of his body ... nearly all those [inventions] deserving the name of
"great" ... have been made without any regard to, or stimulus from the existence of
Patent Law." 91 Macfie comments on this quote by asking: "If this is true of great
inventions, how much more must it be of small ones?" 92 Furthermore, Turner, whist
justifying the patent system on natural rights grounds, felt unable to accept that any
incentive was required to induce invention. The inventive process, he stated, was a
product of "a taste for experiment, a love of trying" that was characteristic of the
English psyche, there was therefore no need for State intervention to promote such
activity. 93 This was a view shared by William Cubitt, President of the Institute of Civil
Engineers, who said of invention: "I think people will always invent anything that is
useful and good, if it will answer their purpose to do so, even without reference to a
patent."94
Such views did not, however, go unchallenged. "That some men could not help
inventing might be true," noted Aston, a patent attorney, in his Paper on the Patent Laws,
The opening address of the president, Report of the jYd Meeting of the British A ssociation for the Advancement
of Science, (1864; London) at lii. Quoted from Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 22.
91 Reproduction of a letter by the author of '..4 Popular Treatise on the Patent Laws' reprinted from the
North British Daily Mail February 2" 1875, in Macfie, The Patent .Question in 1875, (1875; Longmans,
Green & Go, London) at 46.
92 Macfie, The PatentQuestion in 1875, ibid. at ix.
° Turner, Counsel to inventors of Improvements in the Usefu/Arts, op cit. at 4; Quoted from Coulter, op cit. at 80
See Report and Minutes of evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to consider of the
Bill, intituled, 'An Act tvfiirther amend the Law touching Letters Patent for Inventions" and a/so of the Bill, intituled,
'An A ctfor the furtherAmeudment of the Law touchin8 Letters Patentfor Inventions"and to report thereon to the House,
1851, (Report of the 1851 Select Committee) House of Commons Sessional Papers, Vol. XVIII (Command
Paper Nc 486) at 456.
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"but as a rule men invent as they do other work, they invent to live or help them live."95
Further, in his testimony to the 1851 Select Committee on Patents, Carpmael argued
that, all of the steps in the "history of the whole of manufactures of this country
have been founded upon patents from the earliest date up to the present time ... the
whole system is built upon patents."96
 The supporter's arguments were also greatly
bolstered by the fact that they could provide at least two concrete examples of foreign
inventors bringing their inventions and expertise to Britain solely because of the patent
system. In testimony before the 1871 Select Committee, for instance, Bessemer, the
German born inventor of a revolutionary steel-making process that bears his name, told
those gathered that he brought his invention to Britain because he was able to patent it
here. 97 Furthermore, Isaac Holden, in evidence before the same Committee, gave the
example of Switzerland, "where there is no patent law whatever of any kind, [and therel
industry makes no progress, and the people are unemployed."98
A year later, before the 1872 Select Committee, the tide of opinion was even stronger,
with Siemens, celebrated foreign inventor, Fellow of the Royal Society, and President of
the Institute of Mechanical Engineers also testifying to the end that the patent system
was responsible for his presence in Britain. It was, he said, "the fact of there being no
properly understood and regulated Patent Law in Germany [that] induced me to come
over to this country and make this my real home."99
Most critics of the patent system at this time did not, however, go as far as Armstrong et
aL 1 and make such forthright pronouncements on the nature of the inventive process.
Even Macfie, by proposing a system of monetary awards in place of the patent system,
"demonstrated that he was as capable as his opponents of making exceptions to the
general rule of laissez-faire: while they disallowed monopolies but allowed patents, he
disallowed patents but allowed cash subsidies." 101 It will therefore come as no surprise
' Aston, A Paper on the Patent Laws, (1870; Manchester Insdtute of Engineers, Manchester) at 12-13;
Quoted from Coulter, op dt. at 92.
° See Report of the 1851 Select Committee, op cit. at 281. See also Coulter, op cit. at 52.
See Report of the 1871 Select Committee, op t. at 746-62.
98 Ibid. at 764.
' Report of the 1872 Select Committee, op dt. at 433.
100 See text accompanying note 90, etseq., above.
See Coulter, op dt. at 98.
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to the reader that the last of the above propositions, 102 was attacked on identical
grounds to the grant of temporary monopoly as a reward to the inventor; i.e. that there
are better, less harmful methods available.
Even if it is accepted that patents can be effective incentives for inducing inventive
activity, it requires a certain leap of faith to move between this assertion and a statement
that they are necessay to procure an adequate level of invention. As Walters cheid states:
believing that the "supply of invention would be less than it would otherwise be if
patents were not used to protect the inventor ... was one thing and proving it was
another, but few bothered with any attempted proof." 103 Thus the literature is littered
with bold assertions of principle on one side of the debate or the other. The
vehemently pro-patent lobby based their arguments on the theoretical musings of Mill
and Bentham, that patents produced "infinite effect and cost nothing". Taking more of
a middle ground were those who argued that whilst patents were not totally free of
social cost, the benefit that they provided far outweighed any such considerations. At
the other end of the spectrum, others, such as Macfle, argued that monetary awards
were more efficacious and socially cheaper incentives than patents.104
Bentham's bold assertion of the great social value of the patent system and the absence
of any associated social costs is not, it is respectfully submitted, a view that fmds much,
if any, grounding in truth. At even the most elementary level it will be appreciated that
the patent system is not devoid of such burdens. Indeed, the view that patents 'cost
nothing' is not a view that was accepted by the various Royal Commissions and Select
Committees appointed in the latter-half of the 19th century to examine the question in
detail. Instead they concluded that the heavy social costs associated with the operation
of the laws were an unavoidable by-product of their existence.° 5 This is not to say that
11)2 That patents are the cheapest and most effective incentives to invent.
103 Walterscheid, Antecedents JJ/ op dt. at 105.
104 Macfie, The Pateiitfuestion under Free Trade, (1864; Unknown, London; 2fll Ed) at 29; See also Machlup
& Penrose, op czt. at 22.
105 See, for example, the closing comments of the Royal Commission of 1863 where it is stated that "the
inconveniences now generally complained of as incident to the working of the Patent Laws ... cannot be
wholly removed. They are ... inherent in the nature of a Patent Law, and must be considered as the price
which the public consent to pay for the existence of such a law." Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire
i/ito the W"orIeing of the Law Re/a/in8 to Letters Patentfor Inventions 1864 (Command Paper N 3419).
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they are therefore without justification, quite the contrary, it simply serves to divert
attention from bold policy considerations to more concrete comparison between the
social costs and benefits of the system.
Thus Grove QC, an ardent abolitionist, when called to give evidence to the 1871 Select
Committee on Patents, stated that "the sole ground on which letters patent can be held
to be justifiable or permissible, is that they are beneficial to the public. If they are, and,
so far as they are, keep them; if they are not, abolish them."106 He concluded that
patents were not.
According to the abolitionists the patent system failed to satisfy the public benefit
criteria on a number of grounds. Macfie, as ever, was highly vocal in his condemnation,
stating that the provision of royalties to an inventor effectively resulted in taxation of
the public due to the associated increase in prices. 107 Another commonly voiced
concern was that the uncertainty of the patent grant, when combined with the
prohibitive cost of securing protection, rendered the system at best a lottery and at
worst an elaborate mechanism designed to swindle the unwary.WO It should be noted
that this criticism was also one used by those on the other side of the debate in order to
justify amendment of the system, although the injustices were not painted quite so
graphically.
In addition to questions raised about the efficacy of the patent system in promoting
invention per se, some contemporary commentators further inquired into the roots of its
function, examining if indeed it did promote such activity. In short they asked if there
was an additional social cost associated with the fact that incentives were given to
invent. Where, in reality, did the resources diverted to the inventive process by the bait
of the patent system actually come from? And was their re-diversion economically
justifiable?
106 Report of the 1871 Select Committee, op cit. at 7.
107 See, for example, Macfie, 6'ries in a Crisisfor Statesmanship Popular and Patriotic to Test and Contest Free-Trade
in ourManufactures, (1881; Edward Stanford, London) at 30.
108 This opmion is amply illustrated by reference to the evidence placed before the 1829 Select
Committee. See Report of the Select Committee on the Law Relative to Patents for Inventions (1829) Parliamentary
Papers III (Command Paper No 332).
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This argument, that the inevitable effect of the patent system was to divert existing
activities from areas where they might most benefit into areas in which they would be
most profitable, became one of the mainstays of the abolitionists' arsenal. It provided
the campaign against patents a sound economic platform from which to launch their
assault. As Prince-Smith said, patents "do not promote inventive activity ... they
merely steer it into uneconomic channels".'°9 It is a simple argument with a great deal
of emotive strength; moreover, it is an argument that is difficult to defend against.
However, it is also an argument concerning damage that it impossible to quantify and
therefore other, more tangible factors, came to be counted at the fore.
Amongst the most touted of these was the bureaucratic cost of administering the
system, "the court personnel, lawyers, agents, and others engaged in prosecuting patent
applications and litigations." 11° However, far more pernicious was the suggestion that
the mere existence of the patent system was enough to discourage improvement as the
fear of being charged with infringement c(haunt[ed] the potential user of new technology
and discourage[d] him from attempting to improve his technique." 111 Indeed, even
Bmnel complained that he cld hardly introduce the slightest improvement in [his
own] machinery without being stopped by a patent."112 Therefore, one of the strongest
arguments of the pro-patent lobby, that patents were acceptable, as they did not deprive
the public of anything that they formerly had enjoyed, now attracted criticism. The
patent system, the abolitionists cried, served to rob the inventor of the opportunity to
evolve and improve upon their inventions. Furthermore, there was a distinct possibility
that more than one inventor may have been working towards the same goal, only for
the first to get to the patent office to be given a monopoly to the exclusion of the
others. The fact that "[y]ou can never prove that some other persons have not already
invented, or will not soon invent, anything that is the subject matter of a patent"113
meant that the monopoly served to exclude the public from using the same idea as the
109 Prince-Smith, "Ueber Patente für ErJlndunsen' Vierteljahrschrift für Volksswirthschichte, Volume III, at
161. Quoted from Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 23.
lit) Taken from Machiup & Penrose, op t. at 23.
111 Batzel, Legal Monopo/y in Liberal England: The Patent Controvery in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, LL2W
Business Histon 189 at 191, referencing Hawes, On the Manufacture of Soap, (1856) IV Journal of the Soeof
Am 320.
112 See Select Committee on Patents 1851 at 248.
113 Macfie, The Patent uestion in 1875, op t. at 32.
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patentee had. 114 The Economist led the charge by stating that "[o]n all inventors [a
patent] ... is especially a prohibition to exercise their faculties; and ... it is an
impediment to the general advancement [of society] with which it is the duty of the
legislature not to interfere"115
The actual economic costs of these public disincentives of the patent system are
difficult to gauge, and it adds little to our discussion to enter into detailed analysis of the
pros and cons of the system extant in the late-I 9th century. At the time these arguments
were first voiced the institutional structure of the grant was very different to that of
today. Further, the doctrine of precedent was still in its infancy, not yet fully augmented
by the systematic reporting of cases. Litigating a patent was a highly dangerous and
costly process, a voyage only embarked upon by the bold or the reckless. The judiciary
was considered to be distinctly anti-patent and the specification, although over 100
years old by the midl9th century, was still underdeveloped. However, the
commentators of the time raised many objections to the patent system that were not
based on administrative inefficiency or judicial hostility, but which had their footing in a
heartfelt distrust of the patent system per Se. Many of these arguments are no less
relevant now as criticisms pertaining to the philosophical justifications of the system
than they were when Macfle was writing. Indeed, the modern economic literature has
recently returned to the 'old' arguments and finally begun to acknowledge the true
complexity of the problem; that the patent system not only acts as an incentive to
invent, but also acts to block invention.°
Realisation that the system could act as both incentive and dis-incentive to invent added
serious weight to the abolitionists' arguments that the social costs of the system
outweighed its benefits. If it could not be said with any certainty that the 'carrot on a
stick' approach was efficacious in procuring invention where there would otherwise be
none then, it was argued, the system not only harmed progress, but also charged the
public for the privilege!
See Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 24.
The Economist, February 1 1851. Quoted in Machiup & Penrose, op t. at 24.
116 See, for example, Scotchmer, Giants, op *.
91
It should be noted, however, that at the time that these arguments were first advanced
there was still a strong attachment to the image of the inventor as a hero. 117 The idea of
the inventor as an individual, working alone in his workshop, who could not help but
invent and whose driving force was the desire to aid the progression of the Empire, was
strong. Stories of achievement in the face of adversity were commonplace. Figures
such as Watt and Brunel in England, and Edison and Whitney in the U.S. were
prominent role models to be emulated. The country was still riding high on the crest of
the Industrial Revolution and had not yet reached the point where corporate research
and development had seized the day. Therefore, it is hardly surprising, as Machiup &
Penrose simply state, "that the function of the patent as a stimulus to the inventor's
financier was not given ... the full emphasis that it now has." 118 The significance of this
point is enhanced by the realisation that the cost of obtaining and defending a patent
was so prohibitive that "[t]o make the property worth anything, a capitalist must take it
up; but the capitalist, in doing so, stipulates for the lion's share of the profit. Probably
in nineiy-nine cases out of a hundred the reward was obtained by such speculators, and
not by inventors." 11 ' Therefore, to quote Bentham slightly out of context: As "he who
has no hope that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow," 12' the logical
conclusion drawn from the practical cost of the patenting process was that it could not
actually perform to induce invention.
Furthermore, the incentive thesis in its raw, pre-modern, form can only act as
justification for those inventions actually induced by the offer of a patent. A causal
relationship is required: But for the patent system, the invention would not have been
made. Strict interpretation of this requirement focuses attention on the motivation
behind the invention and necessitates the removal of protection from serendipitous or
accidental creations. It should be noted that when these arguments were first advanced
the process of invention was poorly understood. The inventor was, by-and-large, an
individual and this is reflected in contemporary writing. References are found to
invention only; innovation, investment in research and development, the process of
117 See MacLeod, Concepts of Invention and the Patent Controverg in Victorian Britain, in Robert Fox (ed.),
Techno/ogical Change: Methods and Themes in the Histo0i of Tecbno/o, (1996; Harwood Academic Press,
Australia) (hereinafter MacLeod, Concepts of Invention) , at 137.
118 Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 25.
119 The Spectator,June 5tl 1869; Quoted from Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 25.
120 Bentham, The Works ofJeremji Bentham, (1843, William Tait, Edinburgh) Volume III, at 71.
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inventing inventions, was an alien concept. Indeed, it is only at the beginning of the
20th century, due to the work of some highly influential economists 121 , that we begin to
see understanding unfold. It is at this point that we can observe the promotion of
innovation, giving it primacy over invention, placing it at the centre of a modern
appreciation of the system. It is this distinction between the act of invention and the
inventive process itself that distinguishes the classical from the modern incentive
theoty. However, for the present our discussion is limited to consideration of the
classical incentive to invent.
The combined weight of these arguments may well have been fatal to any attempt to
preserve the patent system as it stood, however, as already noted no one who took part
in the highly public debate actually advocated maintaining the status quo. 123 Instead, the
'pro-reform' lobby used the argument to strengthen their calls for improvement of the
administration of the system and to reduce the attendant costs. Also instrumental was
the increased appreciation of the social contract theory of patent protection - that the
patent could be seen as a bargain struck between the inventor and the public whereby
monopoly was traded for knowledge. Thus, we arrive at our final justification of the
patent system, that it is the best incentive to disclose secrets.
The 'Exchange for Secrets' Theory
The idea of the patent as a contract between the public (represented by the Crown) and
the inventor, is a theory that can be traced back to the 'working' clauses often inserted
into Elizabethan patent grants. 124 The notion of such a bargain gained strength from
the emergence of the specification in the 8°' century, and was a trump card played by
121 Such as Schumpeter, Theoy of Economic Development, (1936; Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(Mass)).
122 The modern, or post-classical, theory is discussed in Chapter V, below.
123 Not strictly true. William Carpmael, it appears, was (according to the evidence of Thomas Webster at
the 1851 Select Committee) "almost singular" in his defence of the system as it stood. He opposed
change on a number of grounds, insisting that high fees kept down the number of frivolous patents. He
was also "sceptical of the value of indexes and abstracts, dubious of the necessity for commissioners, and
critical of the Designs Act Extension Bill, which, in his opinion, had only increased the amount of
paperwork accompanying every application for protection." Coulter, op it. at 52; see also the testimony
of Carpmael before the 1851 Select Committee, op dt. at 265-317; and his testimony before the Royal
Commission of 1864, op cit. at 354-73.
124 Discussed in Chapter II, above.
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proponents of the system during the 'Anti-Patent' deba te. Three of the main treatises
extant at the beginning of the crisis, those of Carpmael,' 25 Hindmarch, 12° and Spence,'27
emphasised the contractual nature of the patent grant. Thus in Carpmael's Livv of
Patents for Inventions, FarniIiary E.pIained, he states that the possibility of gaining a patent
was:
"... a great incentive to the exertion of ingenuity; as the ... [patentee] found
themselves rewarded for their labour ... and the public were ultimately benefited by
being made acquainted with the means of producing the invention, which became
public property at the expiration of the term of the grant, or earlier."128
As Coulter states, this view of the patent as a bargain accorded with both the common
law and the 'exchange' arguments of the classical economists. "Any restrictions that the
patent placed upon use of the new manufacture ... were temporary ones acceded to by
the public in return for the public in return for the information contained in the written
specification."129
Hindmarch reiterated this point, rationalising that the only way in which the patentee
could have exclusive property in his invention, once it was made public, was by the
application of some positive law made with the actual or implied consent of the whole
community.' 3° Such consent was deemed to exist because of the benefits accruing to
society from the publication of the invention where it might once have remained
secret. 131 His authority for this conclusion came from the case of Cartwrz.ght v Earner132 in
which Eldon L.C.J. (as he was then) opined that the patent grant should not be
considered "in the light of a monopoly, as it had before been put by the judges, but as a
125 Carpmael, The Law of Patents for Inventions, Familiar/y Explained, for the use of Inventors and Patentees, (1832;
G. Wightman, London).
126 I-Iindmarch, Treatise on the Law Relating to Patent Privileges for the Sole Use of Inventions, (1846; V&R Stevens,
G.S. Norton, and W. Benning & Co., London).
127 Spence, A Treatise on the Principles Relating to the Specification of a Patent for Invention, (1847; V&R Stevens,
and G.S. Norton, London).
128 Carpmael, The Law of Patentsfor Inventions, op cit. at 3. Quoted from Coulter, op cit. at 78.
129 Coulter, op cit. at 78. For a modern appreciation of the information function patents see Beier &
Straus, The Patent .System and its Information Function - Yesterdqy and Todqy, (1977) 8 IIC 387.
131) Hindmarch was at pains to point out that patents, regardless of their social utility, were not a natural
right of the inventor, rather they were a "matter of favour".
131 See Hindmarch, Treatise on the Law Relating to Patent Privileges, op cit. at 1; see also Coulter, op cit. at 79.
132 This case is referred to in HarmervPlane, 14 Ves. Uu,z)_131 (1807).
94
bargain with the public." 133 Therefore the question that should be asked of a particular
specification in order that the patent is good was whether it "is such that a mechanist
can make the machine from the description there given."
Like Hindmarch, Spence cited Cartwright v Earner in support of his proposition that the
specification was the consideration that the patentee provided for his bargain with the
State, and which must therefore be "judged on good faith".' 34 Coulter notes that
Spence took this requirement very seriously, not only on legal, but also moral grounds;
"warning against a deterioration of inward character that would surely result, whatever
pecuniary award might be secured, from acting in bad faith."135
The 'exchange' theory as an example of the 'social contract' nature of the patent grant
shares some roots with the incentive to invent. Indeed, it was often the case that they
were deployed together as twinned justifications, two sides of the same coin. Lord
Granvilie, speaking in the House of Lords Debate on the Patent Law Amendment (N°
3) Bill 1851, did just this. He stated that "the only principle on which patents could be
justified was, that the patent was a bargain between the inventor and the public, by
which the inventor was encouraged to make inventions, and afterwards encouraged to
make them known to the whole world." GranviJie, however, was in favour of abolition
and concluded that in the "present state of the world" there was no need to offer such
incentives, as "to scheme and invent was almost a madness with some people". 136
By eliding the justifications in this manner, it is submitted that his Lordship missed the
main point of the argument: the incentive to disclose is discrete of the incentive to
invent. For, whilst it is common ground between the theses, for instance, that
technological progress and industrial growth are socially desirable and that invention is
necessary for this progress, crucially they differ in their expectations and estimations of
the inventor. Both the reward and the incentive theses suffered at the hands of the
133 See the statement of Romilly and Scott, counsel for the plaintiff in Harrner v Plane, ibid. at 131. Eldon's
judgment in Harmer v Plane ends with his statement that "I adhere to the law, as I stated it in the case of
Cartwrght v Earner" ibid. at 136.
l'l Per Eldon, LC.J., in Cartwright v Earner.
n Coulter, op cit. at 80.
136 See the speech of Lord Granville in the Lords' Debate of the Patents Bill 1851, Hansard (3rd Series),
Volume 118, Cols. 12-17 for these quotes.
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abolitionists' pre-conception that invention was, in essence, discovery. Viewing the
inventive process in this way enabled opponents of the system to turn the argument
that the patentee was owed by society for his intellectual expenditure around so that the
patentee now owed society an "intellectual debt".137
 As Stirling, a Glasgow
manufacturer, stated: the "inventor has the benefit of all foregone human thought, of all
existing civilisation. He has the unbought advantage of all laws, all language, all
philosophy. He has the free use of all methods and appliances, spiritual and material,
which have been painfully elaborated by the thinkers and workers of all time. Why,
then, should he alone have an exclusive privilege in respect of the infinitesimal addition
which he makes to the work of ages?"138
The exchange theory enabled the pro-patent lobby to side-step this difference in views
and to say that even if the abolitionists' view of invention was correct, the patent system
could still be supported on the ground that it encouraged the dissemination of
knowledge. It did not matter about the 'whys and wherefores' of the inventive process,
the important thing was that without some incentive the inventions that contributed to
the technical prowess of the nation, of which all were so proud, would go to the grave
with their creators. The patent, it was argued, should not, therefore, be seen as a
privilege, but rather as the result of a bargain between the inventor and the State,
whereby the inventor agreed to tell the world of his invention in return for a temporary
monopoly. 139 Put simply, a "patent is the price of disclosure".°
Predictably, the argument did not proceed unchallenged. The Economist for example,
doubted that the technological progress of the State would be at all harmed if inventors
were not encouraged to disclose their inventions as "nearly all useful inventions depend
137 See Coulter, o dt. at 85.
138 Quoted in Macfie, Recent Discussions on theAbolition of Patents, op at. at 119. See also Coulter, op cit. at 86.
139 See further, Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 26; Dutton, op dt. at 22, Machlup, op dt. at 24 and Coulter, op
cit. at 94-5.
14(1 Dutton, op dt. at 22, attributes this quote to the testimony of John Farey before the 1829 Select
Committee, at page 21 of the report. Although Farey's testimony appears at this page the quote does not.
On the following page, however, when discussing the priority of two competing applications, Farey is
reported as saying: "The first applicant who is able, and willing, to make disclosure of the secret, ought to
have the patent, that is to be given as the price of such disclosure." Report of/he 1829 Select Committee on the
Law Relative to Patentsfor Inventions, op cit. at 22. It is assumed that Duttori was misquoting this reference.
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less on any individual than on the progress of society." 141 In making this point the
abolitionists aimed to distinguish the patent system from copyright, which the literary
property debate of the late-I 8t1 century had settled as intrinsically valid. Thus, Rogers,
dismissed the claim "that literary works and inventive adaptations are identical in their
nature ... each literary work is a unique creation, capable of disdnct appropriation and
limitation. . ." inventions, on the other hand, lacked the required uniqueness.'42
Therefore, the counter-argument went, if an inventor wished to keep his creation secret,
so be it, it would not be long before another made the discovery and bought the
innovation to the masses. Such an argument is, however, dependent not only upon the
view that inventions exist in the ether, waiting to be made, but also the assumption that
the next person to 'invent' the same improvement would choose, or be forced, to make
it public. Whilst the probability of the invention moving to the public domain will
increase with the number of people practising it, it is still far from certain, in the
absence of any incentive, that such a move will be made, especially if it can be
effectively concealed.
Critics of the theory argued that an invention would inevitably leak to the public even if
its creator tried to keep it secret. They stressed the difficulty of maintaining secrecy,
suggesting it was so great that, under the social contract theory, protection was given for
nothing in return. The difficulty of keeping most inventions secret was a point that had
previously been utilised by the those in favour of the system in order to justify its
existence. Indeed, even with patent protection in Britain there was considerable
concern, justifiably so, that patented technology would be stolen and sold to foreign
industry who did not have to abide by such laws, and who could then undercut British
manufacturers. 143 Supporters of the system had cited the ease with which competitors
could adopt unprotected technology and thereby profit from the 'true' inventor's
' The Economist,July 26, 1851; Quoted from Machiup & Penrose, op t. at 27.
142 Rogers, On the Rationale and JVorking of the Patent Laws, (1863) 262) Journal of the Statistical Socie' o,f
London, 121 at 135-8. See also, Coulter, op cit. at 86.
143 
'This concern was most apparent within the textile industry during the industrial revolution where
many measures were adopted in order to stem the flow of valuable information out of the mills and into
the hands of outside (especially foreign) interests. Thus mill windows were made small and high so that
outsiders could not easily look in, oaths of secrecy signed by the workers were commonplace, and m 1719
and 1750 Parliament imposed restrictions to prohibit skilled artisans and manufacturers from emigrating.
See Coulter, op cit. at 24.
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ingenuity, and now suffered from the success of their argument. However, this did not
stop them defending the system on this ground, even "if the possibility of maintaining
secrecy was confined to special cixcumstances." In addition, they questioned the
competitive advantage that the abolitionists said would be gained by all in the absence
of patent protection, wryly asking; "When do we hear of an important invention coming
to maturity in Switzerland?"45
A consequence of the need to keep an invention secret before a patent was obtained led
some opponents of the system to claim that, rather than encouraging disclosure, it
actually promoted secrecy. Prince-Smith states that, in the absence of a patent system,
"secret and isolated work would cease and its place would be taken by a cooperation of
all qualified talent." 146
 Interestingly, the model of scientific research he advocates
closely resembles the corporate led research efforts of the present day. However, these
conmients apparently provoked little, if any interest during the debate, probably due, at
least in part, to the entrenched view of the lone inventor battling against a sea of
competition.147
The difficulty of maintaining secrecy led the system's opponents to their third criticism
of the theory: only those inventions that could not be kept secret would be patented.
With this in mind, Rogers described the 'bargain' between the patentee and the public as
"thoroughly one-sided" as the inventor only seeks to obtain a patent where he fears that
his invention will be discovered.' 48
 Machiup & Penrose quote the German Economists,
Böhmert and Rentzsch as holding that this argument alone reduced the exchange theory
'' Machiup & Penrose, op at. at 27. They quote JR. McCulloch as stating that "it would plainly be for
the interest of every one who made a discovery, to endeavour, if possible, to conceal it. And
notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of concealment, they are not insuperable; and it is believed that
several important inventions have been lost, from the secret dying with their authors." McCuiloch,
"Patent," A Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial Navigation, Volume II, at 274. Machiup & Penrose, idem.
145 Day, On Patentsfor Inventions, (1870; Smith & Sons, London), at 35. Quoted from Coulter, op cit. at 97.
146 Prince Smith, "Ueber Patente für Erfindungen ' Vierteljahrschrift für Volksswirthschichte, op cit. at 160;
Quoted in Machiup & Penrose, op cit. at 28.
1-17 For a picture of the inventor and their creations in Victorian Britain see MacLeod, Concepts of
Invention, op dt.
148 Rogers, op cit. at 128.
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to tatters. 149 However, as we shall see, it suffers from a similar inadequacy to that of
Granville's attack on the system in the Lords. 15° It will be recalled that his Lordship
elides the issues and assumes that incentive and exchange are so intertwined that the
mere fact that "to scheme and invent ... [is] almost a madness with some people"
justifies abolition of the system. In doing so he ignores the distinction between the two
justifications and paints the system with too wide a brush, disregarding the fact that
different areas of technology, different inventions, can be justified in different ways.
Böhmert and Rentzch, on the other hand, separate the theories too much and, in doing
so, make the same mistake. They fail to see the continuum of invention, the spectrum
of technology, much of which cannot be kept secret but which needs special incentive
to appear at a socially beneficial rate, and the few inventions that must be coaxed from
the fog of secrecy that would otherwise enshroud them. In treating invention as
something inherently likely to leak to the public, they highlight the need for a system
that protects the inventor from misappropriation of his idea, and therefore implicitly
offer justification for the system.
Postscript
We have charted the move from the systematic grants of monopoly privilege in the late-
16th century to the reforms of the 1ate19th century and the philosophical debate that
accompanied them in order that we understand the causes that shaped the modern
picture. Monopoly had tainted the early grants, and in the same manner /aissezjairc and
free-trade sentiment had forced a reconsideration and detailed examination of the
system in the late-Victorian period.
The odour of monopoly still hung in the air, but opinion was divided about whether
such bad blood extended to patents. Abolitionist rhetoric appealed to the sense of
injustice that flowed from the pernicious patents of Arkwright and his kin; the media
became involved and the debate was taken to the masses. However, even the most
vocal of the abolitionist crowd did not fully embrace the Iaissefaire attitude and
advocate removal of all state intervention in the inventive process. True, there were
those that upheld this heterodox attitude, but it would appear that this sentiment, the
149 Machiup & Penrose, op dt. at 27, quoting Böhmert, Die E,jindungipatente nach volkswirtschafthichen, op di. at
67, and Rentzsch, "Geistiges Eigenthum", Handwàrterbuch der Volkswirischaft, (1866; Leipzig) at 629.
15(1 See text accompanying note 136, above.
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true Iaissefaire, went practically unnoticed during the debate. Battle lines were drawn
and territories marked, which divided those who advocated abolition from those who
wanted reform, little attention was paid to the nuances of dissent.
Most critics that called for abolition were forced to bow to the weight of history. Being
unable to prove that there was no link between Britain's prosperity and the patent
system, between patents and progress, they were forced to attack the system on less
concrete grounds, to suggest that there were better, more cost-efficient methods of
promoting the 'useful arts'. Laissejaire sentiment was all 'well and good', but it did not
really gain the same foothold in Britain that it did on the Continent. Very few, and
certainly not Macfie, despite his hatred of the patent system, trusted an unregulated
market to harbour the required amount of inventive activity to keep Britain 'Great'.
By the beginning of the 20th century a much-improved patent system had been created.
Reforms prompted by the 'Anti-Patent' debate had been implemented and many of the
hallmarks recognisable today, such as preliminary examination, fence-post claims,
priority arising from application rather than grant, etc., were in existence. Fees had
been reduced and the application process simplified, however, the distrust of monopoly
was still in the air. The specification had assumed its place at the centre of the grant
and, perhaps due to the changing face of invention, the last vestiges of the patent grant
being a grant of Crown favour, and the lack of any lack of any anti-trust laws, it was
being judged with a highly critical eye.
Thus, by the end of the 19th century, two distinct conceptions of the patent system are
in evidence. The first is that of the patent as a tool of commercial leverage, as reflected
in the works of Smith, Bentham, Mill and others in the pro-patent camp. The second is
that of the patent as a constraint on trade, the old monopoly argument, demonstrated
by Macfle, Rogers, Grove and the other abolitionists. The Courts by this time had
become somewhat mired by their newly created precedents and old views of property to
be defined and claimed as one would claim land, boundaries fixed. The legal system
was ill equipped to deal with treating the intangible as property; patents did not fit
within existing constructs of excludability and exhaustibility that had been used to
define and justify the concept in the past. Therefore the courts did the only thing that
they could do, they treated invention like land and required that it be defined accurately
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and precisely, they stated that what is not claimed is disclaimed, and in doing so they
promoted the specification to the fore. It was no longer simply sufficient to work the
invention and therefore introduce the technology to the Realm in that manner, now the
workings had to be taught to all who would care to read about them. Bureaucracy had
built up around the specification and the smallest of errors could cause invalidation.
The grant was still too close to the Crown for any other rule to apply, but the gap was
widening.
The political economists were keen to mark the patent as a tool of commerce, a
mercantile invention and to cut it free from the mire of its roots. Furthermore, the
nature of invention had changed. The image of the lone inventor was on its way out;
replaced by the new corporate structure of research and development, but the
underlying rationales stayed the same. Technical progress was good for the country,
invention was necessary for technical progress, and the patent system existed to
encourage, promote, and reward. It had history on its side.
For ease of expression the grounds of justification in the preceding pages were
separated in wholly unnatural ways. The reader is reminded of the assertion made at the
beginning of this discussion to the effect that no one theory can adequately explain and
justify the provision of temporary monopoly to the inventor of a new product or
process. It was necessary to draw out the arguments and to comment on each
individually in order to provide the necessary background for the following
investigation into the realities of the system as it now stands. Therefore, with the aid of
an empirical study conducted by this author into the process of claim drafting, we ask,
does the philosophy fit the facts?
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CHAPTER IV
Patents Within the Market
Economy
Part Two
Classical Justifications in a
Modern Setting
Does the Philosophy fit the Facts?
Introduction
Analysis of the patent grant cannot be undertaken utilising traditional definitions of
property. Its area of influence is secondary, tucked behind the words used to define its
scope. Yet the court's approach to the interpretation of patent claims, the tangible
evidence of the intangible subject of protection, in early_2Oth century Britain is clearly
influenced by traditional constructs of what property should be. Therefore, in Lord
Russell's famous dictum in E.M.I. v IJssen that there is:
no canon or principle which will justify one in departing from the
unambiguous and grammatical meaning of a claim and narrowing or extending its
scope by reading into it words which are not in it; or which will justify one in using
stray phrases in the body of the specification for the purpose of narrowing or widening
the boundaries of the monopoly fixed by the plain words of a claim."
The analogy with tangible objects is clearly evident. In Land Law, for example, there is
no principle of equivalence whereby the owner of a strip of land can prevent access to
property outside of the literal fence-posts of his claim. The owner of an apple, for
example, cannot prevent another (absent ingenious placing of the fruit) from coming
within six feet of his prize on a claim of trespass by equivalents. Intangible property is,
by its very nature, infinitely more complex and therefore does not stand up to close
analogy. However, tangible property is something with which all of us is familiar, it is
something that the human mind can directly relate to, and therefore the temptation to
draw comparison is great, and the capacity for misinterpretation still greater.
Indeed, if the 'Anti-Patent' debate has taught us anything, it is that public perception of
the patent system is not based on an in depth understanding of its inner workings, it is
reliant upon popular misconceptions, emotive calls-to-arms and the stigmatic
association with 'odious' monopoly. This view is reinforced when one considers the
symbolic power of a patent. For example, it is irrelevant to the majority of the
consuming public whether or not a patent will stand up in court. Validity is not their
concern. Indeed, it is rare for the relevant members of the public to be able to
distinguish between copyright, trade mark, patents and design rights at all. 2
 For the
1 (1939)56RPC29at41.
2 One will often hear about copyright in an invention, or a patent in a book, etc., in the course of any
given conversation on the topic of Intellectual Property, even among law students that have yet to be
educated to the error in their ways.
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public, the power of the patent is linked to their misunderstanding of the system and
the suggestion of official endorsement that the word 'patented' implies. Recent
illustration can be gathered from the public furore over 'basmati rice' patents in the
United States. 3 Here the power of the patent is not seen to be in the monopoly that it
provides, if indeed it can be called a monopoly at all, 4 but rather in the symbolic nature
of the grant. The mere fact that a patent has been granted is sufficient to engender fear
that there is monopolisation of the production of all basmati rice. The perception of
such grants therefore reinforces the societal view of patents as 'odious monopolies', a
view that is inevitably reflected in the treatment that Intellectual Property is given in the
courts.5
If one accepts that the system is a part of a capitalistic society and that its abolition is
not commercially possible, and further that the consumer is overwhelmingly self-
interested in the present, with little-or-no scope for anything other than personal
forward thinking, then a broad interpretation of a monopoly that would increase price is
clearly not a popular option. The narrowest logical construction of the patent is that
based on a literal interpretation of the claims. Indeed, on a purely proprietary analysis
this is the only scope that can be justified. In order to expand from this position and
offer any degree of equivalence it is necessary to have recourse to at least one of the
philosophical or economic justifications of the patent system discussed above, or a
variant thereof. Therefore, in order that we understand this basic position, the 'literal'
core of the assessment of patent scope, it is necessary to inquire into the patentee's
motivation in seeking a patent and the process of its construction. This investigation
enables assessment of the intrinsic value of the grant and therefore allows better
understanding of the economic considerations for the determination of scope. It also
allows discussion of the totemic value of the patent and provides a point from which to
examine the substance of the folklore claim that about 90% of patents on the register
are invalid, and to ascertain whether, if true, this actually matters.
A web search for "basinati rice patent" in any of the major search engines returns hterally hundreds of
articles, discussions, and web-site postings on the subject, very few of which display any knowledge, or
even understanding, of patent law whatsoever.
See text accompanying notes 9-27 in Chapter V, below.
A good illustration of derisory treatment can be found in the Patents Court decision in Zino Dan/doff u
A&G Imports Limited & Tesco Stores, [20007 Ch. 127, where Laddie J
. 
stated (at paragraph 36) that the trade
mark can give its owner a "parasitic right to interfere with the distribution of goods".
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Our first task is therefore to examine the patentee's motivation in seeking a grant in
order that we can contrast the system's commercial and philosophical purposes.
Why Patent?
Based on the foregoing discussion the reader might be excused for thinking that the
answer to this question is simple. The purpose of the patent system is clearly to foster
invention, whether by reward or incentive. It is designed to further the technological
prosperity of society; this was the explicit intention of the Elizabethan grants and there
is nothing to suggest that things have changed. The patent provides protection from
competition. The corollary of this is that one therefore obtains a patent in order that
this benefit is realised. This said, the principal reason for patenting is to get monopoly
protection.
This is a logical conclusion based on the facts as presented, and is superficially
satisfying. There is a cause and an effect that naturally dovetail; the patent is justified on
the ground that it promotes innovation/disclosure, because it awards a monopoly to
reward, or stimulate, the inventor, or compensates him for letting society benefit from
his idea. However, as Taylor & Silberston note, the "indiscriminate promotion of
invention is clearly not a defensible economic objective from any point of view, except
probably that of those who earn their living as professional inventors or research
workers."6 Therefore, we redraft our hypothesis and state that the patent system can
only be justified if it causes, or rewards the correct pe of inventive activity and
attendant disclosure.
This argument is reinforced by reference to the requirements for patentability.
Inventions must be new in order to gain patent protection. 7 In addition, they must
contain an inventive step (i.e. not be obvious to the person skilled in the art, based on
their specialist knowledge of the technical field in question). 8 Furthermore, they must
be 'capable of industrial application' and not fall within one of the prohibited categories
6 Taylor & Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent 3ystem: A Studji of the British Experience, (1973;
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 28.
s.2 Patents Act 1977.
s.3 Patents Act 1977.
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of things that are "not inventions" for the purposes of British law. 9 The legislation that
implements patent policy is tuned towards the encouragement of inventive ideas that
have been reduced to practice. Therefore, it is not possible to get patent protection for
a discovery, as such, in the UK. However, one can obtain a patent for an invention that
utilises a discovery in a practical manner, for instance the discovery of the virus
responsible for Hepatitis C could be utilised to enable the manufacture of a testing kit
which would not be excluded from patent protection on policy grounds.1°
Everything is neat. The prospective inventor is encouraged to use their inventive
faculties in order to create something new in an area that attracts patent protection.
They are then encouraged to make this innovation known to the world in return for a
patent, which they can use to keep everyone off their 'patch' for the time that is
required for them to realise the value of their invention. The raison d'étre of a patent is
still the monopoly that it confers.
Under this view of the inventive process, the patent system acts in various stages to
incite and reward invention and finally to demand that the inventor make it available to
the public before compensating them for doing so. The theories are intertwined and
therefore the scope of the monopoly granted should reflect this balance, it should
extend to cover that which the inventor has disclosed where this is sufficient to
encourage the invention to be made. The reward that is offered, or the incentive given,
should relate to the contribution that the invention makes to society, and the scope of
the patent should be determined by the technical contribution that it makes to the state
of the art.
By placing the invention in a market unencumbered by direct imitation, the patent
system enables the patentee to charge a monopoly price and therefore maxirnise the
value of the invention and the attendant profits. This value will be primarily dependent
on its utility, either to the user in terms of cost reductions etc., or to the consumer,
arising because it provides a better, cheaper or simpler means of doing something.
There is, after all, no value in something that nobody wants. However, the security of
s.4 and s.1(2) Patents Act 1977 respectively.
° See Chiron v Orgaiion (N? 12) [19967 FSR 153, although such a testing kit would still be liable to attack on
grounds of novelty or inventive step.
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this value is inextricably linked to the scope and stability of the patent itself as the value
of the invention is necessarily dependent on the availability of substitutes, the
availability of substitutes is linked to the scope of the patent, and the scope of the
patent determines its value as it controls the zone of exclusion. The patent is therefore
the shell that protects the delicate invention that provides its value and utility. A patent,
under this model, is obtained precisely because of its ability to exclude competition and
provide monopoly profit to the enterprise that owns and exploits it.
However, there is at least one other reason for desiring patent protection that stands
independent of the scope of the monopoly conferred. Obtaining a patent, rather than
being a means to an end, may be an end in itself.
Motivation to Patent: Other Considerations
The real reason for seeking a patent may be a far cry from the traditional view of
patenting for monopoly, and the purpose of patenting may have considerable
consequences for the scope with which the specification and claims are drafted. As one
patent attorney said when discussing the steps that they undertook in the creation of a
patent application:
"[The first question is always to ask] what they want a particular patent for,
what they wish to cover with it. Do they want something that is fairly all embracing to
keep people off their patch? ... Sometimes a client doesn't want a claim that is too
broad because they don't want to tread on other people's feet - perhaps because they
want a patent which is merely a licensing vehicle for a product that they have in mind
and nothing more. Other times it's a fairly basic patent in which they want as much as
possible protected to prevent other people from competing in one way or another with
them. So that's the first point - why are you drafting with the breadth with which you
are going to draft with? ... There are other reasons for patents. Some governments
will ... give tax breaks to patent holders or the holders of patent applications, and the
tax breaks may be worth an awful lot more than the cost of filing the patent application
- and of leaving it pending for as long as possible regardless of its potential validity...
You may wish to file a patent application to stop someone else from getting one by
publishing it ... so you file your own application and just drop it, let it go, let it
publish... [A] significant amount of others are gained because they are assets,
regardless of how worthy they are. Venture capital companies see them and think that
the entity holding them is worth putting money into - in a lot of cases they needn't
even see a granted patent, they are just as happy with an application.
Therefore, it is easy to see that there are many reasons for obtaining a patent that don't
necessarily conform to the traditional model of patent for protection.
The patent is a tool of commerce and will be obtained because there is a commercial
advantage in doing so. Often the advantage is the monopoly protection, in which case
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the scope of the patent will be crucial. However, it is apparent that this is not always
the fact of the matter. For example:
"There are some patents that people know they have that aren't valid, they're
aware of the fact that there are major problems with their case. They would prefer that
we didn't tell them that in writing, but they know that. But they like to have a large
portfolio of patents. They have a few that they could sue people with and that they're
happy with, but one of the ways that you can value your business is on the value of the
IP that you own. So, "get me some patents, I don't really care that they aren't really
valid and won't stand up in court, I'll never sue anybody with them" ... From that
point of view, does it matter what I put in the claim? In that sort of case I don't need
to worry so much about what will happen if this were ever litigated, because this one's
not going to be. Their only purpose is to enable the patent holder to tell the
shareholders that they've got 'X' number of patents world-wide."
The majority of those interviewed were able to recount first hand experience of this
kind of 'patent grabbing', and all had at least anecdotal evidence of its existence. All
areas of technology were considered to be equally susceptible, however in recent years it
was noted that the 'dotcom' companies seemed to be leading the way in obtaining
patents of dubious validity. The reasons advanced in connection with this observation
were all very similar and centred around the fact that such companies were not very
likely to have significant material assets against which to secure investment and this
therefore forced their intellectual property holdings to the fore.
Where this is the case, and the prospective patentee knows that the invention that they
are seeking to protect is less than wholly meritorious, the attorney will be drafting in the
knowledge that the examiner is the only person they have to impress. In this case they
know that the patent's purpose is to squeeze money from the banks, it will never be
used in anger, therefore the attorney will modify their style accordingly. The scope with
which they draft will be the scope that is likely to elicit the least objections; it will be
pitched narrowly.
There are, in addition, some instances in which the scope with which the patent is
drafted (which I shall ctll the 'intrinsic scope') will be determined by other motivations.
One patent attorney gleefully recounted a case in which he had been instructed to
specifically claim around one possible embodiment of an invention that would solve the
same problem but would be prohibitively expensive to the point of lunacy.
"[lie patentee in such a scenario] doesn't want to keep the competitor right
out, but wants him to see a method of manufacture ... that's so expensive that he can't
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compete in the market place - that amuses them a lot more than keeping them out
altogether."
Others, when asked about this behaviour, simpiy stated that they had heard of such
cases, but could provide no first-hand experience of the patentee's sense of humour.
Drafting a Patent: Determinants of Scope
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the motivation for seeking a patent may
have serious implications for the scope of the application. Those patents that are
sought for reasons other than to ward off competition will be drafted in a manner
designed to n-iaximise the chances of getting the application through to grant. However,
whilst certainly not universally, most patentees will, at least initially, desire to protect
their invention from appropriation by others, and thus desire broad protection:
"In general, you tiy and get the broadest cover that you can for the invention
commensurate with what [the inventor has] come up with and what the prior art
encroaches on."
The reasons for this are many and varied. They range from the fact that it is possible to
amend a specification in the UK by narrowing the scope of the claims, but not by
adding matter, to the view that a patent only protecting a precise embodiment is, at least
under traditional thinking, not worth the paper it is written on.
"It's a very expensive piece of paper to put on the wall and I can find much
cheaper art that looks much better than any patent."
Therefore, assuming for the moment that the majority of patent applications are drafted
in cases where the prospective patentee wishes to maxirnise their protection (or at least
does not communicate their intention to restrict it to their patent attorney), it is prudent
for us to inquire into what other factors may affect the 'intrinsic scope' of the patent.
The first of these other factors is the stage within the process of innovation at which
the patent is drafted.
Timing
The majority of patent systems, including the British, subscribe to the notion that the
first person to file an acceptable application concerning a given invention is, in principle
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at least, the person entitled to the grant of a patent on that invention. 11
 This idea of the
'race to the patent office door' is clearly incompatible with any justification of the patent
system based on a natural rights theory, but naturally dovetails with the idea of the
patent as a social contract. It should be noted that some other countries, most notably
the United States of America, grant patents to the 'first-to-invent' rather than the 'first-
to-frie'.
The first-to-file system is considered to have the benefits of simplicity and expediency,
as it is far less complicated to determine who has filed an application first rather than
who has created the invention first, but has the disadvantage of providing 'rough
justice'.12
A consequence of the race to be the first-to-file is that the patent is usually drafted at an
early stage in the process of innovation. The exact timing of the application will depend
upon the perceived proximity of potential competitors; the fiercer the competition, the
fiercer the race and therefore the earlier the application. Thus, if the particular research
sector from which the invention emerges is notably dense, the patent is likely to be
drafted very early in the process when the attorney will have little information at his or
her fmgertips:
"[W]e become involved very much at an early stage [in the innovation
process, although] ... it varies slightly ... depending on who your client is, whether
you're talking about a small inventor or a multi-national chemical/drug company,
they're after different things... [I]f you take pharmaceuticals as an example, they all
know that their competitors are working in the same sort of field, so they can't really
hang around for long enough to decide which one of a range of drugs is actually the
good product because some other swine will be out there patenting it before you...
We often come in at a stage where we don't really know ... which [of a
number of possible chemicals] is going to be the active one. With a drug, at the time
you're drafting the patent it's probably still on the drawing board. It might have been
through the pilot plant - a few lab experiments will have been done ... It almost
certainly hasn't been on a full-scale plant, so who knows what modifications will be
made before actually bringing something out at the end. So at the time that you're
1 In principle because a later application may, in fact, claim priority from an earlier application - section 5
of the Patents Act 1977 deals with the priority of applications.
12 For a comparison of the relative benefits and disadvantages of the first-to-file versus the first-to-invent
systems, see, for example; Nicolai, First-to-File us. First-to-Invent: A Comparative Studj Based on German and
United States Patent Law (1972) 3 IIC 103; Kingston, Is the United States Right about 'First-10-Invent"? [19927
EIPR 223; Roberts, Paper, Scissors, Stone, [19987 EIPR 89. See also; Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, (2000)
98 Michigan Law Review 926; and Moore, A General Period of Grace in a First to File World: Ky Issues, [2002]
IPO 75.
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drafting there's a lot of crystal ball gazing and a lot of our job is to say to people "could
it work like this?" "Have you thought of this?"
Therefore, provided the patent is desired for the protection that it affords, the intrinsic
scope will be initially broad, as it is far easier to reject claimed matter than it is to add
new material. Where the application is made further along the line, the patent need not
be as broad. By this point decisions have been made as to the best mode, and
experiments have been done that show that various permutations will not work,
therefore the scope can be trimmed to better fit the invention.
"[Yjou have to take a very practical attitude as to where you draw your fence
around your invention in the sense that there is no point in drafting something so
broad that it's never going to be valid, there's no point in drafting anything so narrow
that it effectively teaches a 3 party how to compete with you."
The trimming of the claim is all important as it enables the patent attorney to steer a
course around what has actually been invented, therefore complying with requirements
of sufficiency, whilst avoiding the submerged rocks that are the prior art.
Leaving the prior art aside for one moment, the only way that a net can be cast around
the invention is if the patent attorney actually knows what has been invented. It may
sound obvious, but problems with communication can provide great barriers to the
creation of the intrinsic scope that an invention deserves.
The Importance of Knowledge
All of those questioned considered that the first, and most important, stage in the
drafting of a patent specification was to obtain the relevant information from the
inventor.
"It seems banal to say this, but you can only include what you know, and so
you can only draft with appropriate scope if you have sufficient knowledge of the
invention and the way that the invention works to be able to do so."
It sounds deceptively simple, but most described this as the hardest part of their job,
and further suggested it as the cause of failure for a number of well-known patents.
"The Van der L.ey case is a prime example of bad communication, a patent
agent who didn't ask the right ... questions ... It is not the inventor's job to look for
alternatives; they're concerned with getting something that works... It's the job of the
patent agent to ask for clarification."
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The inventor comes in a variety of shapes and sizes and also has varying levels of
technical expertise, communication skills and, most importantly according to those
interviewed, varying levels of experience in the patenting game. However, a common
complaint, applied across the board, was that prospective patentees tended to be very
narrow-minded.
"The trouble is that most inventors only see one tree and it's the patent
attorney's job to define the wood, or at least the species of tree, if not the genus that
the species lies in. It all depends on how new it allis, if it's the first tree that anybody's
ever seen and nothing other than a cabbage has been known before then you could
have a pretty broad claim. But if it is some minor variant of black maple then that's
what you're going to get - I mean you couldn't, but you know what I mean."
This criticism is "equally applicable to the big players as it is to the smaller concern,"
said one of those interviewed. He continued, "there are some people that I've known
for years that still come in here and say 'We've invented this, here's how it works."
And I ask them if it would work if we changed this bit here or that bit there and they
look up with a puzzled expression and say 'We've invented this and here's how it
works."
One of the skills of the patent attorney is therefore to break the inventor out of this
immutability of focus and to get them to generalise their invention as much as possible.
They must then shape the inventive concept behind the embodiment into something
that can be accorded legal protection and, therefore, should question everything that the
inventor tells them:
"I think the way that the patent agent should go about it is that he should
cross question the inventor hard and you will usually find that when you say to him
"what might a competitor do when he sees this, how would he avoid your patent,
could he do this or could he do that?" The inventor, being fixed, only having seen this
way of doing things will have great difficulty and will be inclined to say "well, nobody
would want to do it that way" and you would have great difficulty in persuading the
inventor that you ought to include other variations... You must remember that you're
dealing with human beings, and that is a great part of it."
However, sometimes the answers that are received are not exactly what the attorney is
looking for.
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A Breakdown of Communication
The communication skills of scientists were, in general, treated with disdain. Whilst it
was accepted that standards varied greatly from person to person, the following general
comments were made.
"Scientists have one major failure in that they tend to equate expertise with a
close progression down a very narrow avenue, they use the most up to date jargon and
acronyms that mean little or nothing to the rest of humanity. The very worst at this
are the microbiologists whose whole language is made up of abbreviations, acronyms
and shorthand - it's almost as if they think that they will appear more intelligent if they
can encode what they are doing so that no-one outside of their circle can understand.
The simplicity of a lot of what they are doing is often concealed within their
abbreviations."
"Scientists, as a whole, seem little interested in communicating with people
outside of their profession and so make no effort to do so - have you ever tried to
read a scientific journal? It's usually impenetrable. If you then compare that attitude
with the function of a patent and the number of people that you need to communicate
with then the tension is obvious. A patent in the general run of things is designed to
be understood by the Patent Office in examination, by other patent agents should the
need arise, by licensees/assignees, and by lawyers and judges. A patent agent must take
all of the technical bunkum that you are fed by the inventor and reproduce it in a
comprehensible form."
The problem of technical jargon is lessened by the fact that the patent specification is
taken to be addressed to the skilled addressee - the person of ordinary skill in the art -
therefore a certain degree of knowledge of the technical field and language used within
it is taken for granted. However, a point that according to one "cannot be over-
stressed" is that if the patent attorney is unable to understand the explanation of the
invention that the inventor gives him then he is at a loss to be able to adequately
describe it in the specification or to claim it. Another noted that the idea of the skilled
addressee is, at best, a familiar fiction, for:
"[Whilst] you're not addressing ... [the specification] to the idiot drafting it
or to a person who knows nothing, you're not really addressing it to a hypothetical
person who works in that field and who knows how it goes either. The true answer of
who a specification's aimed at, of course, is that it is addressed to a judge on the third
day of a trial, when he's usually already come to his decision and is bored to tears of
the whole show."
Therefore, the simplicity with which the inventor can relate their invention to the patent
attorney is vitally important to the production of a strong patent.
"You have to be very careful, especially when you're starting out, because the
skilled addressee that you have in mind might not be the same as the skilled addressee
that the Court, or even your Partner has in mind, and it can change how much you
need to put in [the document]."
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A number of those questioned said that the ease with which they were able to extract
the information required from the inventor found direct correlation with the technical
field within which the invention lies.
"[G]etting information from... [computer programmers] is like pulling teeth
from hens, impossible. The reason that it is so difficult to do this is that the programs
that they write grow under their fingers. They don't, by and large, plan exactly what
they are going to do, they have some aim in mind, but that might change by the time
the thing goes into the marketplace. The process is inherently iterative, something
doesn't work so they move on, if it does work then it might lead them in another
direction, there isn't, in general, any plan until you ask then to write one for you, and
even then it's not usually up to much."
"... [B]iotechnologists are definitely the worst, their reports are scant, their
methods iterative and their language bizarre. The problem is compounded when you
realise that it is generally the case that the people who actually find the sequences are
not the ones who know how to deal with them. The way that they deal with the
problem if they come and see you is to pretend that the actual introduction technique
is something that everyone knows, often they don't know themselves, they expect you
to do the understanding for them."
In the	 engineering fields where the invention itself could be relatively easily
reduced to plan form, whether by way of technical drawing or electronic circuit, the
problems associated with the extraction of the relevant information were:
"... [I]ndisputably less... [TJhe inventor has a prop, you see, and I can ask
him questions about this or that and can see what he's referring to. It makes the whole
process far more straightforward - it's amazing what a scrap of paper can do for an
explanation."
The chemical and pharmaceutical industries also gained praise, those questioned
suggesting that they "usually make quite good reports", and besides, they "keep good
lab books". The reasons advanced for the distinction between general chemists and
pharmacists and those in the field of biotechnology were mainly based on the relative
youth of the biotech industry.
"Of course, chemical and pharmaceutical companies have been doing this
sort of thing for a long time, they know the procedure, they know what they want and
how to get it... [B]iotech has really taken off in the last few years, and that's one of its
main problems."
Some were slightly more scathing:
"It's the biotech boys that think they're God's gift at the moment because
they know some words that the rest of us don't, and because they can make the papers
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with a bloody sheep.. It's better now than it used to be though, we understand a lot
more of how things work and why they work than we used to... if you look at some of
the old cases it was pretty much hit-and-run - and people are amazed when their
patents are too broad and not supported or whatever!"
The 'throw-away' comment at the end of this statement is a telling point, which can be
expanded to cover all forms of technology. One of the consequences of a lack of
knowledge is that it wiJi generally lead to a broader claim than would otherwise be
created, therefore opening the patent up to the prospect of invalidity by anticipation or
lack of support in the disclosure. This, again, relates back to the fact that it is far easier
to narrow the scope of a patent in this country than it is to enlarge it.
"Drafting [a claim] is always a matter of keeping your options open as much
as possible when you don't have all of the information - you don't always have the
information about the prior art, you don't have the information about what your
client's ultimately gorng to market, and in many cases you don't have the information
on which of the things he presents you with is best."
"[Our] primary concern is not being too narrow and, well, making sure you
understand how it works... So you define it in terms of what it is or how it's done as
broadly as you can - which covers all the species in that genus, excludes things which
you already know to be old or which don't work... [and] that's made all the more
difficult if you don't know which bits don't work, ... if you don't have all of the
information."
This may go some way to explain the perceived problem of broad claiming in the
biotech industry.
The Peculiar Problem of the Prior Art
Inexorably linked with the issues of timing and extraction of information is the problem
posed by the prior art. Since the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies it has been
expressly forbidden to grant a patent for an invention that is not new, such a grant
being an 'odious monopoly' and therefore 'without the law'.' 3 The ill-timed emergence
of prior art material is the cause of many a headache for the patent drafter and patentee
alike. Therefore, the discovery of submerged pieces of prior art is of the utmost
importance to the clam-i drafter.
"A lot [of how wide you decide to draft] depends on context, the Context of
the prior art, I mean just how different is the invention from what was known before?
13 This comes from Coke's famous quote that such monopolies were "ever without the law, but never
without friends". Coke, Part III of the Institutes of the Lan's of EngIaac4 (1817; Clarke & Sons, London;
reprint) at 182.
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If it's very different then you ought to be able to have something broader than if it's a
minor variation on a known thing."
The reader will appreciate that the prior art impacts from the point of view of
obviousness as well as novelty; however, it would appear that this is less of a concern to
the patent attorney.
"Novelty is the key. I would say that unless you're doing an exam you're not
terribly bothered about inventive step - it's such a subjective thing, you don't really
want to restrict the claim because of perceived doubts about inventive step too early,
it's something you can always do in prosecution... [But] you wiil always try to draft a
claim that is novel of the prior art that you're aware of."
At the time that the patent is drafted there are two states of knowledge of the prior art
that the patent attorney may have; they either know nothing or they know something,
omniscience is an impossible dream. The amount of prior art that is known to the
patent attorney will depend on the time available to conduct a private search, and the
willingness of the client to pay for one.
"[Whether you've searched it or not] depends on the client's strategy
whether they want something filed tomorrow because they think that there's a
competitor around, or if they're willing to wait for a few weeks for the search results
and you can write something a bit better."
If a search hasn't been done then the patent attorney is effectively shooting in the dark,
where this is the case it is deemed prudent to cover the invention, as far as it is known,
with a broad initial claim and many sub-claims to act as failback positions.
"A lot of clients really haven't got a clue; they don't know what's happened
other than in their own heads, or their own laboratories, or their own garden sheds or
wherever they're inventing things. If they don't want to pay for any searching up front
it's a fairly hit-and-miss approach as to whether what I put together in terms of
defming the invention comes anywhere near being novel and inventive, or not. Very
often it's not, very often it needs to be restricted quite considerably. But in those
circumstances if I were to defme the invention in narrow terms so as to make sure it
stands up I would be losing out on a lot of protection that the client deserves to get."
Thus, it would appear that the secret of a good specification is leeway. Room to
manoeuvre in prosecution combined with a structurally sound framework is of vital
importance to ensure, as much as is possible, the integrity of the patent. By
provisioning fallback positions, even if one of the claims falls in examination or
litigation some degree of protection may still be afforded by the others.
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Knowledge of the prior art is one of the areas in which the patentee with larger financial
muscles will generally have an advantage over less affluent inventors. Well-established
patentees, now usually associated with research and development labs of large
corporations, will probably have significant past experience in dealing with patents and,
it was suggested, are more likely to be aware of the relevant prior art. Such an entity
will:
"[U] sually have documentation available to let [the patent agent] have the
most relevant materials. They'll be able to see for themselves, more or less, the
direction in which the invention is going and will be able to draft a protoclaim; a
statement that defines the invention in their terms from which I can then work. That's
obviously a good situation from my point of view because they've done some of the
background searching; they know the direction in which they're headed. All I have to
do then is check the prior art documents that they've sent me to see that the claim isn't
ridiculously broad. That being said, it isn't always best to produce a claim of the scope
that I expect to succeed at that stage because it's always good practice to have a search
conducted by the patent office on a slightly broader basis than the protection I desire
would suggest - in other words to try and get them to draw prior art out of the
woodwork. So slightly too broad a claim at this point is better than one that is slightly
too narrow."
Simple economics dictates that larger corporations will have less of a problem paying a
few thousand pounds for a comprehensive search than a smaller entity would. Indeed,
such expense may place the search out of the reach of many small enterprises, a risky
patent with a chance of success being far more valuable than no patent at all. The
gamble inherent in deciding against having a private search done is not, however, as
great as it first appears. As one interviewee candidly stated:
"[S]earching is very much a black art. If you find something, you know
you've found it, if you don't find it then you probably weren't looking in the right
place, it doesn't mean there's nothing there. If you just have a quick look then you've
probably spent all that is justified by the position ... bearing in mind at this point you
still don't know whether the invention is ever going to make it to market so why spend
a lot of money on it?"
This being said, the reliability and efficiency of the searching process has undergone a
revolution in recent years due to increasing amounts of information available on the
internet. The cost of searching has been dramatically reduced and the probability of
finding what you are after has risen in equal amounts. The European and the US Patent
Offices now have comprehensive online patent databases, which enable the attorney to
perform keyword searches in a fraction of the time in which a title search could have
been performed in the past. There was universal praise for this advance in the speed of
data recovery.
117
"[Njo one really likes doing the searching for a patent application, but you
tend to do a small one just in case, so what you submit doesn't look too stupid.
However, clients are often not very willing to pay for anything other than a quick look.
Three or four years ago even a quick look was very difficult, now you type in three or
four words and 'bingo', there you are."
If items of prior art are known they can be relatively easily dealt with by amending the
claims so that they no longer cover the offending subject matter. However, sometimes
the patent attorney will choose to deliberately claim the prior art, making sure that they
have narrower claims on which they can fall back when objection arises.
"Maybe you'll write a claim which is drawing something that you're pretty
sure is obvious or not novel because you've had a search done - but you'll write
another sub-claim that you know you're pretty sure isn't; or you have a claim that that
you think might be a bit dodgy so you write another one claiming the obvious and
retreat from it in an examination - give the examiner his pound of flesh."
If no private search is conducted, the earliest that the patentee and patent attorney may
learn about anticipations and possible novelty destroying disclosures \vffl be after filing
when the Patent Office conducts its own search.
A number of interviewees took issue with the efficacy, efficiency, and value of Patent
Office searches, suggesting that in the majority of cases they were a waste of time.
"In my experience although the process of examining in the patent office
might weed out the very weak things - because there's a limited amount of time and
effort that you can put into the searching and examination - essentially, it's only when
you start getting into litigation that people start performing really thorough searches,
and then you find out what the true previous things are because you dig much more
deeply."
"[T]here's a strong argument that can be made for having no searches and no
examination as in the old French system where you just filed it and let the world sort it
out... There's nothing scientific about the searching business, it's very much a hit and
miss procedure most of the time... [Howeverl, there's a direct correlation between the
amount of money you throw at a search and the results that you find. It leads to a very
uneven playing field."
Thus, the intrinsic scope of the patent specification can be directly linked to a number
of things. These include, the purpose for which the patent is desired, the knowledge
that the attorney has about the way in which the invention works, the amount of time
she has to draft the thing, and the degree of knowledge, and proximity, of the prior art.
Patent attorneys regularly draft claims with purposeful imprecision to enable them to
cut back and prune the monopoly should esoteric pieces of prior art materialise. They
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play games and play the system to get their clients what they want, and this is not always
a monopoly. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a great deal of the patents on the
register probably are, in fact, invalid. This conclusion is further reinforced when the
'nuts and bolts' of the drafting process are considered, and it is to this topic that we
now direct our attention.
The Drafting of the Specification
The patent specification is of vital importance to the scope of the monopoly that a
patent commands. As already stated, the claims not only define the invention, but also
determine how far the penumbra of the patentee's monopoly should be allowed to
extend. It may therefore surprise the reader to learn that the total amount of time spent
drafting and refming the specification, including technical time spent before the Patent
Office, typically amounts to a figure of between ten and thirty hours. 14 The time spent
on drafting the claims - the defming feature of the patent - is approximately 30 per cent
of this total. Some of the attorneys that took part in the survey stated that they
expected to write15 something in the order of two hundred specifications a year. When
these figures are considered along with the non-traditional, commercial reasons for
obtaining a patent it is easy to see that there may be some truth in the old saying that
90% of patents on the register are invalid.
There is no set way to begin to draft a patent specification. Some of those interviewed
stated that they like to start with the description to focus their minds; others said that
the claims came first; some liked to build up from the specific embodiment and some
liked to chip away from the general idea. Whatever the approach, there are a number of
common factors in the way that the process of creation proceeds:
"[Y]ou can't simply put it down on paper, you go backward and forwards,
backward and forwards, backward and forwards ... Your thoughts are likely to change
during the drafting, but the thing that I've learnt is that you have to start, you have to
put something down, if you don't put something down, you never get anywhere. So
even if it's rubbish you must put something down, and then you toy with it, and out of
that you develop what is hopefully a useful specification."
"[O]ur minds ... go backwards and forwards. You ask if the claim as drafted
covers something ridiculous, and if it does you reduce it in scope a bit. The eventual
14 None of those interviewed gave figures greater that 30 hours for a 'typical' application.
Or redraft and file if the specification arrived via a PCT application for introduction into the European
market.
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aim is to try and reach a delicate compromise between what is too greedy and what is
sensible and what will stand up in court. So I don't think that you can just sit down
and draft a patent specification, it takes lots of going backwards and forwards, of
carving and refining."
"The first step is to look at the invention and to try and define it, basically
with reference only to the invention... [H]aving got this very woolly definition down
on paper, it's a matter of analysing it phrase by phrase, group of phrases by group of
phrases to see whether there are any unwanted interpretations, meanings, ambiguities,
whatever. Then, having got an internally consistent definition I'd compare that with
the prior art documents of which I'm aware, usually provided by the client, and if they
suggested a change in direction, a restriction of scope, or whatever then I would
implement that. It's an iterative process... The next stage after prior art, it's probably
going back over the terminology in the claims making sure that I've not used a word
which the prior art generally tells me means something different in that technology, or
whatever."
The process of patent claiming was compared to sculpture; "whether you work in
granite or bronze, whether you build up or chisel down, the process is broadly the
same," you are constantly refining the structure, constantly redefining the fascia.
Occasionally the subject matter will dictate the approach, but the end product will have
the same volume whichever way you work. The important thing is to retrace your
steps, to deconstruct and interpret as you construct and defme.
"[The primary concern is to create a technical definition, a secondary concern
is to] try and find language that is appropriate to [get it through the Patent Office].
There are tricks of the trade that are sometimes used here. But getting it right ... it has
to be new and it has to be inventive, to have inventive height as they sometimes call it,
often you can't take a view on that because you don't always know what the prior art
is. You take a fly, you draft broadly, you put in lots of failback positions - that's
terribly important, it's no use drafting it terribly broadly and then showing one or two
specific embodiments because there's nothing to fall back on. If the broad is too
broad, where do you go? Right down to narrow, to the specifics, and what good is
that?"
"[I]t makes it easier if you know what's out there because you know what you
can get away with and what you can't. It also allows you to write the description so
that the exanuier thinks that it's clever when it might not be, or at least it appears
cleverer than it is... [Y]ou should write your description and your introductory
paragraphs of the specification and dress them up so that the examiner gets to the end
and thinks how clever it is. It might well be very inventive, it doesn't have to be
subterfuge ... but on the other hand, you can... dress mutton up as lamb in the same
way, it's no different. It's a game. It's just a matter of telling the story."
The intrinsic scope of the patent is dependent upon a whole host of factors, but at the
end of the day, tricks of the trade or no, the patent attorney can only provision for the
equivalents that she can think of.
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Therefore, we now turn to address the question of whether those interviewed thought
that any degree of latitude should be given to the interpretation of the patent if, and
when, it gets litigated.
Literal or Liberal Interpretation?
It is at this point that the attorneys interviewed split into two distinct factions. One
group hold what I shall be calling the 'traditional' view; that the patent is defmed by its
claims and that these should, in the interests of certainty (and ease of drafting
subsequent patents), be construed more-or-less literally. The other group holds the
'liberal view'; that the patentee should benefit from having disclosed their invention to
the world, and should not be judged according to the depth of their pockets.
Interpretation should, first and foremost, be concerned with fairness to the inventor as
they have chosen to lay their invention open to the scrutiny of the world in return for a
temporary grant of monopoly power.
The Traditional View
The traditional view states that the claims are the focus of the patent, they are the words
and phrases that define the legal monopoly being sought. They are of no-one's
choosing other than the patentee and the patent attorney, and once the patent has been
agreed upon no leeway should be given. To interpret the claims in a more liberal sense
than their literal meaning is to give the patentee something that they have not asked for:
"[The claims] are the definition of the legal monopoly that you seek, so you
are required to define them defmidvely... If something is outside of your claims then
you haven't claimed it... A lot of the things that go to court are very much "oh well, I
haven't claimed it, can I have it? Please sir, I meant to claim it, honest." ... [Now],
quite often they don't get it, but there's so much money at stake that they have to try -
their shareholders expect it... [Y]ou have to remember that with a lot of cases; the
stakes are so big that you have to fight even if the chance of winning are quite small."
Most of those questioned stated that even the current tradition of giving a purposive
construction to the claims of a patent was going too far.
"If you don't agree that whatever isn't claimed is disclaimed['] then you're
really saying that whatever isn't claimed could be claimed but we'll argue about it. That
road leads to lack of clarity and essentially removes the need to claim in the first place
- if you're not bound by what you say. Essentially all the requirements in law, in the
European Patent Convention, the rules in the High Court now are for clarity - the
public needs to know where they stand. And importantly, so does the patentee - a
point that is often forgotten in the quest for "fair protection", if you, yourself don't
' See the speech of Lord Russell in EMI vLissen (1939) 56 RPC23 at 41.
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know where the limits of your patent he how is that fair? So you need to be precise,
you're going to be given a massive monopoly that could be worth millions of pounds -
your half of the bargain is first to produce an invention and show that it works and is
useful second you have to tell the rest of the world what you claim and what you don't
claim - and that's why you have claims at all. Yes, the more I think about it the more
I'm firmly of the view that if it isn't claimed it's disclaimed - because otherwise where
are you?"
If one follows this approach then the "only problem arises where you use very narrow
and precise definition for something that oughtn't to have been narrowly and precisely
defined." In such a case the patentee places the court in a potentially difficult position.
"[If there is] a broader concept in his invention [than that claimed], and we
agree that latitude will be given to the interpretation of what he has actually claimed,
are we going to give him the benefit of the doubt and give him the neighbouring
counties, as it were, even if he hasn't specifically asked for them? If we are then how
many does he get?"
When it was pointed out that the traditional German approach was to look to the
essence of the invention and to see the protection that it deserved utilising the claims as
a guide and that this appeared to function adequately, the reply was stock:
"Ah, but I've seen German cases where the patentee has got away with blue
murder."
"Allowing a bit of latitude may be OK, but not that much, and damn right,
the public needs to know where it stands."
They continued, reasoning that a patent is not a God given right. It is only a right
under the terms of the Patents Act.
"You don't have a divine right to a monopoly, you have to do something for
it, you have to claim it, and if you claim it badly and you don't ask for the right thing,
well caveat applicant if you like. I don't, myself think that the law should fall over
backwards to assist you, unless it's clear that you paid an attorney to do it and he did a
bad job and it's not your fault - you'd get a bit of a following wind there, but not a lot.
It's like the old saying, "if you make a wish, make sure you think very hard what you
wish for". That's Arabian Nights and it's equally true today. The duty is on you to
frame your wish... [If a patent is framed badly then] I don't think any of those should
be more broadly defined when they got to court, they chose to define something
narrowly, they needn't have - they were of sound mind when they did it. Tough. It is,
after all, a contract - there's a weight on both sides."
"A patent is not something that comes in the water, it's something that you
are allowed to have in exchange for invention and you have to define what you want.
The onus is on you to defme it... It's something you have to work for - it's not sort
of "all have done well and all shall have prizes." You've actually got to invent
something and then the second half of the requirement is that you've got to actually
define what you want, the state's not going to do it for you."
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Moreover, all of those holding the traditional view stated that they were professionals
who were paid a lot of money to get this aspect of their jobs right. They were covetous
of their training, insisting that if you can't draft properly then you shouldn't be in the
patent drafting business, a view that has certain charm. They rationa]ised that a lack of
certainty may benefit the rich patent holder who can threaten and bully his competitor
and who can easily absorb the cost of litigation, but asked if it can really be fair on the
smaller enterprise not to know how far their monopoly extends. The professional view
is that patents are for the big boys and that you should get what you ask for, if you
don't know how to ask then that's your bad luck.
"If you can't draft properly then you shouldn't be in the business. I take the
British view of it, that this works in two ways, if you're wearing the hat of the patent
holder, you want uncertainty, because that gives you effectively broader scope -
particularly if you're a rich patent holder, if you're a poor patent holder, it means not a
lot, but if you're a rich patent holder, yes, that uncertainty around the edge of your
claim, if you can make it great enough, gives you a more powerful tool. But we must
not forget that we often represent the other guy in this profession - hired guns, we
shoot who we get paid to shoot - we represent both sides, we act for the patent
holders or as patent busters. So ... my view is coloured by working for both sides of
this..
"I think it is important to have certainty in areas of law, which is an old
British principle. This applies particularly where someone is asking of the government
the grant of a monopoly, which is a favour; they should be precise in what they're
asking for. Why should the government give them something furry or fuzzy? They
should be given what they ask, nothing more, nothing less, certainly nothing more.
And if they can't ask properly then that's their bad luck, they're asking to be given
something, their also asking for something to be taken away from other people, a
freedom to do something, a freedom to act in a certain way... I think if you are asking
to be granted something like that... If you get it wrong then that's your bad luck,
sorry...
[P]retty much everybody is represented in this game, patents are not really for
private individuals unless they are really serious entrepreneurs, they're for businessmen
and nobody in business (as far as I know) is foolish enough to write their own patents,
they all have them done professionally - and if your patent agent makes a mistake then
perhaps you should sue him. That should be your redress, if it's not a mistake and you
genuinely thought that your patent was limited to what you had written in your claim
then tough, why should you be entitled to come back and say "au, but what I really
meant was.....which is what it all boils down to.
Those holding the traditional view continued, saying that if nothing else their view was
the safest.
".. .1 think my viewpoint is the safest one because I can guarantee that even
given a hard nosed interpretation I still get what I thought I would. I would never rely
on some vague, broad interpretation to get me my infringer... [I]t seems to me that by
doing it my way you win whichever jurisdiction you're in because we've probably got
one of the hardest nosed jurisdictions in the world, so if you draft towards a British
court, it'll be OK anywhere else with the local rule of interpretation."
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"The people who lose out are the Conthientals because of the way they tend
to draft, but they're not as bad as they used to be."
A further justification for the approach taken by those holding the traditional view was
that, in their eyes, the efficacy of a patent is dependent solely upon the financial might
of the patent holder. If the owner of the patent is wealthy enough then even a weak
patent can be used highly effectively - 3M was a well cited example of a particularly
aggressive patent holder which is likely to threaten legal action even in respect of its less
sound patents. It was therefore reasoned that literal interpretation not only provides
certainty for third parties, it limits the effects of big corporations like 3M throwing their
weight around. However, it might also be argued that the converse is true; that more
liberal interpretation might dissuade large corporations from feeling that they have to
flex their muscles as much, and that returning to literal interpretation would provide
them with added incentive to tread on the little people.
Whatever the justification, there is another, perhaps less popular, but nonetheless
strongly held view within the profession that deserves explanation.
The Liberal View.
The liberal view reasons that the patent attorney is not, nor will ever be, perfect. It
reasons that the patent specification, in its entirety, is written in between 10 and 30
hours, with perhaps a further 5 hours of technical time during its examination by the
Patent Office. It considers the huge disparity between this and the amount of time that
will be spent considering the documentation if the patent ever becomes litigated.
"\Vhen that patent comes to be considered by lawyers for any reason they will
spend thousands of man hours picking over it and ripping it apart, already the deck is
stacked against you."
A further consideration is the relatively large17 amount of money that is made available
for the litigation of a patent compared to that committed to its filing, and the
commensurate increase that this provides in the danger of attack from the prior art. It
is a common sense application of mathematics that states that where an alleged infringer
is threatened with damages of the order of two million pounds, it is worth spending half
a million searching the prior art in order to attempt to invalidate the patent. Thus, even
17 In some cases 'vast' may be the more appropriate word.
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before the Court steps in to give the claims a its purposive construction, the odds are
against the patentee.
The liberal view is that the patentee should benefit from having disclosed their
invention to the world, and should not be judged according to the depth of their
pockets. They answer the traditionalists and their call for literal interpretation by stating
that:
"Patents are not statutes and should not be interpreted as such. They are
written relatively quickly against cost. Moreover, they are written usually by one
person, we all make mistakes - you only have to look at the atrocious wording of some
statutes to see that even Parliament makes mistakes. It is impossible to get it right in
all cases."
"[T]he client should benefit from having disclosed, he should then be on a
level playing field with competitors. He should not gain extra benefit from having
happened upon a better patent agent, or from having employed a patent agent on a
particularly good day."
The court should be encouraged to look at the patent for what it is, a description of the
invention. It should be encouraged to take the viewpoint that anyone in the
marketplace can get the specification and ask "what are the common features between
what I'm building, etc., and the patent; are they new and related to the patent or are they
different?"
Counsel and the courts, it was stated, seem to take the viewpoint that to give any
latitude is to adopt a position whereby you might give out a monopoly of incorrect
scope, and that if this occurred it would be the end of the world. Attorneys pick up on
this and tend to agree that anything other than literal interpretation encourages deviants
to deprive the public of what is rightly public property. However, it was stated that in
the vast majority of cases if one asks a few simple questions the problem vanishes.
Besides:
"It is often forgotten that the job of the patent agent is not to make sure that
infringers can get away with infringing, the primary purpose of the agent is to protect
the patentee's invention. It is also forgotten that little mistakes are so easy to make and
that it is very rare for anyone to be expected to be perfect all of the time."
They reasoned that the injustice of a literal interpretative doctrine is further
compounded if you take a patent document and file it abroad. The original document is
produced with a certain amount of effort, and if it is taken around the world the
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patentee incurs vast costs in translations alone. If the original document is then
knocked out, or avoided, because of a technicality in the wording then the rest is vanity.
However, it is submitted that the current state of affairs in the United Kingdom is
closer to the traditional view than to that of the liberalists. Therefore to return to a
quote that has been used before:
"[I]f you make a wish, make sure you think very hard what you wish
for"
It may come back and bite.
Conclusion
The traditional and liberal views of patent interpretation are not merely different; they
are irreconcilable. They stem from different perceptions of the grant and, importantly,
different perceptions of the attorney's own jobs and that of the patent system. The fact
that the majority of those questioned saw themselves as potential 'double agents', one
day working for one client and the next working for their competitor, is, it is submitted,
a highly significant factor in the determination of the intrinsic scope of patent
protection. This split allegiance necessitates (at least in the majority opinion) a
minimalistic approach to the latitude that should be given to their wording of the claims.
In addition, a fierce professional pride (that bordered on arrogance in some cases)
seemed to dictate that scope should be restricted to the words as they had written them.
One of those interviewed likened the drafting of a patent to the copying of a painting; it
simply wasn't good enough until you could fool the experts. You couldn't claim success
if they said, "well, this could be the real thing if we give it a broad enough
interpretation," you have to strive for perfection.
The fact that the majority of those interviewed branded the patent grant an economic
monopoly is also highly significant. The reader is reminded of the stigmatic effect of
monopoly rhetoric and the boost that it gave to the abolitionists' argument during the
'Anti-Patent' debate of the 1ate19tt century. 18 The fact that those most intimately
involved with the creation of the patent, indeed those charged with shaping it in the
first place and defining its literal scope, class it as a monopoly that needs to be
See Chapter III, above.
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contained is saddening. It demonstrates distaste for the grant and, as we shall see, 19 a
misconception of the actual effects of the patent. This, in itself, is significant.
We have seen the traditional justifications of the patent system and are now in a
position to answer the question of how these fit in with the commercial realities.
Classical economists clearly saw the patent grant as reward or incentive, the reason for
offering a patent was to enable protection from competition. In the modern sphere
there has been a subtle but significant shift in the underlying reasons for patenting. The
old justifications still hold true to an extent, however, there are now other motivations
behind seeking the grant. These other considerations may well have far reaching effects
on the intrinsic scope with which these patents are drafted. Furthermore, the amount
of time devoted to the preparation of a patent, when compared to the amount of time
that will be devoted to scrutinising it should it ever come to be litigated, is very small.
This is necessarily the case. However, it is something that some would say should be
taken into account when the claims come to be interpreted and their scope defmed.
This point is made all the more significant when the depth of the patentee's pockets is
also considered. If the patentee is rich, then not only will they be more readily able to
defend their patent should the need arise, but also they will have been able to pay for a
better patent in the first place. Money is indeed the key to better patent protection.
Large, well-funded entities are doubly benefited, for as well as capacious pockets, they
will have the patenting 'know-how' that is so important. As noted, one of the most
important things that the patentee needs to know when they are seeking a patent is
exact5i what they want, experience can only improve their chances of getting something
that works.
As we have seen, the determination of the intrinsic scope of the patent is of vital
importance to its fmal breadth of protection because the literal wording of the claims is
generally considered to defme the narrowest interpretation that the patent can have.20
However, the creation of any specification is beset by myriad of obstacles and
difficulties that make this task more of a 'black art' than a scientific endeavour. Indeed,
such are the odds stacked against the applicant that it is amazing that any patents are
ever held to be valid at all. Yet the majority of those involved in the crafting of the
19 See Chapter V, below.
20 However, as we shall see in Chapter VIII, below, this is not necessarily the case.
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grant would still promote legal certainty over fair protection. Self-interest, it would
appear, is the main reason for holding this view, as it is no doubt far easier to draft
subsequent patents in the same area where one does not have to do anything more than
interpret their claims in a literal manner. However, can it really be said that this narrow
approach to the interpretation of claims is any more certain than an alternative
'equivalents' analysis? As many of those interviewed pointed out, the patent game is no
longer one for individuals, it is a business, and in business you employ professionals,
experts, to do your drafting for you. Why then, would it be so difficult to seek
professional advice on the scope of a competitor's patent to see if your invention
infringes? Adopting such an analysis would not encourage sloppy drafting, but may
help to right the balance between the ivory tower of certainty and the much maligned
outcast that is fair protection.
The sad reality of the patent system is that, as the economy has developed, it has turned
into something that protects the strong at the expense of the weak. It is a matter of
historical fact that the majority of groundbreaking, or pioneer, inventions have come
from individuals, not from the hallowed halls of big business. 21 The economic
reasoning for this is simple, big firms are led by profit, the cost/benefit ratio of a
pioneer invention is uncertain, therefore the expected profit that flows from any
investment in R&D associated with such an invention is highly uncertain. It makes far
more economic sense to proceed down a narrowly defined path investing in R&D that
forecasts say has a better than average chance of leading to profit. Put simply,
accountants mean that big firms are highly unlikely to be responsible for the most
spectacular technical contributions, unless serendipitously stumbled upon.
Discussing realities before considering the post-classical economic theories and the
'hard' economics of the patent system may seem like putting the cart before the horse.
However, this is not so. The foregoing discussion provides the reader with specific
context in which to critically evaluate the following Chapter. It will allow the reader to
question the validity of the theories advanced and to note, in the light of practical
21 For example, Morse's telegraphy patent, Watt's steam engine patent, Selden's horse-less carriage patent,
etc. See further, notes 39 to 42 in Chapter VI, below.
22 It should, however, be noted that initiatives such as the establishment of University I.P. centres may be
one potential answer to this conundrum.
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examples, where they depart company with fact. Therefore, we now turn our attention
to the hard economics of demand, cost, and price, as well as the post-classical economic
theory; and ask whether a patent can actually be described as a monopoly?
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CHAPTER V








Some Basics of Economic Analysis
In order to understand the value of the patent grant, and modern economic modelling
of patent scope, it is necessary to understand the economic effects that a patent has on
the marketplace. Therefore, before proceeding to discuss the issue of value within the
market economy, we take a little time to examine some of the basic concepts underlying
this economic analysis and to defme a number of key terms.
The principles stated can be found in any good basic economics text. Posner, Economic
Ana/ysis of Law' and Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopo!y: An
Economic Analysis,2 have been extensively utilised by the author in the preparation of the
following.
Demand and Price
The starting point in our economic exploration of the patent system is the inverse
relationship between price and demand. Put simply, if the price rises then, in general,
demand for the product or service will fall, and vice-versa. This is demonstrated infigur
1 (below). Here the y-axis represents price (L) and the x-axis is the quantity of the item




Figure 1: The Demand Curve
1 (1992; Little, Brown & Co., Boston; 4tI Ed.).
2 (1966) 76 YakLJ267.
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The reason that the demand curve slopes down and to the right is twofold. First, as the
price falls some consumers that would only buy a small number of units at the higher
price will now buy more. Second, there will be some consumers that will buy no units
at high prices but who will buy some units when the price is lower. If we take a simple
example to illustrate this and imagine an island (as a closed system) on which there is
one shop. It sells apples and pears and these are the only food items available on the
island. The price of apples is LI per kilogram and the shop sells 10 kg per day. The
consumers that buy apples value them at Li per kilogram or more, at this price the pear
is a poor substitute. If the shopkeeper raises the price of apples to £1.50 per kilogram,
many consumers will continue to buy apples as they did before, however, some
consumers will reduce the amount of apples that they purchase and buy pears instead.
The quantity of apples demanded by the consumers, and therefore the amount
produced, will fall.
This example is necessarily simplistic and assumes that the only things changing in the
system are the relative price of the goods and the quantity demanded. It ignores other
factors that might impact on the sale of apples; such as other shops opening, the quality
of the apples falling, fluctuations in the income of the consumer, etc.
Elasticity
The value that the consumer places on the goods (i.e. the need, or desire, that they have
for them), combined with the substitutability of other products will affect the slope of
this curve. The slope of the curve at any given point is referred to as its elasticity. This
is a measure of the rate of change of quantity with respect to price. It is calculated by
comparing the percentage change in quantity brought about by a percentage change in
price. The higher the elasticity, the greater the impact that a given price movement will
have on the quantity demanded. Where the slope of the demand curve at a given point
is greater than one, the curve is said to be elastic, where it is less than one it is inelastic,
and at exactly one it is said to be of unitary elasticity.
If we consider the example of apples and pears once more we can see why this is the
case. If we suppose that the population of the island like apples, but really dislike pears
and will only eat them if there is no other alternative, it will take a very large increase in
the price of apples to affect the quantity demanded as the alternative (buying pears or
going hungry) is a poor substitute. Here the curve is inelastic. If, however, the
132
substitutes are more acceptable then the slope of the demand curve will be shallower as
people will more readily replace apples with pears when the price rises too high.
The elasticity of the curve at any given point can be described by the mathematical
formula:
Eq=-p/qdq/dp
Where p is the price, q is the quantity demanded at that price and dq/dp is the inverse
of the gradient of the demand curve.
The Demand Curve under Competition
The demand curve illustrated above is that for the product, in our example for apples.
It will also be the demand curve that the seller will face where the seller is in a
monopoly position and is the only outlet for the product. Where the seller has
competition, she will obviously have to share the market and sell only a fraction of the
total quantity of goods at any given price. The introduction of competition will mean
that the demand curve that the seller faces will usually be slightly more complicated than
that of the total demand for the product. This is because another factor enters the
equation - substitutability of supply. If we return to our island, we can see the effect of
this extra complication if we introduce another shop next door to the first. Now, there
are two shops selling apples and pears. If the price of apples rises in one shop only
(assuming all other variables are constant) then consumers, rather than substituting
pears, will simply turn to the other supplier (the fact that it is next door means that we
can factor out any costs associated with travelling to the other shop).
Therefore, the demand curve facing the seller of the product will lie to the left of the
demand curve for the product (as the seller has to share the market, the quantity
demanded will be less than the total quantity). In addition, it will usually be more
elastic, at least for prices higher than the current market price. The reason for this
qualification comes from the fact that the other sellers in the market may learn of the
reduction in price and therefore also lower their prices. It is tacitly assumed that other
suppliers would not respond in a similar fashion to an increase in price, 3 as they could
catch an increased market share by simply selling at current price. Where the seller
As long as it is not caused by an increase in cost that they all experience.
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£reduces the price of the product and the competition follows, they will not increase
their share of the market. They will, however, sell more units in line with the demand
curve for the product.
In any given market, the slope of the demand curve for our hypothetical seller will
primarily depend on two factors: the first is the demand curve for the product, and the
second is the number of other sellers in the market. Where the seller is a monopolist,
the demand curve that they face will be the same as the demand curve for the product
itself. Where there are a small number of firms competing, such that the conduct of
each firm significantly affects the situation of the other firms, 4 then the demand curve
faced by each may look something like that in fIgure 2 (below).
I
Figure 2: Oligopolistic Competition
The kink in the curve occurs at the existing price (P 0), below which the market is
assumed to respond to a reduction of price by similarly lowering prices, therefore the
slope roughly parallels that of the demand curve for the product. Where the price is
raised the market is expected, for the reasons outlined above, not to respond in a similar
way, therefore the curve is more flattened.
As more sellers enter the marketplace the oligopolistic interdependencies between them
are softened, as the effects of competition diminish the impact that a price change by
one seller has on the rest of the market. Where the market is not perfectly competitive,
either because the number of sellers is too small or because the product is not
4 This is known as an oligopolistic mdustry.
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Figure 3: Imperfect Competition
Where the market is in perfect competition - i.e. the goods of one seller are perfectly
substitutable for the goods of another, and there are many separate sellers, each with
small market share - the demand curve for each seller would look like that in figure 4
(below). Here the demand curve is flat, the elasticity is infinite; such a system is said to
be perfectly elastic. The seller in this scenario can sell all that he produces at the
existing price and nothing at higher prices, as customers would simply go elsewhere. It
is apparent that the seller in our example will wish to trade at the price that maximises
their profit - the difference between their costs and their sales revenue. However,
under perfect competition at every point up to the lowest profitable price the seller
faces the prospect of being undercut and therefore losing sales.
Figure 4: Perfect Competition
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Marginal Revenue
Another useful concept employed by economists is the "marginal revenue curve". This
is the curve that can be drawn for any given demand curve that represents the net effect
on revenues of making ever-larger numbers of sales. If we turn, once more, to our
island example we can see a practical illustration of this principle.
Imagine, once again, that there is only one shop on the island, it sells apples and pears.
The highest price the shopkeeper can charge for apples is LI each, however at this price
he only sells one per day - this is the unit price. If the shopkeeper drops the price to 95
pence per apple then he sells two per day 5 - this is the two-unit price. However, the
sale of two apples at 95 pence is less than the sum of the unit price and the two-unit
price (i.e. 95p + 95p is less than LI + 95p). Here the marginal return is 90 pence (i.e.
95p + 95p - LI). If the shopkeeper wishes to sell three apples he must again reduce the
price. The return to revenue as a result of the last (marginal) sale will always be less
than the price at which the last sale was made.
If the marginal revenue curve is sketched, a number of points become apparent. First,
it will always lie below the demand curve for a product at every quantity after the first
unit (at least where the demand curve is not perfectly elastic. Where the demand is
perfectly elastic the marginal revenue curve will be incidental with the demand curve as
every unit produced can be sold at the prevailing price). Second, the marginal revenue
curve will, itself slope downwards for as long as the demand curve follows a linear
descent. Third, the marginal revenue curve will hit the x-axis at the point of unitary
elasticity and will then fall below it (i.e. the marginal revenue will become negative), as
the curve becomes inelastic. This occurs because, after the point of umtary elasticity, it
is necessary to cut the price by more than one-percent in order to gain a one-percent
increase in quantity sold.
This principle is best illustrated by example. Therefore, suppose that the demand curve
for apples in the shop looks like that shown in Fzgure 5 (below) and our shopkeeper can
sell four apples per day if he prices them at sixty pence each. The revenue he gets from
the sale is L2.40 (i.e. 4x60p). If he drops the price to 50 pence each, he can sell 5 apples
The demand curve slopes downwards to the right, therefore in order to sell more units the price must
drop
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a day. The revenue that he will get from the sales at this new price is £2.50 (i.e. 5x50p).
Therefore the marginal return in moving from four to five apples per day is lop (L2.50
-£2. 40). If our shopkeeper wishes to sell 6 apples per day he has to drop the price to 40
pence. The revenue he gets from the sale of six apples is 6x40p = £2.40, i.e. less than
the revenue that he gained from selling five apples at 5Op each. The curve at the six-
apple price is inelastic. The marginal revenue that accrues from moving between sales
of five apples at 5Op each and six apples at 4-Op each is negative. The shopkeeper loses







o	 "j	 4	 5	 6 Qu2ntity/Day
Figure 5: Marginal Revenue Example
Cost
It should now be apparent to the reader that the demand curve for any given product is
of vital importance to the seller or producer of that product, as it will dictate how, and
when, the sale of the product will be profitable. However, this is not the end of the
story for there is another factor, of equal importance to demand, that affects the market
of a product: Cost.
The interrelation betveen the demand and cost curves for a given product provides
information on the level of production that will take best economic advantage of the
situation.
The lowest profitable price in any situation will be the price that the resources
consumed in the production and sale of the item would command in their next best use.
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This is the price that economists refer to as the 'opportunity cost'. For example,
assume our shopkeeper has a small piece of land that is lying unused. He decides to
start growing lettuce on the land to sell in the shop. The opportunity cost of the lettuce
will be the price that the labour, materials and transport, etc. involved in bringing it to
the point of sale would have commanded if sold to the next highest bidder. This is
because the producer must have outbid their nearest rival to obtain the resources.
However, importantly, it will not include the purchase of the land, as this is a sunk (or
incurred) cost at the time that production is contemplated and commenced. The
shopkeeper already has the land, it is lying unused and therefore will not (assuming that
he is rational) factor in the price he charges for his lettuce. To take another example, if
it cost L1O to assemble a widget, but now that it is assembled the most that it can be
sold for is LI, the fact that it cost L1O to build should not affect the sale price, as selling
at the lower price is preferable to not selling at all.
A consequence of defining 'cost' as 'the value of the resource in its next best use' is that
cost will only be incurred when someone is denied the use of a resource. This
definition means that those resources that can be classified as free goods (goods not
exhausted by use) are, in fact, costless. A commonly quoted example of this concept is
the air that we breathe. Air is costless as one can breathe as mush as one wishes
without depriving anyone else of the aix that they want. There is no 'economy' of air as
there is no next best use, because one cannot, under normal circumstances, be denied
use of the resource. This has important implications for the patent system that will be
explored below.
For expediency economists often divide the total cost for the production of a particular
item into two elements. The first is fixed cost. This is, by definition, the same for all
levels of output available within the seller's normal operating range (i.e. given their
current premises and contractual obligations). The second is variable cost, which rises
and falls according to the level of output. Costs may be described in aggregate, or per
unit, depending on which is more helpful for any given purpose. Aggregate variable
costs will generally rise as production output increases. The total cost of production is
calculated by adding the aggregate variable cost at any given point to the fixed cost. An
illustration of possible fixed cost (FC), aggregate variable cost (VC), and total cost (T'C)
curves is given in Fzgiire 6 (below).
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Figure 6: Cost Curves
The average variable cost (variable cost per unit) AVC), average fixed cost AFC), and
average total cost (ATC) are calculated by dividing each category by the number of units




Figure 7: Average Cost Curves
In much the same way as we calculated the marginal revenue curve from the demand
curve earlier, it is possible (and very useful) to calculate a marginal cost curve. The
marginal cost is the additional amount of cost associated with each successive unit of
product, or, put another way, it is the cost avoided by producing one unit less. Given
that fixed costs are, by definition, the same for all levels of output within the normal
operating range, the marginal cost will be attributable to changes in the variable cost and
will bear close relationship to the average variable cost curve.
Just as the marginal revenue and demand curves coincided at unitary production, the
marginal cost curve at this level of output will be incidental with the average variable
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cost curve and the total variable cost curve. 6 For as long as the incremental cost of
producing another unit of product is less than the incremental cost of producing the last
unit, the marginal cost and the average variable cost will both fall. Additionally, as the
marginal cost curve is, by definition, not affected by the higher incremental costs of
producing earlier units, but the average variable cost curve is, the average cost will be
greater than the marginal cost. At the point at which the cost of making an additional
unit ceases to be less than the incremental cost of making the unit before, the marginal
cost curve will reach its minimum. It will still be below the average cost. However, for
successive units it will now start to rise, whereas the average cost will continue to fall.
Where the incremental cost of producing another unit exceeds the average cost of
producing all of the units before it, the average variable cost curve will find its
minimum. This will occur where the marginal cost curve intersects the average variable
cost curve. The marginal cost will always be more than the average variable cost where
the latter is rising, and less where it is falling. See Figure 8 (below) for graphical
representation of this point.
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Figure 8: Marginal Cost, Average Variable Cost and
Average Fixed Cost Curves
Profit
The motivating factor of all economic behaviour is assumed to be profit maximisation.
If the cost and demand curves for any given period are superimposed then it is possible
to see that profit may be maximised if operation proceeds at the level where marginal
cost is equal to marginal revenue. This is because failure to produce a unit whose
It is simple to see why this is the case, the marginal cost of moving from no units to one unit of
production will obviously be equal to the cost of the first unit.
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incremental cost was less than the incremental revenue that its sale would bring would
not be consistent with the purpose of maximising profit. Similarly, it would not
maximise profits to produce an additional unit where the incremental cost of
production was more than the incremental return to revenue that its sale would bring.
If, for simplicity's sake, we assume that the marginal cost (and therefore the average
variable cost) for a particular product is constant, then we might see a situation such as
that represented in Fzgure 9 (below). The firm, under imperfect competition, will wish
to maximise its profits and therefore produce quantity Q, the quantity that corresponds
to the intersection of the marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) curves. It will
sell the goods at price P, dictated by the incidence of line q with the demand curve (D).
The total (gross) revenue is the area of the grey shaded rectangle formed by lines p, q
and the axes (i.e. the price per unit multiplied by the number of units produced). The
total cost of production will be the average total cost per unit (the average variable cost
plus the average fixed cost) at quantity Q multiplied by Q (i.e. the area of the hatched
rectangle formed by MC, q and the axes in our example). If the point at which Q
intersects the demand curve is above the average total cost curve then profit will be
earned; if it is below it, a loss will be sustained; and if on the curve, then normal returns
to capital will be experienced. Production at point Q (corresponding to the intersection
of MC and MR) will maximise any profit or minimise any losses; production at any




Figure 9: Maximising Profit
Under perfect competition the price will be driven down to the opportunity cost, as if
the price charged is higher other sellers will be attracted to the market. Their
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production will add to the current total production and, due to the downward slope of
the demand curve, this increase in quantity will lead to a lowering of price until it
reaches its minimum level. The opportunity cost of the resources used to produce a
unit of product will dictate the minimum price for that product, as below that price the
bidder would have lost out to the next best use. Where the product in question is a free
good the marginal cost will be zero and therefore the optimal price (to maximise use)
will also be zero.
Where one-person controls the entire supply of goods, i.e. where there is a monopoly,
the monopolist can dictate the quantity produced in order to maximise profits. As a
consequence, production will be less than under competitive conditions. This means
that there will be an under-utilisation of the resources associated with the production of
the goods - as more units of product could be produced at a cost that is less than the
consumer would be willing to pay for them. The price that the producer charges for
each unit will still be dictated by the demand curve, however, the monopoly price will
be more than the competitive price for obvious reasons. Therefore, society will be
charged more for the goods than they would under competitive conditions. This will
mean that some consumers will satisfy their desire for the monopolised goods (for
example, apples) by switching to overall less desirable products (pears), as the high
monopoly price of the apples makes pears more desirable.
The effect of monopoly on the supply of a product can be seen injIgure 10 (below). In
the absence of monopoly, competition will push the price charged for the goods down
to the marginal cost of their production (i.e. to P - for simplicity it is assumed that
marginal cost is constant and that there are no fixed costs, thus, marginal cost equals
average total cost). Therefore, production will be at as this is the point at which the
demand curve for the product and the marginal cost curve intersect. 7
 If the supply of
the product is monopolised, however, the monopolist will be unencumbered by
competition and will he able to set production at a point that maximises profit (price m
and quantity Qm in figure 10). The high price causes some consumers to substitute to
other products. Where these goods cost more to produce than the monopolised goods,
this added cost is a waste to society. The cost of moving from perfect competition to
monopolistic price is approximated by the shaded triangle marked DW (deadweight
See the foregoing discussion for an explanation of why competition has this effect.
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Ploss) inJIgure 10. The deadweight loss associated with monopoly can be simply defined
as the "welfare loss suffered by those who stop buying the [preferred] product [which]
is not off-set by any gain to the seller." 8 In addition, the restriction on supply will mean
that there is a possible under-utifisadon of resources associated with the production of
the product.
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Figure 10: Deadweight Loss
Despite harming society, monopoly benefits the monopolist in a number of ways. First,
the fact that the monopolist is, by definition, the only producer in the market means
that they do not need to share any profits made, but instead can keep them all to
themselves. Second, the ability to dictate supply means that any such profits can be
maximised, either by taking advantage of economies of scale without fear of the market
being flooded, or by liniiting production to get the best price. It is this potential for
monopoly profits that provides the traditional incentives associated with the patent
system.
The trade-off between the harm inflicted upon society by the imposition of monopoly
and the gains from increased levels of inventive activity has been the main focus of
economic attention in this area. Implicit in the early studies was the idea of the patent
as a perfect tool of appropriation, a perfect monopoly. However, more recently
commentators have asked whether this can really be said to be the case.
8 Corones, Restrictive Trade Practices Law (1994; Law Book Go, North Ryde (N.S.') at 5. Quoted from
Loughian, Patents: Breaking into the Loop, (1998) 20 S ydney L Rev 553, (hereinafter Loughian) at 565.
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Throughout our discussion of the patent system the word 'monopoly' has been
deployed, with what verges on reckless abandon, to describe the grant. This use of the
term has been influenced by a number of factors, including convenience, tradition and
expediency, however, now that we have an economic appreciation of the nature and
effect of monopoly in the marketplace it is time to question its suitability to the task.
Therefore, before considering the economics of the patent system in any more detail,
we turn our attention to the nature of the grant once more, and ask if it can really be
called monopoly at all.
Patents as Monopolies - What's in a Word?
It may be thought that the labelling of the patent grant as a 'monopoly' is a largely
academic point and that its discussion has no real value. The patent, call it what you
like, has an economic effect; its presence distorts the market structure experienced by
the product or process that forms the subject matter of the grant. It creates scarcity
where there would naturally be none and, in doing so, shelters the proprietor from the
full rigors of competition and increases their resistance to price pressure. It creates an
area of calm in an otherwise busy market and reduces the availability of substitutes that
would fall within the scope of its protection. It unifies source.
However, as already noted, the consequences of monopoly are more than simply
economic. The word itself has potent effect in the societal mind. Images of high
prices, low quality, and short supply are all conjured up at the mention of monopoly;
economists distrust them, the judiciary distrusts them, and people distrust them. The
effects of censure and denunciation in the sphere of criminal law are well known, 9
 the
susceptibility of the trade mark to tarnishing is also widely acknowledged,° however the
detrimental effect of calling a patent a 'monopoly' is often overlooked. Classification is
important, the "question whether a patent privilege is a monopoly is not a mere
question of words. It is the point of departure for two distinct theories, under whose
influence courts and legislatures may be led to widely different conclusions as to the
dividing line between the rights to be conceded to inventors and those to be reserved to
See, for example, Feinberg, The E?tpressive Fusc%ion of Plrnishm6'nt, (1965) 49 The Mothi 397 discussing the
symbolic significance of punishment.
U) See, for example, Case C-251/95 Sabelv Puma, [19987 RPC 199, at paragraph 48.
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the public." 1 As the late Giles Rich, one of the authors of the United States' Patents
Act of 1952 and respected patent judge, stated: "The tendency is to call a patent
"monopoly" when it is to be invalidated or restricted and to say it is not a monopoly
when it is held to be valid and infringed."12
To what extent, therefore, may a patent be called a monopoly? The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionay defmes monopoly as:
"Exclusive possession of the trade in some article of merchandise; the
condition of having no competitor in the sale of some commodity, or in the exercise of
some trade or business"; or,
"An exclusive privilege (conferred by the sovereign or the state) of selling
some commodity or trading with a particular place or country."13
The definition in the Oxford Dictionary of Economics is somewhat narrower - "A market
situation with only one seller."4
At its loosest, a monopoly is the right to exclude others from the thing monopolised.
However, this is one of the defming features of all forms of private property, 15 and by
comparing a patent to a car, a house, or an apple, etc., critics of the monopoly 'nametag'
attempt to collapse the conceptual distinction between the patent and other, less
'objectionable' forms of property.' 6 It is therefore simple to see that reliance on the
pedantry of definition can cloud the issue. Indeed, it is perfectly possible to "prove" a
patent to be what ... [you] want by selection of the proper "authority"."7
Whatever its definition, it is clear that the 'monopoly' effects of a patent will vary from
invention to invention. Indeed, they will vary from definition to definition, but for any
particular definition it is possible to imagine situations in which total exclusion will be
effected. A popular example is where there is only one drug with which to treat a
' Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions, (1890; Little, Brown & Co., Boston), § 12, at 18-19.
Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants ofMonopo/y? (1993) 15 IVestern New En gland Law Review 239 at 239.
12 Ibid. at 240.
13 "Monopoly" in Trumble & Stevenson (eds), Shorter Oxford English Dictionay, (2002; OUP, Oxford; 5"
Ed).
14 Black, The Oxford Dictionary of Economics, (1997; OUP, Oxford), at 307.
15 See conclusions to this end in Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants ofMonopo/y? op dt. at 254.
16 Loughlan, op cit. at 566.
17 Rich, op cit. at 248.
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particular disease, in such a case there is no substitute product. However, this situation
will be rare, not least because if there is a large profit to be made other producers will be
attracted and will attempt to 'invent around' the patent. Where the monopoly effects of
the grant are strong the scope of the exclusion will therefore become of paramount
importance. In other situations such effects will be less severe, there will be effective
substitutes that expose the patentee to price pressure. But again the scope of the grant
will be crucial, as it will dictate the proximity of any new competition.
The breath of protection that a patent offers is necessarily affected by the perception of
the grant as a monopoly, therefore the degree of monopolisation is contingent upon the
ultimate recognition of the patent as a good or bad use of monopoly power. Loughian
sums up the issue succinctly when she states that "Patents are rapidly becoming one of
the defining characteristics of the market economies of contemporary capitalism and yet
their inherent nature as an economic monopoly seems to defy the very ideology of
competition which constitutes and drives those market economies." 18
 She continues,
quoting Kastriner, Chief Patent Counsel for Union Carbide Industrial Gases, Inc.:
"[o]nce the public misperception of patents changed from anti-competitive
"monopolies" to useful stimulants for creativity and economic growth the patent system
was revived to an extent..."9
In America, Dam2 notes that the 'patent as monopoly' argument showed up frequently
in Antitrust cases in the period spanning from the 1930s to the mid-1980s, and was
accompanied by a tangible enmity towards patents. He states that if "hostility had been
limited to antitrust cases, it might not have been so serious", however, the same anti-
monopolistic sentiment was to be found in patent validity cases as well.2'
18 Loughlan, op dt. at 565.
19 Ibid. Quoting Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent Sjstem, (1991) 73 JOS 5 at 8.
20 Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Lan, (1994) 23 Journal of gal Studies 241. See also Rose, Patent
'Monopo/yphobia":A Means of Extin.guishing the Fountainhead (1999) 49 Case Western Reserve Lan ' Revieov 509.
2! Ibid. at 268-9. In support of this proposition Dam quotes Justice Douglas in Great At/antic &Pac. Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equebment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950, Supreme Court), that: "Every patent is the grant of
a privilege of exacting tolls from the public... The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of
gadgets... The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has to be brought all the way to this
Court to be declared invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from the
constitutional standards which are supposed to govern." at 154, 155, 158.
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In his discussion of the patent grant, Rich notes the symbolic potency of the
'monopoly' nametag - "to talk of the "patent monopoly" weds patents to prejudice" -
but accepts that "monopolistic power is the engine of the patent system"? He states
that monopoly does not have the capacity to be good or bad, it is simply a power that
can be put to good or bad uses. Therefore, in much the same way as Coke
distinguished 'odious' from unobjectionable grants in his commentary on the Jacobean
Statute, Rich separates monopolies into two categories. First are those in which the use
of the monopoly power takes something from the public that they previously enjoyed
unrestricted access to. Here the individual has gained at the public's expense and
therefore the monopoly is 'odious'. The second category concerns things that never
belonged to the public, even before the creation of the monopoly. To this category
there can be no objection. Whereas Coke interpreted 'monopoly' to exclude patents,
Rich simply states that patents, due to the criteria that need to be satisfied in order to
obtain the grant (i.e. that the invention must be novel and inventive) fall into the
categoly of legitimate use of monopoly power. "Unless the grant of a patent gives
some kind of economic power to the patentee that he or she would not otherwise have,
the patent system would not work."24
Thus stated, the patent grant can be said to confer monopoly privilege on the right-
holder, but this does not necessarily lead to a defacto monopoly. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that protection from imitation and the ability to collect supra-competitive rent
necessarily means that the patent owner is placed in a position of significant market
power at all. Figures from the European Patent Office amply illustrate this. In 2000
there were almost 143,000 patent applications filed at the Office, these resulted in the
grant of 27,573 patents.25 Does this mean that there are nearly 28,000 markets that have
been monopolised? It does not. Indeed it is unlikely that any one of these patents has
provided, or will provide, its owner with a single monopoly in any market. 26
 A
television advertisement for a new 'Dyson' vacuum cleaner that was aired in the
22 Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of Monopoiy?, op cit. at 239.
Ibid. at 252.
24 Ibid. at 251.
25 See http: / /wv.european-patent-office.org/epo  Ian rep /2000/images /fs/tab76.f. The actual
number of applications in 2000 was 142,941.
26 See Dam, op cit. at 250 for a similar conclusion utilising figures for the United States.
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summer of 2000 boasted that the machine was protected by no less than 156 patents,
yet Dyson does not have a monopoly of the vacuum cleaner market.
The best that a patent can hope to provide is an increased economic rent for its owner,
and this is not in itself objectionable. There are, for example, many instances of natural
supra-competitive rents flowing from such things as real estate location, artistic or
sporting talent, etc,27 that demonstrate this effect. It is submitted that the distaste for
the increased rent that results from the patent grant is inextricably tied to the
misconception of the patent as a monopoly.
Therefore, to summarise, the presence of a patent creates property in an invention as it
imposes an artificial scarcity on the knowledge resource required for its operation.
Terming the patent grant a cmonopoly does little to aid any analysis of the system;
rather it engenders distaste and breeds distrust. The patent cannot accurately be
described as a legal monopoly, although it does create and confer monopoly power.
The use of this power is legitimate as nothing is taken from the public that they had
previously enjoyed full access to, indeed, before the invention was made the subject
matter of the patent was not in existence. However, monopolyphobia clouds the issue
and the arguments for and against the system. Therefore, with this in mind, and having
already considered some of the early economic and philosophical arguments for the
patent system, we turn our attention to discuss the modern economic theory and
consider some of the determinants of patent value in the market economy. This
discussion necessarily involves consideration of the scope of the patent grant and the
various theories that have been advanced to attempt to model the system.
The Economic Argument for the Patent System
As we have seen, the patent system has been justified on the basis that it increases the
incentive to invent and invest in invention. 28 Invention is considered to be necessary to
27 These examples are given in Dam, op cit. at 250.
28 See Chapter III, above. Consideration of non-patent incentives, such as lead-time, trade secrecy etc., is
outside of the scope of this work. Those interested in these matters are directed to Beckerman-Rodau,
The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: .4 Le ,gal Business Decision, (2002) 84 JPTOS 371,
and Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, (1997,) 29 New
York Universifr Journal of International Law and Politics 11, particularly text accompanying notes 206-249
therein.
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the technological progression of society, which, in turn, leads to the creation of societal
wealth. In the absence of some form of incentive the level of invention would be too
low (sub-optimal). Therefore the patent system offers an ex ante incentive to invent and
to invest in research and development (R&D) as the offer of a patent grant provides
expectation that, provided there is a market for the invention, monopoly profit can be
realised. R&D will receive investment if the expected net revenue from the invention
over the period of protection exceeds the cost of creating it in the first place.29
The ex ante incentive to invent is directly related to the expost protection that the patent
provides. Inventions are 'public goods' which, absent some form of protection from
competition, could be costlessly copied by competitors who did not share the same
burden of R&D as the originator. Without protection competing firms could undercut
the inventor and drive price down to the marginal cost of production. In this expost
analysis the sunken costs of the originator are bygones and will not affect the price at
which the product is sold (for, where there is competition, the inventor could not
charge monopoly price, as they would then sell no units). Within a market
unencumbered by legal protection (or other compensation) for the creator of a new
product, or process, there would be a disincentive to invest in R&D. This is an example
of where a competitive market will produce an unfair (and economically inefficient)
outcome.
As noted above, even Macfie, the most ardent of abolitionists during the 'Anti-Patent'
debate, accepted that the unregulated market would produce a disincentive to invent.39
However, he doubted the efficacy of the patent system in righting the balance between
the market and the inventor, and instead suggested the provision of government-funded
rewards. This is a suggestion that fmds little support in the modern economic literature,
however in one study Shavell and Ypersele conclude that a system of optional reward -
where the inventor chooses between rewards and patents - is socially superior to patent
29 As one of the patent attorneys interviewed in connection with Chapter IV stated, "There's a saying in
the pharmaceutical industry that whilst the second tablet costs tuppence to make, the first costs a few
million pounds... You have to make the numbers add up somewhere, without patents, your competitor
makes tablet two and never has to make the first."
° See text accompanying note 101 in Chapter III, above.
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protection. 31 The same arguments against monetary rewards exist now as did in
Macfie's time, viz. that such a system is too bureaucratic, that the government is ill
equipped to make judgernent on the value of invention, that the patent system is fairer
since it only taxes those who actually use the invention, etc. However, the point is
made; the inventive/innovative system sometimes needs stimulus - a concession that,
in itself, provided one of the justifications for patents.
The classical economic and philosophical rationales of the patent system are, however,
unsubtie. The arguments advanced in the 'Anti-Patent' debate are essentially binary in
their approach; the patent system either is, or is not, justified on balance. Yet "Patents,
once established in principle, can either be too broad or too narrow." 32 Early economic
treatment of the grant makes no attempt to objectively criticise the scope of the system
and to try to re-model it, refining the protection that it affords in order to maxirnise
benefit and minimise loss. In other words, there was little-or-no consideration of
variabics that could affect the balance; the question of the strength/scope of the grant,
for instance, was left open. This narrow approach can be attributed to a combination
of factors, including; the relative infancy of economic reasoning, the nature of the
debate and the stigmatic association with monopoly, and the changing face of industry.
The rationales behind this observation is not, however, of primary importance to our
discussion; it is sufficient to note that a line can be drawn at the beginning of the 20th
century between the 'classical' and 'post-classical' theories.
Post-Classical Models and Justifications
The modern appreciation of the innovative process stems from the seminal works of
Joseph A. Schumpeter, who argued that the traditional view of perfect competition,
characterised by perfect knowledge and therefore costless appropriability of invention,
is not conducive to innovation.33 He therefore rejected the orthodox view, formulated
around quality, price and sales effort, in favour of "competition from the new
31 Shavell & Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Propery Rights, NBER Working Paper N 6956, February
1999. This can be found at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W6956.pdf . This topic is also explored by
Abramowicz, Pefecting Patent Prizes, (2003) 56 Vanderbilt Law Review 115.
32 Alexander & Grady. Patent Law and Rent Disszation, (1992) 78 Vi,ginia Law Review 305 at 307.
See Schumpeter, Theo?y of Economic Development, (1936; Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass)).
This work was first published in German as Theorie der wirtshcafihichen Entwicklun.g (1911; Duncker
Humblot, Leipzig).
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commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of
organization". 34 This process, what Schumpeter calls 'Creative Destruction', "is the
essential fact about capitalism". 35 In essence, therefore, Schumpeter puts the flesh on
the bones laid down by Bentham, and extends the argument that there will be a sub-
optimal level of invention in the absence of some form of incentive to the process of
innovation itself. By the time that he was writing the world had changed significandy
from that experienced by Bentham; large corporations had begun to take the place of
single inventors and the era of corporate led R&D had dawned.
Schumpeter's analysis is significant as it recognises that the motivations for an entity to
invest in a process that may result in an invention are clearly not the same as those that
inspire someone to invent. The profit-seeking firm will not pour funds into the process
of invention if it cannot reasonably expect to be rewarded/compensated for its efforts,
whereas the individual may invent for any number of non-profit reasons, for example,
enjoyment, fame, necessity, etc. Schumpeter acknowledges the primacy of innovation
over invention in the modern economy and therefore limits his discussion to creating
industry structures conducive to investment. As Loughlan states, Schumpeter's
arguments were "not about how to get a scientist into a lonely lab at night."36
This change of focus marks a distinct shift in the theories of protection. Indeed, an
understanding of the process of invention (inventing the method of invention, if you
like) was in itself a milestone discovery.37 The classical 'natural law' or 'justice-based'
theories 38 still maintain their integrity as justifications for the system per se, but the
economic rationale now divides.
The traditional incentive argument, where patent protection is justified for only those
inventions that were induced by the patent system, still operates in an isolated sphere
where the required causal relationship between the invention itself and the prospect of a
patent can be established. However, Schumpeter's work opens up the arena and
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democra9l (1947; Allen & Unwin, London; 2' Ed.). at 84
n Ibid. at 83.
36 Qp cit. at 568.
As Whitehead states, this understanding was the greatest invention of the 19th century; Whitehead,
Science and the Modern W7or/d, (1927; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) at 126.
38 i.e. the natural law theory and the reward theory, discussed in Chapter III, above.
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clarifies the relationship between innovation and economic growth, enabling others to
build and model outside of the classical constraints. 39 It therefore enables the
justification of grants where the innovative process would have been hampered if the
invention could have been freely appropriated in the absence of protection. In other
words, even if the invention is not induced by the patent system, protection can be
justified on the basis that the investment required to bring it to the public would not
have been forthcoming without it.
The 'Patent-Induced' Theory
It might be argued that the difficulty comes in distinguishing between patent induced
and non-patent induced innovation. Utilisation of the criteria of inventive step (or non-
obviousness) is one method that has been deployed in an attempt to differentiate
between those inventions that are 'patent-induced' and those that are not. 40 However, as
Oddi states, "no means are provided for eliminating the economic costs associating
with inventions that can satisfy the nonobviousness standard but still would have been
invented without a patent system." 4' Oddi's discussion is directed at the traditional
'patent-induced' invention theory and does not directly address the wider issues that
arise from a post-Schumpeterian analysis where innovation, and not invention, is the
key. Here the patent acts as a means of directly protecting the investment that has been
made in order to get the invention to the public: But for the prospect of a patent the
money would not have been put into the research that resulted in the invention, or the
invention would not have been brought to the market. Concentration on investment
removes some of the problems that are apparent under the traditional theory. For
example, where an invention is serendipitous or accidental, it cannot be said that the
prospect of a patent induced it. However, investment is essentially proactive; whereas
creation can be the result of luck or chance, investment cannot. Therefore, by adding
another stage to the analysis, and stating that the process of technological growth is
It is clear that Schumpeter was not attempting to provide a model or theory to explain intellectual
property, indeed, he mentions patents and other intellectual property tights only in passing. The theories
that he advances are limited to increasing understanding of the economic nature of the innovation
process, and are necessarily confined to a Capitalist private enterprise economy.
'° Loughian, op dt. at 568.
4' Oddi, Un-Un/ied Eco,iomi Theories of Patents — The Not-nite-Ho!y Grail, (1996) 71 Noire Dame Law Review
2Z. (Hereinafter Oddi, Ho/y Grail).
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dependent upon innovation (which itself produces invention), protection for all but the
market-induced innovation and the trivial invention can be justified.
It will be noted that this still leaves the problem of identifying the non-patent induced
innovation. In a highly influential study, Scherer developed a categorisation of
inventions based on a cost/benefit investment analysis and used this to establish
whether in any given category the patent was needed to induce that investment, thereby
drawing invention and innovation together.42 This "topology of inventions" 43 provides
the apparatus required to solve the patent-induced problem and, in addition, enables
further comparison between groups.
Scherer's categorisation proceeds along the following 1ines. First there are those
inventions that can be described as "revolutionary", i.e. those that Oddi defines as
producing "a genuine revolution in consumption or production." 45 For these
inventions, which are classified as having an uncertain benefit/cost ratio, the patent
system provides a necessary incentive, as it is likely that they would not be forthcoming,
or would be seriously delayed, without it. The second class contains the high
benefit/cost ratio invention. This category would include those resulting from accident,
serendipity, or chance, and which would be classified as non-patent-induced, as there is
a high probability that they would be created without a patent system. These are often
termed the market-induced inventions. Third is the low benefit/cost invention - i.e. an
invention characterised by high development costs compared to the rent that it could
support under favourable pricing conditions, or inventions that are developed in an
industry where there is a high degree of competition. In such cases the patent system
can be said to be necessary for the production of the invention, as without its
protection they would be relatively easily copied by others and there would therefore be
little incentive to produce them.46
42 Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Peformance, (1980; Houghton Mifffin, Boston; 2" Ed.)
(Hereinafter; Scherer, Market Structure).
° Oddi, Ho5i Grail, op dt. at 278.
The classification is condensed from Scherer, Market Structure, op dt. at 443-50.
In this case Oddi utilises Scherer's definition of "spectacular technical contribution". See Oddi, Ho/y
Grail, op dt. at 278 and Scherer, Market Structure, ibid. at 448.
See Scherer, Market Structure, ibid. at 447. Also Oddi, Ho/y Grail, ibid. at 279.
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Questions of Scope
Justification for patent protectionperse is only the first step in any analysis, however, for
once the decision to have patents is made, or the need for patents highlighted, the next
step is to determine their scope. Scherer's 'topology of invention' is, again, helpful in
this area as it enables restriction of the inventive field and establishes orderly points for
comparison between the different theories that are to be advanced.
For revolutionary inventions, the scope of protection suggested by the patent-induced
theory is necessarily broad. The sine qua non of these creations must, due to their
uncertain cost/benefit ratio, be the patent system. Market factors alone would not be
sufficient to justify entities investing the amount of time, effort and money that creation
of a spectacular technical contribution would require. Broad protection for these
inventions is, therefore, justified; for as Schumpeter demonstrated, such revolutionary
creations are an important driving force behind economic growth. 47 This point is easily
accepted today, but it is clear that it still took a number of influential empirical studies,
including those of Abramowitz 4° and Solow49 to make economists fully aware of the link
between innovation, technological progress and economic growth.5°
The link between innovation and economic growth was one of the revolutionary points made in
Schumpeter's Theory of Evnomic Development, op at. Studies following on from Schumpeter's Capitalism,
Socialism and Democra'y, (1942; Harper & Row, New York) investigated and refined his hypothesis that
monopoly and large firms are inherently conducive to innovation.
48 Abramowitz, Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870, (1956) 46 American Economic Review
5.
4 Solow, Technical 6'hange and the Agregate Production Function, (1957) 39 Review of Economics and Statistics 312.
50 These two studies are sourced from Takalo, Essa,ys on the Economics of Intellectual Prop ery Protection, (ISBN:
951-45-8671-9) an academic dissertation presented to the University of Helsinki and available at
http://ethcsis.hclsinki.fi/julkaisut/val/kansa/vk/takalo/ . More recent studies and papers on the
importance and effectiveness of patents in inducing invention and research include those of Scherer,
Patents and the oeporation: A Report on Industrial Technolo,gy under Chan,gin,g Public Policy, (1958; J
. J . Galvin,
Boston); Taylor & Silberstone, The Economic Impact of the Patent 4ystem, (1973; Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge); Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, Imitcitio,e Costs aced Patents.' Ace Empirical Study, (1981) 21
Economic Journal 907; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, Appropriabiliy Conditions and W/Iy Firms Patent and WIy they
do not in the American Manufacturing Sector NBER Working Paper N° 7552, February 2000. This can be
found at http://papers-nber9.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf.;  and Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent
Protection? Estimates by Technolo, i Field, (1998) 29 RAND Journal of Economics 77. See also Merges,
Commercia/Success and Patent Standards: Economic Peripectives on Innovation, (1988) 76 California Law Review 803.
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For the second and third of Scherer's categories (the high benefit/cost and the low
benefit/cost inventions) the patent-induced theory would predict narrow scope. For
the former this is because the theory posits that the incentive should not extend further
than is necessary to induce the invention. Therefore, as non-patent factors would
probably be sufficient to procure a high benefit/cost invention any extra incentive is
over-kill. For the low benefit/cost inventions broad scope would reduce the incentive
for others to make improvements and would also restrict the use that could be made of
the invention, thereby increasing the costs associated with the patent grant.
Criticisms of the Patent-Induced Theory
The primary criticism that can be levelled at the patent-induced theory stems from the
difficulties associated with divining which inventions are actually induced by the
prospect of a grant, and which are not. Oddi, in an article proposing the adoption of a
'revolutionary patent' for the protection of inventions that provide significant social
benefit, suggests the establishment of an 'extraordinary to experts' test to determine
patentability. 51 Whilst this might solve the problem for revolutionary inventions (and
even then prompts the questions 'How extraordinary?' and 'Which experts?'), it does
nothing for those of a less groundbreaking nature, where the difficulties in separating
the patent-induced from the non-patent-induced are far greater.
Further, as Ko states, the entire theory "rests on the dubious assumption that the
invention would not exist but for the efforts of the inventor who patented it." 52 This is
a strong point of contention for those commentators that subscribe to the 'social
evolution' theory of invention. This theory states that invention will occur, with or
without patents, when the state of basic knowledge and other social conditions are
ripe. 53 If this is the case, or even if there is duplicative research in the area of the
invention, then the correctness of granting a patent to the first inventor must be
questioned.
51 See Oddi, Bond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Tweni-First C'entui, (1989) 38 American University
Law Review 1097.
52 Ko, An EconomicAna/ysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, (1992)102 Yale Law Journal 777 at 792.
See, Ko, ibid. at note 105 in his text. Also, for an interesting aside on the process of creative thought
see Koesder, The Act of Creation, (1976, Hutchinson, London; 21d (Danube) Ed.).
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In addition, the 'patent-induced' theory is very simplistic. Indeed, as Oddi states: "The
only conclusion that can be drawn from the theory is that if patents were restricted to
those inventions that are, in fact, induced by the patent system, then a net benefit would
accrue to society." 54 Further, the theory takes no account of the benefit or hindrance
that the patent might give to future generations of inventions. It is to this topic that we
now divert our attention.
A Brief Aside - The Problem of Cumulative Research
Most early studies on the patent system looked at innovations in isolation, building on
Schumpeter's conclusion that big businesses and monopolies are conducive to their
production. These embryonic attempts at modelling and understanding the economics
of the patent system were necessarily based on the more traditional patent theories and
failed to take into account the cross-fertilisation, or spillover, that occurs within the
patent system. As Scotchmer states: the real challenge is to "reward early innovators
fully for the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward
later innovators adequately for their improvements and new products as well."55
Studies conducted by Arrow56 and Usher57 in the early 1960s were among the first to
demonstrate that the incentive to innovate deteriorates as the level of knowledge
spillover increases. However, these early studies tended to see innovation as a linear
process, building one block upon the next. The reality is far more complex.
It is clear that the interaction between first- and second-generation inventions will
depend on the scope of the primary patent, often called the upstream right 58. If the
patent on the original technology is narrow then this will allow many improvements to
be patented and marketed without infringing the primary right. 59 Where the protection
Oddi, Ho/y Grail, op dt. at 281.
55 Scotchmer, Standing of the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and Patent Law, (1991) 5 Journal of
Economic Per.ciectives 29 (hereinafter Scotchmer, Giants) at 30.
56 Arrow, Economic W"e/fare and the Allocation of Resources for Inve,xtion, in Nelson (ed), The Rate of Inventive
ActiviOi: Economic and Social Factors, (1962; Princeton University Press, Princeton).
Usher, The Welfare Effects of Invention, (1964) 31 Econometrica 279.
° See, for example, Rai, Fostering C'umulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Indust0i: The Role of Patents and
Antitrust, (2001)16 Berkeleii Technolon Law Journal 813.
59 For an example of a system traditionally seen as providing such rights see Chapter VIII, below.
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is broad, licenses will need to be obtained in order for second-generation creators to be
able to do the same. As Scotchmer states, this may tempt the reader to conclude that
broad protection will encourage "firms to find fundamental technologies, but
discourages them to from seeking out second-generation applications and derivative
products." However, this conclusion is only partially valid, as the correct incentive
may only be provided if the primary patent holder is able to profit from the second-
generation technology in a more direct way.
Strong patent protection provides strong incentive to invest in R&D that is likely to
result in a patent. However, it also leads to potentially large social costs, such as the
inefficiencies associated with monopoly profits (deadweight losses) 61 . Further, it is
possible that the incentive created by strong protection may be too great, attracting
firms to the 'race' for a patent and causing them to over-invest in research in that area.62
The fact that only one of the competing firms can be awarded a patent on the invention
means that the funds that the others diverted to the race are effectively squandered.
This position is further complicated by the fact that the social value of the primary
invention will also include the boost that it gives to subsequent innovators. The
'signalling' potential of the patent is something that is close to the core of Grady &
Alexander's 'rent-dissipation theory', discussed below.63 However, for now it is
sufficient to note that the extra social value added to the primary innovation by its
signaUing potential can fall into one of at least three broad groups. 64 The first occurs
where the second generation is reliant upon the first for its existence - i.e. the second
generation could not have been developed without the first. Here the primary innovation's
value to society includes the incremental increase in social surplus added by the second-
generation innovation. The second category encompasses situations in which the first
60 Scotchmer, Giants, op cit. at 30.
61 See the section on Profit, above.
62 This is especially pertinent if the real cost of achieving the invention is far less than the market value of
the patent. See Scotchmer, Giants, op dt. at 31; also Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, (1979) 93
Quarter/v Journal of Economics 395. In addition, see the criticisms of the 'prospect' theory set out in text
accompanying note 81 et seq., below.
63 See text accompanying notes 122 etseq. below.
64 These three groups are given in Scotchmer, Giants, op cit. at 31. The remainder of the paragraph is
extensively based on her work.
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innovation reduces the costs associated with the second innovation, i.e. the costs of
production or of achieving the second-generation. This cost reduction is an additional
benefit of the primary innovation, and is added to its social surplus. The final category
includes the added-value of obtaining the second-generation more rapidly if the primary
innovation accelerates the process of its creation.
The additional benefits created by one generation of technology in respect of the next
are often overlooked in the patent literature. It is easy to see why this is the case when
the potential permutations and leads offered by any given piece of 'new' technology are
considered. However, this oversight provides one of the main criticisms of the existing
patent theories. As Scotchrner states: "There are no simple conclusions to draw about
the optimal breadth of patents." 65 Prior agreements and licences of technology make
the situation even more complicated as they enable circumvention of the potential
blocking effects of prior patents. 66 Furthermore, the breadth of any given bundle of
patent iights must be dictated by the observable aspects of the patented technology (i.e.
the external view of the patent), and not "prior expectations regarding technological
outcomes and costs of research." 67
 Because the efficacy, or attractiveness, of incentives
offered necessarily involves a consideration of the inside of the grant (i.e. a cost/benefit
analysis of the value of the invention compared to the cost of the research and the
probability of success), the effectiveness of the patent system in protecting incentives is
greatly restricted.
One further consequence of the cumulative nature of innovation is that the scope of the
patent right will also effectively determine its duration. Schumpeter's process of
'creative destruction', whereby competition comes from new and improved inventions,
means that a broader patent will have a longer effective life, as the period of time before
it is surpassed by competing technology is extended. It should be noted that this will
only be the case where the second-generation product is in competition for the same
subset of the consuming public as the first. If the situation is otherwise, for example if
65 Ibid. at 37.
On the issue of blocking patents see, for example, Merges, Intellectual Proper/ji Pagh/s and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blockin8 Patents, (1994) 62 Tennessee Law Review 75. Also see Kai, Fostering Cumulative
Innovation in the Biopharmacentical Indust,: The Role of Patents and Antitrust; (2001 .) 16 Berkele' Technolorv Law
Journal 813.
67 Scotchmer, Giants, op cit. at 38.
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the new technology serves a different market, then the life may be independent of
breadth.68
Therefore, it is clear to see that "patent policy is a very blunt instrument trying to solve
a very delicate problem." 69
 Up to this point we have been considering the patent grant
in terms of the single innovation without really focussing on the impact that the patent
grant will have on the downstream incentives to innovate. This competition between
the static and dynamic effects of the patent system is something that has troubled many,
but has been glossed over by most. For example, as recently as the early 1990s, both
Klemperer70 and Gilbert & Shapiro71 created economic models for optimal patent scope
that did not consider the problems of cumulative innovation. This is somewhat
surprising, since in 1977 a theory was first advanced that looked at the benefits that
could accrue from granting broad primary patents to co-ordinate downstream research.
It is to this theory that we now direct our attention.
The 'Prospect' Theory
The 'prospect' theory is advanced by Edmund Kitch in 'The Nature and Function of the
Patent S)istem.'72 He argues that the traditional analyses offer an incomplete view, as they
do not take into account the fact that the system increases the output from resources
used for technological innovation. The patent enables its owner to co-ordinate further
R&D efforts by creating a prospect, "a particular opportunity to develop a known
technological possibility". 73 The system, therefore, promotes efficiency in the
development of each prospect as it publicly awards an exclusive right in the prospect
shortly after its discovery. As such, he likens it to the U.S. mineral claims system.
Kitch takes three features of the patent system and uses them as illustrations to justify
the importance of the prospect function in its American embodiment; all are, to a
greater or lesser extent, also applicable to the British system. The first feature that he
highlights is the scope that is awarded to patent claims, "a scope that reaches well
68 Although the value of the patent may be eroded by non-infringing competition.
69 Scotchmer, Giants, op cit. at 40.
° How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection be?, (1990) 21 RA.ND Journal of Economics 113.
' Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, (1990) 21 RAND Jour/zal of Economics 106.
72 (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 265. Hereinafter Kitch, Nature and Function.
Ibid. at 266.
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beyond what the reward function would require." 74 The second feature concerns the
fact that the system encourages early filing and hence early claiming, thus emphasising
the prospective nature of the grant. A final point that Kitch draws attention to is the
fact that there are many patents that have been granted for inventions long before their
commercial application became possible. He notes that all three points have played an
"mportaflt role in the antipatent arguments so recurrent in the economics literature, for
each is troublesome under the reward theory"75
In developing his theory, Kitch questions the applicability of the traditional downward
sloping demand curve to the patented product, suggesting that, as "[m]any patents face
competition from other processes or products", the slope will vary from case to case.
However, the implication is clearly that the demand curve should be substantially
horizontal.
Kitch examines the benefits, or public welfare effects, of a system that offers both trade
secrecy and patent protection, and compares it to a system that only protects secrets.76
He notes seven distinct advantages that the patent system holds over this alternative.
These include increased efficiency with which investment in innovation can be
managed; a lowering of the costs of contracting with other firms for complementary
information and resources; 77 reduction of the amount of duplicative research; reduction
of the cost of maintaining control over technology; and provision of returns based on
the economic value of the technology rather than speculation on its wealth distribution
effects.78
74 Ibid. at 267. It will be recalled that the traditional 'reward' theory seeks to reward inventive effort and
therefore does not justify patent protection for serendipitous or accidental inventions. See further, text
accompanying note 46 et seq. in Chapter III, above.
Kitch, Nature and Function, op cit. 267-8.
76 Kitch reasonably assumes that a system without trade secrecy as an alternative to patent protection is
an impossibility "absent the most draconian and costly measures". Ibid. at 275. For a discussion of the
business decisions that are involved in choosing between trade secrecy and patent protection see
Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Lega1 and Business Decision,
(2002) 84 IPTOS 371.
As no obligation of secrecy needs to be imposed the discussions can be conducted in the 'open'.
78 For a complete list of Kitch's benefits see Kitch, Nature and Function, op cit. at 275-80.
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In making his comparison, Kitch notes that the arguments advanced could be "offered
in support of exclusive ownership of anything of value," including land. 79
 In essence,
therefore, he draws analogy between the intangible patent property and the tangible
sphere with which we are all familiar. He attempts to dissolve the intellectual barriers
between the two, and insists that the patent right could be treated as any other property
right. If this is the case, Kitch advocates creating such rights along the 'frontier of
technology', leaving an older core that is free for all to use, concluding that this is a
rational distinction since the advantages of the prospect function are confined to the
areas where movement is taking place. When discussing the boundaries of this
'frontier', he rejects the non-obviousness standard as a criterion for patentability as "not
particularly helpful", instead suggesting that the test of invention should be one of
substantial novelty. The question that should be asked when deciding if a patent should
be granted is therefore whether this is "information whose significance should be
further investigated? In the case of any substantially new technological information the
answer to this question is yes because new information could not have been (by
definition) previously investigated." 80
 Kitch places particular emphasis on the
information and notice functions of the patent grant and stresses that in the absence of
a system that promotes publication and dissemination of knowledge the same mistakes
and successes will be duplicated and this will lead to independent creation of the same
inventions, which will waste valuable resources.
The 'prospect' theory has attracted widespread criticism. In a damning article,
McFetridge & Smith state that, amongst other things, Kitch does not "understand the
implications of allowing basic knowledge to remain a common property right". 81 In
particular, any efficiency gains that are made as a consequence of co-ordination through
the prospect are "dissipated in the rivalry for the patent itself". 82 All that the system
does is to move competition one stage back from the commercialisation of the
invention, "since there is no pre-patent right to a patent". 83 They therefore conclude
' Ibid. at 275.
° Ibid. at 284.
81 McFetridge & Smith, Pate,zts, Propects , and Economic Suiplus. A comment, 198O) 23 Journal of La.'u
Economics 197 at 202.
82 Ibid.
83 Ko, An Economic Ana/ysis of Biotechnoloi Patent Protection, (1992)102 Yale wJournal 777, at 801.
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that the 'prospect' theory is "not a useful framework within which to assess the merits
of the patent system."84
In addition, Kitch's assumption of a horizontal demand curve is not one that finds
much support amongst commentators; Scherer, in particular, is quoted as expressing
extreme discomfort with the notion.85
Merges & Nelson, in advancing their own theory of patent protection, 86 dismiss the
'prospect' theory and argue that elimination of rivalry, a goal so close to the core of
Kitch's propositions, leads to inactivity and complacency as it "diminishes the
threatened costs of inaction". 87 They state that practice shows that co-ordinated
development is not better than rivairous, and note that "there are many instances when
a firm that thought it had control over a broad technology rested on its laurels until
jogged into action by an outside threat." 88 Scherer also takes issue with Kitch's view of
the 'inventing around' problem that is created by the development of broad prospects,
stating that it "seems little influenced by any concern for reality." 89 Furthermore, given
that it is not possible to know for sure "what possible inventions are in the
technological pooi", as different parties are likely to view the prospects differently,
Merges & Nelson argue that Kitch's attempts to model in order to prevent wasteful
overexploitation of the inventive prospect are misplaced. The real danger is not, they
insist, from overexploitation, but rather from under utilisation of the prospect post-
grant.'° This last criticism is especially pertinent when the implications for patent scope
that flow from the 'prospect' theory are considered.
Implications for Claim Scope
In essence, the 'prospect' theory is concerned with achieving efficiency in co-ordination
of research and development by the elimination of inefficient competition. Central to
84 McFetridge & Smith, op cit. at 203.
85 In Scherer, Comment on Edmund Kitch, (1986) 8 Research in Law and Economics 51. In Oddi, Ho'y Graii op
cit. at 282.
86 Discussed in more detail below. See text accompanying note 101 et seq. below.
87 Merges & Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, (1990) 90 Colombia Law Reuiew 839 at 872.
88 Ibid.
89 Scherer, Market Structure, op cit. at 449.
Merges & Nelson, op dt. at 873.
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Kitch's proposal, therefore, is the idea that a wide patent (or prospect) should be
granted initially that would extend to protect subsequent improvements, or refinements,
of the invention. The grant of such a right would enable the patent holder to control all
versions of the invention until it expires, and would therefore be of great co-ordinating
value to its owner. This broad scope would be available for all inventions that passed
the test of 'substantjal novelty'. Such a wide patent right would be especially important
for those inventions that could be defmed as 'revolutionary', and therefore of uncertain
cost/benefit ratio. 91 For such creations the co-ordinating benefit of a broad scope,
enabling control of improvements, would be great as it would offset a degree of
uncertainty surrounding the benefits to accrue.
Ko states that the 'prospect' theory fmds a certain degree of support in U.S. patent law
through the application of the doctrine of equivalents, although co-ordination of future
research has never been explicitly stated as one of the justifications of the doctrine. 92 As
noted, Kitch's model would seem to support the increases in scope awarded to 'pioneer'
inventions over 'mere improvements,' 93 the degree of co-ordination possible for major
advances being significantly greater than that applicable for incremental ones.
However, this conclusion seemingly exposes inconsistencies in Kitch's internal
reasoning and raises questions concerning its application to decided cases. As Grady &
Alexander state: under the 'prospect' theory the scope of the rights given to each
inventor of a 'substantially new' invention should be much the same, "regardless of how
many other inventors might be tempted to develop and exploit improvements".' 4 The
prospect granted would be a right to exploit the inventive area around the invention,
and with Kitch's test of 'substantial novelty' rather than obviousness governing the
grant of the patent, 'mere improvements' would not, in general, be patentable.
91 See text accompanying note 45, above.
92 Ko, op cit. at 802.
° See, for example the wide approaches formulated by the court in ft"estinghouse v. Bqyden Power Brake Co.,
170 U.S. 537 (1898, Supreme Court) and Liidlum Steel Co. v. Teriy, 37 F.2d 153 (1928, Distict Court of
New York) when compared to the narrow approach in Kinenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (1984,
CAFC). Also Ko, op ct. at 802.
Grady & Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissebation, (1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 305, at 315. This
appears to be in conflict with Ko's conclusion that in the U.S. broader protection should be provided to
the extent that co-ordination will be gained.
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Moreover, Beck observes that the Patent Office and the courts have usually avoided
granting wide prospects.95
Furthermore, specific problems with the application of the 'prospect' theory arise in
areas such as biotechnology where unpredictability confounds its central notion of co-
ordination. 96
 The uncertain nature of some experiments carried out in the field renders
predictability, and therefore co-ordination gains, most uncertain. 97 If gains are low then
the impediments to creativity that a broad prospect entails will probably outweigh them.
This may provide one possible explanation of the fact that small, independent firms,
and not corporate monsters, can be seen to drive the biotech industry in contrast to
other areas such as traditional pharmaceutical research where size is an important
factor. 98 If, as another possibility for biotech patents, direct co-ordination is rejected in
preference of wide licensing, so that others develop the patented technology, then the
prospect justification for the grant is removed. This, as Merges & Nelson state, would
mean that "subsequent development of prospects would proceed in spite of; or at least
in indifference to, the broad patent," 99 which cannot have been within Kitch's
contemplation. Therefore, clearly the 'prospect' theory has significant problems
matching the reality of the system, even in the U.S. This problem is compounded if the
system that it is applied to is that extant in the UK where there is no 'doctrine of
equivalents', only purposive construction, which, at its most liberal, gives only narrow
supra-literal protection.'°
' Beck, The Propect Theoy of The Patent System and Unproductive Competition, (1983) 5 Research in Lam and
Economics 193.
Ko, op cit. at 803.
97 Although it should be noted that as the subject matures, and the processes it deals with become better
understood, the predictability of outcome will become much more certain and the 'prospect' theory may
be better applied.
See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democray, op cit. for the conclusion that large firms and
monopolies are conducive to innovation. Also, Taylor & Silberston, op cit. who conclude that of all types
of industry pharmaceuticals are most dependent on patent protection.
' Merges & Nelson, op cit. at 907.
100 However, this may change with the insertion of a clause on equivalents included in revisions to the
Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC agreed at the Diplomatic Conference of November
2000 on amendment to the European Patent Convention.
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Thus, having concluded that Kitch's 'prospect' theory is at best limited and at worst
fundamentally flawed, we now turn our attention to a third post-classical model of
patent protection - Merges & Nelson's 'race-to-invent' theory.
The 'Race-to-Invent' Theory
Merges & Nelson first advanced the 'race-to-invent' theory to describe the patent
system in their 1990 Colombia Law Review article 'On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope.Wl Like Kitch, they lament the relative dearth of economic writing on the issue of
patent scope compared to other, more settled, topics such as duration of grant and
compulsory licensing, and then set down the criteria for their model. The basic premise
of their argument is the principle that "when it comes to invention and innovation,
faster is better."°2 They accept that competition will often cause waste, but, un]ike
Kitch, "have little faith in the imagination and willingness of a "prospect" holder to
develop that prospect as energetically or creatively as she would when engaged in
competition." 103 In addition, the reality of human organisational thinking and behaviour
means that an entity's ability to co-ordinate and orchestrate development is less than
perfect. Therefore, they conclude; "we are much better off with considerable rivalry in
invention than too little."104
The link between the speed of innovation and the overall number of innovations is first
explored in terms of simple economic reasoning. "For the same reasons people prefer
to have money in hand now, as compared to the same amount (and more, depending on
the interest rate) later, so society prefers to have improvements now, rather than later."
And second, by searching for consistency with the goals and purposes of patent law
itself. Thus, the preference for early reduction to practice, the provisions designed for
early filing, and the priority of the first-to-invent, 105
 all favour early invention. 106 Having
101 (1990) 90 Colombia Law R piew 839.
102 Ibid. at 878.
103 Ibid. at 877.
'° Ibid.
105 In the U.S. and a very small number of other countries only.
16 The same can actually be said of the first to file system that is practised in the UK and most of the rest
of the world. Here the first person to apply for a patent is prima facie entitled to the grant, regardless of
whether they were the first to invent the invention. This system encourages early application, and
therefore early invention.
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satisfied themselves that the 'rcetonent' theory is consistent with both the
economics and policy of the system, they then use historical case studies to show that
technological development has been retarded in industries where broad patent
protection was granted, relative to those in which there was significant developmental
rivalry.107
Criticisms and Implications for Claim Scope
The degree of impedance to the progress of technology, based on historical, economic
and policy considerations and case studies, enables Merges & Nelson to define three
different areas of invention and to tailor application of the general theory to each. The
categories are dynamic, so that a particular field of invention may fall into a different
one now than it did in the past, or may in the future when the field matures. "As a
result, the issues involved in setting appropriate patent scope change as an industry
advances." The three categories that are examined are those of cumulative
technologies, the chemical industries, and the science-based industries. 108 Despite this
categorisation, the conclusions are startlingly simil.... "multiple and competitive sources
of invention are socially preferable to a structure where there is only one or a few
sources." 1 ' Therefore scope should be narrow in order to preserve competition, and to
place the "inventors of significant improvements.., in a strong bargaining position vis-â-
vis the inventors of basic inventions.""0
This conclusion is the antithesis of Kitch's prospect function, where co-ordination is of
paramount importance. The observation that "every potential inventor is also a
potential infringer" 1 is one that was repeated many times during the interviews
conducted in connection with the empirical study in Chapter IV, above. It is also a
con-u-nent that conjures images of anti-patent sentiment, an image, it might be
suggested, that patent attorneys would be well advised to keep hidden from clients. In
anticipation of this criticism, Merges & Nelson expressly disclaim this conclusion.
107 Merges & Nelson, op cit. at 880-908, especially 884 et seq.
Industries dependent on scientific breakthroughs rather than incremental improvement, and which are,
therefore, capable of great advance m a relatively short space of time. The biotechnology and
superconductor industries are examples of this type of business. See Merges & Nelson, op di. at 907-8.
'° Ibid. at 908.
110 Oddi, Ho/y Grai/ op cit. at 283.
11 Ibid. at 916.
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Relying on studies such as that conducted by Taylor & Silberston,112 where it was shown
that the patent system is regarded as essential by firms in only a small number of
industries, they state that a reduction in the scope of the patentee's monopoly wifi not
severely undercut the incentive to invent. The modifications that they suggest would
only apply "to the broader claims of a small number of patents, primarily those on
pioneering breakthroughs." 3 Put in this way, it is clear that a model that recommends
the narrowing of the scope of pioneer patents is a theory that is aimed at procuring
incremental progress over revolution, the contraposition of the patent-induced theory.
Indeed, considering the potential benefits available to incremental innovators through
non-patent measures, such as lead-time, market recognition, and learning curve
advantages, not to mention the short lifetime of most incremental inventions, it has
been questioned whether a patent system is needed at all under the 'race-to-invent'
theory.114
One of the main problems associated with a system of narrow grants is that it may
produce excess rent dissipation in the competition to improve upon original, basic
patents. In addition, it can be argued that a system that discriminates against pioneer
inventions and promotes incremental advancement in this way necessarily promotes
secrecy, and thus more rent dissipation through duplicative research." 5 It is therefore
the interface between trade secrets and the patent system that provides much of the
criticism of the 'race-to-invent' theory.
As Beckerman-Rodau notes, the decision to patent or 'keep secret' is one that is
pertinent to all technology, and will be dependent upon a number of factors." 6 One of
which is the scope that the eventual patent right will enjoy if granted. Scope plays an
112 Taylor & Silberston, The Economic Impact of the Patent Syctem, op it.
" Merges & Nelson, op dt. at 916.
114 See Oddi, Ho/y Grail, op dt. at 283.
It is interesting to note that Japan did not feel the need to have any form of trade secrecy law until
1990, as "No employee would think of taking his house's secrets to another place. Indeed defectors
would be treated with suspicion by any subsequent employer, having proven that they could not be
trusted." See Rosen & Usui, The Social Structure ofJapanese Intellectual Property Law, (1994) 13 UCLA Pact/ic
Basin Law Journal 32 at 53.
116 See BeckermanRodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: .4 Legal Business
Decision, (2002) 84 J1OS 371.
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important role in the decision to patent due, in part, to the educative nature of the
specification. Regardless of which of the justifications of the patent system we are
labouring under, the effect of applying for a grant is standardised. At some point,
usually 18 months after application, 117 the invention is published, and therefore laid
open to public inspection. It is at this point that the patent first teaches the invention
to the patentee's competitors. If its scope is very narrow then they only need make
insubstantial changes to evade its area of protection. In such cases secrecy may be the
better option.8
Second, as Kitch notes, a mistake common throughout the economic literature on
innovation is that patents are considered in isolation. 9 This produces a distorted
picture of events because it is very rare, if ever, that the patent is the only piece of
intellectual property that attaches to, or is associated with, a particular invention.
Therefore, economic factors connected with other IP rights (trade marks in the main)
may provide non-patent incentives to innovate in certain areas. When combined with a
narrow interpretation of claims, these non-patent incentives may mean that for
inventions of low life span the patent system becomes an expensive and unreliable
alternative to secrecy.12°
However, it can be argued that the narrowness of the grant, and consequent
incremental nature of technological advance, might make the possibility of independent
creation more of a risk than would otherwise be the case. This would therefore render
the patent system, which protects against such competitive action, more attractive than
secrecy. This could then lead to a position in which the technological field would soon
117 See section 16 Patents Act 1977 and Rule 27 of the Patents Act Rules in the UK, also Article 93 EPC
and Rules 48-50 EPC Rules. In the U.S. see 35 U.S.C. section 122(b) (1999).
118 See Beckerman-Rodau, op dt. at 364-96 for further discussion of this point.
119 Kitch, E/ementay and Persistent Errors in the Economic Ana/ysis of Intellectual Property, (2000) 53 Vanderbilt
Law Review 1727 (Hereinafter; Kitch, Persistent Errors) at 1738 et seq.
120 Brand ioyalty, and the problems associated with a new product breaking into any particular market
may be the decisive factor in any such decisions. Therefore well-known trade marks, such as PEPSI,
McDONALD'S, MICP OSOFT, COCA COLA, etc., have a strong advantage in the marketplace due to
the powerful associations that the consuming public has with them. See also Beckerman-Rodau, op at. at
388-91 and 399-400. Additionally 402, quoting from Mishawa/ea Rubber & Woolen
	 Co. v. S. S. Kresge
, 316 U.s. 203 (1942, Supreme Court) at 205; that "A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut".
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become mired with narrow competmg interests and the system would fail to operate in
any beneficial manner. However, the Japanese experience, a system typified by narrow
grants, demonstrates that this problem could be lessened, if not avoided, by anti-
competitive regulation of the market, cross-licensing and/or other technology transfer
practices.121
The final point that will be made on the issue of narrow patents and secrecy is purely
fmancial. Patents are neither cheap to obtain, nor to enforce, and the rights that are
granted are far from certain. Depending on the nature of the invention, the number of
people that need to have access to it, and the risk of reverse engineering, the cost of
secrecy can be high or low. If there is perceived to be a benefit to patenting the
invention, i.e. if the costs of the process are outweighed by the benefits that flow from
the grant, then it is more likely to be patented. The larger the benefit, the more likely
public disclosure is to follow. The narrower the interpretation of the grant, the less the
potential returns and the further the scales tip away from patentability.
Therefore, having noted some of the disadvantages of narrow patents arising from the
'race-to-invent' theory, we now turn our attention to the fourth of the post-classical
models of the patent system, Grady & Alexander's 'Rent Dissipation' Theory.
The 'Rent Dissipation' Theory
The 'rent dissipation' theory is borne out of dissatisfaction with the traditional view of
patent protection as a trade-off between offering an incentive to innovate and
encouraging hopeful inventors to "squander valuable social resources in the race to win
the patent."1 Grady & Alexander express disquiet with Merges & Nelson's proposal
for narrow patent protection; although never expressly condemning (or even
mentioning) the other's work by name they state that such a system "would punish the
bold and reward the fussy".' Equally, Kitch's 'prospect' theory comes under fire; in
"awarding full control to the inventor who is first, the costs of developing dreams that
ultimately fail would equal or exceed the benefit to society of those that succeed."24
121 See Chapter VIII, below, for more discussion of the Japanese patent system.
122 Grady & Alexander, Patent iw and Rent Diss4tation, (1992) 78 Virpinia Law Review 305 at 306-8.
123 Ibid. at 307.
124 Ibid. at 308.
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In providing an alternative theory on which to model the patent system, Grady &
Alexander posit that the societal profit from innovation is often far greater than the
inventor's developmental costs, and that the inventor should therefore receive the
difference as rent. 125
 The rent would be paid by way of monopoly right; "otherwise
competition by imitators would discourage innovation by making it unprofitable."126
However, there is an inherent defect in such a system where the benefits to society from
having the invention are dissipated by redundant and wasteful investment. Three types
of 'rent dissipation' are thus identified that occur at different stages in the process of
innovation.
The first arises in the rush for the original monopoly, for only one can receive the
prize. 127 The second, in the race to improve upon the patented technology where the
patent may 'signal' the way to improvements and thus create wasteful competition in
developing those 'prospects'. 128 Third is the rent dissipated where the inventor invests
in protecting the secrecy of an invention - i.e. where the expected returns from a patent
are not sufficiently attractive to persuade the inventor to make their invention public.
The system is optirnised where these rent dissipations are minimised, so that societal
benefit is at a maximum.
Grady & Alexander remain "agnostic about whether patent rewards are a good idea."
Rather, they believe that the courts have "found ways of minimizing the problem that
patents create." In other words, they contend that "the patent system seeks to
discourage wasteful activities contributing little or nothing to social welfare." 2' The
'rent dissipation' theory is, therefore, their attempt to understand and rationalise the
'glosses' and policies that the courts utilise to "lead them to good results." 13' It is a
125 i.e. the difference between what society would pay for the invention (based on its utility) and the
developmental costs.
126 Grady & Alexander, op t. at 308.
127 The reader will appreciate that this is a criticism concomitant with the 'prospect' theory, above.
128 'Prospect' is this author's addition. Tbis second type of rent dissipation is what Kitch's 'prospect'
theory was aimed at preventing. See text accompanying note 72 et seq., above.
129 Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Gra4y-Ahxander Thesis, (1992) 78 Virginia Law
Review -359 at 360.
n Grady & Alexander, op rit. at 309-10.
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"positive theory of cases interpreting the patent statute as itexists" (sic) and therefore is
not directly concerned with justifying the system per se. However, they note that by
minimising the third kind of rent dissipation (that associated with secrecy), implicit
justification is provided for the system as it necessarily removes some of the need to
keep the invention secret.
The novelty (or as one commentator put it, the genius 131) of Grady & Alexander's
approach is the ability to distinguish between "(a) rents promised by pioneer inventions,
and (b) rents arising from follow-on improvements, signaled by the initial discovery at
the time that the discovery is patented."132 (sic) As we shall see, this facet of the theory
has significant repercussions for the analysis of patent scope.
Criticisms and Implications for Patent Scope
'Rent dissipation' theory offers a more sophisticated approach to the determination of
claim scope than either Kitch's 'prospect' theory or Merges & Nelson's 'race-to-invent'
theory. The authors concisely articulate the basic position: "Rent dissipation theory
predicts that the courts will enforce a patent when the size of the patent rent is
proportionate to the rent dissipation that the invention's technological signal would
otherwise induce. In this situation, heating up the race to find new patentable
inventions is a good social bargain, because patent enforcement cuts off races to
improve. Otherwise broad protection is unwise."133
Therefore, the key issue is the signalling potential of the invention. In cases where this
is high - i.e. where the invention suggests multitude of additional avenues of closely
related research - then a patent is justified as it will control further activity and therefore
minimise rent dissipation. Where there is little, or no, probability of improving upon
the invention (e.g. if the invention is the best solution to the problem that could be
devised), the 'rent dissipation' theory would make the unorthodox prediction that a
patent should not be granted. 134 Further, "[ajs the value of the invention increases, the
case for patentability [or broad enforcementi weakens because the large monopoly rent
131 See Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation through Patients: Or Less is More, (1992) 78 Virpinia
Law Review 351 at 352 (sic).
132 Ibid.
' Grady & Alexander, op cit. at 321.
134 Or if granted, should not be enforced.
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conferred on the inventor tends to encourage rent dissipation at the preinvention
stage."135 The most likely candidates for patent protection are therefore those
inventions that, "although of comparatively small value, nonetheless signal a large
potential for improvement."36
The 'rent dissipation' theory would, therefore, predict narrow scope for pioneer
inventions in order to minimise the rent dissipation associated with the race for a
patent. In this respect it is the antithesis of Kitch's 'prospect' theory. Further, for
inventions that provide elegant, unimprovable, solutions to technical problems, the
theory would predict even narrower protection. As one commentator notes: "Applying
rent dissipation theory would result in the ultimate disincentive for investing in the
creation of elegant (basic/revolutionary/pioneer) inventions generally considered the
most valuable to society."137
The implicit assumption made by Grady & Alexander in connection with the
aforementioned criticism is that all rent dissipation is bad. However, as Oddi notes, it is
far from clear that this is the case. 138 For example, it is often stated that the fear of
competition is one of the factors that spurs on innovation in the first place.13'
Grady & Alexander's choice of authority to back up their arguments is also a cause of
concern for some. Merges notes that it is only in retrospect that the theory explains the
outcomes, indeed, this is all that the authors lay claim to. However, the important point
to note is that the doctrine under which the cases were decided has evolved over time
and, in addition, slight variations in facts may have led to different outcomes,
independently of the degree of rent dissipation.1"°
133 Grady & Alexander, op dt. at 321.
' Ibid. at 320.
137 Oddi, Ho/y Grai/, op cit. at 285.
138 Ibid.
139 It will be recalled that one of the criticisms levelled at the 'prospect' theory was that the grant of a
broad patent would encourage the holder to 'rest on their laurels'. See text accompanying note 90, above.
'° See Merges, op irt. at 366-7.
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Further, despite claiming that it "seems to explain actual patent rulings better than the
tests and rules applied by the courts," 141 the 'rent dissipation' theory has been heavily
criticised on the basis that application to actual patent cases is difficult. The fact that
the technological signalling potential of an invention is the determining factor in their
analysis is the major cause of this complaint. Martin, for example, doubts whether it is
possible to know when an invention signals improvement and when it does not: "What
if improvements were signalled but had not yet occurred when an infringement claim is
brought?" 142 There is no guidance as to the amount of time that is allowed to pass
before the 'signalling' assessment is satisfied. If an invention is created that is current/y
the most elegant solution to a problem and therefore unimprovable, the 'rent
dissipation' theory would suggest that no patent should be granted. The invention may
only begin to be understood as signalling when future technological advances 'catch up'
with it - does this mean that it is less deserving of patent protection now?
Grady & Alexander provide no "specific criteria and only a few examples" 43
 to aid in
the interpretation of this core provision of their model. Indeed, they themselves state
that "[t]o some extent, assessing an invention's technological signal requires guesswork
on the part of judges." However, they stress that "[t]he need for judicial clairvoyance is
reduced by the time that inevitably lapses between Patent Office action and litigation
involving the validity of that action." 1 This is far from sound as an explanation of the
shortcoming, primarily as it introduces a degree of hindsight into the analysis, which the
British courts, especially, are keen to caution against.45
Indeed, it is apparent that Grady & Alexander give very few hard guidelines concerning
the application of their theory at all. The balancing act between the benefits and costs
associated with granting a patent on a particular invention, for example, remains
somewhat of a 'black art'. An unfortunate effect that flows form this is that the theory
suffers from a lack of objective reproducibility and capacity for verification. As Oddi
cautions, "while the same degree of scientific verifiability [as a unified theory in physics]
141 Grady & Alexander, op r/t. at 322.
142 Martin, op t. at 356.
" Ibid.
'4' Grady & Alexander, op cit. at 320.
' See, for example, the judgment of Mance U. (in the majority) in Wheatky v Dr/I/safe Ltd [20017 RPC
.W at paragraph 90.
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cannot be expected of economic theory, methodological rigor may not be ignored."'°
Rich's comments on the 'patent as monopoly' arguments, therefore, seem equally apt
when considering this theory: You can "prove" a patent to be what ... [you] want by
selection of the proper "authority."147
Recent Alternatives
Discussion of the economics of the patent system would not be complete without brief
mention of two recent alternative theories that claim to provide a more satisfactory
explanation of the primary function of the patent system than those already advanced.
Meter Theory of Patent Protection
In the first, entitled The Prirnay Function of Patents, Carvalho specifically argues against
the reward and prospect theories of patent protection. He states that the system cannot
operate to reward the actions of the inventor as patents "have no intrinsic value and do
not automatically confer competitive advantage." 148 He therefore sides with Penrose,'49
and reasons that if the system was, in reality, one of reward, then some degree of
proportionality between inventive effort and remuneration should be expected.' 5° This
is clearly not the case in a system where technical and economic (societal) 151 value is
subservient to market value and the whims of the consuming public. Indeed, a system
that attempted to increase fairness by assessing the merits of each and every invention
would run the risk of introducing unwanted externalities into the process, such as the
risk of abuse, that would paradoxically act to tip the balance in the opposite direction.'52
When discussing the 'prospect' theory of patent protection, Carvalho is no less critical.
"The prospect function presents the same problems as the reward function: both are
only partially correct and neither constitutes a primary concern of the patent system."53
' Oddi, Ho/y Grail, op t. at 326.
' Rich, op cit. at 248.
148 Carvallio, The Primary Function of Patents, [200 1/Journal of Law, Technology and Po/igy 25 at 25.
149 Penrose, The Economics of the Inter,iational Patent .System, (1951; Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore) at 28-9.
The Penrose quote is simple and elegant: "for great inventions, great patents; for small inventions,
small patents." Ibid.
i.e. actual economic benefit to society, as opposed to the benefit perceived by the consuming public.
152 And therefore make the process biased and unfair. On this point see Carvaiho, op t. at 3 1-2.
'5 Ibid. at 35.
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"The bulk of inventions are made by companies ... [and c}ompanies do not invent 'in
the dark'. Inventing is already a risky enough business, let alone inventing without
knowing the intended practical application of the eventual results." 154 Therefore, the
prospect theory cannot be said to explain anything more than a few 'visionary' cases
"whose creativity is ahead of their time."155
In their place, therefore, Carvaiho advances his own theory wherein "patents serve as
relatively accurate meters of an invention's value to society." Market forces facilitate the
'metering' function, the fidelity of which is dictated by "two essential characteristics of
the patent system: disclosure of inventions ... and pre-determination of the terms of
protection," 156 (what Carvalho respectively calls 'quantification' and 'qualification' of the
invention). The patent therefore enables realisation of the value of the technology that
forms its subject matter and eliminates the transaction costs that are associated with
other forms of management such as trade secret protection or government funding.157
This reduction in transaction costs is Carvalho's "cornerstone justification of the patent
system," 158 and provides a basis for his later comment that "meters perform better when
clear." 159 Therefore, he suggests that, if indeed this is the 'primary function' of the
patent system, there should be a preference for narrow, and thus more certain, claim
scope, although never explicitly stating this to be the case.
When compared to other theories of patent protection, the crux of Carvalho's
conclusion appears alarmingly simple, so simple, in fact, that it verges on being a mere
statement of the obvious. "... [T]he patent system exists because it is the only known
legal institution that allows inventors to put a price on technology and at the same time
permits society to measure, through the competitive interplay of market forces, the
154 Ibid. at 27-8.
Ibid. at 28.
156 Carvaiho, op cit. at 28.
157 The transaction costs arising from trade secrecy are obvious. Those associated with government
funding arise because of the choices that have to be made in deciding whether a particular avenue of
research deserves pursuing. This process necessarily involves some estimation of the value of the end
product, the invention, which, in turn, introduces the possibility of pursuing political rather than strictly
economic considerations, therefore potentially adding social cost into the equation.
158 Carvallio, op cit. at 52-3.
159 Carvalho, op cit. at 74.
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adequacy of such a price with relative efficiency." 16° This is true, to a point. However,
as the reader will appreciate, even this explanation 0f the existence of the system is too
complex. In its most basic form, the patent system today operates and exists because a
system of providing protection from competition to the creators of new manufactures
has done, in one form or another, for over 500 years. As Machiup concluded in his
review of the U.S. Patent system in the 1950s: "No economist, on the basis of present
knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates,
confers a net benefit or a net loss upon society.... If we did not have a patent system, it
would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system
for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our current knowledge, to
recommend abolishing it." 161 The patent system exists, therefore, primarily because of
familiarity and reliance built up over a long period of time; this is, as far as this author
can ascertain, the most pragmatic explanation of the system as we experience it.
However, whilst this is an ep1anation of the current state of affairs, it is far from
rigorous as a philosophical or economic justfication or model of the system; it is on this
point that Carvalho's thesis also fails.
In his rush to ascribe a 'new' primary function to the tangled philosophical and
economic roots of the system, he slips into the trap of merely describing it, rather than
ascribing a model upon which to justify it. The key to his theory is the fact that the
patent enables the market to 'relatively accurately' decide the price of the invention, it
conimercialises the subject matter and rescues it from the realms of intangibility,
transforming it into an asset that has real monetary value. However, this is not, strictly
speaking, what a patent does. The appearance of the patented technology on the
balance sheets of the entity that holds the rights is simply a by-product of this process,
an effect rather than a cause. A patent does nothing to the subject matter itself; it
merely prevents others from profiting from the protected technology without the
consent of the right holder. It offers limited protection from competition and may
therefore assist in the decision to disclose the information that it protects, or indeed to
III) Carvallio, op cit. at 52.
" Machiup, An Economic Review of the Patent Sjistem, Study No. 15 of the Sub-Committee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 85th Congress, 2 Session,
(1958; Washington) at 80-1.
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embark upon the creative process. Furthermore, the price that is charged for the
invention will, logically, be as close to the profit maximising price as the right holder can
reasonably expect to go without jeopardising sales.' 62 This price may be significantly
above that which the majority of society would be prepared to pay for the goods, and
therefore possibly above the value of those goods to society as a whole, as long as there
are some that value them highly. The technology itself (necessarily subsequent to
creation) has a market value with or without patent protection. All that the patent does
is enable the holders to appropriate more of this for themselves.
Seen in this light, it is clear that Carvalho's thesis is little more than a combination of
the classical 'incentive to disclose' and 'incentive to invent/invest' theories dressed in
fancy clothes. "[AJn accurate metering of technology improves efficiency in the
allocation of private resources into R&D," 63 i.e. the ability to appropriate the profit
maximising market worth of an invention (as opposed to the competitive price) will
affect the decision to invest in the creation of technology. As the reader will appreciate,
this is hardly rocket science. All other 'insights' into the system come from a similar
series of banal observations, superficially disguised.
Patents as Incomplete Contracts
The second of these recent additions to the stable of economic opinion revisits the
concept of the patent as a bargain between the inventor and the State. However, in
Patents as Incomplete contracti; 164 Kesan & Banik propose a model of protection that
significantly deviates from the classical theories upon which it is ultimately based. In
their words, they put forward a proposal that "is an incentive-compatible trade that
maximizes joint social surplus."165
162 Assuming, that is, that they are acting, and indeed are free to act, to maximise profits and do not have
some ulterior agenda.
163 Carvalho, op cit. at 54.
164 (2000) 2 Jr/ashi,ton Universite Journal of Law and Polic'.' 23. The full title is Patents as Incomplete Contracts:
A4gning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art.
165 Ibid. at 27. The reader will note that this theory offers more in the way of proposals than justifications,
however, it is mcluded as demonstration of the continuing utility of the classical theories in modern
economic opinion.
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Their starting point is logically, therefore, classical theory: "By conferring rights to the
inventor to exclude others from making, using, or selling a patented invention without a
license, patents provide incentives for inventors to invest in costly and risky R&D."
They continue; "Patents also encourage the dissemination of information about new
inventions, thus permitting competitors to build upon or develop improved versions of
patented inventions." However, whilst noting these positive aspects of protection, the
authors also recognise the social costs associated with the patent system and therefore
state that "efficient patent systems aim to induce investment in R&D while limiting
losses due to market power."166
Kesan & Banik explain 167 that the losses due to market power, indeed the market power
of the patent itself can be limited by the granting of narrow patents, thereby reducing
the scope of the patentees monopoly and their ability to fend off competing, but not
directly duplicative, technology. The increase in public welfare that accompanies a more
competitive market is, however, at all times offset by the reduction in incentive that the
narrow scope provides for future investment in R&D. This classic balancing act
between the need for 'fair protection for the patentee' and 'a reasonable degree of
certainty for third parties' will be familiar to the reader as a recurring theme that runs
throughout this work. However, the point at which Kesan & Banik's theory departs
from this well-trodden path is in their appreciation of the partial-contractual nature of
the patent right: "While analyzing patent policy in the same way as any other property
rights is an attractive proposition, several differences ... are crucial."168
These differences, primarily the possibility of post-grant rescission of the right by
invalidation of one or more of the claims, prompt Kesan & Banik to view the patent as
a "contingent... probabilistic property right." Further, they reason that the uncertain
nature of the inventive process and the possibility of invalidation due to post-grant
discovery of prior art mean that "the public cannot "contract" with the inventor to
create a new invention but instead must establish patent enforcement rules by which a
patent may be invalidated." 169 They continue, stating that these defects in the contract
166 Ibid at 23-4.
167 Ibid. at 24-5.
168 Ibid. at 25.
169 Ibid.
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theory' 7° of patent protection are remedied if one considers the patent, not as a fully
formed contract, but rather as one that is incomplete, the gaps being filled by the
substantive rules of patent law that enable the grant to be invalidated. Such "default
rules confer broad residual rights to the public to invalidate a patent through post-
issuance litigation."171
Two forms of incompleteness are discussed. The first is the legally incomplete (or
literally incomplete) contract, whereby some aspect of the contract's operation is left
unspecified over a set of circumstances in which the contract is to apply. The second is
the economically incomplete contract, which relates to the "ex post efficiency of
contractual outcomes." In this latter case, the question that should be asked is whether
the contract allows "the joint surplus of the parties to be maxiniised by taking into
consideration the buyer's marginal valuation of the good and the seller's cost?" Such a
contract is considered to be incomplete because the "immutable terms of the contract
prevent parties from engaging in mutually beneficial trade." 172 This second type of
incompleteness may result where one party to a contract withholds information that
would maxirnise the joint surplus of the parties. This will occur, for example, where the
patentee does not disclose a potentially fatal piece of prior art to the Patent Office and
then, if granted, sets licence fees at a (low) level that will minimise the risk of litigation173
and yet still provide income for the holder of the right. Here the joint surplus of the
parties (patentee and public) is not maximnised as the added benefit to the patentee of
having a broader (yet more precarious) patent than would otherwise be the case is offset
by the cost to society of a grant covering something that is not new. Furthermore, the
social cost of an unwarranted patent will be exacerbated by the expense of litigating to
170 Whereby the patentee is presented with incentive to invent/disclose the invention in return for the
improvement to the technological standing of society and associated welfare gains that the publication of
the specification provides.
171 Kesan & Banik, op dt. at 26.
172 Ibid. at 28.
173 This conclusion is drawn from Lanjouw & Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Proper/ji Rights, NBER
Working Paper No 8656, Dec. 2001. Who conclude that the perceived value of a patent is one of the
determinants of whether a patent will be challenged, the more valuable the tight, the more likely a
challenge is to be forthcoming. They also note that the size of the firm holding the patent can be
important, with patents owned by small enterprises being more likely to be embroiled in litigation than
those owned by larger firms. The paper can be found at http://papers.nher.org/papers/W8656.pdf.
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invalidate the grant. Yet this danger of economic incompleteness is inherent in the
patent system as the prosecution "process does not provide adequate incentives for the
patentee to reveal such information." 74 This comment is especially pertinent in high
technology fields, such as biotechnology, where the patentee and the Patent Office are
"asyn•et:ically informed about the relevant prior art."175
To Conclude
None of the traditional or post-classical theories of patent protection detailed above
provide us with a definitive model. 176 All are, to some degree, concerned with the
classical view of the patent being obtained solely for the market effects that its
exclusionary nature creates. As noted in Chapter IV, above, this view of the system is
often out of step with the commercial reality in which patents are sought for a number
of reasons only remotely connected with their attendant 'monopoly'.
In addition, all of the theories are found wanting when questions of real life applicability
are considered. They are all theoretical without application, and skirt round the
question of how a court would actually utilise the principles that they espouse in its
determination of the scope of a patent, instead concentrating on an expostfacto analysis
of decided cases in an attempt to divine some sense of order and logic from an
essentially human endeavour.' 77 As Oddi notes, doubt must be cast on any theory that
"premises itself on a limited number of non-randomly selected cases." 178 All fall foul of
this point. Moreover, the nature of the comparisons made between sometimes wildly
differing technological fields also brings the theories into question as it seems to this
author that the interpretation placed upon the claims and the level of generality with
which they are viewed must depend on the intended addressee. Therefore, any attempt
to provide a general theory of interpretation for all nature of invention is fundamentally
flawed from the outset. Further, any theory must be rejected that considers all cases to
174 Kesan & Banik, op at. at 30.
175 Ibid. at 32.
176 To be fair to the authors of these theories, very few either tried or claimed to have succeeded in
creating the definitive answer to the patent system.
i.e. they are too theoretical, without practical application. Although again, to be fair not many of the
theories actually claimed that they were anything more than analytical models of the system.
178 Oddi, Ho/y GraiI op irt. at 326.
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have been rightly decided,' 7' as error is an integral part of any human experience. The
shifting formulations and evolving doctrines evident in all legal spheres, especially one
as fast moving as that linked with high-technology, mean that the courts get the chance
to review past decisions, to trim and shape, and move with the times. Historical
judgments are important because they tell us what the law is not and reveal the
pathways by which the current law came to be made. Mistakes are possible and bad
decisions probable. Times change and a general theory will always struggle to explain
and rationalise something as fickle and situationally dependent as human reasoning.
As Oddi sagely states, "the outcome of actual patent litigation may be better explained
on the attitude (bias) of the court toward patents at the time of decision" than by any
unified theory. To this end, the "pro-patent bias of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit is palpable and may offer a far better indicator of patent validity and
infringement than any of the economic theories." 18t This author agrees. 11t ' Economic
theories may help to decide what the scope of protection of any given grant should
optimally be, but modelling the vagaries of the human mind is outside of their current
understanding. Therefore, having viewed the arguments and models advanced to justify
and explain the provision of patent protection, this author is left with the feeling that
grant and litigation is ultimately an expensive lottery where the prizes are big, and the
chances of winning proportional to the financial status of the interested parties. Thus,
in words echoing Machlup's conclusion in his review of the U.S. Patent system in the
1950s,182
 the best justification that we currently have for the patent system is the fact
that we currently have a patent system.
It has been the purpose of these three chapters on Patents Within the Market Econornj to
provide insight into the economic and theoretical literature on this topic, and more
specifically the determination of patent scope, whist alerting the reader to the fact that
certain 'settled' issues may not be what they first seem. The issue of 'monopoly-phobia'
179 See Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, (1992) 78 Virginia
Law Review 359, at 367; also Oddi, Ho!5i Grail, op cit. at 326, who states, at note 366, that: "Some cases, of
course, were never "good law."
l() Oddi, HoLy Grail, op rit. at 326-7.
flIt Although he also notes that the tide in the CAFC's favours may now have turned. See further Chapter
VI, below.
1112 Reproduced in text accompanying note 161, above.
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is one that has tainted patent decisions on both sides of the Atlantic, on and off, ever
since the inception of the system. 183 Despite convincing arguments advanced by
Kitch,' 84 Dam, 18' Rich, 186 Rose, 187 and Loughla& 88 etc., that the patent grant cannot
accurately be described as producing an economic monopoly, the sentiment can still be
found in popular opinion. This public distaste for monopoly finds itself reflected in
judicial pronouncements, both in this country and abroad. The traditional British
position in relation to determining patent scope has already been discussed, 18' however,
it is clear that other States' patent doctrines deal with the problems in different ways to
our own, and it is to these differences that we now direct our attention.
Three caricatured systems are seen to be in evidence in addition to the UK. The first,
America, offers two-tier protection, extending a patent's scope under the doctrine of
equivalents to supplement the literal meaning of the claims. The second, Germany,
offers traditionally broad protection for the 'general inventive idea' that lies behind the
invention. Finally we look to Japan, where the system is traditionally characterised by
very narrow protection giving rise to many small patents. Each system is examined in
turn before moving our focus back to the UK in order to reflect upon the current state
of affairs in the light of our findings.
183 See Rose, Patent 'Monopoyphobia" A Means of Extin,guishin the Fountainhead (1999) 49 Case W"estern
Reserve Law Review 509.
184 Kitch, Eleinenta?y and Persistent Errors in the Economic Ana/ysis of Intellectual Propertji, (2000) 53 Vanderbilt
Law Review 1727.
185 Dam, The Economic Undeipiiznins of Patent Law, (1994) 23 Journal ofLegal Studies 241.
186 Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants ofMonopo/y? (1993) 15 U7estern New En gland Law Review 239 at 239.
187 Rose, Patent 'Monopo/yphobia' op cit.
188 Loughian, Patents: Breaking into the Loop, (1998) 20 S ydney L Rev 553.






Promoting the 'Useful Arts'
"Congress shall have power... To promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."
—Article 1, s.8, cl.8 of the Constitution of the United States of America
Preface
There are three systems that together have been claimed to handle nearly 90% of the
total patent traffic in the world. 1 The customary approaches to claim interpretation in
the three varies wildly, from the traditionally narrow 'sub-literal' Japanese approach, to
the German courts' broad protection of the 'general inventive idea'.
In the first of our comparative chapters, however, we turn our attention to the United
States and the patent system extant there. The U.S. system in many respects treads a
middle path between Germany's traditionally broad protection and the narrowness of
Japanese grants. Full treatment of the jurisdiction could create a work of many times
this size, therefore the subject matter of this Chapter has been limited, often crudely, to
the bare bones of the 'doctrine of equivalents', the central pillar of claim theory in the
U.S.
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, the theory upon which claim drafting is
based is that of peripheral definition, where the claims mark the outer boundary of
protection. Their scope is determined by the application of a two-stage test whereby
the literal scope of the wording used is augmented by recourse to the doctrine of
equivalents. The doctrine is justified on the basis that it tempers "unsparing logic and
prevent[s] an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention." 2 Therefore,
combining a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties with a reasonable degree of
fairness for the patentee.
Discussion of the American system is deemed necessary as, not only does it provide
informative illustration of the manner in which protection for equivalents can operate,
thereby providing insight into the possible operation of a European doctrine, 3 but it
I Namely the American, European and Japanese systems. See Isayama, Japan's Views on a Desirable IP
Sjstemfor the Global Economji, (1999) 2fournaloflVorld Intellectual Propert y 679 at 685.
2 Per Justice Jackson, delivering the leading judgment in Graver Tank v Linde Air Products; 339 U.S. 605
(1949, Supreme Court) at 608.
As provisioned in the amendments to Article 69 of the European Patent Convention and the Protocol
on its Interpretation agreed at the Munich Diplomatic Conference in November 2000, and adopted by
the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation on 28 th June 2001.
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also allows us to appreciate the context from which much of the pressure for expansion
of the patent right originates.
We begin by briefly considering the historical development of the doctrine from
Colonisation to the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Graver Tank Co. v Linde
Air Products Inc., 4 before moving on to assess the impact of Graver Tank itself. Recent
developments in U.S. law will then be considered, including the infamous Festo5
litigation, which has just completed its second en banc passage through the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).
Op t.
Festo Corporation v Shoketsu Kinroku Kogyo Kabushi/ei Co., Ltd, 234 F.3d 558 (2000, CAFC, en banc), 535 U.S.
722 (2002, Supreme Court), Unreported decision of the CAFC (en banc) of 26h1 September 2003.
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Early History
As noted, American patent law has at its core the idea that the claims mark out the
boundaries of the invention. However, this has not always been the case; indeed it was
only in 1836 that Congress first codified the practice of using claims at all.
U.S. patent law is grown from a British seed, and as such its lineage is traceable (in
terms of historical markers, if not defining acts) through the common law of the 18th
century, the Statute of Monopolies, Elizabethan practice and, ultimately perhaps, to the
Statute of Venice. 6 As a colony of the British Empire, the 'newly discovered' North
America inherited the English law concerning 'monopolies' upon Colonisation. It was
transported to the dependency with the first settlers where it evolved into a patent
custom initially little changed from that of the motherland.
Working on the jurisdictional boundaries of the original 13 States, patents were granted
in America from 1641. Such was their utility that the practice continued under the
Articles of the Confederation after the Revolution. However, initially little was done to
change the existing system, and by the 1780s problems concerning the limited
jurisdiction of the patent grant had led to dispute between States. A paradigm example
of this is the problems connected with the development of interstate steamboat lines,
which was hampered by conflicting patents issued in separate States.8
Partly in response to this jurisdictional problem, and partly due to pressure for
furtherance of the Union, the Constitutional Convention of 1789 resolved to make
patent protection in the United States a right of the people. Therefore, Article 1, s.8,
clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
For more information on the history of the British system, see Chapter II, above.
A patent issued by the State of Massachusetts. See Merges, Intellectual Properi in the New Technolqgical4ge,
(1997; Aspen Law & Business, New York) at 125.
8 Walterscheid, The Ear/y Evolution of/he United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I), (1996) 78 JPTOS 615
at 632-7, also The Ear/y Evolution of the United States Pate,zt Law: Antecedents (5 Part II) (1996) 78 JPTOS 665
at 673-84. See also Flexner, Steamboats Come True. American Inventors in Action, (1944; Viking Press: New
York), and Merges: Patent Lan' and Policy: Cases and Materials, (1997; Michie, Charlottesville, Virginia; 2"
Ed.) (hereinafter Merges, Patent Law and Poliy) at 8.
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Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries".
Thereafter, a nation-wide patent system was created by legislative power in 1790 in the
very early days of the first Congress; as Merges notes, this reflects the importance of
this matter.9
Early American patent law, like its English cousin, was raw in comparison to its modern
incarnation, and it was not until the Patent Act of 1836 that Congress adopted a
recogrnsable modernistic approach to the protection of invention.
The 1836 Act is noteworthy for a number of reasons, not least because extended the
possibility of protection to "citizens or residents of any country", protection formerly
being limited to resident citizens only, 1 ° and also it established for the first time a formal
system of examination. The latter replaced the simple registration scheme introduced
by the 1793 Act, 11 which was fraught with problems as it gave no power to refuse a
patent grant on grounds of a lack of novelty or usefulness. 12 However, it should be
noted that the 1836 Act also gave the applicant the right to "compel issue of a patent by
bill in equity, against an adverse decision of the Commissioner and of the Board of
Examiners," a practice that Vojáek states provided an "excellent safeguard of the rights
of the inventor."13
The Act also introduced a requirement that the potential patentee "particularly specify
and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own
invention or discovery." 14 Although significant from a Legislative point of view, this
See Merges, Patent Law and Po/i9', ibid. at 9.
II) Although, it should be noted that there was still a raked fee scale for U.S. and non-U.S. citizens.
Americans paid $30 for a patent, British inventors were asked to pay $500 and all others $300. See
\Tojáek, A Survy of the Princp/e National Patent Systems, (1936; Prentice Hall, New York), (hereinafter
Vojáek) at 117.
11 Registration was introduced in the Amendment of 1793 as a replacement for the original procedure
whereby the patent application was subjected to the examination of three high-level Government
Officials - See Merges; Patent Law and Policy, op cit. at 10.
12 Any attack on these grounds had to be conducted m court, giving rise to much unwarranted litigation.
13 \Tojáek, op cit. at 119.
14 s.ó Patents Act 1836. See Hantman, Doctrine of Equivalents, (1988) 70 IPTOS 511 (hereinafter Hantman)
at 517. Also Takenaka, Intetpreti,g Patent C/aims in the United States, Germany and Japan (1995) TIC
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requirement was simpiy codification of the existing practice required by the Courts and
established some fifteen-years earlier in the case of Evans v Eaton, 15 in which Justice
Story stated that the:
"specification ... has two objects: one is to make known the manner of
constructing the machine so as to enable artizans to make and use it ... The other
object of the specification is, to put the public in possession of what the party claims as
his own invention, so as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common use, or is
already known, and guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention
which the party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented..."6
This was, however, a significant departure from previous practice, where the invention
merely had to be described so as to distinguish it from other things before known.
Infringement at this point was decided on principles laid down in the case of Odiorne
Wink/eji, where it was stated that "[m]ere colorable differences, or slight improvements,
cannot shake the right of the original inventor." 17 The question of where the border
bertveen 'colourable' and 'substantial' difference lay was resolved in the 1817 case of
Grqy vJarnes, in which Justice Bushrod Washington charged the jury:
".. [W]e think it may safely be laid down as a general rule, that where the
machines are substantially the same, and operate in the same manner, to produce the
same result, they must be in principle the same. I say substantially, in order to exclude
all formal differances; and when I speak of the same result, I must be understood as
meaning the same kind of result though it may differ in extent." 18 (sic)
Therefore, laying down for the first time the, now classic, 'function-way-result' or 'triple
identity test'.
Publications Vol. 17 (hereinafter Takenaka, Interpretin,g C/aims) at 6; and Jessup, The Doct,ine of Equivalents,
1972) 54 JPOS 248.
' The case first reached the Supreme Court in 1818 - 16 Us. 454 (1818, Supreme Court) - and was the
first time that a substantive patent issue had done so. The Court remanded the issue for a new trial and it
returned to the Supreme Court in 1822 - 20 U.S. 356 (1822, Supreme Court). It is this latter case in
which the practice was formally established.
16 20 U.S. 356 at 433.
17 Per Circuit Justice Story, charging the jury. 18 F.Cas. 581 at 582 (1814, Circuit Court for Massachusetts;
Case N 10432).
18 10 F.Cas. 1015 at 1016 (1817, Circuit Court for Pennsylvania; Case NQ 5718).
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'Central Definition Theory'
Despite requiring claims in the 1836 Act, it was not until almost 35 years later that they
came to define the extent of protection. Up to the passage of the 1870 Patents Act, the
scope of protection was determined by reference to the description in the specification
and the drawings. Therefore, in much the same way as the claims of a German patent
were traditionally understood to do little more than describe one form of the invention,
so too the early American claims functioned as guides to draw attention to the
invention's prominent features, and little more. Therefore, they often referred to
numbered elements in the drawings and to the specification with the phrase
"substantially as herein described" or "substantially and for the purpose set forth".
The scope of the patent, however, covered all forms that embraced the principle or
mode of operation disclosed in the patent and gave the same effect. Therefore, in
W/inans v Denmead, Justice Curtis, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
"It is generally true, when a patentee describes a machine, and then claims it
as described, that he is understood to intend to claim, and does by law actually cover,
not ony the precise forms he has described, but a/I other forms which embodji his invention..... 19
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the scope of protection extended to the preferred embodiment (as claimed)
and its equivalents. This method of claim drafting, defining the invention using claims
including only its prominent features and extrapolating from this central point in the
determination of infringement, has been referred to as 'central defmition theory' 2° and,
as we shall see, bears close likeness to pre-1981 German practice.
Winans v Denmead is also important as it is considered by many to be the first case in
which the doctrine of equivalents was voiced. 21 The litigation involved a patent for a
See lVinans v Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853, Supreme Court) at 342.
20 As opposed to the 'peripheral definition theory' that categorises the current British approach. See
further, text accompanying notes 1-6 in Chapter I, above. Also, Deller, Patent C/aims, (1971; Lawyers Co-
operative Publishing (Bancroft-Whitney), New York, 21d Ed.), Section 9. Takenaka, Interpreting C/aims, op
cit. at 3-12; and Hantman, op cit. at 517.
21 See the opinion of the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Mfs Co. v Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605
(1949, Supreme Court) at 608; see also Takenaka, Interpretiig Claims, op cit. at 9. However, Haniman, op cit.
at 518 states that the "W'inans principle is a restatement of the charge to the jury in ... Evans v Eaton." He
does, however, concede that it was the first rime that the principle appeared in a Supreme Court decision.
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railway car designed to carry coal. The question that was before the Court was whether
a car in the shape of a tapered hexagonal pyramid infringed the patent, which described
and claimed a car in the shape of a frustum of a cone. Both designs operated in
substantially the same way to achieve the same increased load-bearing benefits. Justice
Curtis, adding to the previously quoted passage, stated that the protection offered by a
patent extended beyond the precise form portrayed:
". [It being a familiar rule that, to copy the principle or more of operation
described, is an infringement, although such copy should be totally unlike the original
in form or proportions."22
Evidently, at this time the doctrine of equivalents was not used to supplement the
normal scope of protection, it was the primary tool in such a determination. However,
it is generally accepted that it was used to expand beyond the literal scope of the claim
language? This is eminently clear for so-called 'pioneer' inventions, understood to
mean a new device performing a completely new function, which were given a very
broad range of equivalents. 24 Yet, at the time of the Winans decision, the claims of the
patent did not yet defme the scope of the invention, they were merely an expression of
one form that it might take, and as such did not limit the extent of the monopoly in any
way. Seen thus, it is easy to explain the expansive doctrine of equivalents as a product
of the 'central definition theory' and thereby limited to it. However, by the time the
1870 Act was in place the days of 'central definition theory' were over, replaced by a
sterner, more literal, approach to the determination of patent scope.
22 Winans v Denmead, op dt. at 342
23 However Hantman, op irt. at 527-8 questions whether this can be said to be the case. He uses the
dictionary definition of a cone, which he concludes covers a conical form without a circular base, and
therefore argues that the infringing railway car actually falls within the literal wording of the claims. He
fails, however to note that the test for literal infringement is not, and has never been, whether the accused
device falls within the scope of the claims as they might be interpreted. The test is whether the alleged
infringement falls within the claims as interpreted by the Court. In W"inans "cone" was interpreted as
requiring a circular base, therefore it is clear that a tapered hexagonal prism cannot be said to fall within
the literal scope of the claim as inte,preted.
24 For example the electro-magnetic telegraph patented by Morse in 1840 was considered to be of
"pioneer" status and thus was allowed a broad range of equivalents. Although in 0 'Rei/y v Morse, 56 U.s.
2 (1853, Circuit Court for Kentucky) the court was unwilling to extend the equivalency to all machines




the latitude given to patentees in infringement proceedings was significantly narrowed
and protection was denied for mere inventive concept. 33 Finally, because claims enabled
applicants to defme their inventions more specifically, Courts began to require that they
did so. Therefore the old "substantially as described" claim format was struck down,
the Court in Hobbs v Beach stating that the phrase adds little to the claims:
"If these words are used, the patentee may still prove infringement in the use
of a mechanical equivalent; if they are omitted, he is bound to prove no less. Perhaps
it would be sufficient to say that, if a doubt arose upon the question whether the
infringing machine was the mechanical equivalent of the patent device, that doubt
should be resolved against the patentee where the claims contain the words
'substantially as described or set forth."34
Therefore, as time had gone on, and the claims had assumed their role in defining the
boundaries of patent protection, the early liberal attitude to the determination of scope,
and the expansive doctrine of equivalents that accompanied this, had been gently, but
sternly, phased out.
The knock-on effect of increased judicial reliance on claim language was that the
patentee, robbed of this former interpretative latitude, took to enlarging the literal scope
of their claims as much as possible. It became common practice to include such stock
phrases as "means for" or "adapted to" in an attempt to broaden claim language.35
Thus, in a series of cases that can be said to have reached cul.mination in Westinghouse v
Bojiden Power Brake Co.,36 the doctrine of equivalents was used to restrict the claims by
limiting infringement to only some of the structures within their literal scope. This
method of limitation was based on sufficiency of disclosure, its justification being that
the claim should only validly cover the subject matter that the inventor actually discloses
and equivalents thereof. Therefore:
"The patentee may bring the defendant Within the letter of his claims, but if
the latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent,
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to
i.e. the general inventive idea.
180 U.S. 383 (1901, Supreme Court) at 400.
See Hantman, op cit. at 522. For recent illustration of the effect that the phrase "means for" can have
on the breadth of protection afforded to a patent in the U.K. see Warheit v 0/ympia Tools Ltd., [2002]
EWA ('iv 1161. Discussed by Dunlop, Court ofAppealgets to Grljs with the Protoco [20037 EIPR 342.
170 U.S. 537 (1898, Supreme Court).
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be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be
convicted, when lie has done nothing in conifict with its spirit and intent."37
Thus, in a string of cases towards the end of the 19ih century, the American courts can
be seen to be using what would now be termed the 'reverse' doctrine of equivalents to
restrict protection to less than that actually claimed.
The reader will appreciate that the patent systems of Europe were undergoing a similar
age of unrest at this point in time. As discussed in Chapter III, above, the mid-to-late-
9d century marked a period in which a new breed of political economists had begun to
question the foundations and justification of patent law, and the fear of broad
monopoly stifling domestic industry was, once again, brought to the fore. The
Netherlands abolished its system during this period, 38 and in England the patent law was
the subject of heated debate resulting in significant changes to the law. The period in
which inventors and their inventions were romanticised by the populace was coming to
an end, replaced by 'big' business and corporate research and development, and the
idealistic image of the lone heroic inventor was banished to fairytale.
Graver Tank
The ear1y2Oth century marked a period of vacillating protection in the United States'
patent system. A number of strategically important patents in key industries, such as
the light-bulb,39 the aeroplane, the basic design of the automobile,4' and in the area of
wireless telegraphy,42 had established significant market power for the entities that
owned them. This domination of the market in several key areas did not go unnoticed
3 Per Justice Brown, giving the opinion of the Court in Westinghouse v Boyden, ibid. at 568.
38 The Netherlands patent law was repealed in July 1869. See Machlup & Penrose, The Patent Controverg in
the Nineteenth Centuy, (1950)10 Journal of Economic History 1 at 5.
° U.S. Patent No 223,898, issued January 27, 1880, to Thomas A. Edison for an incandescent electric
lamp, in which the leading wires are secured to a carbon filament by cement carbonised in situ.
'° U.S. Patent N° 821,393, issued May 22, 1906, to Orville and Wilbur Wright for a flying machine —
notably for a system of steering and stabilisation.
41 U.S. Patent N° 549,160 granted November 5, 1895, to the George B. Selden for an improved road
engine.
42 U.S. Patent No 586,193, granted July 13, 1897 and reissued June 4, 1901 as reissue No 11,913 to
Guglielmo Marconi for improvements in transmitting electrical impulses and signals and in apparatus
therefore.
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by the judiciary and, driven in part by a number of anti-competitive acts committed by
large patent controlling companies, the courts became increasingly unwilling to enforce
patent rights. 43 This trend is amply illustrated by reference to the statistics of Supreme























































Figure 1: Results of Patent Litigation before the
Supreme Court of the United States'
However, it would appear that America's involvement in World War II may have
helped to alter the balance, as it was towards the end of the l940s that the expansive
doctrine of equivalents, which had lain dormant since Westinghouse, 45 was brought back
to life.
The Decision in Graver Tank.
Graver Tank & Mfg Co. v Linde Air Products Co. has been hailed as one of the most
important decisions in the development of American claim interpretation theory. 47 It
stands as a buoy in a sea of anti-monopolistic sentiment, and affirms the survival of the
expansive doctrine of equivalents thought by many to be long dead.
43 This trend is mirrored, to a certain degree, by narrow interpretation in the U.K. courts at this time. See,
for example E.M.I. u Lissen, (1939) 56 RPC 23.
Taken from Fox, Monopolies and Patents: A Stud5 of the Histoy and Future of the Patent Monopofy, (1947;
University of Toronto Press, Toronto), at 266. Also, Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An
Anafysis of the Record, (1974) 56 IPOS 758 at 776-7 notes that in the period 1921-73 the Supreme Court
held invalid 82% of the patents that it considered. See also, Janicke, To be or not to be: The Lung Gestation of
the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 645, at 646.
Westinghouse v Boyden Power Brake Co., op cit.
° 339 U.S. 605 (1949, Supreme Court).
See, for example, Takenaka, Inte?7'retiig Claims, op cit. at 13.
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The case involves an action for infringement bought by the owner of a patent for fluxes
used in electric welding, and the process of welding using them. The patent in question
essentially disclosed and claimed a combination of alkaline earth metal 48
 silicate and
calcium fluoride - the actual flux produced and sold under the patent contained silicates
of calcium and magnesium. The allegedly infringing product was similar except that it
contained silicates of manganese and calcium - the former not being an alkaline earth
metal. In all other respects the two compositions were identical, producing the same
kind and quality of weld and operating in the same way. The question that faced the
Court was whether the substitution of manganese - not an alkaline earth - for
magnesium took the allegedly infringing flux out of the scope of the patents claims.
In answer to this question, the Supreme Court laid down a two-stage test for the
determination of infringement. Justice Jackson, giving the opinion of the Court, began
by stressing the importance of the claims in the determination of patent scope,
declaring:
"If accused matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and
that is the end of it."
However, he continued saying that:
". . . [To] permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every
literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and
useless thing. Such a limitation would leave room for - indeed encourage - the
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions
in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough ... [to evade] the reach
of the law... [It] would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be
subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention
and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the
primary purposes of the patent system."49
The doctrine of equivalents, he explained, evolved in response to this experience: "To
temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an
invention,"5
 its essence being that ccone may not practice fraud on a patent."51
48 Those elements found within group II of the periodic table, i.e. beryllium, magnesium, calcium,
strontium, barium and radium.
Graver Tank, op cit. at 607.
5° Ibid. at 608 quoting Judge Learned Hand in Roya1 ypewriter Co. v Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691 (1948,
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit)
Graver Tank, op cit. at 608.
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The Court cited with approval the opinion of Justice Sanford in Sanitary Refngerator Co. v
Winters52 stating that the doctrine may be utilised against an alleged infringement if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
substantially the same result. It added to this 'tripartite test' by highlighting that any
difference between the two devices must represent an insubstantial change. The Court
further highlighted the importance of "known interchangeability" between the claimed
element and its equivalent.53
Criticism of the Decision
The Court cited Winans v Denmeact4 as establishing the doctrine and, disregarding the
changes in claim format that had occurred in the intervening period, stated that it had
been consistently applied by the Courts ever since. Whilst it is true that the Supreme
Court had never explicitly overruled the expansive doctrine in the years following
Winans, it has been argued by academics and practitioners alike that to suggest
consistent application is a bit far-fetched. Indeed, Hantrnan goes as far as to argue that
Graver Tank is an abomination reviving an anachronistic expansive doctrine that has no
place under 'peripheral definition theory'. He states that "[i]t was not reasonable for the
Court to compare an alleged infringing invention with the claimed invention using a
doctrine developed a hundred years earlier to apply to a situation in which the claims
were not the measure of the invention."55 Further, he contests that it goes against the
fundamental principles of the 'peripheral definition theory' of claim drafting, as it
introduces unacceptable ambiguity into infringement proceedings.
However, Hantman's argument fails to take account of a number of small, but in the
opinion of this author, important points. First, under 'central definition theory' the
doctrine of equivalents provided the test for infringement, there was no other. Second,
the Court in Graver Tank stresses the importance of the claims in the determination of
patent scope, stating that they define the invention, and reduces the doctrine of
52 The original passage referred to states that a "substantial equivalent of a thing, in the sense of the
patent law, is the same as the thing itself; so that if two devices do the same work in substantially the
same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in
name, form, or shape." 280 U.s. 30 (1929, Supreme Court) at 42.
Graver Tank, op cit. at 609.
op cit.
Hantman, op cit. at 543.
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equivalents to a secondary measure supplementing an 'all elements rule' so that one-to-
one equivalence is required. Third, and possibly most importantly, it recognises that the
doctrine may also be used to restrict protection where "the device is so far changed in
principle from the patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a
substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the
claim. It is therefore apparent that, far from resurrecting a long-forgotten principle
and unleashing it upon an unsuspecting world, the Court made clear the role of the
doctrine under peripheral claim theory. It updated it and applied it to modern practice.
Therefore, whilst Hantman's argument would be valid if the Court simply used the old
doctrine of equivalents established under Winans without change this is not what it did.
To argue such a point is simply an exercise in verbalism and avoids the question of
whether the doctrine as laid down in Graver Tank is, in substance, the same as that under
central defmition theory. Quite simply, it is not. The motivation for extending
protection on an equivalents basis is the same under both authorities, but, whereas
previously it was subordinate to nothing, under Graver Tank it is a supplemental tool,
second string to the 'all element', literal infringement rule. Indeed, as Takenaka
correctly points out, it can be said that by clarifying the claim litnguage as the primary
point of reference in any patent infringement action, and by stressing the importance of
a claim referring to an accused device, Graver Tank can actually be seen as the case that
established peripheral definition theory.57
Hantman's second argument, that the decision introduces an unnecessary degree of
uncertainty into the patent process and therefore is against the public interest, is
powerful in the fight against revival of the doctrine. However, it is apparent that the
Court in Graver Tank was adequately aware of this a viewpoint, and actually intended
such imprecision. It explained:
"Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an
absolute to be con'idered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every
purpose and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same
thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes
different may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose
Graver Tank, op cit. at 608-9
Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, op ct. at 13.
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for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the
other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform."58
The Court accepted that that one of the primary objects of patent law is "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by duly rewarding the inventor. It recognised
that to permit evasion of penalties for infringement by making insubstantial changes to
the invention as claimed, whilst still allowing the wholesale theft of its substance, would
soon render the patent useless. Moreover, it acknowledged the fallacy of ]imiting patent
protection to the literal scope of the claims, stating that this would encourage the
concealment of invention, therefore going against another tenet of patent law. Thus,
Takenaka concludes that without the doctrine of equivalents "peripheral definition
theory can never function completely and effectively to implement patent policy."59
However, whilst this may be the case, it is not clear that patent policy itself could not be
implemented without the doctrine, as business practices and expectations could be
changed in order that the goals, as stated, could be realised. As we shall see, this is the
situation that occurred in Japan where traditionally narrow interpretation of claims
forming the periphery of protection forced the system as a whole to react in order that
the underlying policy could be implemented.6°
Section 112 Equivalents
Shortly after the decision in Graver Tank, Congress revised the patent law. Section 112
of the 1952 Patents Act included requirements for the claims and the description of the
invention, and was, in many ways similar to that of the 1870 Act. However, the section
also included a paragraph for which no precedent existed and which deserves some
attention, it reads:
"An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."61
Thus, a second type of equivalent, often confused with the judicially created doctrine of
equivalents, was introduced into American law. The Court of Appeal for the Federal
Grayer Tank, op cit. at 609.
' Takenaka, Intctprcting C/aims, op cit. at 17.
' See further, Chapter VIII, below.
61 s.112(6).
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Circuit (CAFC) went to great lengths to explain the difference between the two in
D.M.I. Inc. v Deere & Co. stating:
"[flue word "equivalent" in §112 should not be confused ... with the
"doctrine of equivalents." In applying the doctrine of equivalents, the fact finder must
determine the range of equivalents to which the claimed invention is entitled, in light
of the prosecution history, the pioneer-non-pioneer status of the invention, and the
prior art. It must then be determined whether the entirety of the accused device or
process is so "substantially the same thing, used in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result" as to fall within that range. In applying the
"means plus function" paragraph of §112, however, the sole question is whether the
single means in the accused device which performs the function stated in the claim is
the same as or an equivalent of the corresponding structure described in the patentee's
specification as performing that function."'2
The rationale behind s.1 12(6) was clearly stated in 0.1. Corp. v Tekmar Co., where Judge
Lourie said that it was "intended to permit use of means expressions without recitation
of all the possible means that might be used in a claimed apparatus." However, "[t]he
price that must be paid for use of that convenience is limitation of the claim to the
means specified in the written description and equivalents thereof." 63
 Therefore, "[li
the specification is not clear as to the structure that the patentee intends to correspond
to the claimed function, then the patentee has not paid that price but is rather
attempting to claim in functional terms unbounded by any reference to structure in the
specification. Such is impermissible under the statute."64 Thus, the Court made clear
that the doctrine was not to be interpreted as providing expansive protection, rather its
application was strictly limited by the disclosure in the specification. As such, it cannot
be seen as creating a patch of 'central defmition' within a statutory framework. Rather,
s. 112 informs the claim meaning for a literal infringement analysis, by restricting the
scope of a (potentially broadening) functional claim limitation. The doctrine of
equivalents, on the other hand, extends the enforcement of claim terms beyond what is
literally described in the event that there is equivalence between elements of the
patented article and the alleged infringement. 65 Therefore, as the statutory provisions
merely assist in the determination of literal infringement, they can only embrace those
62 Per ChiefJudge Markey, giving the opinion of the Court, 755F.2d 1570 (1985, CAFC) at 1575.
63 115F.3d 1576 (1997, CAFC) at 1583.
Per Judge Clevenger, in Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, [Unreported] Decision
of the CAFC of 22u September 2003.
65 See Al-Site Corp. v VSI International Inc., 174 Rid 1308 (1999, CAFC).
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equivalent structures or acts existing at the time of issuance. 'After arising equivalents'66
can only infringe, if at all, under the doctrine of equivalents.
Hostility and Instability
The years after the Supreme Court's acceptance of the expansive doctrine of equivalents
in Graver Tank are marked with inconsistency and confusion in the application of the
doctrine. 67
 A certain degree of anti-monopolistic sentiment continued and the result
was a line of cases in which the doctrine was interpreted and applied very narrowly.
Thus, in Feed Service Corp v Kent Feeds Inc. 68 a decision of non-infringement was made for
a process where reactants were fermented in the reaction vessel rather than being added
separately. In Deyerle v Wreght Manufacturing Co.° 9 the use of a pin to fix bone fractures
was held not to infringe a patent calling for a "fixing nail". Here the Court stressed that
as the invention was not 'pioneer', but was rather "an improvement in a crowded art",
the claims were therefore only entitled to a narrow range of equivalents. A similarly
narrow interpretation is found in General Djinamics Corp. v Whitcornb 7° where a patent
calling for a wing body extending "just forward" of the position of maximum panel
thickness was not infringed by a similar design in which the body extended four-feet
forward this position, even though this was minimal compared with the length of the
wing. The Court here holding that "differences in form and shape may weigh
importantly in the balance 'where form is of the essence of the invention."71
In addition to the uncertainty and intrinsic subjectivity of the 'tripartite' test, additional
defects also developed. Litigants began to exploit cracks in the test and to "dispute
what specific function, way, or result characterized the invention or the accused device,
66 i.e. those arising after issue of the patent.
See Takenaka, Inteipreting C/aims, op cit. at 17. Also Comment, Per,jthera/ Definition Theory v Central
Definition Theo?y in Patent C/aim Inteipretation: A Survey of the Federal Circuit, (1967) 32 Georve IVashin gton Law
Review 609.
528 F.2d 756, (1976, United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit).
69496 F.2d45, (1974, United States Court of Appeals, 6th1 Circuit).
° 443 F.2d 630, (1971, United States Court of Appeals, 4111 Circuit).
71 Ibid. at 633. See ftixther Noonan, Understanding Patent Scope, (1986) 65 Oregon Law Review 717 at 725-9.
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with each side advocating the particular function, way, or result that would cause it to
win."72
The resulting doctrinal instability was further enhanced by regional variations in judicial
hostility in the District Appeal Courts. As Noonan notes, the patentee "almost always
lost in the Second and Eighth Circuits but almost always won in the Tenth Circuit."73
One of the consequences of such marked regional prejudice was an increase in forum
shopping. This added to the cost of litigation by introducing an often-lengthy pre-
infringement action to decide the trial venue; that is in cases where it did not effectively
decide the issue by referring the case to the Eighth Circuit where "patents simply were
not valid."74
By 1982 the problem of regional inconsistency was so bad that Congress itself decided
to address the problem by setting up the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) to which it gave overall jurisdiction in all patent appeals and decisions of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The CAFC set to work almost in-imediately to create a coherent set of rules for the
determination of patent infringement and validity proceedings. There was palpable
effort in the early cases that passed through the hands of the newly created Court to
remove the spectre of monopoly that had dogged many previous decisions. As noted in
Chapter V, above, Giles Rich, writing extra-judicially, had stated:
"The tendency is to call a patent "monopoly" when it is to be invalidated or
restricted and to say it is not a monopoly when it is held to be valid and infringed."75
72 Weston, A Comparative Ana!sis of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Can European Approaches solve an American
Dilemma? (1998) 39 IDEA 35 (hereinafter Weston) at 44.
Noonan, op cit. at 719. See also Baum, op dt. at 762, who explains that between 1961 and 1973 the
Second Circuit held valid only 1 8% of patents that it considered. For the Eighth Circuit, the result was
even worse with only 11 % of patents adjudicated not being invalidated. Statistics for the Tenth Circuit in
the same period show 70% of patents were held to be valid.
4 Noonan, op cii at 720.
Rich, Are Letters Pate,it Grants of Monopo/y? (1993) 15 Western New England Law Review 239 at 240.
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This was clearly seen to be the case by the infant Court, with Judge Rich leading the
charge against misuse of the moniker:
"The patent system, which antedated the Sherman Act by a century, is not an
"exception" to the antitrust laws, and patent rights are not legal monopolies in the
antitrust sense of that word. Accordingly, if a patent is held to have been obtained
illegally, it is not properly said, ipso facto, that it was all along an illegal monopoly and,
thus, that its procurement and attempted enforcement was a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. A holding that monopoly analysis should end in favor of liability on a
determination of fraud, without more, would signal a fundamental misunderstanding
of the substance and purposes of both the patent and the antitrust laws."76
In place of the view of patents as limited monopolies, the CAFC cultivated the patent
grant as "intangible property, to be maintained free of trespass."77
Hughes Aircraft
One of the first cases to reach the CAFC concerning the doctrine of equivalents was
HughesAircraft Co. v United States78 in 1983. It concerned an invention for controlling the
orientation of a communications satellite in orbit (the Williams patent). The claims
required means for sending information to earth concerning the current position of the
satellite and for receiving and directly executing a control signal sent back to reorient it.
The issue at stake was whether advances in semiconductor technology, which allowed
positional calculations to be executed in situ by microprocessors, took the alleged
infringement outside of the scope of Williams.
In the Court of Claims, the trial judge found no literal infringement because there was
no means for two-way communication between the satellite and the ground. The Court
also refused to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents since there was no
"obvious or exact equivalent" 79 for either the means of sending, or receiving and
executing, signals.
The CAFC concluded otherwise, stating that the defendant's spacecraft:
"are identical with the Williams satellite, except for the employment of
sophisticated, post-Williams equipment (computers) to achieve attitude control in the
76 American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (1984, CAFC) at 1367.
Noonan, op cit. at 721, referring to American Hoist, ibid.; Schenck v Nortron Coip., 713 F.2d 782 (1983,
CAFC); and Co,ine/Iv Sears Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (1983, CAFC).
78 717 F.2d 1351 (1983, CAFC).
'215 U.S.P.O. 787 at 812, (1982, U.S. Court of Claims) perJudge Colaianni.
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basic manner taught by Williams. Advanced computers and digital communications
techniques developed since Williams permit doing on-board a part of what Williams
taught as done on the ground. As one of our predecessor courts, the Court of Claims,
has thrice made clear, that partial variaon in technique, an embellishment made
possible by post-Williams technology, does not allow the accused spacecraft to escape
the "web of infringement"."80
The Court also stressed that the doctrine of equivalents applied to the invention 'as a
whole'. Therefore, rather than being forced to find equivalents for each and every
claimed element, Hughes states that infringement may be found under the doctrine if the
accused device is substantially similar (in function, way, and result) to the patented
article even if it omits elements of the claimed invention. The Court further opened up
the doctrine by saying that elements may be found to be equivalent even if they were
not known to be so at the time that the application was frled.81
The decision in Hughes has received considerable criticism 82 and can be seen as marking
the beginning of a period of extreme protectionist policy within the CAFC during
which the doctrine of equivalents became one of the most powerful tools of judicial
discretion within patent law. 83 It would appear that efforts to address the perceived
anti-monopolistic stance of the various Appeal Circuits, and to right the injustices of the
previous decades, provided momentum to expand the doctrine at an unprecedented
rate. This was not to everyone's liking, the main thrust of criticism levelled against
Hughes being directed to its seeming non-adherence with the doctrine of 'file-wrapper'
estoppel.
File Wrapper Estoppel
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is limited by another important doctrine, that
of 'file-wrapper', or 'prosecution history', estoppel. This simply states that the patentee
is estopped from using the doctrine of equivalents to reclaim subject matter surrendered
in previous prosecution or at the Patent Office to secure the grant.
HughesAircrafi, op dt. at 1365.
81 Indeed, at the time of the filing of the Williams patent, the provision of on-board computational power
sufficient to calculate orienting data and issue corrective signals to the boosters was a technical
impossibility.
82 Haritman, op cit. at 547 unsurprisingly gives the most thorough dressing down of the decision saying
that the decision contradicted all of the Supreme Court's findings of the previous 200 years. See also
Noonan, op dt. at 732-3
83 See Weston, op dt. at 44.
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A simple illustration of the application of the doctrine can be found in the Supreme
Court's decision in Exhibit Supp/y Co. v Ace Patents Co.çb. 84 Here the patent concerned a
switch that closed an electric circuit on a pinball table when the target pin was hit by a
rolling ball, therefore allowing score to be kept. The application, as originally filed, was
drafted rather broadly and called for conductor means "carried by the table". This was,
however, rejected by the U.S. Patent Office as conflicting with prior art, so the phrase
was replaced by "embedded in the table" to secure the grant of the patent. The owner
later brought an infringement action against a competitor who produced tables where
the conductor means was carried by, but not embedded in, the table. The patentee
alleged that the defendant's modification was equivalent to that claimed by his patent.
The Supreme Court decided in favour of the defendant, Chief Justice Stone, giving the
opinion of the Court, stated:
"By the amendment he recognized and emphasized the difference between
the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment of all that is embraced in that
difference... The difference which he thus disclaimed must be regarded as material,
and since the amendment operates as a disclaimer of that difference it must be strictly
construed against him... As the question is one of construction of the claim it is
immaterial whether the examiner was right or wrong in rejecting the claim as filed."85
This is a thread of argument that has been picked up in the recent Festo litigation, 86 and
is a subject to which we shall return in due course. However, for the moment it is
sufficient to note that the ground of objection in Hughes arises from the fact that the
majority of the Court ignored Hughes' narrowing of the claims. Several broad claims
were deleted and substituted with claims containing limitations directly relevant to the
alleged infringement. Noonan, therefore, explains that the "new limitations required a
means for providing an indication of the satellite's position to the earth, which was
precisely what ... [the alleged infringement] did not do."87
However, what Hughes did do was to institute a "flexible bar" approach to the
determination of the effect of amending claims in prosecution. Therefore, the Court
84 62 S.Ct. 513 (1942, Supreme Court).
85 Ibid. at 519.
86 Festo Coiporation v Shoketsu Kinryku Koo Kabusbiki Co., Ltd, 234 F.3d 558 (2000, CAFC, en banc); if
U.s. 722, (2002, Supreme Court).
87 Noonan, op cit. at 733.
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stated that file-wrapper estoppel may have a limiting effect on the doctrine of
equivalents "within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero." 88 However, it did
not necessarily preclude the application of equivalents protection to the element in
question. "Rather, the range of estoppel extended only so far as would have been
necessary to distinguish the scope of prior art asserted by the examiner."89
'Reverse' Equivalents - Texas Instruments
Three years after the decision in Hughes the CAFC had another opportunity to consider
the application of the doctrine of equivalents, this time in Texas Instruments Inc. v United
States International Trade Commission. 9H The case concerned a patent for a handheld
calculator owned by Texas Instruments, the claims of which were written in very broad
functional language, which could have allowed for a wide interpretation. The patentee
brought an action alleging that certain imported calculators fell within the scope of their
claims. The Court agreed that the claim wording could be read onto the allegedly
infringing devices, but considered that they were so far improved from the claimed
invention that:
"[T]he total of the technological changes beyond what the inventors disclosed
transcends the equitable limits illustrated, for example, in Graver Tank, ... [etc.,] and
propels the accused devices beyond a just scope of the ... claims."91
Therefore, the device as a whole was considered to be so far changed "in principle from
the patented article that it perform[ed] the same or a similar function in a substantially
different way". 92 The survival of the restrictive doctrine of equivalents was thus
acknowledged and the 'as a whole' test, used in both the expansive and restrictive tests
was, once more, confirmed as correct.
Narrowing the Doctrine
The 1980s were a period of great economic growth in both the United States and
Europe. Industry flourished, and so did the doctrine of equivalents. However, just as
88 Hughes, op cit. at 1363.
Atkinson, Rose & Wasleff Was Festo RealyNecessay? (2001) 83JJTFOS 111 at 118.
90 805 F.2d 1558 (1986, CAFC).
1 Ibid. at 1571.
92 Grayer Tank, op cit. at 608-9
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the economy was to crash at the end of the decade, so the 'as a whole test' used in the
application of the doctrine of equivalents was also to meet an untimely end.
Penn wait Corp. v Durand- Wayland Inc.
Despite beginning the decade as one of the most powerful devices of judicial discretion
in patent law, by the end of the 1980s the doctrine of equivalents was a shadow of its
former self, and it appeared that it may be phased out in the interests of predictability.
The runaway liberalism of the CAFC in its early years, evidenced by decisions like that
in Hughes, was brought to an abrupt end in the en banc93 decision of Pennwa/t Corp. v
Durand- Wqyland Inc.94
The patent in question concerned an apparatus for sorting fruit by weight, colour, or
both. It contained claims in which each element of the invention was represented as a
means for performing a particular function. The alleged infringements embodied most,
but not all, of the functions of the patented article. Specifically, the accused devices
were found to have no "indicating means" to determine positions of the items to be
sorted",95 nor their functional equivalent, 96 as a microprocessor stored weight and
colour data, not the positions of the items to be sorted. This therefore negated finding
literal infringement.
The Court moved on to the question of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
reminding the parties that:
"[Tjhe doctrine of equivalents is designed to do equity, and to relieve an
inventor from a semantic strait jacket when equity requires, it is not designed to permit
wholesale redrafting of a claim to cover non-equivalent devices, i.e., to permit a claim
expansion that would encompass more than an insubstantial change."97
3 i.e. judged by the full bench, a session whereby the entire membership of the Court (12 judges in the
Federal Circuit) participates in the decision rather than the regular quorum.
' 833 F.2d 931 (1987, CAFC).
Ibid. at 935.
96 Due to the fact that the claims of the patent were drafted in 'means-plus-function' format recourse to
s.112(6) was necessary to determine li.trral infringement.
Ibid at 935, quoting from Ptr/ein-Elmer Corp. v Westinçhousc Elec. oep., 822 F.2d 1528 (1987, CAFC) at
1352.
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Having dispensed this advice, the majority proceeded to find the patent not infringed.
In coming to this conclusion the Court did not consider whether the claimed invention
and the accused devices were equivalent 'as a whole', as had been previous practice, but
instead introduced a new test for determining equivalency. It used an 'all elements', or
'element-by-element' analysis stating that if even one element of the claim limitations is
missing in an accused device there can be no finding of equivalency.
"In sum, the term "equivalents" in the "doctrine of equivalents" refers to
"equivalents" of the elements of the claim, not "equivalents" of the claimed invention.
While a device found to be an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is, in a
sense, "equivalent" to the claimed invention, that conclusion follows from application
of the doctrine. It is not the equivalency determination to which the doctrine is
directed, but die result thereof. To speak of a device as being an "equivalent" of the
patented invention muddles the analysis ."
The dissent was strong and to the point. Senior Circuit Judge Bennett stated
"[rjhe majority has made shortsighted policy choices. The majority has
contrived an analytical framework for the doctrine of equivalents that is little more
than a redundant literal infringement inquiry, which renders the doctrine of equivalents
so unduly restrictive and inflexible as to end its usefulness as judicial doctrine."99
He continued:
"[l]n practical effect, the majority has eviscerated the underlying rationale of
the Graver Tank test by requiring, under the doctrine of equivalents, an exact
equivalent for each element of the claimed invention. The majority in fact commends
[a test that] was never the extent of the doctrine of equivalents analysis under our
here-ignored precedents which also required that the analysis be undertaken in light of
the entirety of the accused device and entirety of the patent-in-suit."109
By applying the 'element-by-element' test, the majority took a strict peripheral view of
the claims, thereby narrowing the effect of the doctrine. Takenaka suggests that the
reason for this restriction lay in confusion with s.112(6) equivalents, the 'all-elements'
test being intrinsic to the statutory approach. 101
 She points out that an examination on
an element-by-element basis "not a proper means of evaluating the modification
because the patent is granted for an entire combination of elements, not for each
individual element." 102
 Indeed, reducing the scope of protection 'out of the blue' in the
98 Ibid. at 953.
' Ibid. at 939-40.
10 Ibid. at 940. The "here-ignored precedents" being Martin v Barber; 755 F.2d 1564 (1985, CAFC);
Carman Industries Inc. v Wa!,!, 724 F.2d 932 (1983, CAFC), and Hughes, op dt.
191 By Takenaka, Interpreting C/aims, op t. at 20.
102 Ibid. at 21.
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manner that the CAFC did in Pennwa/t fails to support patent policy on two fronts.
First, confinement of the doctrine of equivalents in this manner was justified in the
name of certainty; however, radical alteration of 'accepted' interpretative practices
introduces its own uncertainty, unacknowledged by the majority in the case. This sub-
layer arises because of the business practices that have arisen in and around the judicial
sphere and are connected with the application of known rules to the claims in hand.
Alteration of these rules necessarily gives rise to uncertain practices until their proper
scope is established. As patent law does not allow the redrafting of claims based on old
principles when those principles change, the result is a glut of patents drafted with
differing purposes in mind being interpreted as though they were consistent. When a
similar change is implemented by statute transitional provisions govern the change,
however, this is not the case with paradigm shifts in judicial reasoning. The alteration in
Pennwalt therefore fails patent policy on the grounds of certainty. In addition, by
curtailing the scope of protection in this manner, the act of change, in itself, fails policy
on the grounds of fairness to the patentee.
After Penn wait
Pennwa/t ignited a bitter argument created by the obvious tensions between fair
protection and public notice. The strong dissent by four of the panel found reflection
in wildly divergent opinions in the lower Courts, some applying the element-by-element
rule so strictly that there was little to differentiate it from a test of literal infringement.103
The confusion surrounding application of the doctrine of equivalents was further
enhanced by the fact that the next case decided by the CAFC opened it up once more.
Utilising similar reasoning to the majority in Pennwalt, the Court in Corning GIass1°4
relaxed the application of the all element rule by clarifying, some would say
redefining, 105 what is meant by an element in a claim.
The defendant in the case argued that their device was not equivalent to the patentee's
as it lacked an element found in the claim, thereby advocating an equivalency of
103 See, for example, Safe F/ight Instrument C'oip. v Su,istrand Data Control Inc., 706 F.Supp. 1146 (1989, United
States District Court, Delaware). See also, Takenaka, Interpreting Claims, op dt. at 21-2
104 Corning Glass Works v Sumitomo Electric, 868 F.2d 1251 (1989, CAFC).
105 See, for example, Player, Elemental Equivalence: Intelpretin8 'Substantia//y Ihe Same IVaji' under Pennwalt -
Taken in Leght of Corning Glass, [19897 EIPR 421.
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component approach consistent with the reasoning in Pennwalt. The Court, however,
rejected this argument, stating:
"Element" may be used to mean a single limitation, but it has also been used
to mean a series of limitations which, taken together, make up a component of the
claimed invention. In the All Elements rule, "element" is used in the sense of a
limitation of a claim... [I'he defendant's] analysis is faulty in that it would require
equivalency in components, that is, the substitution of something in the core for the
absent dopant. However, the determination of equivalency is not subject to such a
rigid formula. An equivalent must be found for every limitation of the claim
somewhere in an accused device, but not necessarily in a corresponding component,
although that is generally the case."6
The combined effect of Pennwalt and Corning Glass was inconsistent application of the
two differing standards. It was therefore something of a relief when the Supreme Court
finally came to address the problem of the doctrine of equivalents once more in the
1997 case Warner-Jenki.nson v Hilton Davis.107
Warn er-Jenkinson: The Supreme Court Revisits Equivalents
Warner-Jenkinson was the first case concerning the doctrine of equivalents to come
before the Supreme Court since the landmark decision of Graver Tank. As such, it was
of great significance. In its deliberations the Court took time to consider whether to
limit, or even delete, the doctrine, and assuming its survival, how the test for equivalents
should be phrased so as to avoid some of the uncertainty and distrust of the previous
decade.
Death of the Doctrine?
Justice Thomas, delivering the opinion of a unanimous Court, got straight to the point,
opening his judgment by stating:
"Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in [Graver Tank] ... set out the modern
contours of what is known in patent law as the "doctrine of equivalents." ... [The]
Petitioner, which was found to have infringed upon respondent's patent under the
doctrine of equivalents, invites us to speak the death of that doctrine. We decline that
vi ti
1(16 Corning Glass, 868 F.2d 1251 (1989, CAFC) at 1259.
'° W7arner-Jenkinson Co., Inc v Hi/ton Davis aemica/ Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997, Supreme Court).
108 Ibid. at 21. It is significant that none of the 21 judges in the Supreme Court and CAFC who ruled on
the matter disputed the existence of the doctrine. Further, at 28, the Court considered that "Congress
can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy
arguments [concerning its abolition] made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress, not this
Court."
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However, the Court then continued, lamenting the confusion that had arisen over the
operation of the doctrine and stating that it would endeavour to clarify its scope, stating
that:
"[T]he doctrine of equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank,
has taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no
denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."°9
(emphasis supplied)
It quoted the dissenting opinion of Judge Nies (dissenting) in the CAFC's opinion in
the case, stating that one means of avoiding the conflict could be found if a distinction
was drawn, that was not too esoteric, between:
"...substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and
enlarging the metes and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed... Where a
claim to an invention is expressed as a combination of elements, as here, 'equivalents'
in the sobriquet 'Doctrine of Equivalents' refers to the equivalency of an element or part
of the invention with one that is substituted in the accused product or process... This
view that the accused device or process must be more than 'equivalent' overall
reconciles the Supreme Court's position on infringement by equivalents with its
concurrent statements that 'the courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the
scope of its claims as allowed by the Patent Office.' [Citations omitted.] The 'scope' is
not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution of equivalent elements."°
(emphasis in original).
And continued:
"We concur with this apt reconciliation of our two lines of precedent. Each
element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the
patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual
elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that
the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such
broad play as to effectively e •• ate that element in its entirety."1
The Court therefore confirmed the 'all element rule' as governing the application of the
doctrine of equivalents and prevented expansion of the scope of protection beyond that
which could be deduced from the claims. As we shall see in Chapter VII, below, the
alternative formulation, adopting the pre-Pennwalt approach to interpretation and
applying the 'invention as a whole' rule, is startlingly similar to the traditional German
practice of determining scope by reference to the 'general inventive idea'. Given the
109 Ibid. at 28-9.
11 Ibid. at 29. Quoting from 62 F.id 1512, at 1573-4 (1995, CAFC) Nies,J., dissenting.
ill Warner-Jenkinson (Supreme Court), op dt. at 29.
212
fact that American practice is now firmly founded in 'peripheral definition theory' it
would have been surprising if the Supreme Court had adopted a broader formulation
based on the invention as a whole. However, the Court did not stop its analysis here,
and, true to its word, continued to consider the limitations of the doctrine in more detail
in order to help defme its scope.
File-Wrapper Estoppel
On the matter of file-wrapper estoppel, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument
that the mere fact that an amendment had been made in the course the prosecution
history should precluded use of the doctrine of equivalents. It explained that ptiot
cases had consistently applied file-wrapper estoppel only where the claims had been
amended for a limited set of reasons, and that it could see no reason to require a more
rigid rule which did away with the right of the patentee to explain the change made.
However:
"Where the patent holder is unable to establish such a purpose, a court
should presume that the purpose behind the required amendment is such that
prosecution history estoppel would apply."2
Therefore, where the reason for the change is considered sufficient, estoppel may be
avoided. However, the burden is on the patentee, and in the absence of good reason
the presumption is that the Patent Office had a substantial reason related to
patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment. In such
circumstances, the Court considered that prosecution history estoppel would bar
application of the doctrine equivalents to that element.113
Intent of the Defendant
Warner-Jenkinson is also significant in confirming that it is not permissible to consider the
intention of the defendant when deciding on the questions of infringement. The
defendant had argued that the seeming reliance on the absence of independent
experimentation in Graver Tank created an equitable defence where such
experimentation had, in fact, taken place. The CAFC in Warner-Jenkinson had endorsed
the proposition, explaining that the alleged infringers' behaviour was an indirect
reflection of the substantiality of differences between the patented invention and the
accused device or process:





formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case
determinations."1
Mani-Festo for the Future?
At the time that the Supreme Court was considering the appeal in Waiwer-Jenkinson,
another case was rumbling in the background. The Festo litigation had already been
from first instance to Supreme Court once, 122 where it was remanded for
reconsideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson. The litigation had now reached the CAFC
for the second time, which, due to the importance of the issues at stake, had vacated
their earlier decision and granted the defendant's request for rehearing en banc. The en
batic decision of the Court was delivered on the 29t1 November, 2000, and was set to
rock the patent community to its very foundations. Indeed, such was the effect of the
judgment that it caused one commentator to proclaim "the doctrine of equivalents is
dead, dead, dead." 24 Furthermore, Wegner, in a recent article, brands Festo a "patent
law nightmare" that has caused damage to the "fabric of infringement law". 125 Others,
whilst not being quite so melodramatic, reflect the gravity of the situation nonetheless,
stating that "the Festo decision may have transformed prosecution history estoppel into
an exception that swallows the rule."126
The Problem Identified
The Festo litigation concerns two patents for magnetic rodJess cylinders composed of
three basic parts: a piston, a cylinder, and a sleeve. They were the U.S. counterparts of
German applications. Justice Schall, giving judgment in the CAFC in the following
terms, describes the basic operation of the invention:
[I]he piston is on the inside of the cylinder, and is moved by fluid under
pressure. The sleeve is on the outside of the cylinder, and is magnetically coupled to
the piston. The magnetic attraction between the sleeve and the piston causes the
sleeve to follow the piston when it moves along the inside of the cylinder. The sleeve
is used to move objects on a conveying system."127
122 Ibid.
123 Festo Co,poration v Shoketsu Kinoku Kogyc Kabushi/ei Co., Ltd, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997, Supreme Court).
' Hosteny, Does Festo Change Patent Prosecution? [2001] (AIav) IP Toda 44 at 44.
125 Wegner, Fes/ering .Questions After Festo, (2003) 13 Fordham Intellectual Probertv. Alec/ia and Entertainment Law
JaI9_1, at 891, 907.
126 Atkinson, Rose & Wasleff, lVas Festo Rea//y Necessai? 20O1) 83 JJTFOS 111 at 111.
127 234 F.3d 558 (2000, CAFC, en banc) at 579.
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The allegedly infringing articles differed from the patent in a number of areas.
Specifically, where the patent claimed a device with a pair of sealing rings, the
defendant's products contained only a single resilient two-way sealing ring.' 28
 In
addition, the defendant's piston sleeve was made of aluminium, whereas the patent
called for one made from magnetizable material (aluminium is non-magnetizable).
Therefore, the articles did not fall within the literal scope of the claims, but
infringement was found under the doctrine of equivalents.
Such is not controversiaL The problem with the case, however, stems from
amendments made during prosecution before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(the USPTO), which gave rise to prosecution history estoppel. The en banc Court
requested briefs on five questions for the rehearing, all of which concerned the
operation of this bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents. Justice Schall
sumrnarises the questions as follows:
"1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim
creates prosecution history estoppel, is "a substantial reason related to patentability,"
[citation omitted] ... [as required by Warner-Jenkinson] limited to those amendments
made to overcome prior art under §102 and §103 [novelty and inventive step], or does
"patentability" mean any reason affecting the issuance of a patent?
2. Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a "voluntary" claim amendment - one
not required by the examiner or made in response to a rejection by an examiner for a
stated reason —create prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under Warner-
Jenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of
equivalents for the claim element so amended?
4. When "no explanation [for a claim amendment] is established," [citation
omitted] ... thus invoking the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under
Warner-Jenkinson, what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of
equivalents for the claim element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate Warner-Jenkinson's
requirement that the application of the doctrine of equivalents "is not allowed such
broad play as to eliminate [an] element in its entirety," [citation omitted]. In other
words, would such a judgment of infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson, violate the "all
elements" rule?"29
The majority answers were stark.
128 The Court explains the difference letwecn the two in the following manner: "A scaling ring has a lip
on only one side of the ring that seals against fluid flow on that side. By contrast, a two-way sealing ring
has a lip on both sides of the ring that allows each side to seal against fluid flow." Ibid. at 582.
129 Ibid. at 563.
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Judgment in the CAFC
The Court began by examining the function of the doctrine of equivalents in patent law.
Referring to Graver Tank, Justice Schall, giving the opinion of the Court, stated that it
operates to prevent the:
". accused infringer from avoiding liability for infringement by changing
only minor or insubstantial details of a claimed invention while retaining the
invention's essential identity."
In undertaking this task, however, he noted that a balance must be struck between
ensuring that patentee enjoys their just reward and ensuring that the claims give "fair
notice" to third parties of the patent's scope. This balance could be easily upset
because, in the words of the Supreme Court in W/arner-Jenkinson:
". the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement."131
He continued:
"Prosecution history estoppel is one tool that prevents the doctrine of
equivalents from vitiating the notice function of claims... [It] precludes a patentee
from obtaining under the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has
been relinquished during the prosecution of its patent application... Therefore, "[t]he
doctrine of equivalents is subservient to ... [prosecution history] estoppel."132
[citations omitted]
With these points in mind, the Court then proceeded to consider the answers to the
questions posed. In respect of the first, it held that "a substantial reason related to
patentability" was not limited to the avoidance of prior art, but also included any other
reason related to the statutory requirements for patentability:
"Therefore, an amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for any reason
related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history
estoppel with respect to the amended claim element."33
In answer to the second question, the Court considered that voluntary amendments
should be treated in the same manner as other amendments:
'3° Ibid. at 564. Referring to Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605 (1949, Supreme Court) at 608.
131 Ibid. Referring to U7arner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17(1997, Supreme Court) at 29.
132 Ibid.
' Ibid. at 566.
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"[T]herefore, any voluntary amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for
a reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution
history estoppel with respect to the amended claim element... [As b]oth voluntary
amendments and amendments required by the Patent Office signal to the public that
subject matter has been surrendered."34
The Court therefore clearly views the doctrine of equivalents as an exception to the
general rules of interpretation, to be strictly controlled. This conclusion is further
highlighted by reference to the Court's answer to the third en banc question.
"\Vhen a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard
to a chum element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim
element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely
barred (a "complete bar")."35
The answer to the third question has been described as the "heart of the Festo
opinion"° as the 'flexible bar' approach of the past was swept aside in favour of the far
more restrictive 'complete bar' to the application of the doctrine of equivalents. The
Court stating:
"Our decision to reject the flexible bar approach adopted in [Hughes]
comes after nearly twenty years of experience in performing our role as the sole court
of appeals for patent matters. In those years, the notice function ofpatent c/aims has become
paramount, and the need for certainty as to the scope of patent protection has been
emphasized. A problem with the flexible bar approach is that it is virtually impossible
to predict before the decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn.
After our long experience with the flexible bar approach, we conclude that
its "workability" is flawed." 37 (emphasis supplied)
The Court continued, extolling the virtues of the "complete bar" approach in lending
certainty to the process of determining the scope of protection conferred by a patent.
"With a complete bar, both the public and the patentee know that once an
element of a claim is narrowed by amendment for a reason related to patentability, that
element's scope of coverage will not extend beyond its literal terms. There is no
speculation or uncertainty as to the exact range of equivalents that might be available.
This certainty aids both the public and the patentee in ascertaining the true scope and
value of the patent without having to resort to litigation to obtain a case by case
analysis of what subject matter the claims can cover. With a complete bar, neither the
public nor the patentee is required to pay the transaction costs of litigation in order to
'' Ibid. at 568.
Ibid. at 569.
'3( By Wharton, Festo and the complete Bae W"hal r left of the Doctrine of Equivalents? (2001) 20 Saint Louis
University Pub/ic Law Review 281 at 287.
'3 Ibid. at 574-5.
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determine the exact scope of subject matter the patentee abandoned when the patentee
amended the claim."138
Furthermore, in answer to the fourth question, the Court stated that no range of
equivalents would be available where no explanation for a claim amendment was
established.°' Therefore, further extending the 'complete bar' rule. Due to its answers
to the preceding questions, the Court found no need to reach a decision in relation to
question 5.
Fallout
By answering the en banc questions in this manner, the CAFC caused uproar in patent
circles. The primary criticism came from the establishment of the 'complete bar'
approach whereby any amendment related to patentability would automatically preclude
application of the doctrine of equivalents to that element. As noted in Chapter IV,
above, the standard practice of those drafting patent claims is to begin broad and
an-iend as, and when, necessary to narrow the scope of protection during prosecution.
This approach is a product of many factors, including the stage in the innovative
process at which the patent application is made and the position of known prior art in
relation to the invention. Therefore, those patents that were drafted prior to the
decision in Fesio almost invariably suffered from amendments of some kind related to
patentability due simply to the nature of the drafting process. In making its statement
on the complete nature of the bar, the Court failed to consider the penalties that this
'certainty' would impose upon those patents in force at the time of the judgment.
The problems arise due to the effects that prior rules had on the system surrounding the
interpretation of patent documents. The interpretation that will be placed on the claims
of a patent is but one of a number of factors that govern the effective scope of
protection. Institutional practices augmenting the Court's approach to the
determination of patent scope rely on consistency for their operation. Patents are
drafted in the expectation that they will be interpreted in a certain way. Therefore,
criticism of the Feslo decision is not criticism directed to the future effects on drafting,
but rather to the seismic shift in the i/al/is ',w that renders tst inventive effort devoid
of reward.
138 Ibid. at 577.
139 Ibid. at 578.
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The effect of the CAFC's decision was to provide a patentee's competitors with a
charter to infringe. All that they need do was order a copy of the patent and the
prosecution history, isolate those areas in which amendment was made and substitute
functional equivalents for those elements. The apparent policy justifications for patent
protection were changed overnight as the 'public notice' function gained prominence.
Therefore, patents drafted with all due care and diligence based on the Court's previous
practice found themselves, after Festo, robbed of the scope that they would once have
enjoyed. Thus, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court was, once again called in to
decide the issue.
Festo in the Supreme Court (Again)
After considering the history of the case, the Supreme Court began its discussion of the
substantive elements of the appeal by examining the policy considerations that lay
behind the operation of the doctrine of equivalents. The tone of the judgment is clear
from the outset:
"The patent laws "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by
rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly... [I]he nature of language makes it
impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application. The inventor who
chooses to patent an invention and disclose it to the public, rather than exploit it in
secret, bears the risk that others will devote their efforts toward exploiting the limits of
the patent's language... The language in the patent claims may not capture every
nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If
pate/its were alwqys inteipreted /.,j their literal terms, their value would be Sreat/y diminished."
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the Court explained that the doctrine of equivalents has evolved to combat
this devaluation by simple acts of copying where unimportant and insubstantial
substitutes for certain elements have been made. Uncertainty is "the price of ensuring
the appropriate incentives for innovation, " and the Supreme Court has consistently
"affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule"4'
With these points in mind, the Court proceeded to consider the limits placed upon the
operation of the doctrine by prosecution history estoppel.
"Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents
remains tied to its underlying purpose. Where the original application once embraced
'4° 535 U.s. 722 (2002, Supreme Court) at 731.
141 Ibid. at 732.
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the purported equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or
to protect its validity, the patentee cannot assert that he lacked the words to describe
the subject matter in question. The doctrine of equivalents is premised on language's
inability to capture the essence of innovation, but a prior application describing the
precise element at issue undercuts that premise. In that instance the prosecution
history has established that the inventor turned his attention to the subject matter in
question, knew the words for both the broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively
chose the latter."'42
It confirmed that estoppel would arise where an amendment made to secure the patent
resulted in a narrowing of its scope. However, it rejected the 'complete bar' rule
suggested by the CAFC, stating that this approach was:
"inconsistent with the purpose of applying the estoppel in the first place - to
hold the inventor to the representations made during the application process and to
the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment. By amending the
application, the inventor is deemed to concede that the patent does not extend as far as
the original claim. It does not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so
perfect in its description that no one could devise an equivalent."43
To hold otherwise would be to resort to the "very ]iteralism the equivalents rule is
designed to overcome." 44 The Court then stressed that both the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel were "settled law":
"The responsibility for changing them rests with Congress... Fundamental
alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their
property."4'
Comment
By rejecting the 'complete bar' rule, the Supreme Court clearly recognises the effect that
such a shift in legitimate expectations of both patentee and their competitors would
have on the process of innovation aireadji instz,gated under the patent system. It is clear
that the assessment and determination of scope cannot be isolated from those grants
alreadj in existence, which have had their intrinsic scope' determined by the legitimate
expectations of their drafters. The importance of the doctrine of equivalents in the
United States is thus primarily related to the effect that it has on patents in operation,
rather than the prospective effect that it may have on patents in the future. The
142 Ibid. at 734-5.
'4 ibid. at 737-8.
'44 Ibid. at 738.
'45 Ibid. at 739.
146 i.e. the scope with which they have been drafted.
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American experience therefore highlights one of the paradoxes inherent in 'designing' a
better, or optimal, patent regime. The act of change, in itself, is incompatible with many
of the aims of; and justifications for, the system. As Machiup stated in his review of the
U.S. Patent system in the 1950s:
". .If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis
of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting
one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible,
on the basis of our current knowledge, to recommend abolishing it."
The same can be said instituting the sort of ad hoc amendments to current practice that
the CAFC did in Festo. The quest for certainty and predictability undertaken by the
Court is admirable, however, given the status quo before Festo, the CAFC's approach was
reckless. 'Certainty' means more than predictable patents, in common law jurisdictions
it also means predictable litigation based firmly on precedent. The Federal Circuit's
decision in Festo not only evidences a change of favour for patents, withdrawing from
the Court's early pro-patent policy, but also flies in the face of clear precedent.
Such was the outcry over the ruling that it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court acted
as it did, condemning the junior Court's actions. However, the story does not end here.
On 26 September, 2DD3, an en banc CAFC issued judgment in Festo for the second
time.'48
Postscript: The CAFC revisits Festo
Despite having their previous udgement vacated by the Su.çretne Court, ud ,e Laurie,
giving the opinion of the Court, began his discussion by reinstating "those holdings of
Festo VI that were not disturbed by the Supreme Court." 49 He therefore stated that any
"narrowing amendment made to comply with any provision of the Patent Act ... may
invoke an estoppel." This was to include voluntary, as well as requested, amendments.
In addition, the Court 'clarified' that:
147 Machlup, An Economic Review of the Pateizt System, Study No. 15 of the Sub Committee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 85" Congress, 2" Session,
(1958; Washington) at 80-1.
148 Unreported judgment of the CAFC (en banc of 26th September 2003,
I4 Festo Vi refers to the first en ban judgment of the CAPt in the case, reported at 23 E3d 558 (201J0,
CAFC, en banc).
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"• [T]he Supreme Court's lVarner-Jenkinson presumption, which treats a
narrowing amendment as having been made for a "substantial reason related to
patentability" when the record does not reveal the reason for the amendment
remains intact."
Conceding, however, that the "consequences of failing to overcome that presumption
have been altered."
Therefore, the test to be applied was essentially a three-stage assessment. First, did the
amendment narrow the literal scope of the claim? If so, then the assessment moves to
the second ciuestion, if not, prosecution history estoppel does not apply. The second
question relates to the reasons for the amendment; was it carried out for a substantial
reason relating to patentability? The presumption being that it was. If so, the next step
in the analysis is to consider the scope of the subject matter surrendered by the
narrowing amendment. The presumption connected with this third-stage being that the
patentee has surrendered all of the territory between the original claim and the amended
claim. Again, this is subject to rebuttal, the grounds for which are mentioned below.
After setting out these criteria, the Court continues, stating:
"... [f]f the patentee fails to rebut the Feslo presumption, then prosecution
history estoppel bars the patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents for the
accused element."
This latter statement therefore reintroduces the 'complete bar' via the operation of a
series of presumptions that expand the surrendered territory. This point is emphasised
by Judge Newman in her dissent. In addition, she finds the majority's conversion of
two of the Supreme Court's three rebuttal criteria into questions of law (from questions
of fact) "flawed".
The 'Rebuttal Criteria'
The majority opinion gives the following summary and guidance on how to apply the
'rebuttal criteria'. The first criterion is satisfied where the patentee shows that the
alleged equivalent would have been unforeseeable at the time of the amendment, and
"thus beyond a fair interpretation of what was surrendered." This is an objective test
that requires the Court to ask "whether the alleged equivalent would have been
unforesecable to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the amendment."
Equivalents will usually be unforeseeable if they represent "later-developed technology",
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"... at the pace of these changes in fundamental patent law, the noble
objective of bringing more certainty to the doctrine of equivalents nonetheless exacts a
price in unintended consequences... [T]he Supreme Court's stringent estoppel
presumptions also entail considerable unanticipated arbitrariness because examiners
differ. Some examiners aggressively seek to narrow and define claims. Others demand
far fewer amendments. Thus the application of the forfeiture presumption often
depends on the luck of the examiner draw. In any event, the new certainty rules for
equivalents (a rebuttable presumption that narrowing amendments erect a complete
bar), at least for a period of time, may disrupt as much certainty as they provide. In
particular, these new rules are likely to influence both the patent acquisition and
enforcement processes in unpredictable ways."
The point is therefore made that it is the pace of doctrinal change that causes the
problems. The patent system as a whole, including the procedure of issue, the
technique of drafting, and the interpretation of claims, is internally slow to respond to
external changes imposed upon it by decisions such as Festo. Therefore, paradoxically,
the quest for certainty that is being undertaken by the CAFC in the case is, in itself,
responsible for "disrupting the fundamental principle of certainty in the scope of patent
claims."5'
The message is therefore clear: The perceived attitude of the courts (in the U.S.
especially the CAFC), is a far more accurate measure of the scope that will be given to
any litigated patent than any of the economic or theoretical 'justifications' or models of
the system considered above. The responses of society as a whole will, eventually,
remedy any chang,es in interpretative standards as business practices, litigation, and even
patenting itse1f strive to maintain the status quo. 152 With doctrinal shifts of the size and
type displayed in Festo, the patenting business is essentially a lottery. There are big
prizes for the winners, but equally big risks too.
Therefore, with this in mind, we now turn our attention to consider a position lying at
the other end of the spectrum, from the restrictive Festo doctrine, as we look at the
151 Per Judge Rader, delivering concurring opinion in the CAFC's recent Festo decision.
152 Indeed, in the aftermath of the CAFC's original en banc decision in Festo, articles such as Hosteny, Does
Festo Chan&e Patent Prosecution? [20017 (Ma y) IP Today 44 sprang up giving advice on avoiding the Festo
pitfalls.
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A Tradition of Expansive Interpretation
Preface
Europe has one patent system, a supposedly homogenised grant and opposition process
for the 27 States 1 that contract to the European Patent Convention (the EPC). In
addition, the EPC also boldly legislates for the scope that these grants are to enjoy once
created. Yet without a common appeal court to act as final arbiter iii matters relating to
the determination of the breadth of protection, a history of wildly differing
interpretative styles has rendered any harmonisation on this latter ground incomplete.
We have already seen the United Kingdom's traditional approach to claim
interpretation, and now in the second of three chapters on comparative aspects of
patent scope we turn our attention to one of the UK's closest, and yet in this arena
most distant, neighbours: Germany.
The traditional view of the German patent system is that it lies in diametric opposition
to that of the United Kingdom. In almost any text one cares to mention that raises the
issue of the interpretation of a British patent, the reader will be referred to decisions of
the German courts (most notably, indeed notoriously, the Epiladj litigation2) as a
demonstration of European disharmony on the determination of protection scope.
This comparison is encouraged, perhaps even engendered to a degree, by the wording
of the statutory provisions that govern the interpretation of any patent granted by a
signatory country of the EPC; Article 69 and the Protocol on its interpretation.
Article 69 and the Protocol: A Brief History
Article 69 of the (unamended) EPC states that "the extent of protection conferred by a
European patent ... shall be determined by the terms 3 of the claims. Nevertheless, the
description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims." This provision is based
on Article 8 of the Strasbourg Convention on the harmonisation of substantive patent
As of 11th August 2003. The States in question are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Fmland, France, Germany, Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.
2 In the UK [19907 FSR 181. The German proceedings are reported at (1993)24 IIC&38.
3 The corresponding word in the German version of the official text is "inhalt" which roughly translates
as 'contents'. It will be noted that this is not entirely concomitant with "terms" in the English version, yet
both are considered to be authoritative translations.
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law, and had proved to be one of the most difficult provisions to gain agreement over
when being drafted in the Council of Europe.4 The problem stemmed from the wildly
differing roles played by the claims of a patent in the Member States at the time,
particularly the weight that their wording was given in the determination of the scope of
protection. In countries like the UK and Switzerland, the claims formed the periphery
of the monopoly. 5 Their interpretation was the key to both the definition of the
invention and the extent of protection. In countries like Germany and the Netherlands,
however, the claims served only to defme the invention, the scope of protection was
determined by generalisation of the inventive concept, unhindered by the exact words
used in the c1aims.' The drafters of the Convention therefore took what has been
described as a "big step"7 by opting to follow peripheral claim theory rather than central
defmition theory, and using the claims to mark the boundaries of the patent.
By adopting a formulation whereby the "extent of protection conferred by a ... patent
shall be determined by the terms of the claims"8 (emphasis added) rather than, for
example, the words of the claims, the Council of Europe consciously chose a position
somewhat broader than that of pure literal interpretation. This policy decision is made
manifest in the records of the drafting Committee, where it is stated that this wording
"seeks to lay down a principle for interpreting claims which is somewhere between the
system in which claims may be interpreted strictly according to the letter and that in
which they do not play a decisive part in defining the limits of protection."9
4 See Arn-iitage, Interpretation of European Patents (An'. 69 EPC and the Protocol on the Inteipretatio&, (1983) 14
IIC 811, (hereinafter Armitage, Interpretation of European Patents) at 813.
Hence the term 'peripheral definition theory' has been applied to the role of the claims in these
jurisdictions. See generally, Takenaka, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germanji and Japan, Vol.
17 Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law (1995; Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich) (hereinafter Takenaka, Inte,pretin& C/aims).
Thus, giving rise to the term 'central definition theory' - whereby the claims define the core of
protection and the scope of protection is determined by extrapolation from this central position. See
Takenaka, Interpretin.g Claims, ibid.
See Armitage, Inteeprelation of European Patents, op dt. at 813.
The French version refers to "teneur des revendications".
Quoted from Armitage, Interpretation of European Patents, op üt. at 814. See also Armitage, Orgins of
Relevant Provisions of the Munich and Luxembour,g Conventions, in Kemp (ed), Patent Claim Drafling and
Interpretation, (1983; Oyez Longman, London) (hereinafter Kemp) at 7-15. It will be noted that these
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the claims when considering the scope of protection - and suggests a middle ground,
balancing the dual virtues of fairness and certainty.
The German patent system has therefore been chosen as a comparison in this work as it
traditionally occupies a position that is poles apart from the British in terms of
interpretative style. It represents stark contrast to the principle of protection of the
public that defmed early UK practice, embodying a rather more pro-patentee 'reward-
based' philosophy for justification of the grant. The modern German approach to
determination of patent scope is now substantially harmonised to a pan-European
standard by the operation of Article 69 EPC and the Protocol attached thereto.
However, as will be seen, the old practices of the courts in this jurisdiction regarding the
interpretation of the claims, most notably their insignificance in the determination of
the breadth of the grant, provides vivid illustration of an alternative formulation to the
'accepted' 12 norm of pseudo-literal purposive construction, and thus aids in its
understanding.
Germany: The Historical Perspective
The current practice of the German courts marks what can be seen as its fourth distinct
period in claim interpretation practice. Takenaka surnmarises the first three periods as
follows: "the first period in which claim scope was interpreted to correspond to the
scope of patent protection; the second period in which the scope of patent protection
was completely liberated from claim language; and the third period in which the scope
of the patent protection is expansively interpreted based on the claim language.
The Fourth Period is characterised by increased reliance on the wording of the claims
and a consummate narrowing of claim scope compared to that seen in the Second and
Third periods. Although prompted by broader EPC harmonisation measures, 14 this
:urrent trend can clearly be seen to parallel a similar push towards a more clearly
[efmed patent standard, and the consequent containment of the scope of protection,
een recently in the United States. As noted in Chapter VI (above), the pronouncement
)f the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the Festo litigation is clear
12 Accepted in the UK, that is.
13 Takenaka, Intctpreting CIaimi op sit. at 26. A similar discussion can be found in Winkler, The Scope of
Patent Protection: Past, Present and Future, (1979) 10 IIC 296.
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ifiustration of a more restrictive attitude being adopted by this erstwhile manifestly pro-
patentee court. 15 However, whilst the position envisaged by the Protocol on the
Interpretation of Article 69 EPC, that a middle ground should be trodden between
using the claims merely as a guideline and interpreting them literally, appears to be
producing a more harmonised approach, certain tensions are still perceived to exist. In
order that this perception of tension can be clearly understood, 16 it is necessary to
establish a picture of the doctrinal and historical pressures that fuel the view of this
Anglo-Germanic interpretative conflict. Therefore, we turn our attention to the
establishment and growth of patent protection in Germany, and explore some of the
theories that underpin its existence.
Towards Protection
As noted in Chapter III above, the lack of a patent system in the Germany Zollverein17
provided one of the main bones of contention for the critics of the British system in the
'Anti-Patent' debate of the mid19th century. It will be recalled that both sides in the
argument utilised the absence of protection as illustration that their own view was
correct. The abolitionists called for an end to the idiocy that enabled the free
movement of inventive information on the Continent whilst in Britain growth and
technological freedom was hampered by 'pernicious patents'. The pro-patent lobby, on
the other hand, cited famous examples of German 'defectors' who moved to the UK
ostensibly because of the protection that their inventions would receive there.
By the end of the century, however, resistance to patents had crumbled and British
system was saved from abolition. The changing face of invention and innovation,
particularly the rise of large research intensive firms, had emphasised the need for some
degree of incentive/reward to enable the recovery of costs sunk in the name of R&D.
Therefore, rather than abolishing a system that was accepted in principle, but unpopular
14 Although not to be confused with European Union harmonisation measures, as the EPC is not a
product of the European Union, its precursors or affiliated bodies.
15 It is subn-iitted that this prognosis remains true despite the US Supreme Court's interference in the case.
IC The author leaves open for the present the issue of whether this perception is, in fact, a reality.
17 i.e. the German Customs Union. It will be recalled that various member states of the German Reich
had already adopted patent protection, however, these were the exception rather than the rule. See
further, Machiup & Penrose, The Patent Controuer., in the Nineteen/h C'entui, [1950) 10 Journal of Economic
His/ore 1 at 3-6.
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in practice, the Government ceded to reform. In Germany the same pressures,
especially the growth of large chemical and dyestuff companies like Bayer, Hoechst and
BASF, and the political harmony that flowed from the creation of the Second Reich in
1871, meant that those opposing the introduction of a patent system suffered the same
fate as their British counterparts. Therefore, in 1877 a uniform patent law for the entire
Reich was adopted by the German legislature.
The First Period
Perhaps taking their lead from the established systems of the time, i.e. predominantly
the British and American, the claim occupied a fundamental position in the
determination of the scope of protection offered by the grant in the First Period. "The
question of how far legal protection should extend was decided, in case of doubt, on the
basis of the expressed intent of both parties" 8, i.e. the Patent Office and the applicant.
The claims were considered concrete declarations of this intent to be construed under
private law. 1 ' Thus, the prosecution history, the discourse between the Patent Office
and the patentee, was of vital importance in the determination of the scope of
protection at this time.
However, it soon became obvious that the agreed declaration of what the patentee
thought they had invented and their actual contribution to the art were often not
coincidental. Therefore, in order to provide proper reward to the patentee, i.e. to
protect the 'true' invention, the courts initially resorted to "the fiction of a presumptive
intent"2' on behalf of the parties when determining patent scope.21
The creation of this fiction of intent represents a significant shift in the underlying
theory of patent protection in the German republic. By moving towards a formulation
whereby the expressed intention of the parties could be manipulated in this way, the
courts began to divorce the determination of scope from the actual language of the
claims. Therefore, as Takenaka notes, "the significance of claim language... and that of
" \Vinkler, op tt. at 297.
' This can be seen in decisions such as that of the Reichsgericht (the German Supreme Court of the time)
of I 5th December, 1890. Cited in Takenaka, Inteipreling C'/aims, op t. at 28.
2)) Winkler, op ut. at 297.
21 Illustrated by the judgment of the Reichsgerzcht of 4,h May, 1889. Cited in Takenaka, Interpret:n c/aims, op




In 1910, this move towards detachment of the scope of protection from the wording of
the claims was made complete by a judgment of the Reichsgerich?7 in which it concluded
that the intentions of the Patent Office and the patentee should be disregarded
completely when determining the scope of the patent. 28 Rather, the extent of protection
should be determined exclusively by its contribution, objectively judged, to the state of
the art. By adopting this approach to the assessment of patent scope, the Court
answered the emerging problem of adequately rewarding the patentee for their inventive
efforts. Therefore, whereas the American courts had adopted peripheral definition
theory and the doctrine of equivalents to protect the inventor's interests, the German
courts moved fully to central definition theory.
This divorce of patent scope from the claims heralded the beginning of the Second,
most expansive/least certain, 2' period in German case law. In order to justify the
courts' growing tendency to divert from clear and unambiguous wording of the claims
from the end of the First Period, German legal philosophers had put forward
hypotheses based on the separation of jurisdiction between the courts and the Patent
Office. One of the leading theorists was Isay, 3° who stated that, as the Patent Office
defines the subject matter and decides on the patentability of the invention, and the
courts independently decide on the scope of protection, the former's interpretation of
the state of the art in the context of examining the invention during prosecution is
irrelevant once that grant is made. Indeed, given that the Patent Office only considers
the invention as a whole, and never any modification or sub-combination of its
elements, and given the impossibility of being able to consider all of the prior art before
grant, the role of the Office must be limited to consideration of patentability only.
Therefore, given the separation of jurisdiction, and given the different purposes of the
investigations by the two bodies, the intention of the Patent Office in making the grant
27 Judgment of the Reichsgericht of 9th/lOth February 1910 (Takenaka cites the 9th, whereas Winkler cites
the 1 0th). 80 Reich gerichtsenlscheid,inger in Zivi/sachen GZ) 54.
28 See Winkler, op di. at 297.
29 And therefore most/least favourable period depending on which side of the fence (patentee or
competitor you happened to be sitting.
'° Put forward in Isay, Wesen and Aus/e8ung des Patentanipruchs, [1909] Mitteiluneen der Deutchschen Palentanwä/te
.U . Cited in J-Iäusser, C/aim iVording, Inventiveness and Scope of Protection Under German Patent L..aw, in Kemp,
op dt. at 89 (hereinafter Häusser).
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Such expansive, indeed potentially limitless, deviation from the wording of the claims
attracted widespread criticism, most notably on grounds of the uncertainty that it
injected into the process of innovation and patenting. Whilst theoretically beneficial to
the patentee, providing protection commensurate to the inventive merit of their
creation, third parties were at disproportionate disadvantage. This was because one
could no longer rely on the patent documentation to determine the scope of the
invention. The patent revealed the invention, but the scope was determined by looking
at this disclosure through the veil of prior art that surrounded it. In other words, by
promoting the reward theory above all other classical justifications of the patent grant,
the German practice in the Second Period had undermined the value of the patent as an
information tool. 36 This defect in the system also provided disadvantage to the
patentee, as they could not be certain of the scope of their grant, which had important
repercussions for the decision to litigate.
The Third Period
Disquiet amongst practitioners and industry alike concerning the uncertainty of the
patent grant eventually galvanised the Supreme Court into action to temper the now
runaway expansive doctrine of the Second Period. The high water mark 3 ' had come in
a decision of the Reichsgericht in which the Court held that "a patent protects all
techniques taught by the patent specification to those skilled in the art, irrespective of
the wording of the claim." 38 Subsequent cases marked a retreat from this position, a
retreat that was completed by a ruling of the Federal Supreme Court 39
 of 11th May 1954.
For more information on the information function of patents see text accompanying note 124 et seq. in
Chapter III, above; see also Beier & Straus, The Patecit Sjstens and ii: Injrr#ation Function - Yesterdqy and
Todqy, (1977) 8 IIC 387.
According to Bruchhausen, The Scope of Patent Protection in Di/jèrenl European Co,mt,ies - tl,: Outline of
Recent Case Law, (1973) 4 IIC 306 at 322. Takenaka is uncharacteristically vague in her discussion of the
retreat from the expansive interpretations of the Second Period. She stutes that opposition to such broad
interpretation had mounted by the late 1930s and marks the Third Period from 1940 onwards, but offers
a Supreme Court decision of 23rd October 1952 as authority for the adoption of the 'three-part' doctrine.
See Takenaka, Intepretin,g claims, op cit. at 33. Ostensibly taking \X'inkler's vague assertion that attempts
had been made to temper the "legal uncertainty" caused by broad interpretation since "about the end of
the 1930s" as gospel. See Winklcr, op cit. at 297. Bruchhausen's account is therefore preferred.
38 Decision of 10th1 November, 1942. Quoted from Bruchhausen, ibid
" The Reichsgericht has ceased to be with the collapse of the Third Reich,
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protection provided by the patent. The first, core category, was that of the direct
subject matter of the invention, or the literal scope of the claims.
The "Direct Subject Matter of the Invention"
This was the kernel of the patent, the element that existed in deference to the fact that
the Patent Office had seen fit to make the grant, and which survived even if the subject
matter of the invention was anticipated by the prior art. It was considered to be the
minimum degree of protection available to the patentee, to be meted out only in cases
where the invention was in fact nil. The purpose of this construction was intended to
"spare competitors, if possible, the necessity of bringing a nullity suit."45
The prospect of resorting to a literal interpretation of the claims only in cases where the
patent is in fact objectively invalid seems very strange when looked at from the British
point of view. However, the reasons for the differences in practice are two-fold. First,
the reader will appreciate that in the UK the courts have jurisdiction over both
infringement and validity proceedings, and are therefore able to strike down claims, or
even remove entire patents from the register, where they are anticipated by the prior art.
The strict jurisdictional separation evident in Germany makes this process impossible
for, as previously noted, ordinary German courts deal exclusively with matters of
infringement and the Patent Office has exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity.
Therefore, it was only after a successful application for revocation that the literal
wording of the claims ceased to be a problem for the alleged infringer.46 Second, in
addition to these differences in practice, there was also disparity in claim style itself
during this pre-harmonisation period, which renders direct comparison impossible.
Whereas in Britain the principle for many years had been that the patentee was free to
draft their claim in any manner that they chose, in Germany the Patent Office had
rapidly adopted a prescribed pattern of claim shortly after the inception of protection.47
Hiiusser gives succinct sunimary of the practice thus: ". . . the generic category to which
See, for example, Schienenscha/terll [1972] GRUR 597. Cited in Sijp, op cit. at 436.
Winkler, op cit. at 298.
46 See Sijp, op cit. at 436.
See Vojáek, A Suni of the Principal National Patent ytems, (1936; Prentice Hall, New York) at 149 50,
who states that "Germany was the first to evolve in the eighties of the last century a special type of
claims, neatly divided into a preamble indicating the object of the invention and the known features
thereof, and the characteristic definition of the new features for which protection is claimed."
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the invention was most closely subordinate was first stated, followed by the essential
features of the invention; this was done by separating the two parts by the words cm
which' or 'characterised in that'." He continues, stating that "the need to differentiate
the novel features of an invention from previously known features led to a
corresponding grouping of features. Accordingly all previously known features were to
be found before the phrase 'characterised in that', in the so-called generic clause or pre-
characterising clause, whilst the novel features were put into the characterising clause.
This, even at a very early stage, led to the adoption of a wording of the claims which
subsequently was prescribed as essential, and is in use to this day."48
Therefore, given the strict requirements of the Patent Office relating to the formulation
of the claims, and the fact that the courts habitually determined the scope of protection
based on equivalents analysis, a literal interpretation of the claims of a German patent
was correspondingly narrower than its British counterpart.49
The "Subject Matter of the Invention"
The subject matter, or technical teaching, of the patent formed the second level of
protection around the invention. As already noted, in the central definition theory of
claim interpretation the claims form the core of the monopoly, but protection is
determined by extrapolation from this central point based on what the patent actually
teaches the skilled addressee. 5 Therefore protection extended to cover any substitution
by elements that were clearly equivalent to those in the patented invention, providing
they had the same technical function and retained the same effect regarding the
inventive idea.
The subject matter of the invention was found by adopting a problem-solution analysis;
examining the problem that the patented invention set out to solve and the solution that
it provides. Such an examination was designed to expose the technical teaching, which
lay in a combination of elements. Given that the entire specification would be utilised
for the purpose of defining the elements of which the invention consisted, it was
48 Häusser, op cit. at 88. This day referred to was the date of the Benescience Foundation Conference on
Claim Drafting and Interpretation held in May 1981.
See further \Tossius, C/aims Drafting and the Supportin& Description under the EPC and the German Patent Law,
in Kemp, op dt. at 68-72. Also Armitage, Inteepretation of European Patents, op dt. at 813-4.
5 See further the text accompanying note 19 in Chapter VI, above.
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immaterial whether the individual components were separately claimed (or even
whether they were mentioned in the claims at all). The important factor was that the
skilled person would have understood the invention to compose of these elements at
the priority date, without knowledge of the alleged infringement. As Sip notes, it was
only in a borderline case that "the technical teaching may coincide with the literal
wording of the claims," 51 in most other cases this level of generalisation of the invention
supplemented the literal scope.
Once the subject matter of the invention had been determined, the alleged infringement
then underwent a similar elemental analysis. The two were then compared, and the
obviousness of any substitutions, omissions or additions to the patent formula were
considered. It is important to note that the German practice under this head of
protection did not require one-to-one substitutability of elements, therefore
infringement could not be avoided if an element was omitted provided that its omission
did not change the manner in which the accused embodiment solved the technical
problem. Therefore, the technical teaching of the invention can be seen as similar to
the essential elements of the invention under an equivalents analysis. As long as the
alleged infringement had the same function and operated in the same way to produce
the same result then a fmding of infringement would be forthcoming. 52 However, it is
clear that whereas the 'function, way, result' formulation utilised in American decisions
such as Graver Tank53 required the elements to be identified in the claims themselves, the
German tradition of the Third Period made no such demands. The focus here was on
what the specification taught the skilled addressee, and <:inly modifications, anants.,
substitutions, additions or omissions that were immediately evident to the average
person skilled in the art were included within the scope of protection. Therefore, this
level of abstraction from the specification of the patent was relatively uncontentious as
the requirement that any variation be immediately apparent arguably placed no undue
burden on the patentee's competitors as it closely paralleled the practice that the Patent
Office would undertake when considering patentability. Additionally, as already noted,
expansion of the scope of protection beyond the literal wording of the claims was only
51 Sijp, op cit. at 436.
52 See Mo/hed U2Z4J GRUR 460 for an example of the application of this test. Cited in Sijp, op cit. at
436.
Graoer Tank & Mf Co. v Linde Afr Products Co., a2) 339 U.s. 605.
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available where the technical teaching was itself novel. If it was not then protection was
limited to the direct subject matter of the invention.
The "General Inventive Idea"
Finally, extending out from the previous zones of influence lay what was known as the
'general inventive idea'. Justification for this layer of protection derived from the
premise that the inventor should be able to reap reward to the extent that their
invention enriched the art. 54 The patentee's monopoly therefore extended, subject to
certain criteria, to cover equivalents that were not immediately evident from the claims
but which were nevertheless deducible by the average person skilled in the art. This
level of generalisation came to characterise the German practice, and formed the subject
of most criticism directed towards the system. The main problem lay in the association
that this layer had with highly expansive, far-reaching and uncertain protection; all
characteristic features of the much maligned Second Period.
In order to dispel some of the concerns surrounding the adoption of this third leg of
the three-stage test, Chief Justice Lindenmaier of the German Supreme Court set out to
provide firm theoretical justification for extending protection in this way. 7'5 And in
doing so gave credence, if it was needed, to Vojáek's assertion that "With typical
German thoroughness the basic conceptions of patent law are dissected and followed
up almost to a transcendental plane." 56 Lindenmaier's explanation of the need for
protection outside of the subject matter of the invention focussed mainly on the
separation of jurisdiction between the courts and the Patent Office, and in many ways
resembled similar justifications put forward in an attempt to legitirnise the practice of
the Second Period. However, he also gave his name to a list of three criteria 57 that must
be satisfied before infringement can be found under the 'general inventive idea', and in
doing so helped to quell some of the fears concerning the potential uncertainty that the
concept engendered.
See Sijp, op cit. at 437, citing Spengler, 119677 GRUR 390.
7' Lindenrnaier, Der Schnt.umfan,g des Patents nach der Neureren Rechtsprechun&, f19447 GRUR 49. Cited in
Takenaka, Inteipretin,g c/aims, op cit. at 34.
Vojáek, op czt. at 149.
Sometimes referred to as "Lindenmaier's provisos". See Sijp, op cit. at 437. Also Beton & Heimbach,
C/aim Drafting and Szgn/icance - An Anglo-German Industrial View, in Kemp, op cit. at 44.
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Sijp sumrnarises these criteria as follows:
"1). The general inventive idea must be deducible by the average person
skilled in the art from the claims of the alleged infringement, using the knowledge
available on the filing or priority date.
2). Deduction of the general inventive idea must not entail any inventive
effort.
3). The general inventive idea must satisfy all recpiixements for patentability; it
will be for the Court to examine, in an infringement case, whether it in fact does so."58
Therefore, the difference between this category of protection and that available under
the subject matter of the invention lay in the degree of consideration that the skilled
addressee must devote to the subject of equivalence. Under the tecimical teaching any
equivalents had to be immediately evident, if they were then the assessment stopped
there and liability (subject to any defences) was established. If on the other hand, the
alleged infringement fell outside of the subject matter of the invention, the court would
then consider the general inventive idea. This involved an examination of whether,
after .ipedal and detailed consideration, the average person skilled in the art would have
realised, at the priority date and without exercising inventive effort, that they could have
replaced elements of the patentee's invention with elements of the alleged infringement
and still have solved the technical problem in the same way. Thus the difference
between the second and third stages of the three-part theory lay in the degree of
consideration that must be directed towards assessing the substitutability of the
elements. By limiting the application of the general inventive idea to cases where this
substitution did not require the exercise of inventive effort, the courts could be seen to
be putting important restrictions on the scope of the doctrine whilst simultaneously
promoting innovative practice by safeguarding the rights of competitors to invent around
the patent.
The Defence of "State of the Art"
In addition to being able to restrict protection to the literal scope of the claims where
the patent was clearly anticipated, and limiting the application of the general inventive
idea to non-inventive equivalents, certain other safeguards grew up alongside the three-
part test that served to mitigate the harsh results that the separation of jurisdiction may
have caused. One of the most powerful of these was the defence of the state of the art.
Here, despite the fact that the courts did not have the power to examine the validity of a
58 sijp,op	 at437.
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patent in infringement proceedings, it was possible to circumscribe liability by
consideration of the patentability of the accused embodiment. If it clearly lay within
prior teaching then the court could legitimately avoid enforcing the patent without
trespassing on the exclusive territory of the Patent Office.59
The Object of Criticism
However, despite the safeguards that the defence 'state of the art' and resorting to literal
interpretation of the claims when the patent was clearly anticipated may have placed on
an expansive interpretation of the scope of protection, significant problems concerning
the perceived uncertainty of the grant remained. Difficulties inherent in the three-part
doctrine, such as the problem of distinguishing between evident and non-evident
equivalents, attracted widespread criticism. 60 Even the courts considered that the
distinction should be abandoned and that the latter category should be included in the
subject matter of the invention.6'
Moreover, as Winider notes, adopting an objective standard for assessment of the
general inventive idea does not actually provide any real degree of certainty. Such a
standard is, after all, tainted with both the possibility of hindsight and the impossibility
of saying with any degree of precision "how the average person skilled in the art, a
purely fictitious person, would have acted. ,,62 It is accepted that this is also a problem
implicit in the determination of inventive step, however, whereas uncertainty regarding
the grant of a patent is undoubtedly important for the prospective patentee, it has far
less practical impact on the field in question than uncertainty relating to the scope of
that patent once granted. In addition to this, the problems connected with predicting
the outcome of an infringement action were increased in the case of pioneer inventions
by the court's extension of the scope of protection to cover embodiments utilising the
The reader will note the simi]arity of this test to the Gillette 'defence' in the U.K. where the defendant
argues that their alleged infringement is not novel in the light of the prior art, thus placing the claimant on
the "horns of a dilemma". See Gillette Safety Raor Co. v Anglo American Trading Co. Ltd., [1913) 30 RPC
For further information on the Infringement/Validity mirror see Wepner, The Patent
I,xva/idiy/Infrinement Para/lel. S5mmety or Semantics? (1988) 93 Dickinson Law Review 67.
° See, for example, Winider, op rit. Also Sijp, op cit.
61 See judgment of the Bwzdesgerichtshof 15" March, 1960, [19607 GRUR 474. Cited in Takenaka,
InlerpretinS Claims, op cit. at 36.
62 Winkler, op cit. at 304.
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underlying ideas, regardless of whether the person skilled in the art would have
conceived of them.63
The inconvenience caused by the 'fair' and yet uncertain grant was alleged to be
considerable and prompted many commentators to call for narrower protection. Sijp,
for example, concludes after much consideration that "A narrow interpretation is
preferable by reason of its social consequences," 64 among them the lower chance of lost
investment through unwitting infringement. This sentiment was carried through under
the new law (discussed more fully below) and resulted in the jettison of the general
inventive idea with the 1986 decision of the German Supreme Court in Re Formstein.
However, during the Third Period these problems associated with assessment of the
general inventive idea were effectively absorbed within the system as a whole, and were
seen by many as a small price to pay for adequate protection of the patentee's interests.
Häusser, for example, expressed considerable fears over the move away from the three-
part doctrine towards the harmonised standard called for by the EPC. He stated that a
perceived narrowing of scope might cause claims to be broadly drafted in order to set
down every conceivable embodiment to preserve the widest possible protection. This,
he claimed, would lead to uncertainty.65
Häusser's comments obviously reveal a fear of the unknown, but in addition to this they
also expose a fundamental issue in our discussion. Comparison with external systems,
in this case the revision imposed by the EPC, often leads to acontextual reactions
concerning perceived limitations and benefits without consideration of the broader
picture. This balancing of factors ignores the fundamental observation that the process
of change in itself engenders uncertainty; uncertainty that is only dispelled when a point
in time is reached at which 'new' becomes 'normal'. Therefore, rather than drawing
incomplete comparisons with external systems in the quest for something 'better', the
focus should first be directed inwards. Thus, by externalising the standard by which
63 See, for example, Supreme Court Judgment of 15" April 1975, [1975] GRUR 484, cited in 'Takenaka,
Interprezin,g C/aims, op cit. at 35.
Sijp, op cii. at 449.
65 See Häusser, op cii. at 96-102
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protection was assessed, and by providing strict control of the intrinsic scope 66 of the
patent, the German system in the Third Period undertook the monumental task of
reigning in the runaway doctrine of the Second, and therefore provided certainty relative
to it. The factor of change is fundamental to this assessment, as the system cannot be
isolated from the administrative and social context in which it exists. Moreover,
concepts of fairness and certainty, upon which any comparison is based, only gain
meaning once their definition has been fixed by revelation of what is unfair and
uncertain. Therefore a comparison between Second and Third Periods is more apposite
as the scope of protection is the only variable, everything else (the patentee, the grant
and the drafting style of the patent) remained constant. 67 The same cannot be said of a
raw, unqualified, comparison with the British approach to claim interpretation,
especially if one takes the view (as is almost invariably the case) that one or other offers
a 'better', or even 'correct', level of protection. In other words, such a comparison is
rendered devoid of meaning unless appreciation of the wider administrative and social
context of the grant is undertaken, including the expectations of the patentee and the
public. For a British patentee faced with a Third Period interpretation of a British grant
the protection provided would have been relatively uncertain compared to that they
could expect at home, however, when viewed from the position of a Second Period
patentee the converse is true. However, this assessment fails to take into account the
fact that the British patent would not have been drafted in the British way at the hands
of a German patent attorney for protection in Germany. Therefore any comparison at
this level, other than for the purpose of illustrating that alternative approaches are
available, is meaningless and simpiy serves to divert attention from the real question of
whether protection is too uncertain to achieve the purposes of providing that protection
in the first place - i.e. whether the system works.
At the core of any patent system, separate from the various theories that can be utilised
to justify the grant, lies a common purpose - what the drafters of the American
Constitution succinctly defmed as promoting of the progress of science and the useful
66 Defined, as in Chapter IV, as the scope with which the patent is drafted.
67 Of course, the German political and cultural context was in a period of flux at this point in lime,
however, whilst this may provide clues as to the motivation of the courts in making the change from the
Second to Third Periods, it does nothing affect the validity of the comparison,perse.
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artsf' The key element is the assumption that technological progress is beneficial, and
regardless of whether it is justified on the basis of natural right, reward, prospect,
incentive, race, or whatever, that the patent system has links with this concept. This
purpose is not achieved by any one element but by the system as a whole, by the
complex interrelation of components, and it is perceived failure in this core that
prompts internal change. Thus, the body of opinion turned against the system of the
Second Period and gave rise to the Third. The German system in the Third Period
worked. It was criticised, it was exalted, supported and denounced, but one key fact is
undeniable; German industry did not falter and grind to a halt under its influence, the
inventive landscape was not choked with unwieldy broad grants. It served its purpose.
Indeed, such was the support for this method of interpretation that no agreement could
be found over narrowing the wording of the Official German version of Article 69 EPC
(which refers to the 'contents' 6' of the claims) to match the Official English and French
versions (referring to 'terms'). 7 Change, when it came, was externally imposed and
highlights another key point.
It is only when a national patent system becomes international that a divergence in
claim style and interpretation becomes important, and then primarily to foreign
patentees used to one form of drafting. To assume that all other countries will interpret
claims in a manner akin to that of the home courts is both arrogant and unfair, yet is the
predominant principle that underlies any harmonisation measure. Implicit also is the
assumption that the harmonised product is superior to the original. Whilst this may be
the case as regards the ease of transfer between nations, it is not necessarily so across
the board. 71 Indeed, as demonstrated by the growth of the British system, it is apparent
that different standards may be appropriate at different moments in a country's
6I Article 1, §8, cl.8.
69 Inhalt.
70 See further, Armitage, Inte,pretalion of European Patents, op di. at 813-4, discussing the history of Article 69
EPC and the Protocol on the Interpretation thereof.
1 Insight into the Japanese system, discussed in Chapter VIII below, provides graphic illustration of this
point.
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technological evolution due to the variation in incentives that broad or narrow
protection provides to the inventive pool.72
Concerns over traditions of divergent interpretation in Europe led to the adoption of
the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC once the decision to harmonise
had been made. Whatever the subsequent successes or failures of this measure, it is
noteworthy in that it achieved a diplomatic compromise that secured speedy enactment
of the EPC.73 It is therefore to this post-Protocol period of interpretation that we now
turn in order to see how the institutional and operational traditions of the past have
been adapted to meet these new requirements. In doing so we shall see a characteristic
evolutionary lag in caselaw reflections of the new regime as the system slowly reacts to
the imposed standards of interpretation.
The Fourth Period
The German Patent Act of 1981 was promulgated in order to satisfy Germany's
obligations under the EPC. It included a provision (section 14) corresponding to
Article 69 and the Protocol on its interpretation. 74 It will be recalled that the latter
expressly rejects the expansive protection created by the central definition theory where
the claims serve simply as guidelines in the determination of the scope of protection.
Therefore German practice had to be modified to a position whereby the claims
occupied a position more central to the grant.75
It is widely accepted that the position adopted by the courts in the Third Period was
"never as woolly as assumed by the Protocol" 76 . However, the presumption underlying
the protection of the general inventive idea - that the patentee is entitled to reward to
72 For example, it is often said that broad protection encourages so-called 'pioneer' invention whereas
narrow protection encourages more in the way of 'follow on' innovation. See further the discussion of
the economics of the patent system in Chapter V, above.
Sherman, Patent C/aim Interpretation: The Impact of the Protocol on Interpretation, (1991) 54 MLR 499 at 509
notes this as one of the Protocol's main, and often overlooked, successes.
Section 14 of the 1981 Act therefore provides that "The extent of protection conferred by a patent or
patent application shall be determined by the contents of the claims. Nevertheless, the description and
drawings shall be used to interpret the claims."
This is not to say adopting a position of central defmition, merely that the claims could not be passed
over in consideration of the scope of protection.
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the full extent of their contribution to the art - is most significant and can be seen to
have coloured many decisions under the 1981 Act. Most important here is the Epiladji
litigation,77 noted above, in which parallel actions 78 were commenced in several
jurisdictions including Germany and the UK with wildly differing outcomes, and where
no common reasoning on the issue of claim interpretation could be found. However,
before examining the position taken by the German courts in this case, time must be
taken to explore a decision of the Bundeigerichtshof that represented the leading authority
at the time, and has even been utilised by the English Court of Appeal as providing a
test preferable to the established Catnic approach to claim interpretation: 7° Formstein
7VIou/ded ('urbstone).8'
Forms tein
Any change in the legal standards concerning the interpretation of patent
documentation necessarily takes time to filter through the system. 81 Confusion over the
scope of the 'new' grant was therefore considerable in the early 1980s as patentees,
practitioners and the lower courts considered the impact of the revisions. 82 Relief came
in the Re Forms/em decision.
The patent in question claimed the following:
76 Jacob, C/aims and Infrin.gement, op cit. at 67.
In the UK principally Improver v Rsmin8ton f19907 FSR 181. For the German decision see Improver v
Remington (1993) 24 IIC 838.
78 Dealing with national, but for practical purposes identical, patents.
In PLC Researci, v Arc/on International [1995] RPC 287. Although it must be noted that this rally in
Formstein's favour was very short-lived; Aldous J refused to follow the 'new' approach in Assidoman
Mii/ti)ack v The Mead Co,poration [19957 RPC 321 less than two weeks after the decision in PLG.
80 Reported at (1987) 18 IIC 795 with comments by Geissler. Also [1991] RPC 597. All quotes are taken
from Geissler's translation in TIC.
8! An application for a patent takes an average of 44 months to progress to grant under the EPC. See
http://www.european patent office.org/epo/obtain.htm . Additionally, Section 14 of the new German
law only applied to patent applications made after the 1 January 1978 - see Hiiusser, op cit. at 94-5.
Therefore, it is to be expected that there would be a lag of at least 44 months post-1978 for cases to enter
the courts. Appeal adds more time to this equation, so interpretations of the provisions of the new law in
the Higher Courts would be expected some seven or eight years after the first applications - i.e.
approximately 1985.
82 See, for example, the discussions in Kemp, op dt.
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"1. Integral or cross-sectionally multi-part moulded stone with a longitudinal
trough for dewatering lines at the side of the road, characterised by the fact that it
comprises at least one cross channel branching off form the longitudinal trough and
opening into the side of the stone facing away from the street centre.
2. Moulded stone in accordance with claim 1, characterised by the fact that
the cross channel has a small inclination."
In other words, a sloping curbstone with channels to guide water and debris away from
the street, thus facilitating drainage.
The defendant was a city that had laid a street with conventional paving stones setting
gravel-filled gaps between them to channel the water. The patentee brought an action
for infringement. At first instance the court found the patent infringed, issued an
injunction and awarded damages. On appeal the decision was reversed. The Supreme
Court was therefore provided with a perfect opportunity to review the revisions to the
patent law and to comment on their interpretation. In an uncompromising decision, it
did just this.
The Court explained that the effect of Article 69 EPC and the Protocol on its
Interpretation was that "[1 contrast to the legal situation until 1978, patent claims are
now not merely the starting point but rather the essential basis for the determination of
scope."53 [emphasis supplied]. In making this statement, the Court clearly anchored the
claims at the core of the grant, however, such was the magnitude of change brought
about by the revisions, and such was the firmness of the Court's resolve to ensure their
proper implementation that it continued:
"In terms of Sec. 14(2) of the Patent Act of 1981, the contents of the claim
have to be determined by interpretation, taking the specifications and drawings into
consideration. As the protocol on the interpretation of Art. 69(1) EPC (corresponding
to Sec. 14 of the Patent Act of 1981) shows [citation omitted], the interpretation does
not only serve the purpose of correcting uncertainties in claims but also of clarifying
the technical terms used in the claims as well as the limits and bounds of the invention
described therein...
Under the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC, the scope of a
patent encompasses not only what follows from the precise wording of the claims.
This opens the way for a determination of the scope of protection beyond the wording
of the claims to encompass modifications of the invention circumscribed in the
claims...
The scope of protection of a patent filed after January 1, 1978, is determined
as regards the use of the invention by equivalents, by the contents of the claims to be
determined by interpretation. The significance of the invention as recognized by
person skilled in the art has to be considered. The question is whether a person skilled
in the art based on the invention protected by the claims, is able to clear up the
Judgment oi the Supreme Court section 5(b), fIrst paragraph. See (1987J 18 TIC 795 at 798.
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problem solved by the invention with equally effective means, i.e. to achieve the
desired success with other means which also lead to the same result. Solutions which
the average person skilled in the art can determine due to his professional knowledge
as being equally effective based on considerations oriented to the inventions paraphrased
in the claims will generally fall within the scope of protection of the patent. This is
required by the goal of adequate remuneration for the inventor under consideration of
the aspect of legal certainty." [emphasis supplied]
Abandoning the uncertainty of the 'principle of the invention' as a detenrnnant of the
scope of protection, the Court clearly considered that the new law marked a firm
departure from the principles of old. However, the way in which the Court structured
the new test, and in particular the statement that the invention is "paraphrased in the
claims", belies the legacy of expansive interpretation and leads to a perverse, indeed in
the light of its previous comments, paradoxical, state of affairs. As Geissler notes, "The
Court in this case... while holding that there is a new law, in fact provides a potential
scope of protection, which, at least in this case, does not seem to be different from, and
is in particular not less than that which was usual in Germany." 84 The test had changed
- now the basic question was whether the person skilled in the art was able, on the basis
of their specialist knowledge, to arrive at the allegedly infringing embodiment using the
specification and the claims - but the scope was startlingly familiar. Thus, a street of
the defendant's construction could potentially infringe a claim directed to a moulded
stone.
The potential inequity flowing from such an expansive interpretation of the claims
seems to have been apparent to the Court, as in addition to its discussion of
infringement it also strengthened the defence of the 'state of the art'. Therefore,
whereas previously the defendant could have escaped liability where the alleged
infringement was 'known' from prior teaching, 85 the Supreme Court now expanded the
defence to include occasions where it was obvious in view of the prior art. This, it
explained, "does not limit the jusIfied reward for the inventor in return for the disclosure
of his patentable invention", but rather secures the freedom of others to continue with
non-inventive development of the prior art. 86 Therefore, once again, the mantle of the
skilled addressee provided the key to assessing the scope of protection.
Geisser, Comment on Forms/el,;, op cit. at 802.
i.e. had been previously disclosed.
86 Judgment of the Supreme Court section 6(a), second paragraph. Se 1987) 18 IIC 795 at 81)0-801
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The adoption of this standard in Formstein clearly demonstrates the difficulty of breaking
with the old traditions of expansive interpretation and coming to terms with a new,
externally imposed regime. The intention of the Court to depart from the practices of
the Second and Third Periods is clear, and the message given in the judgment to this
effect is robust and uncompromising. However, the subtext pervading the case is
littered with remnants of past practice; the references to the object of the law being to
reward the patentee and the statement that the invention is "paraphrased" in the claims
being the most notable examples of this. Moreover, the Supreme Court's comments
clearly demonstrate that infringement by equivalence is as much within the scope of the
claim as those elements literally covered by the wording. This point is significant as,
contrary to the position in the U.S. where the demarcation between literal infringement
and infringement by equivalents is tightly policed, the lack of boundary in Germany
allowed broad protection to remain as there was no question of recourse to the doctrine
being seen as offering supplementary protection. Accordingly, the German approach
still embraced central definition theory as the claims functioned as the post from which
protection was anchored, but did not "provide a framework for clarifying which
features in the accused device are beyond the literal meaning of the claim language."87
However, whilst criticism of the scope of protection post-Formstein can be made, any
comparison to 'preferred' standards of protection must take into account the wider
institutional and administrative context of the grant and the practices that grew up
around it. Recourse to the standard of the skilled addressee was made more certain by
"constant collaboration with experts appointed by the courts in the most widely varying
technical fields, for determining the subject matter of the patent in revocation and
infringement proceedings". 88 Thus, the system as a whole reacted to the courts own
style of interpretation in order to provide sufficient certainty for efficient operation
without compromising the aim of rewarding the patentee. Cognisance of this factor
helps to explain the seemingly paradoxical effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Forms/em, for the trauma of creating a continental shift in the established practices of
interpretation would have caused more uncertainty than it aimed to prevent. Therefore,
rather than actually altering the interpretative s/a/ui' quo, the Court can be seen to be
87 Takenaka, Inleipreting C/aims, op cit. at 157.
88 Bruchhausen, Determini,g Patent Subject-matter in Grant, Iifringement and Renocation Proceedings, L.289) 20 IIC
341 at 344.
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paying lip service to the new regime on interpretation and effecting transfer by other
more subtle means; namely expansion of the defence of cstate of the art'.
Post-Formstein Solidification of Approach
Decisions following on from that in Formstein show a renewed vigour in the Supreme
Court's handling of the issue of claim interpretation. Indeed, the sheer number of cases
to reach the Court's doors is, in itself, revealing of the seriousness with which the issue
was treated. Therefore, in disputes such as Ion Anaysis, 89 Heai-Metal Oxidation
Cata(yst!° and particularly Handle Cord for Battey, 91 the Court of Appeal's continued
recourse to the content of the description, giving it precedence over the wording of the
claims and allowing 'redefinition' of the invention, attracted strong criticism from the
senior Court.
Thus, in Handle Cord for Battery, in a powerfully worded judgment, the Supreme Court
reiterated its opinion that where the "embodiment to be judged deviates from the
meaning of the content of the patent claims", infringement may be only be found in
specified circumstances. In order for such a decision to be made, the skilled addressee
must, on the basis of their technical expertise, be able to identify "the modified means
employed in the challenged embodiment as being equally effective in the solution of the
ptob2em underlying the invention."92
 It then continued, stating that "[t]he
dererrnination of the scope of protection of a patent under the new Act requires that
the merrmg of the content of the patent claims, to be determined by interpretation,
constitutes not only a point of departure but the decisive basisfor the detern.iination the scope of
protection. This must be based on the patent im... "93 (emphasis in original). The
Court of Appeals had erred by judging the question of equivalent use primarily by
reference to the description, and had therefore "lost sight of the partial feature of Claim
1, which typifies the invention. .
89 (1989) 20 IIC 249. All three of these cases are discussed by Millett L.J. in PLG Research v Ardon
Internaiiona/ [19957 RPC 287 at 308.
° ff989] GRUR 205.
9t Judgment of the Supreme Court, 3 October, 1989. Reported at (1991.) 22 IIC 104.
92 Ibid. at 107
Ibid.
' Ibid. at 107.
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This pronouncement is significant, as it is clear evidence of the Supreme Court striking
down past practice and reiterating its more 'claim-centric' approach to the
determination of the scope of protection. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's
continued reliance upon 'old' principles demonstrates just how difficult the transition
from the Third Period was proving to be. However, the Supreme Court's resolve is
unambiguous, and the statement in Handle Cord for Baltey that the requirement of legal
certainty is to be given "the same consideration as providing equal reward for the
inventor"95 reinforces this approach. This said, reward was still the fundamental
justification for the grant of patent protection at this time, and this simple fact can be
seen to have directly contributed to a broader scope of protection than might otherwise
have been the case. Such is clear from the oft-quoted Epiladji litigation.96
Epilady
The multi-jurisdictional litigation between Improver and Remington has provided
commentators with much 'fodder' in their discussion of claim interpretation. 97 Parallel
actions were brought in the courts of various countries, in Europe and beyond. All
dealt with substantially identical claims, specifications, and allegedly infringing
embodiments but came to wildly differing conclusions on the matter of infringement.
The decisions are therefore often used as clear illustrations of divergent approaches to
claim interpretation under the EPC. We shall return to consider the validity of this
viewpoint in Chapter LX when examining the British litigation, however, for the present
it is sufficient to consider the German approach in isolation.
The patent in question concerned a depilatory device (Remington's "Smooth and Silky")
that operated by means of a revolving bent helical spring. The windings of the spring,
when moved rotationally, opened and closed, trapping hairs that were then plucked out
by the motion of the device. The defendant's product did not contain a spring, but
Ibid. at 108.
The German proceedings are reported at (1993)24 IIC 838.
r See, for example, articles by Sherman, Patent C/aim Inteipretation: The Impact c/the Protocol on Inteepretation,
(1991) 54 MLR 499; Pagenberg, Twen-Five Years of Patent Law in IIC, 411995) 26 IIC 752; Norman,
Determining the Scope of the Patentee's Monopo./: Puiposive c'onstruction Reuisited f19987 Anglo-American Law
Rwiew 221; and Bannerman & Hamer, DrentApp roaches to the "Doctrine of Equiiia/ents"in Germa.'y, UK, US
and Japan, [20007 AIPPI Journal 82 to name but a few (and not to mention the various appearances that
the decisions make in text books on Intellectual Property Law).
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achieved the same result by substitution with a slotted rubber rod. When bent and
revolved, the slits in the rod opened and closed in the same manner as the windings of
the spring, thereby facilitating hair removal in the same manner as the patented device.
The Decision
The Düsseldorf Court of Appeals (Ober/andeigerichl) first considered the patent claims
and concluded that the accused device could not be said to fall within their literal scope
since the disputed embodiment "uncontestedly does not feature a helical spring". 98 It
then proceeded to examine whether the 'slotted rubber rod' could be said to be a helical
spring in equivalent form. In undertaking this analysis, the Court adopted a clear
'problem-solution' approach. It went to great lengths to consider the function of the
limitations in the claim, assessing the relative merits of both the patented article and the
contested embodiment, and was clearly concerned with the technical effects of both.
The fact that this initial analysis was conducted outside of the confines of a discussion
of literal infringement is significant as it avoided the need to concentrate on a
meticulous analysis of the consequences of using the term 'helical spring'. The starting
point was therefore, once again, what the person skilled in the art would interpret the
patent as teaching. As such, the Court considered that the skilled addressee would:
"easily recognize that the coil spring is only proposed for the reason that it is
an elastic cylindrical body which may be quickly rotated in the arcuate state and, above
all, for the reason that it features ... means that stretch the surface of the body to form
gaps at the convex side, while at the concave side they result in clamping areas with the
help of which the hairs that entered the gaps may be clamped and plucked."99
Therefore, the claim is considered to provide functional information to the skilled
addressee concerning the operation of the patent. Critically, the basic thesis is that "a
person skilled in the art will not interpret the coil as a spring, but as an elastic body with
gaps ... as it is obvious that the helical spring is not used as a spring per se.lth) The
main issue is thus not a matter of assuming that the patentee must have intended to
restrict his claim to the precise wording used unless there is clear evidence to the
contrary. Rather, it is that the claim should be interpreted with function in mind. This
approach is similar to that proposed by Lord Reid in Van der Le/y and Rndi &




Vienenberger (discussed in Chapter I, above) in that it reflects the difficulties in drafting
all encompassing claims from the outset. The only thing that is essential, once it has
been ascertained that the spring is not operating as a power source and functions solely
to pluck the hair, is that hair must be able to "enter between adjacent areas of the body
(walls), and that the walls must approach it up to clamping Given the function of
the spring, the substitution of a slotted rubber rod was clearly obvious and therefore fell
within the scope of protection. As we shall see when we come to consider the British
litigation in this case, the outcome there was somewhat different.
The important factor here is that the German Court approached the problem from the
point of view of operating the invention. Therefore, the question of whether the scope
of protection should be extended from the literal wording of the claims to cover
obvious variants does not hinge on the 'intent' of the drafter, as is the case under the
'traditional' British approach, discussed in Chapter I (above), as intention is assumed.
By focussing on rewarding inventive efforts, the German courts necessarily provide an
opportunity for broader protection than would be available where the rationale for the
grant is based on other considerations.
However, such an approach cannot be dismissed 'out-of-hand' as inconsistent with the
Protocol, despite its obvious links to 'Third Period' interpretative practices, as it is clear
that the claims function to defme the scope of protection. Furthermore, a middle
ground is, in fact, trodden between giving them a literal interpretation and using them
only as guidelines. The fact that there was a different outcome in the German and
British legs of the ¶Epiladj' litigation does not alter this fact. Brändle makes the point
succinctly when he states that a solution to the problem must be found that ensures "if
not identical application of the law in all countries, then at least legal certaintj"102
[emphasis in original]
Implications and Recent Practice
Brändle's point is really the key issue. The aim need not be conformity of decision, for
it is evident that even when national courts consider patent infringement cases different
'°' Ibid. at 844.
W2 Brändle, Can and iViqy Iniecpretation and Determination of the Extent of Protection of a European Patent in
Dère,it Cowitries Lead to Drent Results? (7999) 30 IIC 875, (hereinafter Brandle, Can and Maji) at 878.
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interpretations may be placed upon identical claims by different judges. Rather, the goal
should be a certain degree of predictability.
In more recent decisions in Germany, commentators have noted that the approach
adopted is moving towards a more Catnic-like application of the legal principles.
Indeed, Franzosi goes as far as asking "Wi/i Europe Adopt Catnic?' 103 and points to a
decision of the German Supreme Court in which reference has been made to the British
case. Thus, in Mü//er-Hi/tj, 4 the Bundeigerichtshof stated that the correct approach to the
determination of the scope of protection of a patent was to ask whether:
"The means used in the contested embodiment, instead of the means
expressly recommended in the patent, serve to solve the concrete problem set in the
patent and achieve the effect intended by the patent at least essentially. These
principles ... correspond to the principle developed in English case law within the
framework of the so-called Calnic questions... Modifications are outside the scope of
protection if they have a significant effect on the functions of the invention..... 105
However, this is little other than illustration of the German Court acknowledging the
existence of the general Catnic approach and falls seriously short of providing evidence
that it is applied as Franzosi seems to suggest. Therefore, his closing comments that
"In the end, I would not be surprised if in Europe everybody applies Catnic," 106 appear,
at the time he was writing, to have been somewhat premature. This said, he does note
that even if this test is adopted for all of Europe it does not guarantee, and nor would
he expect, "uniformity because of that."107
Engel takes a more realistic view of the subject and, rather than making any great
proclamations about shifting to a British viewpoint, concentrates on establishing trends
in the concrete practice of the courts. He highlights specific terminology utilised in
judgments; noting that the 'Wortsinn' translated as the "meaning of the words" in the
Ion Ana/ysis decision,' 08 "is intended to express the notion that the examination of an
infringement should not be tied to the literal wording of the claims, but should be based
on its identifiable meaning... The decisive factor is not the philological meaning of the
103 Franzosi, Three European Cases on Equivalence - Will Europe Adopt Catizic? (2QQ1) 32 IIC 113.
104 Spannschraube, /19997 GRUR 909.
I05 Quoted from Franzosi, op cit. at 120.
'°' Ibid. at 123.
107 Ibid.
108 (1991) 22 IIC 249.
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wording but rather the technical sense that the person skilled derives from the
claims." 1 °' Therefore, whilst it is clear that Engel believes the Third Period practice of
detaching the scope of protection from the wording of the claims is firmly behind the
German courts, it would still appear that a significant degree of latitude will be given to
their interpretation based on the technical teaching.
Plastic Pipes
This supposition is confirmed by reference to the recent decision of the Bundesgerichishof
in Plastic Pees"° where the Court lays down the following three-stage test: First, does the
embodiment "solve the problem addressed by the invention with means which, albeit
modified, objectively have substantially similar effects"? Second, would "the skilled
person, as a result of his specialised knowledge... be able to arrive at the modified
means as means having substantially similar effects.., based on the claim"? Finally, is
the effort that the skilled person has to make "based on the sense of the technical
teaching protected in the claim, so that he considers the differing embodiment with its
modified means to be a solution equivalent to that of the patent"? 111 The reader may
note that this expression bears more than a passing resemblance to the questions
formulated by Hoffmann, J
.
, in Improver v Remington 2 and utilised by the British courts.
Yet, the focus of the assessment is defmed more in terms of equivalency than is the case
in the U.K., thus reflecting the German courts' past interpretative tradition. However,
the references to the skilled addressee being able to divine the technical solution "based
on the claims" is clear evidence that the move from the 'uncertain practices' of the
Third Period, started in Formstein, is maintained in current decisions.
The Plastic Pipes case also provides another example of the German Supreme Court
referring explicitly to Catnic. However, interestingly it latches on to the approach taken
by Lord Diplock as authority for the proposition that the decisive factor in the
construction of the claim is the semantic context of the patent determined using the
description and the drawings. Therefore, rather than simply adhering to the patentee's
alleged intention in drafting the claim, the Court asks whether, given the purpose of the
109 Engel, The "Wortsinn" of Pate,zt C/aims in German Case Law on Patent Infringement Disputes, (2003) 34 IIC
233 at 235.
110 [2003] ENPR 163.
111 Ibid. at 169.
112 [19907 FSR 181. Discussed in more detail in Chapter IX, below.
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invention, the skilled addressee would consider that protection extends to the accused
embodiment. As we shall see, in Chapter IX (below), this approach is strikingly similar
to the dissenting judgment of Aldous, U. in IVheatley v DriIIsafe, 3 and provides for an
mterestmg comparison.
Once again, the issue is approached from a position that places emphasis on the
concept of fairness. The skilled addressee expects the patentee to have intended to
cover all embodiments that are made obvious by the claims. Therefore, as long as the
principles of construction are well known, the requirement of certainty is fulfilled. This
presumption of intention is rebuttable where the claims are precise in their scope, and
where the desire to confine protection in this manner would be plain to the skilled
addressee. However, the patentee is still afforded protection consummate with their
contribution to the art. Such an approach graphically illustrates the Court's perceived
focus of the grant, which, based on historical and economic analysis, must be to
encourage and reward innovative activity.
Cutting Knife I
This slant on the Catizic decision is further illustrated by the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Cutting Kiz/è 1.114 Here, once again, the British test is held to be authority for
the proposition that the skilled person may consider some degree of inaccuracy to be
within the technical sense of a claim.
The case concerned a patent for a paper cutting apparatus that comprised a cutting
knife co-operating with a counter knife, which were inclined at between 9 and 12
degrees to each other. In the allegedly infringing article, the blades were inclined at
8°40', i.e. just outside of the range.
Approaching the issue of construction, the Bundesgerichtshof stated that the essential
question was whether:
"...the skilled person, on the basis of considerations linked to the sense of
the invention protected in the claims and by using his specialised knowledge, was able
to arrive at the modified means used in the contested embodiment as means having
113 2OO1 RPC 133.
114 [2O03 ENPR 309.
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substantially similar effects in terms of solving the problem addressed by the
mvention."Ib
However, it then reiterated comments made in the Handle Cordfor Batte0i" 6 case that the
requirement of certainty "ranks equally with the concept of fair protection for inventive
skill", and that the claims were no longer to be merely the starting point for determining
scope, but were now the "authoritative basis" for doing so.117
The Court also restated the three-stage test set out in Plastic Pipes but then, significantly,
proceeded to consider what the British approach may have been in this particular case.
It issued a broad statement that:
"An embodiment can be considered to have substantially similar effects in the
sense of the patent claim only if the skilled person can arrive at it as an embodiment
that actually aclueves not only the effect of a feature of the invention that is
numerically limited in the claim but also the very effect which he understands to he
inherent in the numerical limitation of this feature according to the claim. If that is not
the case, an embodiment even having otherwise substantially similar effects - both
objectively, and technically as perceived by the skilled person — is essentially not
covered by the extent of protection conferred by the patent."8
And concluded that, in order to establish whether infringement had taken place, the
U.K. courts:
agreeing with the above in essence, considered whether the reader skilled
in the art could expect and be prepared for strict compliance with the primary meaning
of the patent claim to be an essential requirement of the invention... In relation to a
single feature in the patent claim, what is important is whether the feature in question
appears to the skilled person to be one that can be used only literally if the practical
technical teaching claimed is to be followed."9
Therefore, it is clear that despite paying lip service to the British test here, the German
Court is still approaching the problem from a direction in which fairness is exalted. The
investigation is very definitely focussed on the claims as determining the scope of
protection, but the presumption of intention, as we shall see in Chapter IX, is
dirmetrically opposed to that operative in the U.K. The fact that the Court relates the
interpretation of the claims to the effects of the limitations contained within it when
examined by the skilled addressee is reminiscent of the 'technical teaching' test of the
' I ' It'id. at 313-6.
1' Judgment oldie Supreme Court, 3" October, 1989. Reported at 199122 TIC 104.
r See Qffin Knift I, op *. at 316.
" 200T ENPR 309, at 318.
)IbuLai3lS9
261
Third Period. When approached with the presumption that the patentee must have
intended to include all obvious variants within their claim unless the contrary is
conclusively demonstrated, this results in a broad, reward-based, interpretation of the
claims.
Thus, when the Court came to apply these principles of construction to the facts of the
case, rather than interpreting the numerical values as decisive cut-off points so that any
deviation outside of these boundaries represented a failure to adopt an essential
element, 12°
 it looked to the effect of the restrictions. Therefore, the Court examined the
purpose of angling the cutting blades at between 9° and 12°, and concluded that this
was to ensure a smooth cut. It then stated that this benefit was also achieved when the
angle was slightly more acute. Therefore, when considering whether an angle of less
than 9° was outside of the scope of protection, the Court stated that where:
"...a specific range was stipulated in a patent claim and there was nothing in
the patent specification to suggest that the values claimed might be meant only by way
of an example, the skilled person would generally have no reason to consider whether
the invention might be capable of being performed even if other values were selected.
The situation was, however, inevitably rather different with values that lay only so
minimally outside of the range stated in the patent that there seemed from the outset
to be absolute/y no likelihood of the effect bei,:g sn,fIcant/y mod/Ied." 12 ' (emphasis supplied)
The focus on the effect of the variant is interesting as it suggests that the primary
question is whether the defendant's modification is within the teaching of the patent
rather than within the claim per .ce - an approach that is strikingly similar to Lord Reid's
formulation in Van der Le{y v BarnJirds. The fundamental consideration therefore
remains fairness to the patentee. However, by ensuring that the test is based on
objective considerations, the Court safeguards predictability of result. The effect of the
judgment is to confirm Franzosi's suspicion that adoption of a single test would not
necessarily result in conformity of decision across Europe, for as we shall see it is
unlikely that this result would be forthcoming if litigated in the British courts.
120 This is the interpretation that the U.K. Patents Court places upon a numerical range in Atichinloss v
gricultura/ and Veterina0i Supplies, [1997] RPC 649.
121 Cutting Knji I, op cit. at 320.
122 [fl3] RPC 61. Discussed at notes 39 to 42 in Chapter I, above.
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Conclusion
1 he Germin e\perlence provides graphic illustration of an alternan e approach to the
relau ely strict literalixn of the 'traditional' British approach to claim interpretation.
'1 he fact that the German courts have traditionally viewed the determination of patent
scope from the point of iew of re arding the patentee is significant, for this necessarily
leads to a broader interpretation even when using the same tests) than when the patent
is viced as an exception to an otherise absolute prohibition on monopoly. The
'runa ay' protection of the Second and Third Periods has, to a great extent, been
brought under control by the tenacity of the Supreme Court, and it is undeniable that
current practice does accord ith the Protocol. Ho e er, as Franzosi notes, this does
not neccssarih mean that there will be 'harmonisauon' in the strict sense of the ord.
Indeed, it is debatable whether this is actually needed at all, for as Brándle statcs, what
is needed is ij, .' i r/; illj and this is something altogether different. The current German
approach pros ides this certainty in a manner that is less objecuonable i.e. more
objecri ely erifiable than the arguably 'fairer' protection of the Second and Third
Periods. I he initial uncertunties, caused in no small amount due to the '.ery fact that
cI1lnge implemented at all, have now settled to a point were the Buiideig i'thIs/iof is
content to make a direct comparison to the 'British' way of thinking. Furthermore, this
is not mack with the intent of exposing a different view, for the references in recent
decisions expose ' hat the Court obviously believes to be conformity of approach.
Ho ever, the point suit remains that the question of construction is considered with a
benevolent e c that tends towards broad interpretation.
1 herefore, the question that remains is whether the balance of certainty and fairness is
an objective that can be fulfilled by other means. We have already seen, in Chapter 1\T,
that the patent grant ma y ha e a value independent of scope, for the simple fact that it
is a patent. We have also seen that the provision of broad protection, based on the
uncertain concept of the 'general inventive idea' did not stifle Germany's technological
grow th to ans major extent during the Second and Third Periods. Therefore, it is
scnsiblc to now question hether the effectiveness of the system may be affected by
interpretation at the opposite end of the spectrum, i.e. that which is very narrow. In
Br.uidle, can	 p at. t 818.
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"And We Shall Have Patents"
"We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we can be
like them ... We said, "What is it that makes the United States such a great
nation?" and we investigated and found that it was patents, and we shall have
patents."
- Korekiyo Takahashi, Founder of the Modern Japanese Patent Law
Of the three patent systems that comprise the modern triptych, 1
 the Japanese is easily
the most esoteric when viewed from a common law perspective. The current law 2 was
enacted in 1959 and, although somewhat harmonised to a world standard by
international agreements such as TRIPS, still maintains certain features that mark it out
as distinct from the other systems that we have considered. The most important
distinction from our point of view is Japan's novel approach to the determination of
patent scope.
Article 70 of the 1959 Patent Ordinance inserted, for the first time, a requirement into
the substantive law that the courts should determine the technical scope of an
invention, and therefore the breadth of protection, by reference to the claim 3 . Previous
to this, patent scope was decided by reference to the disclosure in the specification, a
practice akin to the traditional German approach to claim interpretation. 4 However, the
promotion of the claims in the 1959 legislation did little to change the institutionalised
perception that Japanese patents were fundamentally narrow in scope.
The traditional Japanese attitude to claim drafting and interpretation is aptly summed up
by Takura, who notes that there are three positions that may be adopted in the
determination of the scope of a patent. The first is that of literal interpretation; this, he
explains, emphasises the importance of legal certainty. The second is to afford the
claims a 'supra-literal' interpretation, expanding the patent's scope beyond their precise
wording, thereby emphasising the importance of protecting the right holder. Both of
these approaches will be familiar to the reader, the former being a description of the
traditional British process, and the latter the traditional German one. The third, it
would appear is peculiar to Japan. It calls for a 'sub-literal' interpretation, providing for
a narrower understanding of the claim than the actual wording would suggest, and
emphasises protection of the general public. As Takura states: "It is only a matter of
I Namely the U.S., European and Japanese systems, whose combined output amounts to approximately
900 0 of the world total - see Isayama, Japan c Vieivs on a Desirable IP 4ystem for the Global Economy, (1999) 2
Jwirnal of Il7orld Intellectual Prop er/v 679 at 685.
2 Tok/eyoho (Patent Law) (Law N" 121, 1959).
this point in time the Japanese patent system only allowed applications to contain one claim.
' See Takenaka, Inte,pretin,g Patent Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan, Vol. 17 Studies in Industrial
Property and Copyright Law (1995; Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright
and Competition Law, Munich) (hereinafter Takenaka, Inteipreting Claims) at 193.
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suppresses the breadth of any patent, as the patentee may only claim protection for
what he has actually created and therefore fully disclosed to the public. As an ideology,
it fits very well with an economic model that promotes importation and assimilation of
technology, a kind of legalised piracy promoting patent clusters, 11 rather than giving
incentive to create pioneer inventions. In order to understand why the Japanese law
took and maintained this unique shape well into the 1990s we must first consider the
historical context in which the seed for Japan's legal protection of inventions was first
planted.
Brief History
Japan originally introduced a viable patent system in 1885,12 some 95 years after the US
had instituted similar protection, and 260 years after the Statute of Monopolies had
declared that legitimate patents of invention were not to be condemned as abuses of
Crown prerogative. As such, Japan was a relative latecomer in the patent law stakes;
what Kahn calls a patent follower country. 13 This tardy adoption of legal protection for
inventions, and the eventual shape that the system took once created, can, at least in
part, be ascribed to the particular political and cultural influences that prevailed in Japan
from the late 16th century until the mid-1800s. It is therefore to this period that we
briefly direct our attention.'4
example, Takenaka, Inteipre/ing c/aims, ibid. at 66. Also, Nakayama, op dt. at 673. And Yoshifuji, Tokyojo
Gaisetsu (Outline of Patent Law) (1994; Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 8th Ed.) at 394. The latter two are sourced
from Takenaka, idem.
11 i.e. the grouping around any inventive concept of patents that are narrow in scope and claim only
incremental advances over the prior art.
12 Tok4yo SenbaiJorei (Exclusive Selling Patent Ordinance) (Law N 7, 1885)
13 Kahn, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessions from American and European HistoG', Study
Paper la of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. This can be found at:
http://www.iprcorninission.org/papers/text/studv papers/spla khan srudy.txt.
14 The following discussion of the history of Japan is, to a great extent, based on that found in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Japan"; Emyc/opa'dia Britannica Online. This can be found at:
11ttp://wwv.search.eb.corn/eh/article?eu=IO9)37. In addition, basic information on the 1-listory of
Japan can be found in the pages of Japan-guide.com . The history index can be found at
hrtp://vww.japan-guide.com /e/e641 .h tin].
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Towards Isolation
The 16th century had been a troublesome period in Japanese history. Intense conflict
between powerful daimyo (landholding mi]itary lords) had wracked the land, and the
traditional feudal system was in a state of steady decline. By the mid 1500s, the civil
wars of the previous century had moved into an even fiercet stage of conffict as daimyo
struggled to consolidate power by expansion of their domains. Eventually, one warlord,
Oda Nobunaga of Owari province, succeeded in capturing the capital (Kyoto) as first
feudal unifier in 1568. Nobunaga's regime was marked by bold wars of suppression
waged against other daimyos and any other pockets of resistance.
By 1590 Nobunaga's successor, Hideyoshi, had all of Japan under his control, and had
proclaimed himself Taiko (chancellor) feeling constrained by lineage not to take the title
of Shogun.' 5
 Hideyoshi died in 1598, but failed to bequeath power to his heir,
I-Iidoyori. A bitter power struggle ensued between Hidoyori and Tokugawa Ieyasu,
Hideyoshi's most powerful daimyo. Matters came to a head in 1600 at the battle of
Sekigahara where Ieyasu won a decisive victory, and therefore control of Japan. Aware
of Hidoyori's continued influence, he reduced him to daimyo of the Kinki (Osaka)
district far from his family's traditional seat of power. In 1603 the Emperor appointed
Tokugava Ieyasu to the position of shogun. The appointment ushered in over 250
years of Tokugawa shogunate rule.
Ieyasu established his government at Edo (Tokyo) 16 and brought the country under
tight control. Attracted by trade as a source of wealth and military strength, Ieyasu was
initially tolerant of Christian teachings' 7, but later came to fear such 'risky thinking',
realising that Christian policy threatened the highly organised feudal system that was the
key to much of the shogun's power. In addition, Ieyasu is said to have feared that the
Christians would join with Hidoyori and resist his government. Therefore in 1612 and
1614 he issued decrees to prohibit the spread of Christianity, and in 1615 he made a
decisive strike at Osaka Castle, destroying Hidoyori and the Toyotomi family.
5 J-iideyoshi was the son of a peasant who had risen through the ranks of Nobunaga's aides due to his
outstanding talent in the art of war. The Shogun was traditionally one of noble blood.
16 Thus giving the era of Tokugawa rule its alternative title: The Edo bakufu.
' That inevitahiy came twinned with trade from Portugal and other Western nations.
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Under Ieyasu's successors this policy against Christian teaching became much more
severe, manifesting itself in the 1630s with the issuance of a number of directives
enforcing a policy of national seclusion at the expense of trade. Thus in 1635 the
Japanese were forbidden to make journeys overseas or indeed return from abroad. In
1639 Portuguese ships were forbidden to visit Japan and trade with the outside world
was reduced to limited links with the Dutch and Chinese through the port of Nagasaki.
Furthermore, all foreign literature was banned. In the early 1 8th century a law was even
proclaimed that prohibited the manufacture of any new product based on new
technology in Japan.' 8 In short, for the next 200 years the country was almost entirely
isolated from the outside world.
The impact of this seclusion policy was profound. To begin with it was instrumental in
enabling the Tokugawa shogunate to establish almost 300 years of peace. It cemented
the power of the shogun by enforcing a strict hierarchical system of social interaction,
with the shogun and daimyos at the top and the peasant classes at the bottom.
However, it also led to severe technological retardation. As a consequence Japan
missed out on the developments ushered in by the Industrial Revolution that had swept
across Europe and the United States by this time, and by the close of the 18th century
was still tilling the land as it had always done.
From Abstention to Acceptance - Isolation's End
By the mid-I 800s external pressure for reform was strong," and in 1858 the Tokugawa
shogunate government fmally bowed to the combined weight of the US, Great Britain,
Germany and France, and opened its doors to overseas commerce. Japan suddenly
found itself as a feudal economy thrust into an industrialised world in which it could not
compete.
18 Shi,zkihatto no ofuregaki (Ordinance Prohibiting Innovations), Ordinance of the I\lilitary Government of
July 1721 See Rahn, The Role of Industrial Proper, in Economic Development: The Japanese Experience, (1983) 14
IIC 449 at 453 (hereinafter Rahn, The Japanese Experience). Rahn confusingly states in the main body of the
text that law was passed in 1718. The citation given above is taken from the footnote. See also
Kumagai, Histoy ofJapanese Industrial Propery System, A Joint Production of the Japanese Patent Office and
the Asia-Pacific Industrial Property Centre (1999) (hereinafter Kumagai), at 2. This can be found at:
http://www.apic.jiii.orjp/facility/text/l-07.pdf.
Including the famous display of American naval might perpetrated by Admiral Matthew C. Perry and
his fleet of warships that entered Uraga Bay in July 1853.
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The impact that Japan's opening had on its culture was profound; feudalism was simply
unable to survive the onslaught. As a result the Edo government, with its power so
firmly based in this type of rigid economy, collapsed amidst bitter internal conflict.
However, before its demise it entered into a number of 'unequal treaties' with the
Western powers in an attempt to gain a trading foothold. These 'agreements' were
heavily biased, and granted outside nations extraterritoriality whilst depriving Japan of
its own tariff levying rights. 2 The repeal of these 'humiliating' treaties is stated by Rahn
to have been one of the "overriding political objectives of the Meiji state during its first
decades."2'
A Return to Imperial Rule
The Meiji Restoration is the title commonly applied by Western scholars to the political
changes that returned power to the Imperial House in 1868. It is in this period that
we see the start of sweeping reforms, both legal and institutional, aimed at modernising
an essentially Mediaeval Japan. Rahn notes that the "Japanese embarked on a feat of
learning by borrowing," taking the United States and Europe as their models.
Therefore, the early years of the Meiji Restoration are marked with rapid assimilation of
foreign technology. However, it is clear that although significant advances were being
made, the country was still a long way behind the West. In order to spur on
advancement, therefore, it was not sufficient to simply continue appropriating
technology from abroad; Japan had to entice foreign investment, and to do this it had to
offer some degree of protection from competition. In addition, a number of famous
cases in which Japanese inventors had the profit of their inventions misappropriated -
such as that of Tatchi Gaun, 24 the inventor of a prize-winning Japanese-style spinning
20 See Kumagai, op dt. at 7. Also see Rahn, The Japanese Experience, op *. at 461-2. The main treaties in
question were the Treaty of Kanagawa (also known as the Perry Convention, 1854) and the Harris Treaty
(1858), see 'Japan'; Enjc/opadth Britannica On/i,ze. at: http://wv.search.eh.com/cb/artic1e?cu=1O9537.
21 Rahn, The Japanese Experience, op cit. at 462.
It is interesting to note that the Japanese term this period a renovation, stressing the dramatic
innovative change that the country underwent.
Rahn, The Japanese Experience, op cit. at 458.
24 Sometimes referred to as Tokimune Gaun - see, for example Harris, The Makin,g of an IP Nation.
Available online at https:/ /v.japaninc.net/ardcle.p1ip?articIeID951&page3.
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machine, who was reduced to poverty by the wholesale piracy his invention - had
highlighted the need for some degree of protection for the creators of new things.25
The Protection of Invention - A False Start
As already noted, Japan introduced a working patent law in 1885. The 1885 Ordinance
was not, however, the first attempt to provide protection to inventors in the Japanese
state. In 1871 the Meiji Government implemented the 'Concise Regulation of
Exclusive Selling'2", based on first-to-file principles and purporting to employ
preliminary examination of applications. However, Kumagai notes that this first
attempt at a 'quick fix' was doomed to failure, as it was adoption of a law in the
"absence of a basis for its operation." 27 Although claiming to examine applications
there was actually no government office in place to accept one. Furthermore, there
were no officials appointed to handle applications. 28 Additionally, the new principle was
a "complete departure from the Tokugawa Shogunate government policy" of the
previous 160 years, and was thus hardly accepted amongst the Japanese people. 29 The
law was therefore repealed in 1872, one year after its adoption.3°
The years that passed between 1872 and 1885 were marked with explosive advances in
Japanese technological understanding. Unhindered by any form of patent protection,
industry was able to progress at a remarkable rate by the assimilation of foreign
technology. As Rahn notes: "A period of sweeping reform and extensive
modernization [had begun]... At this time, what has now become a fixed tradition, was
25 See Kondo, K!)note Address at S,jmposium to Commemorate the CentennialAnniversay ofJapanr Accession to the
Paris Convention - Roles of the Intellectual Proper Rights System in Economic Development in the Lzght ofJapanese
Econom), (2000) 25AIPPI 28 (hereinafter Kondo), at 30 for a more thorough discussion of this case. See
also, Kumagai, op cit. at 4-5.
26 Senbai Rjaku Kisolcu, (Law Nu 105, 1871). See Takenaka, Interpreting Claims op üt. at 40. Rahn, The
Japanese E.xperience, op cit. at 460 calls this Ordinance the "Summaty Rules of Monopoly". See also
Kumagai, op cit. at 3.
2 Kumagai, ibid.
See Kumagai, ibid. at 4. Also Heath, Commercialising University Inventions in Japan, A publication of the
Max Planck Institute, Munich. Available online at http://wwv.cmmt.gr.jp/jalo4/pdf/hcath.pdf .
[Accessed 16" June 20031.
Kumagai, op cit. at 3-4.
30 As Rahn states, it is proof that it is "impossible to create a functioning patent system out of nothing by
just promulgating a law." R.ahn, The Japanese Epethnce, op dt. at 460.
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started on a grand scale: young Japanese by the thousands were sent abroad... [to study]
American railways, British textiles and metallurgy, French and German law.
"Foreign mania raged everywhere, and everything was manufactured in imitation of
foreign articles."32
The 1885 Ordinance
The 1885 Ordinance is one of a number of Statutes that marked a new period m
Japanese legal philosophy. As noted above, earlier attempts at founding systematic
protection for invention had failed due to the lack of a sound institutional and
theoretical basis. Put simply, the prospect of promoting technology was too great a
culture shock to be sustained in the years immediately following the Tokugawa
seclusion policy.
The pressures of the commercial world into which Japan has suddenly found itself
thrust were too great, however, to thwart the institution of such a system for long. The
disadvantage at which Japan was placed in the technology transfer stakes, alone a major
hindrance to industrial progress 33 , forced political and cultural change. Furthermore,
the great benefits of a system for the protection of intellectual property (and inventions
in particular) was apparent to all concerned with the renovation of the Japanese political
structure during the Meiji restoration. One account above any other brings this
realisation into focus. Upon visiting the United States to study the American patent
system Korekiyo Takahashi, the founder of modern Japanese intellectual property law,
is quoted as saying: "We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so
that we can be like them ... We said, "What is it that makes the United States such a
great nation?" and we investigated and found that it was patents, and we shall have
patents."34
Raho, Tue Japanese Experience, op cit. at 458.
32 Lockwood, The Economic Development ofJapan: Growth and Structural Oiange (1868-1938,), (1954; Princeton
University Press, Princeton) at 326. Quoted from Rahn, The Japanese Experience, op cit. at 459.
The reader will no-doubt recall the lengths to which the English crown went to remedy a similar
technological lag. See Chapter II, above.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Patent Office, The sto0' of the United States Patent Office, (1972; U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington). See also Hayasbi, ('omparative Study on Patent 4ystems between US
and Japan - 1987 and 1993 Revisions in Japan, (1995) 20(4) AIPPI Journal 171 at 171, Rahn, The Japanese
Experience, op cit. at 450 and; Vaver, The future of Intellectual Propeqy Law: Japanese and European Perspectives
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Despite this forthright declaration of pro-American technology policy, it is apparent
that the structure of the 1885 Ordinance owed a great deal to both the American and
Continental European patent systems. As Kumagai states, the requirement in the
Ordinance that the applicant file a description specifying the scope of the invention35
was a distinctly American concept, however the choice of term of the patent (a
maximum of 15 years) and the "invalidation of a patent right due to non-use were
adopted from the French patent law." 36 In addition to these features, the Ordinance
called for the adoption of the principle of examination, required that the invention be
novel and useful and stipulated that there could only be one invention per application.37
It also deemed inventions contrary to public order or relating to pharmaceuticals not to
be patentable.38
The Ordinance of 1885 represents a great step forward in the invention of a modern
Japan. It is clear evidence of a country wishing to advance and embracing the
opportunities that modern technology has to offer.
compared— Text of a talk given at the Third Oxford University Academy Salon at Academy Hills, Tokyo,
13" April 1999. This can be found at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/E1WP0999.html.
u Notice Nii 5 of the Exclusive Selling Patent Procedure 1885 (Senbai Tokkjio Tetsuk:) stated that the
procedure for applying for a patent"... requires the inclusion in an application of a description specifying
the scope of the invention. It is recommended that the phrase "the scope that is claimed for a grant of
patent regarding this invention" be used." See Takenaka, Interpretin,g Claims; op cit. at 40.
Kumagai, op cit. at 5-6. Also Heath, Enforcement of Patent Rights in Japan (2000) 31 IIC 749 at 751, noting
the influence of Continental European legal systems on early Japanese patent law. Additionally, it is
interesting to note the wider influence of the Continental European legal system (particularly that of
Germany) on the Japanese reforms of the Meiji era. Britannica states that: "Many Japanese believed that
constitutions provided the unity that gave Western nations their strength." A constitution was finally
drafted, which was published in 1889. The commission that was responsible for its creation was headed
by Ito Hirobumi, and aided by the German constitutional scholar Hermann Roesler. In preparation for
the drafting, Ito travelled widely in Europe and it is said that "[i]n Germany he found an appropriate
balance of imperial power and constitutional forms that seemed to offer modernity without sacrificing
effective control." - see "Japan"; EnycIoperdia Britannica Online;
http: / /www. search.eb.com/eb /article?eul  09537.
7 This principle added to the perception of the Japanese patent system as one that granted very narrow
rights, as it limited the applicant to one claim per patent.
38 See Kumagai, op cit. at 6 for a brief discussion of the main features of the 1885 Ordinance.
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American Influences
The influence of American patent law policy at this point in time was strong. In 1888,
for example, the patent law was revised to include the first-to-invent principle.
Provision was also made for the annulment of a patent if the invention was not new, or
"if the specification contained incomplete or superfluous disclosure."39 In addition,
interference procedures, strongly reminiscent of American practice at the time, were
introduced. Furthermore, as Takenaka states: "The theory that a patent constitutes a
substantive right also shows strong American influence, because Japanese patent law at
that time regarded a patent as a right to exclude others"tm in the same way that U.S.
patent law did. 4 ' German and French law, on the other hand, regarded the right not
only to exclude, but also to exploit the patented invention. 42 However, although
American influence was predominant at this point in time, it is clear that the law shows
what Vojek describes as the "wise eclecticism of Japanese legislators," as many
provisions were copied from other countries.43
National Favouritism - A Lesson from the West?
However, despite evidence of foreign influence in the shaping of patent law and policy,
there remained a number of peculiarly Japanese practices connected with the granting of
patents. Vestiges of the Tokugawa shogunate's seclusion policy can be seen to have
survived the Restoration in that, although not specifically prohibited in any Ordinance,
foreigners could not, at least in the early years of the system, file a patent application
with the Japanese Patent Offlce. This principle of national favouritism appears to
have been a calculated manoeuvre intended to rapidly improve Japanese technological
standing; operating in much the same manner as the importation of valuable ideas that
had improved England's technology under Elizabeth the First. 45 In addition, it also
See Vojácek, A Survey of the Pthzcipa/Nationa/Patent 3ystems (1936; Prentice Hall, New York) (heremafter
Vojáek) at 159. He discusses Japan at 159-65.
° Takenaka, Interpreting C%ims, op cit. at 41.
" Tokkjio Senbal Jorei (Exclusive Selling Patent Ordinance) (Law N° 84, 1888); Article 1 provided "A
patent means granting an inventor a special right to exclude unauthorized people from making, using and
selling the patented invention." Taken from Takenaka, I,zte,pretin& C/aims, op cit. at 41.
42 See the discussion of the Early German patent system in Chapter VII, above.
Predominantly France, Germany and Britain. See \Tojáek, op dt. at 160.
' See Kondo, op cit. at 30; See also Kumagai, op cit. at 6.
15 See further, Chapter II, above.
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gave Japan a powerful bargaining tool in the renegotiation of the 'unequal treaties'
signed in 1858 when Japan first opened its doors to the West at the end of the period of
seclusion.46
It will be recalled that, when implementing a similar policy in the mid16th century,
England had the benefit of being amongst the first to instigate a system for the
promulgation and promotion of invention by the offer of time-limited monopoly.
There was no external agenda to contend with, no pressure for conformity at an
international level, and no fiction of the right to protection. England could concentrate
on self-improvement without fear of recrimination, content in the knowledge that, to all
intents and purposes, the country's business was its business alone. The Crown could
tailor the scope of the grant, and, most importantly, settle upon a recipient by exercising
prejudice and policy with impunity. Japan was not so fortunate. By the point at which
it entered the international arena the times had changed, and the impossibility of
maintaining a xenophobic patent policy (despite the benefits that it offered) was clear.
However, it appears that it was too good an opportunity to overlook completely.
The reason that national favouritism held such allure, and one possible explanation of
the shape that the system took once such a policy was rendered impossible by Japan's
accession to the Paris Convention in 1899, can be ascertained if we look towards the
alternative. One of the fundamental qualities of an open47 intellectual property system is
that anyone can apply for, and be granted, protection for their creation as long as it
meets certain objective criteria. This provides what would commonly be regarded as a
'fair' system, a meritocracy, and this is clearly the case where the field on which the
entities vying for protection is reasonably level. However, in the situation in which
Japan found itself at the end of the nineteenth century, the field was perilously steep.
It will be recalled that one of the fundamental complaints concerning the British patent
system during the 'Patent Controversy' of the mid-nineteenth century concerned its
interaction with England's trading partners in the international dimension. 48 A powerful
46 See Rahn, The Japanese Eperience, op at. at 461-2.
The term 'open' is used to denote a system that adheres to the principle of national treatment - i.e. that
all applications are treated equally, regardless of whether they are from foreign or national applicants.
See Chapter III, above.
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becoming reliant on external innovation without being able to learn by improving.
Once established, piracy is taboo. However, on the road to establishment it is an aid of
unparalleled efficacy in educating and developing a nation's technological standing.
Indeed, if we look at the birth of the patent system in England then we see that great
advance was made through this very practice, through the systematic importation of
knowledge from abroad. However, whilst Britain was free to dictate its own fortunes
and form an innovation policy that benefited no-one but itself, Japan had emerged from
the dark years of seclusion into an arena governed by international trade and subject to
a new world order. External pressure from the international community for the 'equal'
protection of inventions was strong. On patent matters, therefore, it was clearly
caught between a rock and a hard place. It recognised the need to advance technology
and the benefits that a system of granting temporary monopolies could provide. In
addition, it was clear that foreign investment and the introduction of overseas
inventions was needed, however, it would have been equally clear that there were
significant dangers and disadvantages to domestic industry if the protection offered was
too strong. Therefore, by initially prohibiting foreign interests from receiving patent
protection, Japan gained valuable bargaining power in the renegotiation of the 'unequal
treaties' that it had entered into upon the suspension of its seclusion policy. In addition,
it enabled domestic interests to defend against internal competition in a bid to spur on
intellectual and industrial development. The grant of narrow rights would have been
optimal in the pursuit of such a policy as these encourage incremental technological
growth rather than fundamental innovation.50
As already noted, Japan's accession to the Paris Convention in 1899, and the patent law
revision Ordinance that accompanied this, put an end to the outright prohibition upon
granting protection to foreign applicants. However, it is submitted that the policy
The story of the creation of the NEC Corporation is a vivid example of the international pressure that
Japan found itself under to give strong recognition to intellectual property rights. The Corporation,
formed from a He up of Nippon Electric Co. Ltd. of Japan and the Western Electric Co. Ltd. of the U.S.
was created just two days after the Paris convention went into force in Japan, and included provisions on
the management of intellectual property rights in its articles of incorporation. For more detail on the
creation of NEC see Kondo, 	 t. at 30
And why bother to invest in fundamental innovation, a costly process, when you can import, assinite
and improve upon someone else's work?
Si However, there was still an obligation to designate an agent residing in Japan. See Kumagai, op di. as 8.
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interests underpinning the principle of national favouritism, primarily the need to
encourage domestic industry, were not so easily removed. Indeed, they maintained such
a fundamental role in the shaping of Japanese patent law that the system was often
criticised as encouraging 'follow on' inventions at the expense of fundamental
innovation until well into the 1990s. 52 In short, it has been stated that "[i]n the
hundred-odd years from the Meiji Era onward, the Japanese industry has developed by
improving technology from abroad."53
Post-Convention - Incremental Development
The 1899 patent law Ordinance was the first of a series of revisions that Takenaka states
demonstrate the movement from an essentially American to a Germanic system of
principles regarding the scope of protection. 54 She explains that whilst the 1885 law was
based on the American system and saw the patent as a right to exclude others, the 1899
revision provided that the patent gave the right to "use exclusively and distribute the
patented invention", something that the American system did not. 55 This process was
continued with the 1909 Ordinance, which adopted a pseudo-Germanic model of
jurisdictional separation between the Patent Office and the courts, 56 and was completed
with the 1921 Ordinance,57 adopting the first-to-frle system of application priority.58
52 See Maskus & McDaniel, Lessons from Japan for U.S. Patent Reform: Po/ig Implications of a Pre-G rant Disclosure
3) stem, a Japan Information Access Project working paper (revised on 1t June 1999). Available online at:
htrp: www.ji.iponline.org/publications/docs/l  999/june/FJNAL 0 o20PAPER%206.1.99pdf at 5.
Sito, Strengt/ening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights to Meet the Needs of the 2V' Century - Future Pc/i9
on Intellectual Properj RigJts, (2001) 26(4) AIPP1 Journal 199 at 200. This observation, is shared by the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights in the Twenty-first Century irs its report to the Japanese
Patent Office dated 7th April 1997 - Toward the Era of Intellectual Creation: Challenges for Breakthrough.
Available online at http: www.jpo.go.jp/old/tousie/rep2leng.doc.
Takenaka, Interpreting C/aims, op cit. at 41. This sub-section is largely inspired by her work. However,
also see Vojiek, op cit. at 160 to 165. On the post 1899 developments in Japanese patent law he
summarises by stating that "\Ve see clearly [in this period] ... the development of the Japanese patent
system, which in its essential features inclines more and more to the German and Austrian system...
[However, p]eculiar to the Japanese system are stipulations concerning ... contingencies which, as to
minuteness have hardly a parallel in any other patent law...". Vojãek, ides,,, at 165.
5 Takenaka, Inteipreting C/aims, op cit. at 41.
Article 49, Toklej oho (Patent Law) (Law N' 32, 1909). This meant that anyone wishing to invalidate a
patent had to commence proceedings at the Patent Office, as per the current German model.
Tokkjoho (Patent Law) (Law NL 96, 1921).
58 See Kumagai, op cii. at 9.
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However, in one important aspect the Japanese system was to retain its own specific
identity.
The patent scope certification trial was introduced by the 1899 Patent Ordinance, and
effectively functioned to vest interpretative power concerning the scope of protection in
the Patent Office. The trial enabled the patentee to bypass the court system when
questions of this kind arose, and its use may go some way to explain the very low
numbers of reported patent cases in the period up to its abolishment with the 1959
Patent Ordinance.
The existence of the certification trial was very important as it functioned to erode the
separation of jurisdiction envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance. As matters of
interpretation were being considered by the Patent Office a situation akin to that in the
UK and America59 was effectively in existence based, however, upon German
principles. Therefore, as the Patent Office took the main role in developing claim
interpretation theory, the court was relegated to second fiddle. This had important
repercussions for cross-jurisdictional transfer of theory between Germany and Japan,
for it is clear that throughout the period that ran from the 1899 Ordinance onward the
influence of the German legal system was strong. Examples of such international
transfer of policy/theory are given by Takenaka and include the establishment of the
concept of identification of the invention, similar to the 'general inventive idea' of the
German courts, sitting at the core of interpretative theory. In addition, she mentions
the classifications that the Patent Office utilised to divide modifications being almost
wholesale copies of their German counterparts. 6° However, the blurring of the
separation caused by the patent scope certification trial meant that whereas in Germany
these principles were simple utilised to decide the scope of the patent once granted, in
Japan they could also be used to deny protection.
Where one body (in these countnes the Court) has competence to decide on issues of both
infringement and validity.
The classifications that she mentions are "mechanical workshop modifications" (sekket henk,
"msignificant modification" (sekkeyo no bisa), "designing around the invention" (ukai hatsimez), and
"inferior modifications" (kaiakiijsshi). See Takenaka, interpreting C/aims cii. at 42.
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This factor had important repercussions for claim interpretation theory, as it effectively
enabled the courts to operate unrestricted by the claims. The claims functioned to
define the invention, but the disclosure made by the patentee in the rest of the
specification was considered to be of more importance when the scope of protection
was considered. Thus, over and above the principle of classifying modifications, the
Germanic doctrine of the 'general inventive idea' was bastardised and effectively
functioned to limit the scope of the patent to that explicitly recognised by the inventor,
evidenced by the disclosure in the specification. This theory, often known as the
'inventor's recognition limitation theory' 6 ' came to be the governing doctrine in
Japanese claim interpretation, and confmed the protection afforded by the patent to the
explicit disclosure.62 Unlike the German system, where the general inventive idea was
utilised to expand the scope of protection to those devices that could have been
conceived by the skilled addressee based on the claim language and the disclosure in the
specification, the Japanese 'inventor's recognition theory' operated to limit the scope of
the patent to what the inventor was perceived to have intended to claim based on the
disclosure in the rest of the specification.
The patent scope certification trial had removed the need to be bound by the claims by
enabling the Patent Office, the forum in which the claims were drafted, to also
determine their scope. The fact that the apparent separation of powers envisaged by
the 1909 Ordinance did not adequately correspond to this model appears to have gone
unnoticed in the years that followed its enactment, and the Patent Office continued to
operate as judge, jury and executioner on matters of claim scope. It was in this respect
far more powerful than the courts or Patent Offices in any of the other jurisdictions
that we have considered, as it was free to re-examine and re-draft the patent as it
determined its scope. Various practices arose to surround this core concept, including
the determination of the gist of the invention (hatsumei noyoshi), which augmented the
61 Ninshikigendoron. See Takenaka, Liiterpreting Claims, op di. at 43.
62 Takenaka utilises a Judgment of 16" October 1915 (Taisho 7 N" 459), stating on page 43, Note 21:
"Since an application including descriptions of the nature and purpose of the invention, a detailed
explanation of the invention, the scope claimed for the grant of the patent, and specified the gist of the
invention and means and devices by which the invention is embodied so that he or she claimed the
characteristic portions of what he described, the meaning of each element described in the claim must be
interpreted with respect to the nature and purpose of the invention and the detailed description of the
invention."
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narrowing of protection scope by reading the limitations in the description as limitations
on the claims themselves.63
F-lowever, this was not the end of the matter, as the Japanese courts also adopted this
procedure to justify redrafting the claims in infringement proceedings "by declaring a
new claim as the gist of the invention or patent." 64 The fact that the courts adopted this
process served to further muddy the jurisdictional separation between the two bodies,
with both entities believing that they had the power to redraft and reinterpret the claims
at will.
Therefore, we see the same principles that were being used in the German courts to
expand the scope of protection being used in the Japanese Patent Office in scope
certification trials, and in the courts in infringement actions, to narrow the claim scope.
All that the jurisdictional separation envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance succeeded in
doing was to render the decisions of the Patent Office unquestionable in court. The
German motivation for such a division of power was not transferred into the Japanese
model, and, as such, the system preferred narrow protection.
This said, it is clear that the system was able, as and when the circumstances dictated, to
expand protection on an ad hoc basis to minor modifications that did not appear in the
description or drawings. 65 However, as Takenaka states, this "involve[d] the mechanical
one-to-one exchangeability of claim elements but ... [did] not involve the equitable
consideration of the patentee's interest and the public's interest in the context of the
patent policy of encouraging innovation ... [so as to provide a] broad range of
equivalents."66 It is clear that such expansion of the claims was far from normal.
63 Takenaka, Intetpreting C/aims, op cit. at 44-45.
Ibid. at 45.
(is An example of the ad hoc application of the doctrine of ecjuivalents can be found in the decision of the
Tokyo District Court of 28" September 1964 (Hanrei N 168). See also, Kukimoto, The Patent L.aw:
Chapter 3 The Patent Right, (2001) 26 A1PPI journal 79 at 87.
66 Takenaka, Intepreting C/aims, op i1. at 46. Whilst this may be the case, the implicit assumption in this
statement that narrow protection does not encourage innovation at all is somewhat incorrect. This point
is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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It may be possible that the outcome of this process was, as some commentators have
claimed, based on incomplete understanding of the legal principles that were employed
in its key stages of creation.'7 However, this conclusion ignores the fact that, from an
economic and practical point of view, this policy of granting narrow patents was actually
beneficial to Japanf'5 It would be naïve to conclude that a practice that encourages
progression by imitation, therefore creating patent 'clusters' 6' and spurring on domestic
industry70
 - industry that would be in danger of being strangled by broader protection -
could only be based on such 'incomplete understanding'. Rather, it would appear that
the system flourished, and Japan made the immense technological leap that it did in the
manner that it did, precisely because of the nature and scope of the rights that the
patent system granted.7'
Cultural Formatting - Institutionalised Collectivism?
The fact that narrow protection was traditionally granted by a Japanese patent also
accords very well with the wider picture of the Japanese legal culture. The honourable
See Takenika, InteipreIing claims, op cit. at 44 et seq.
The conclusion that broader protection encourages more innovation is, in itself, dubious. See
Sakakibara & Branstetter, Do Slron,ger Pateizis Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent
Law Rcfr'ns, NBER Working Paper N 7066, Apr. 1999. Available online at:
http: / /wv.nher.org/papers/v066.pdf.
Again referring to the situation whereby an mvenuve concept becomes surrounded by patents that are
narrow in scope and claim only incremental advances over the prior art.
A vivid example of an incremental innovation that nonetheless came to define an age and demonstrates
the encouragement of domestic industry is that of the "Sony Walkman". The pioneer invention
accompanying this advancement (tape recording) was not made in Japan, but who can remember the
inventor? The "\Valkman" spawned a whole host of related products, and marked its producer as one of
the industry greats. For a more in-depth discussion of the invention of the "walkman", and other
Japanese incremental advances that became giants in their own right see Rosen & Usui, The Social Structure
ofJapanese Intellectual Properfy Law, (1994) 13 UCL4 Pacific Basin Law Journal 32 (hereinafter Rosen & Usui)
at 41-33.
71 It is interesting to note that Vojiek, writing in the mid-1930s, felt able to conclude that the "present
Japanese law may justly claim to be the most carefully thought out and perhaps the best modern law in
the world." Takenaka's conclusion that it was based on "incomplete understanding" seems to be
grounded on the assumption that anything that is not American/European is somehow wrong. This
author wishes to politely suggest that this is not always the case. Indeed it would appear that Takenaka
herself has also noted the undeniable benefit that the system in Japan actually had at the time. See
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nature and form of all social interactions carried over into the country's legal system72
and helped to shape the envelope of intellectual property in general, and patents in
particular. Thus, the interests of society are clearly evident in the decision, explicit or
not, to confine the scope of protection within narrow boundaries.73
The Japanese system can therefore be seen to emphasise the protection of the general
public by limiting the claims to what the inventor has disclosed in the specification.
This sub-literal protection also promotes another element of Japanese patent culture,
that of collectivism, over and above the more Western notion of individual reward.
With a system of narrow grants, patents beget patents and it is virtually impossible for
one entity to control all of the technology surrounding an invention. 74 The consequent
'flooding'75 that results from many competing applications may soon render the initial
innovation impotent. Therefore, rather than doggedly defending one's territory and
bringing expensive legal actions in order to ward off competitors, as is the traditional
Western approach, Japanese patentees traditionally entered into cross-licenses as a
matter of course.7°
Takenaka, The Role of/he Japanese Patent system in Japanese Indnsty, (1994) 13 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal
25.
72 "[I]n order to obtain the highest degree of compliance possible, both judicial opinions and public laws
try to find the common ground or, that magic word, "consensus" regarding any specific subject." Port,
The Spirit ofJapanese Law (Book Review), (2002) 1 Washington Universit y Global Studies Law Review 573 at 574,
reviewing Haley, The Spirit ofJapanese Law, (1998; University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA).
See, Harris, Competition Law and Patent Protection in Japan: A Ha!f-Centu0i of Progress, A New Millennium of
Challenges, (2002) 16 Colombia Journal of Asian Law 71 at 75 to 76. Also more generally, Rosen & Usui, op
cit. passim.
" This narrow division of the inventive field into numerous 'thin' patents has led some critics of the
Japanese system to nickname it the 'sashimi' system, after the sliced fish delicacy - see Sakakibara &
Bransetter, op cit. at 3.
A term utilised by many commentators including Rosen & Usus, op cit. to describe the "multitude of
patent applications claiming minor, incremental changes" over previous innovations - see Sankaran,
Pate,it Flooding in the United States and Japan, (2000) 40 IDEA 393 at 394. See also U.S. General Accounting
Office, Intellectual Propery Rights: U.S. Companies' Patent E.speriences in Japan, GAO/GGD-93-1 26, at 18 Quly
1993), which states that whenever a patent of value is published, competitors of the patentee will file
"excessive numbers" of patents claiming minor variations, a practice known as "patent flooding."
° See, for example, Rosen & Usui, op cit. at 45-46. In addition, the empirical research undertaken by this
author in relation to Chapter IV (above) confirms this stereotypical approach to technology transfer
within Japan. Further, in an interview with a Japanese Patent Attorney visiting the UK this author was
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This institutionalised diplomacy was vital to the success of the patent system in Japan,
for without it the system would have rapidly become gridlocked. The fact that the
Japanese system encourages the 'laying open' of technology may also account for the
monumental progress, both technological and cultural, that the country has witnessed
since the Meiji Restoration. By opening the knowledge contained in the inventive pooi
by effective cross-licensing, the Japanese system has gone far beyond the
information/disclosure function of the patent grant itself in effect rationalising
innovation as a national rather than individual activity. This process accords with the
Schumpeterian notion that large entities are conducive to innovation - i.e. the process
of investing in invention - provided that they are able to satisfactorily recoup research
and development costs. 77 In Japan the fact that narrow protection was granted moves
the scope of protection and therefore the return on each individual innovation outside
of the primal sphere of influence. The scope of the rights is therefore not as important
as the fact that rights are granted in the first place. Form is championed at the expense
of content. In other words, the whole process of innovation becomes one of numbers.
Competitive advantage is gained, not by the quality of the advances made, but rather by
the quantity of patents that can be thrown into the bargaining pot, thus shifting the
focus of the patent incentive rather than replacing it entirely.78
told that that "The honourable thing to do is to come to an agreement, not to litigate. I think that this
principle still applies to many patentees in Japan. They learn from their Western competitors, but it is
better to trade than to fight." In addition, one of the British qualified patent attorneys interviewed in
relation to Chapter IV, and with significant experience of the Japanese system stated that "The Japanese
on the whole don't care [about the quality of individual grants, they] ... only want a patent, they collect
them. They may amass [thousands a year] ... and bargain with them, they go to their competitors and say
"we've got more than you, give us some money". They don't seem to care about the value of each one."
See Schumpeter, Theoy of Economic Development, (1936; Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass)).
This work was first published in German as Theorie der wirtshcafihichen Entwicklung (1911; Duncker
Humblot, Leipzig). Discussed further in Chapter V, above.
78 See similar conclusions concerning the efficacy of the Japanese patent system in providing incentives to
innovate in Cohen et al R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States,
(Working Paper Jun. 2001). Available online at:
http: / /www.druid.dk/conferenccs/nw/paperl /cohen.pdf.
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Continued Pressure for Reform
This process of cannibalisation by the collective, the assimilation and improvement of
(primarily foreign) technology, operated well when Japan was playing 'catch up', but it is
clear that by the end of the 1950s the system, as it stood, was becoming unworkable.79
Japan's technological progress had been explosive, moving it from the Middle Ages to a
point at which it was able to compete with the Industrialised West in a period of less
than 100 years. However, this growth was now in danger of being thwarted by the very
system that had enabled this rapid progression: It was time for reform.
As already noted, the current incarnation of the Japanese patent law was promulgated in
1959. It implemented changes recommended by the Council for the Study of
Intellectual Property System Revision, which had been installed at the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry in 1950, and was designed to update the system to
enable it to cope with Japan's rapid industrial progress after World War jj•80
Furthermore as Takenaka states, the Ordinance served to codify a number of judicially
created principles; for example, it inserted an inventive step requirement into the
substantive law. 8t In addition, it expanded the scope of the novelty provision by
including overseas publications within its remit, and it made it possible to file a patent
application that covered more than a single invention for the first time. It also inserted
a requirement, in Article 70, that the court determine the technical scope of an
invention, and therefore the breadth of protection, by reference to the claim82.
Protection scope certification trials were also abolished, thereby transferring
responsibility for claim interpretation to the courts and clarifying the jurisdictional
separation envisaged by the 1909 Ordinance.
See Kumagai, op th'. at 10. He states that the "laws had some provisions no longer effective to cope
with the reality and unable to catch up with the country's economic and industrial development rapidly
progressing in the post-war years."
See Takenaka, L'itetpreting C/aims, op tt. at 47. See also Kumagai, op t. at 10.
81 In Article 29 Paragraph 2 - "Where an invention could easily have been made prior to the filing date of
the patent application by a person with ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains on the
basis of an invention or inventions referred to in any of the paragraphs that provide the novelty
requirements, a patent shall not be granted for such an invention". Translation quoted from Takenaka,
Inte,preting C/aims, ibid. at 47. See also, Kumagai, op at. at 11.
82 At this point in time the Japanese patent system only allowed applications to contain one claim, thus
seriously limiting the scope of protection.
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The inclusion of Article 70 in the new law was intended to prevent the courts from re-
examining the patent claim, as had been the pre-1959 practice. By inserting reference to
the claim in determining the scope of protection, "the legislature aimed at forcing courts
to read the claim as it was granted in infringement litigation." 83 However, as ever,
legislative intent and court practice do not always see eye-to-eye, and the courts
continued to udlise pre-1959 practice to limit the claims based on disclosures made
elsewhere in the specification.
Subsequent revisions to the Patent Law attempted to expand the scope of protection.
Therefore in 1975, a multiple claim system was introduced. 84 Whereas previously it was
only possible to include one single, independent, claim in an application, the revision
allowed the inclusion of multiple dependent claims. 85 However, it is clear that this
amendment did not substantially alter the number of claims actually included in most
patent applications at the time. 86 The reasons for this are manifold, but it is submitted
that a significant contributing factor to this observation is the fact that the revision was
primarily motivated by Japan's ratification of the Patent Co-operation Treaty 87 , i.e. an
external rather than an internal factor. This suggests that there was no institutionalised
call for more claims therefore, as the single claim system was perceived internally to be
working well, there was little need to include more claims in the application. This
argument is supported by the fact that the number of patent applications continued to
grow year-on-year throughout this period, rather than suffering downturn as broader
protection removed the need for a patent clustering protection strategy.88
83 Takenaka, InIe,preting C/aims, op cit. at 50. Referring to Comments made by Justice Masao Miyake,
formerJapanese Supreme CourtJudge.
M Article 36, Law N 46, 1975.
85 See Sakakibara & Bransetter, op cit. at 3-4. Also Takenaka, Inte/preting C/aims, op cit. at 48, and Kumagai,
op Lit, at 14.
86 Sakakibara & Bransetter, ibid. They provide statistical data gathered by the Japanese Patent Office that
shows that until 1987 the average number of claims per patent application across the board was below
1.5, idem. at 39.
8 \iid therefore its need to comply with the provisions of the Treaty.
88 See Sakakibara & Bransetter, op dt. at 38.
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In 1987, following two relatively minor revisions, 8' the law was again amended and the
claim system modified to allow multiple independent claims. Furthermore, the ease
with which related inventions could be included in a single patent was significantly
increased with the new law. It would appear that these revisions had far greater effect
on the average number of claims per patent application than any of the previous
amendments did. For example, figures from the Japanese Patent Office show a rise
from approximately 1.2 to somewhere in the region of 2.5 claims per application
between 1987 and 1988 when the reforms were implemented.'° This is significant for
an effective multi-claim patent should (theoretically) enable greater breadth of
protection, even under a sub-literal interpretative regime, than a patent consisting of a
single claim would allow. This can be seen in figure 1 (below):'1
Figure 1: Scope of Single Claim and Multi-Claim Patents
The diagram shows that the use of three relatively narrow independent claims enables
the patentee to utilise the space surrounding the inventive core of the application
without straying into the prior art more effectively than a single claim would do. Whilst
this scope of protection could theoretically have been achieved before the reforms by
89 One in 1978 (Law N 30, 1978), and one in 1985 (Law N o 41, 1985).
90 See Sakakibara & Bransetter, op di. figure 3 on page 39. By 1989, the average number of claims per
application was 2.8 - see Japanese Patent Office, Trends of Industrial Property Right Applications and
Re,gistrations, avaliable online at http://vww.jpo.go.jp/shiryou e/trends of ipr.httn. The data set in the
latter document spans 1989 to 2001, and shows a year-on-year rise in the number of claims per
application.
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the filing of multiple applications (as was the common practice), it is clear that the
revised system would have significantly reduced the cost of a given level of protection.
In addition to this, as Sakakibara & Bransetter note, the multi-claim system may also
have improved matters by making it possible for "innovations that could not be
completely protected under the old system ... [to] now receive full protection."92
Therefore, by implementing measures such as these, the scope of a Japanese patent was
manipulated without the need for changes in the established rules of interpretation. It
should be noted, however, that the ctake up' of the multiple claim system by Japanese
patentees was relatively slim in the first few years of its operation, suggesting that
there was a need for an institutional change in working practices in addition to
legislative reform.
Policy Reforms
Continued international pressure and criticism, both internal and external, of the narrow
scope of protection afforded by the courts' interpretation of Japanese patents finally
became too much to ignore. Therefore, in the midst of a decidedly pro-patentee era in
Japan - evidenced by the publication of reports such as that of the Council for the
Consideration of Intellectual Property in the 21" Century, entitled Toward the Era of
Intellectual Creation,' 4 that details proposals for accelerating the cycle of intellectual
creation through intellectual property rights'5 - the Japanese Supreme Court issued what
' Inspired by a similar diagram in Sakakibara & Bransetter, op dt. at 37.
92 Sakakibara & Bransetter, op t. at 6. For more detail on the ways in which the revisions in 1987
expanded the effective scope ofJapanese patents see idem, at 8-11.
For example, whereas 91.2° o of non-Japanese applicants utilised multiple claims in their applications to
the Japanese Patent Office in 1989, only 4O.9% of Japanese applicants did so. See Japanese Patent Office,
Trends of Industrial Propery Right Applications and Ristrations, op cit. figure 1-3.
'-" The full title is Tovard the Era of Intellectual Creation - Challen,ges for Breakthrou,gh. Report dated 7th April
1997. A detained outline of this document is available from the Japanese Patent Office website at:
http: / /\vvw.po.go.jp/
 shirvou e/roushin e/kenkvukai e/rep2l eng.doc.
' A report of the Planmng Subcommittee of the Industrial Property Council entitled To the Better
Understanding of Pro-Patent Po/i9' is rather more blunt in its recitation of policy. This is available online at:
http: / /www.jpo.go.jp /shiryou e/toushin e/ shingikai e /reporr.pdf.
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has been described as landmark decision 96 in Tsubakimoto Seiko v THK j i<" (hereinafter
the BallSpliize decision) and explicitly endorsed the doctrine of equivalents.98
As noted, the Japanese system in the pre-equivalents era was heavily biased towards
protection of the interests of society over and above the interests of any individual
patentee. The policy in the early years of the system was geared towards technological
growth, to reduce the yawning gap between Japan and the advanced Western nations on
which it modelled its renovation. Improvement and advancement were the
watchwords, and therefore individual success was less important than the success of the
collective. Technology advanced by assimilation and there was no room for the
uncertainties that extending protection into the area beyond the literal scope of the
claims would allow. Indeed, as Takenaka notes, "the Japanese Courts refused to
introduce an unclear concept of equivalents into their patent system," resulting in a
patentee's claim for infringement by equivalents to often be viewed as an admission of
no infringement. 9' It was only in 'exceptional' cases, with the aim of preventing a
manifestly unfair result, that any protection beyond the textual meaning was achieved,
and even in such circumstances this was facilitated by manipulation of the literal
meaning under what was known as the 'substantial identity rule'. 10' Explicit recognition
of the doctrine of equivalents by the Japanese supreme judicial body is therefore of
considerable importance in the evolution of the intellectual property system there.
96 By Yainamoto & Tessensohn, Doctrine of Equivalents adds Torque to Japanese Patent Infrin,ement 29) 81
Jj TOS -183 (hereinafter Yamamoto & Tessensohn, Torque) at 483.
1630 HanreiJiho 32 (Supreme Court, 1998).
98 Discussions of the Ball Spline decision are many, and include Takenaka, The Doctrine of Equivalents in
Japan, (2000) 6 CASRIP Srmtusium Pu6lication Series 125 at 125-6. Available online at:
hp://www.Liw.washingron.edu/casrip/Svmposiuin/Numberó/Takenaka.pdf. Also see Tani, TI-IK Co. v
Tsubakimoto Seiko C'o. - Infth;8emen/ case for Ball Spline Bearing, (1998) 16) Journal of W"or/d Intellectual Prope
2 . Kim, A Comparative Ana4sis of the Japanese Supreme Court Decision on Doctrine of Equivalents, [2002] IPQ
. Sonoda & Kobavashi, Doctrine of Equivalents in Japan, available online at:
hnpl/wv.p:ircnts.jp /Doctrine°'20° p82° o8F° 82° 0860 o2I2Euivalents%20Supreme%2OCourt.pdf.
Also Yamamoto & Tessensohn, Torque, op cit.
' Takenaka, The Doctrine ofEquivalents in Japan, op cit. at 125-6.
tOO Somewhat similar to the old British approach utilised to avoid results that would rob the patentee of








considered that the element for which the defendant had provided a substitute was
indeed essential, and therefore declined to find infringement. Further, considering the
non-obviousness of the substitution, it concluded that the third test for the invocation
of the doctrine of equivalents was also not satisfied.127
Another decision that is of interest is that of the Tokyo District Court in KK Kouken v
KK Tatsurni Ryouki. 128 The case concerned an invention for a water resistant load system
that comprised of a cylindrical main electrode and a hollow cylindrical base electrode.
The base electrode was insulated and the patent required the main electrode to pass
through the bottom of this element. In the alleged infringement, the main electrode
was modified so that it did not pass through the base electrode, but was rather spaced
apart from it. 129 It was accepted that this produced a risk of electrical short-circuit being
created via the water.
The Court began by explaining that the basis for the doctrine of equivalents was found
in the court's ability to give recognition to substance over precise form. In the same
way that the court could recognise a relationship between a man and a woman who had
not registered their marriage but were in substance a married couple, so it could
recognise infringement where the accused and the patented devices were, in substance,
the same. This ability under the general law enabled the court to avoid unfair results
that would be produced by strict enforcement of formality requirements. Having
rationalised the application of the doctrine in this way, the court then proceeded to
apply the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court in Ba/I Spline. In doing so it allocated
the burden of proof for the first three stages of the test (the positive criteria) to the
patentee, and the latter two (the negative criteria) to the defendant.13°
127 i.e. that the person of ordinary skill in the art would not have perceived the substitution as obvious,
and therefore there could be no infringement.
128 Hanreijtho N 1657, 122 (1999) a decision of the Tokyo District Court (7th October, 1998).
129 The summary of the case that appears in the next few paragraphs is largely based on that found in
Yamamoto & Tessensohn, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Recent Japanese Patent LJtgation, op cit.
at 283-6. See also Takenaka, The Doctrine of Equivalents after the Supreme Court 'Ball Spline" Decision. (1999)
5(4) CASRIP 6. Available online at:
http: / /www.law.washington.edu/Casrip /newslettcr/nevsv5i4jpl  .htm.
130 In contrast to the U.S. position, whereby the burden is placed on the patentee once the prosecution
history has been raised.
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Regarding the first and second conditions, i.e. that the difference must be in an
inessential element of the invention and that the modification must not alter the
function and result of the patented invention, the Court found that the defendant's
machine was substantially the same as the patentee's invention. However, it was on the
interpretation of the third leg of the test - that the variants adopted by the defendant
should have been readily understood by everyone in the field of the invention to be substitutes
for those detailed in the patent - that the possibility of infringement by equivalents
floundered. The Court considered that the risk of electrical short-circuit in the
defendant's product was sufficient to dissuade many in the field from adopting the
variant, thus it was not readily conceived by everyone in the field, and was consequently
not equivalent to the patentee's invention.13'
The adoption of such a standard is most significant, as it renders the degree of
obviousness for the replacement of features between the patented device and the
accused infringement at a much higher level than the corresponding test for inventive
step.' 32
 Therefore the protection provided by the patent under an equivalents analysis
does not accurately correspond to the degree of 'dead flesh' that the grant creates
around any given innovation, and furthermore does not correspond to the Supreme
Court's policy justification of the doctrine of equivalents in Ball Spline. 133 As such, the
establishment of a strict standard enables the courts to provide narrow protection,
denying the application of the doctrine of equivalents to all but the most obvious
modifications - i.e. those cases in which a literal interpretation of the claims would
produce an unfair result; startlingly similar to the pre-BallSpline position.
Having denied infringement by equivalents in this way the Court obviated the need to
enter into the treacherous area surrounding the issue of file wrapper estoppel, in which
virtually the whole of the defendant's arguments had been based. Therefore, at the
same time as the courts in the U.S. were lintiting the effect of the doctrine of
'' Although this does seem to be precipitously close to saying that an infringement done badly is not an
infringement.
132 The test for the inventive step being defined in the Patent Ordinance as "would not readily have been
conceived by one skilled in the art". See Article 29(2).
See text accompanying notes 105 etseq. above.
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Therefore, under this analysis, whether an element is essential or not depends on the
view that is taken of the prior art, i.e. the path by which the invention may have come
about. This can be seen as a variation of the problem-solution approach undertaken by
the European Patent Office when determining inventive step, 139 and suffers from the
same problems - in that the perception will vary with the choice of prior art. Hence,
where there are two equally close prior disclosures that concern different elements it
may be difficult to decide which, if either, to use to determine the essence of the
invention. After all, any element added to distinguish from one or the other piece of
prior art may be seen to be essential and thus not variable.
Additionally, Takenaka suggests that the adoption of this test will contradict the "well-
accepted notion of a greater scope of equivalents for pioneer inventions and important
improvements than for minor improvements."° This is because the greater the gap
between the prior art references and the patented invention, the more likely the
elements are to be seen as essential - given that they form the basis for solving the
problem unique to the patented invention. The potential for a wide range of
equivalents will, therefore, be most marked in inventions resulting from a combination
of known features, as here all of the elements already exist in the prior art, and cannot
be seen as being essential.
This is a critical distinction, as the introduction of the doctrine of equivalents into
Japanese law was, to a certain degree, prompted by Japan's desire to move from a net
imitator to net producer of technology: To enter the "era of intellectual creation". It
will be recalled that the pre-equivalents Japanese system had been widely criticised as
promoting incremental rather than pioneer innovation. The pioneer invention entails
the greatest risk on the part of the innovator; it has an uncertain benefit/cost ratio and
is therefore the invention that benefits most (in terms of increasing the probability of
139 Evident in cases such as Bqyer/ Carbonless Copying T1/80 [1979-851 B EPOR 250. Although this is not
to say that this was ever intended as such by the Japanese Court.
'° Takenaka, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Japan, op rit. at 13 1-2. The reader will appreciate that whilst it
may be a "vell accepted notion" that pioneer inventions should receive broader protection, it is by no
means universally accepted. See, for example, Merges & Nelson's 'race to invent theory' described in
their 1990 Colombia Law Review article On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, (1990) 90 Colombia Law
Review 839. See further text accompanying note 101, et seq. in Chapter \T, above.
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production) from patent protection. 141 The Ba/I Spline decision was hailed as an epoch
in Japanese claim interpretation, casting off the restrictive burden of the previous
narrow practice. Yet the requirements and limitations placed on the operation of the
doctrine of equivalents under Ball Spline (as interpreted) once more favour the
incremental over the pioneer invention.142
Conclusion
Despite explicit recognition of the doctrine of equivalents in Japanese patent law with
the decision in Ball Spline, the subsequent ambiguity and narrow approach of the lower
courts when considering the scope of the five-stage test has somewhat lessened its
impact. However, the very fact that it was introduced at all is significant as it marks a
conscious decision by the Supreme Court to move from a net importer of technology to
an "era of intellectual creation".
However, the question that now arises is whether the changes were actually required to
make this transition, or whether, as the cynic may suggest, they were implemented in
order to fit in with an increasingly Americanised market? Let us examine the evidence:
In pre-Ball Spline Japan the patent grant still managed to push forward technology,
however, it did not do this by the grant of enticing broad monopoly grants designed to
reward only the first to innovate in any given area. It pushed the technological
boundaries by providing a structure in which invention and innovation could be traded.
Inventing became not so much a practice of Ruanturu leaps, but rather one of continual
refinement. Business practices, specifically the patent trade that accompanied the
development of technology, avoided the need to go to court and therefore avoided the
need for wide grants. A complex trading game, 143 whereby corporations would pay
royalties and negotiate licences based on the number of patents that they have, operated
in a connected sphere and emphasises that factors other than broad scope can be
141 This analysis is based on Scherer's categorisation of invention that can be found in his highly
influential study, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (1980; Houghton Mifflin, Boston; 2nd
Ed.) at 443-50. See text accompanying notes 42-46 in Chapter V, above.
142 The reader may note that the approach taken by the English Court of Appeal in Kirin-Am,gen Inc. ii
Transkayotic Therapies Inc., [20031 RPC 31 also seems to limit the interpretation placed on the patent
claims in 'fast moving' technologies (where pioneer inventions are generally to be found).
143 "Pokemon" anyone?
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utilised to manipulate and control inventive activity. The Japanese experience proves
that it is a fallacy to conclude that patents are just important for the protection that they
offer. They are also important, as has been noted, 1 '' for the very fact that they are
patents. Therefore, does the interpretation that is given to the claims actually matter as
long as it is consistent? As has been shown, there is a strong argument that can be
made for very narrow interpretation, akin to that available in pre-BaI1 Spline Japan, m
order to spur on the refinements in technology that form a broad basis for future leaps.
No 'equivalents' protection, indeed no broad protection of any kind, is required to fulfil
this aim provided the position is clear and industry can react.
The traditional Japanese patent system (i.e. that before Ball Spline) actually incorporated
a device that can be seen to operate in the same manner as the U.S. style doctrine of
equivalents albeit by radically different means. By limiting the scope of the patent to
that actually embodied in the specification as a whole, with the claims limited as
necessary by the description and drawings, the Japanese system simply made the
extension to cover equivalents unnecessary. It was the market as a whole that dictated
the equivalents protection, and the patent system protected these by the grant of
additional patents. Admittedly this protection was not complete, but the adoption of
different standards for the assessment of inventive step and the assessment of when a
variant will be obvious enough to be considered an equivalent leaves much the same
gap in protection even post-Ball Spine. In the pre-equivalents days, as the narrow
position was well known to all that were involved in the process of innovation, it was
unnecessary to extend the scope of protection to enable any one patent to cover the
ground that the mass could cover. The research and development spending was
structured in such a manner as to avoid the complications that could have arisen. The
answer to narrow protection was not, nor could it ever have been, litigation: The answer
was the development of business strategies, including simple bargaining between
companies, which augmented the patent system and served to qualify its perceived
limitations. In such a model, the only people not benefiting were those unfamilimr with
the customs or unwilling to play the game. It is therefore no coincidence that these
parties were the very ones pushing for reform to a fairer' 45 'international' standard.
144 See Chapter IV, above.
145 i.e. more familiar, Westernised.
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The question that then arises is whether the world system, as we see it, needs disparity
between nations, with some giving broad protection and others giving narrow
protection, in order that the spectrum of innovative activity can be maintained? If this
is the case then the push towards a world standard of intellectual property protecdon1
may actually do more damage than good. Japan's story vividly demonstrates the
difficulty of technological evolution in an increasingly international world. The
meteoric rise from feudal surf to technological whiz-kid that the country has undergone
in less than 150 years is little short of astounding, and poses the question of whether it
could be repeated today. The homogenisation of Patent Law, the claim implicit in
TRIPS that one size can, and indeed should, fit all, does not adequately correspond with
the picture of Japan's evolution. If Sakakibara & Branstetter's conclusion that the
Patent Law reforms of 1988 did not have an appreciable effect on the level of
innovative activity in Japan, despite objectively broadening the potential scope of the
claimed invention,' 47 then the American premise that stronger is better seems to be
misplaced. The object of any patent law cannot be the satisfaction of international
interests over and above protection/ stimulation of national ones, and yet this is what
TRIPS demands.
If as the Japanese experience suggests, narrow protection does not necessarily equate to
slow progress, and moreover broadening protection does not automatically lead to an
increase in innovation, then, as Sakakibara & Branstetter conclude, "some of these
theoretical models and the "pro-patent" public policies based on them will need to be
reexamined." 148 Indeed.
146 As evidenced by international trernes such as TRIPS
147 Sakakibara & Branstetter, op cit. at 31.





The current law on the interpretation of patent claims in the U.K. shares its origins with
that of Germany. Both are based on Article 69 of the European Patent Convention
('the EPC') and the Protocol on the Interpretation thereof ('the Protocol'). The reader
will recall that the former decrees that "the extent of protection conferred by a
European patent ... shall be determined by the terms of the claims," and that the
description and the drawings are to assist in their interpretation. The latter stresses that
a middle ground should be taken between using the claims merely as guidelines and
determining protection based on their literal wording alone, thus combining a "fair
protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties."
These provisions are incorporated into British law by s.125 of the Patents Act 1977
('the 1977 Act'). This section is "so framed as to have, as nearly as practicable, the same
effects in the United Kingdom as the corresponding provisions of the European Patent
Convention."2
The case that is generally (although by no means universally, or always enthusiastically)
accepted as forming the starting point under the 'new' law is Catnic Components v Hill &
Smith. 1 Despite being decided in the context of a 1949 Act patent, the Catnic test (as
reformulated in subsequent decisions) has become the mainstay of the British approach
to claim interpretation under the 1977 Act. For current purposes it is important to note
that Lord Diplock's famous judgment in the case shifted emphasis from the erstwhile
restrictive approach of the courts, evidenced by decisions such as Van der Ley v BarnfortLt
and Rodi & Wienenbeiger v Showell, 4 towards the new Jerusalem of 'purposive
construction'.
The Test
The case concerned a patent for a steel lintel in which the claims specified that the back-
plate should extend "vertically" from the floor-plate. Lord Diplock began his
discussion of infringement by considering the nature of the specification. This, he said,
could be characterised as:
See further, the opening paragraphs in Chapter VII, above.
2 Section 130(7) Patents Act 1977.
I1982 1 RPC 183
' Discussed in Chapter I, above.
305
"... [A] unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of his own choosing,
addressed to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of his
invention ... by which he informs them what he claims to be the essential features of
the new product or process for which the letters patent grant him a monopoly."5
He then continued, stressing that there were no separate questions of 'textual' and 'non-
textual' infringement: 6 simply put, there is "but a single cause of action". Therefore,
the:
"... specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a
purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in
which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge."7
Lord Diplock then laid down what has become the classic test for the interpretation of
the claims of a patent in the U.K.
"The essential question in each case is: whether persons with practical
knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the mvention was intended to
be used, would understand that strict compliance with a particular descriptive word or
phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential requirement
of the invention so that aiy variant would fall outside of the monopoly claimed, even
though it could have no material effect on the way the invention worked.
He continued, stating that this question is only to be answered in the negative:
"... when it would be apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular
descriptive word or phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended by a patentee, who
was also skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants which, to the knowledge of both him
and the readers to whom the patent was addressed, could have no material effect on
the way in which the invention worked." 9 (emphasis supplied)
The Problems
Lord Diplock's choice of words here is revealing. By restricting protection to those
cases in which the skified addressee believes that the patentee cannot have intended strict
compliance, his Lordship illustrates a very traditional approach to claim construction
whilst explicitly claiming otherwise. The grant is viewed from the point of view of
public certainty, just as in Van c/er Ley and its ilk, and the message that is communicated
is that the patentee must have intended strict compliance unless this results in a
Per Lord Diplock, in Catnic, [19827 RPC 183, at 242-3.
6 As was the position under the 'pith and marrow' test discussed in Chapter I, above.
Ibid.
8 Ibid. at 243.
Ibid.
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manifestly wrong result. Indeed, if we apply the Catnic test to the facts of the
aforementioned 'hay rake' case then we see the same outcome - the skilled addressee
would be entitled to think that the patentee had some reason for restricting their claim
to disrnountable 'hindmost wheels' so that any variant falls outside of the scope of
protection.
Lord Diplock's application of the test also illustrates its sensitivity to the identity of the
skilled addressee. In Catnic his Lordship describes the patented technology, a steel
lintel, as "simple". Furthermore, he considered that the addressee in this case, identified
as being a builder rather than a geometer, would have understood the adverb
"vertically" in the claims to mean "near enough to the exact geometrical vertical to
enable it in actual use to perform satisfactorily all of the functions that it could perform
if it were precisely vertical". 10 Taken in the light of the preceding Chapters, this
formulation is most significant. The actual result of the case is strongly reminiscent of
the approach of the Court in Henri/esen v Talon, 11 in that the patent is interpreted so as
not to rob the patentee of all protection. However, rather than basing the decision on
broad policy arguments, it is the level at which the patent is addressed that is conclusive
as it has a marked impact on the degree of latitude with which it is to be interpreted.
The fact that it was "simple" technology seems to have influenced His Lordship's
conclusion that the patentee could not have intended to limit their claim to the 'literal'
defmition of vertical; understood by structural engineers everywhere to mean 900 to the
horizontal. The choice of the skilled addressee in this case is intriguing. Lord Diplock
considers that the specification is addressed to those using the invention - i.e. the
consumer - rather than the person interested in performing it, or in creating the
inventive product. Setting the standard of the relevant teaching at such a low level
enables the decision, which may be seen as being a fair one on the facts of the case, to
be made without delving into a detailed examination of the justifications for making the
apparent departure from existing practice. However, it does render the subsequent
application of the Catnic question rather surreaL
10 Ibid. at 244.
11 11965] RPC 434. Discussed at notes 23 to 26 in Chapter I, above.
307
A problem occurs because Lord Diplock's choice of a consumer, someone with
ccpractjcal knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was
intended to be used," as the focus of the investigation necessarily expands the emphasis
of the patent. This conclusion is apposite as they, unversed with the intricacies of the
law, should see no reason for the patentee to restrict the claim's scope to a literal
interpretation of the words used where this would rob them of all protection in any
given situation. Therefore, in order to answer the question, the skilled addressee would
need to be informed of the function of the claims in the patent. As Turner notes, their
answer would then depend on what they were told. If for example, they had been
schooled in the British approach and informed that the claims define the outer
boundary of protection then a narrower interpretation would be forthcoming than if the
addressee had been told that they simply identified the principal features of the
•	 I,invention. -
Furthermore, Lord Diplock's fiction of intent does not correspond to commercial
reality, for it is anomalous to assume that the patentee has restricted themselves to a
literal interpretation of their claims unless this cannot have been their intention. If the
patentee had thought of the variant then the patent would have been drafted in such a
manner that it fell within its literal scope. The fact that it does not must necessarily
mean that it did not occur to them. Therefore, whilst there is an argument that the
scope of protection should be limited to that explicitly asked for, and thereby claimed in
the patent, it is absurd to infer intention from the fact that a variant did not cross the
patentee's mind. Lord Diplock's formulation also assumes that it is the patentee - i.e.
the inventor, probably a scientist or engineer not versed in the pedantry of the law -
who actually drafts the patent in the first place: this is rarely the case.
When the reality is considered, therefore, this fiction of intent is fataUy flawed on two
grounds. First, by virtue of the fact that the patentee would never intend to restrict
their protection in the manner contemplated by His Lordship. Second because it is not
generally the patentee, a person traditionally perceived to be ill at ease with semantic
gymnastics, which drafts the patent in the first place. It will be noted that the pressures
that these considerations place upon the direction of the investigation may be argued to
12 Turner, Puqosive Construction - Seven Reasons w/ Cain/c is W'rong, [19997 IPAJ 700 (hereinafter, Turner,
Seven Reasons at 700-1.
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be equal and opposite. Therefore, the fact that the patentee would not choose to limit
their protection finds mitigation in the fact that they employ, or can employ, a third
party in the drafting process. It is clear that patentees are free to draft their patent
documents themselves, however they are then at a disadvantage compared to those
engaging the services of a seasoned professional. However, even if this view is taken, it
is a significant step to then assume that just because a particular variant is not included
in a claim the person drafting it must have intended to exclude it.
This point is important as it exposes the some of the tensions in the Catnic decision
itself and additionally highlights the fact that if a patent attorney, rather than a patentee,
drafts the claims then one eye will certainly be focused on preventing 'designing around'
the invention.' 3
 Therefore, it could be argued that it would be better to explicitly
recognise, for the purposes of infringement at least, that the claims are directed to those
with a practical interest in interpreting or drafting them. If this is the case then there is
a far stronger argument to be made for a narrow interpretation. Yet this line of
reasoning is fundamentally flawed as it reverts to a literal interpretation of the claims; a
result explicitly prohibited by the Protocol. The better view, therefore, would be to
maintain the current Catnic formulation but to require the assessment of scope to be
made on the date at which the claims are being designed around, i.e. the date of
infringement. Requiring an interpretation to be made at this point would marry
construction with the information functions of the patent and, in the opinion of this
author at least, would provide a more rationaJ basis fox the prOtection of mvention.
This would also help to tie the provisions th patenta\iity anc\ mringement in a rnuc'ri
more satisfactory manner, as the question of what the patent teaches the skilled
addressee is then reflected in the protection that it is to enjoy at the date of
infringement.
However, it is in relation to this point that we find possibly the most important
restriction in Lord Diplock's assessment, for his Lordship states that the Catnic question
does not arise "unless at the date ofpublication of the ipeciJIcation it would be obvious to the
informed reader" that the variant would have no material effect on the way in which the
invention worked.' 4 As we shall see, this restriction often renders the application of the
See further Chapter IV, above.
'4 Cmi, op cit. at 243. (emphasis supplied)
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question impossible in cases that concern 'pioneer' patents, 15
 as alternatives obvious at
the time of infringement may never have been contemplated, or even have been
possible, at the date of publication. It is also difficult to fit this requirement in with the
justifications of the patent system discussed in Chapters III and V (above). The
traditional incentive arguments would suggest that the scope should be determined at
the time of application, 16 as is validity, and the more generous reward theory dictates
that the assessment should be made at the time of infringement. Indeed, as noted, this
latter view would allow the determination of scope to fit in far better with the teaching
of the patent and reduce the inventive no-man's-land surrounding the grant.
Lord Diplock's formulation is often exalted as providing certainty to the process of
claim interpretation, and by adopting the mantle of the skilled addressee we clearly see
an objective standard being applied. However, reliance on an objective interpretation of
the subjective intention of the patentee at a time when various pressures add to
encourage speedy filing offers a standard that is far from certain. Additionally, when
the level of the skilled man is so critical to the subsequent interpretation, the Catnic test
appears to offer little more than a judicial licence to enforce, or excuse, on a whim.
The Legacy
Catnic's biggest positive contribution to claim interpretation appears to be the
imposition of an objective assessment of what it is that the patent actually does.
However, couching this in terms of an 'objective' interpretation of the subjective
intention of the patentee, and operating under a presumption that the claims must be
limited to their literal meaning unless this cannot have been intended, plants us firmly
back at the feet of Van der Le4i and its brethren. Limiting the assessment to the date of
publication adds further restrictions in the field of fast-moving technologies.
Nevertheless, despite the problems inherent in Lord Diplock's test, the decision appears
'fair' in result, and these issues could have simply withered and died if the case, as its
factual matrix suggests, was limited to its context, the Patents Act 1949. However, in a
15 i.e. patents representing a "spectacular technical contribution". See Scherer, Industrial Market Structure
and Economic Peeformance, (1980; Houghton 1\fifflin, Boston; 2 Ed.) (Hereinafter; Scherer, Market
Structure), at 448. One such example is given by the facts of Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Rousse/, 120037
RPC31 discussed in text accompanying note 86, et seq., below.
16 For the patent can only provide incentive to invent or to innovate in the point up to the application
stage, after this time the focus necessarily passes into realisation of the incentive.
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"miraculous sleight of hand" 17 subsequent cases have held that Lord Diplock's
approach is consonant with that required by the Protocol. Therefore, whilst it has been
forcefully argued that Catnic should have no relevance to the interpretation of the claims
of patents granted under the 1977 Act, 18 a bastardised version of the test (flow branded
the 'Protocol Questions')" still governs claim interpretation in the U.K.
It is Catnic's timing that presents the most unfortunate aspect of the case, for whilst not
mentioning the Protocol explicitly, it is almost inconceivable that Lord Diplock was not
aware of its effect when delivering his judgment. Therefore, it is tempting to conclude
that he (apparently)2
 altered this aspect of the law in order to provide a Protocol-
aligned test in the U.K. The attractiveness of this conclusion is enhanced when one
considers Jacob's contemporary comment on the coming of the 'new' law, that: "It
seems therefore that the Protocol adds virtually nothing to our existing methods of
construction. Thus, if the position extant in 1978 was assumed to be in line with
the Protocol it seems impossible that a modification of the test to make the assessment
'fairer' could somehow misalign the U.K. approach. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that
Catnic therefore finds itself adopted as the test to be applied under the new law when the
first cases concerning 1977 Act patents finally reach the Court of Appeal.
Catnic begets Improver...
As noted in relation to the German implementation of the Protocol, it took a number
of years before decisions concerning the new statutory regime began to filter through to
the appellate courts. In contrast to Germany, where the first cases concerning the new
legislation arrived in the Supreme Court in 1985,u in the U.K. there is hiatus in evidence
' Norman, Determining the Scope of the Patentee's Monopo/y: Puiposive construction Revisited, 119987 Anglo-
American Law Review 221, (hereinafter Norman, Purposive Construction Revisited) at 238.
See, for example, Turner, Seven Reasons, op cit. Also see the judgment of the Court of Appeal in PLG v
Ardon 119957 RPC 287.
19 See, for example, W7heat/y (Dan/na,) ii Dr/i/safe Ltd., [2001] PPC 133. Because, as noted in Chapter V in
relation to the misbranding of the patent right as a monopoly, names matter. See also Robin Jacob's
comment in Industrial Property - Industy's Enemji, [19977 IPO 3 at 3, that "A squirrel is a rat with good P.R."
2(1 Norman, Prnposive construction Revisited op dt. argues that Lord Diplock's approach is not particularly
novel in the light of Henr/ksen v Ta//on, op cit. and Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories [19787 RPC 153.
21 Jacob, Inteipretation of Claims and Infrin,gement, in Vittoria (ed), The Patents Act 1977, (1978; Sweet &
Max\vell, London) (hereinafter Jacob, C/aims and Infringemenl at 67.
22 See text accompanying note 81 in Chapter VII, above.
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post-Catnii 21 that lasted until the interim Epilac/y litigation (i.e. Improver v Remington24)
decided in August 1988. This, in itself is odd, as this period in time is not devoid of
discussion of other provisions of the 1977 Act. The issue of construction, however,
seems to have passed U.K. appeal courts by in the decade that runs from the Act's
coming into force.
One possible explanation for the lack of discussion at this point in time relates to the
fact that the converse position is evident in Germany in the same period. Whereas the
German courts, especially the Biindesgerichtshof felt that their practice did not conform to
the Protocol and therefore went to great lengths to ensure change, the U.K. attitude was
rather more Imperial in nature: current practice satisfied the Protocol, and no discussion
would be entertained on the subject. This lack of cases therefore lends credence to the
suggestion that Lord Diplock did indeed have one eye on this provision when issuing
his judgment in Catni Furthermore, the lack of discussion of the topic of claim
interpretation in this period served only to entrench the position. The law had
effectively been frozen for 10 years by the time the first appeal case came to be decided
in 1988. During this time practice had continued as normal 25
 and the potential effect of
any change of position had been magnified. Patents claiming priority as of the l.t of
June 197826 were half way through their lifecycle by this time and the convenience of
avoiding change, if nothing else, dictated that the 'settled approach' should be extended
to the new provisions. As noted, this is in stark contrast to the German position,
whereby a decision was clearly made that 'Third Period' practice did not conform to the
Protocol and must therefore be changed. 27 Thus, in the tlrst case in whic!i the issue of
claim construction under the 1977 Act reached the Court of Appeal little more was
done than to confirm that Catnic was consistent with the Protocol.
Therefore, in Improver v Remington, the Court of Appeal at the interim stage stated that
Catnic provided an approach that did indeed combine a fair degree of protection for the
patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties, as demanded by the
n ' Thjch, as noted, was decided m the context of the 1949 Act anyway.
24 [19897 RPC 69.
25 Cementing Jacob's view, reproduced in text accompanying note 22 (above).
26 i.e. the coming into force of the Patents Act 1977.
27 This is not to say that the pace of change was rapid, nor that the transition was smooth, simply that the
choice was made.
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Protocol. The Court also noted, however, the differing opinions of the U.K. and
German first instance judgments on the facts of the case,28 concluding that they:
"... cannot both be correct as interpretations of the same patent in
accordance with the Protocol. Either one has fallen into the error of attaching too
much weight to the strict hteral meaning of the wording used in the claims, or the
other has fallen into the error of extending protection from a consideration of what
from the description as understood by a person skilled in the art the patentee may be
supposed to have contemplated."29
Taken in the light of preceding Chapters, it is apparent that this 'black and white' view
of the situation is clearly erroneous, and imparts too rigid an interpretation on the actual
effect of the provision. To assume that one decision is correct, and that consequently
the other is incorrect, misunderstands the nature of the Protocol, which aims at
avoiding "extreme interpretation" of any of the official texts. 3° All that the provision
states is that a position should be adopted between the extremes which combines fair
protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties. On
the basis of the foregoing discussion on the state of German claim interpretation at the
time of the decision, 3 ' the outcome of pi/adj was perfectly predictable. The courts
were, admittedly, in a period of transition from the more liberal protection of the
general inventive idea, but decisions in patent cases were never plucked from the ether.
In terms of certainty the Utopian position imagined by the Court of Appeal, whereby a
patent may be selected at random and assured the same degree of protection in
whatever circumstance it fmds itself litigated, is unrealistic in a national (let alone
international) context. The fact that the thing is litigated in the first place reflects the
point that different views can, and do, exist concerning its interpretation. However, this
is not to say that the outcome will be any less predictable as long as one understands the
national rules relating to its construction.
On a reasonable interpretation of the Protocol, the Court of Appeal's implicit
assumption that there is only one correct position possible under it that combines a fair
degree of protection for the patentee with a reasonable degree of certainty for third
28 The reader will recall that parallel actions were brought in Germany, the U.K. and a number of other
jurisdictions concerning alleged infringements of Remington's "Smooth and Silky" depilatory device.
29 r19897 RPC69 at 76.
° See Armitage, Interpretation of European Patents (Ad. 69 EPC and the Protocol on the Interpretation), (1983) 14
11C811, at 814.
' See Chapter VII, above.
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parties is absurd. The wording is simply not that precise and the requirement of
certainty will depend greatly on the point from which the claims are viewed. Indeed, if
we look at the Catnic decision using the mantle of a structural engineer (the designer)
rather than a builder (the consumer) then the decision falls the other way - 'vertical' is a
word of precision. The essential difference, therefore, between the English and
German courts' treatment of the Epiladj litigation is the focus of justification for the
grant. In the U.K. the courts' approach concentrates, in traditional terms, on the
incentives created by the patent and seeks to eradicate uncertainty. In Germany, by
contrast, the focus at this point in tin-xe was still very firmly on reward of the patentee.
Both approaches can be seen to be in accordance with the Protocol, in that they both
tread a middle ground between extremes, but both necessarily provide different,
although by no means less predictable, decisions. The choice of justification is largely
historic, as has been shown in earlier Chapters, and is something which the Protocol
makes no claim to address.
Improver at Full Trial
The implications flowing from the two-nn Court of Appeal's &ita' ata cn
interpretation in the interim proceedings of the Epiladji litigation were, however, far-
reaching. Despite containing little more than bold statements of principle, noticeably
devoid of actual reasoning to back them up, the fact that the words were uttered by the
Court of Appeal was conclusive: Catnic was here to stay. Therefore, in the next patent
interpretation case to come through its doors, counsel before the Court of Appeal
agreed that the "guidlines [sic] enunciated by Lord Diplock represent the same
approach as the approach now enjoined by the 1977 Act and the Protocol."32
Thus, at the substantive hearing in the Epiladji litigation, Mr Justice Hoffmann (as he
was then) was bound to follow the Court of Appeal's approach and adopt Catnic.33
However, critically, instead of simply reiterating Lord Diplock's words, he reformulated
the one Catnic question into a three-stage test by combining it with the paragraph that
follows it in the decision itself. Therefore:
"If the issue was whether a feature embodied in an alleged infringement
which fell outside the primary, literal or acontextual meaning of a descriptive word or
32 See Anchor Building Products 	 u Red/and Roof Tiles Ltc4 [1990] RPC 283 at 287.
n See comments to this effect in Imp rover v Remington, f1990j FSR 181 at 190.
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phrase m the claim ("a variant") was nevertheless within its language as properly
interpreted, the court should ask itself the following three questions:
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If
yes, the variant is outside the claim. If no -
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at
the date of publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the
variant is outside the claim. If yes -
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the
language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with
the primary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention. If yes,
the variant is outside the claim.
On the other hand, a negative answer to the last question would lead to the
conclusion that the patentee was intending the word or phrase to have not a literal but
a figurative meaning (the figure being a form of synecdoche or metonymy) denoting a
class of things which included the variant and the literal meaning, the latter being
perhaps the most perfect, best-known or striking example of the class."34
The resultant Irnproi'er questions display, therefore, a subtle change in focus from the
original Catnic formulation. The three-stage test necessarily narrows the approach to the
essential question: is strict compliance, for whatever reason, demanded by the patentee?
The presumption that arises by virtue of working through the initial stages of the
Improver questions is that there must have been some reason for them to choose to
utilise the words that they did in drafting the claim even though it is obvious that
variants existed. Furthermore, by anchoring the assessment of the second question at
the publication date of the patent, the test reiterates Lord Diplock's most restrictive
criterion.
Applying the Test
Upon applying the newly-created questions to the facts of the case, Hoffmann J.
considered that the substitution of the slotted rubber rod for the coiled helical spring
called for by the patent had no material effect on the way in which the invention
\vorked. Both devices operated by trapping and removing hair in a tweezer-like
manner, both plucked "to the satisfaction of customers". Therefore, the differences,
"so far as they exist, are not material." 35 Hence the first question was answered in the
negative, and the assessment continued.
In answer to the second question, Hoffmann J
.
 considered that this would have been
obvious to the skilled addressee at the date of publication of the patent, even if it could
Ibid. at 189.
3 Ibid. at 192.
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not have been used in all of the preferred embodiments. He cautioned against reading
"obvious" in this context as one would read the word in relation to assessment of
inventive step, stating that:
"... the question supposes that the skilled man is told of both the invention
and the variant and asked whether the variant would obviously work in the same
This question is essentially asking whether the skilled addressee would have thought at
the time of publication that the variant was a mechanical 37 equivalent of the claimed
element. In other words, did it share all of the essential characteristics of the integer
specified - here was it "bendy" and "slitty" - such that it could perform the function of
the former if substituted for it, albeit not necessarily as efficienily? The Court
considered that it could.
It was upon application of the final Improver question, however, that the claimant's case
faltered, as Hoffmann, J
.
, considered that the skilled addressee would have understood
the patentee to have restricted themselves to the primary meaning of their claim. He
stated that:
"This is not a case like Catizic in which the angle of the support member can
be regarded as an approximation to the vertical. The rubber rod is not an
approximation to a helical sprmg. It is a different thing which can in limited
circumstances work in the same way."38
In order to back up this conclusion, he considered that the problems associated with
hysteresis and the fact that the plaintiff inventors had done no work on rubber rods.
This provided the answer to Lord Diplock's rhetorical question of why the patentee
should wish to restrict his invention to the specified embodiment only, therefore
making avoidance easy. However, the fact that avoidance would be easy only becomes
apparent when the skilled addressee is informed of the function of the claims and the
rules relating to their construction. Yet Mr. Justice Hoffmann ends his application of
the law to the facts of the case by stating that he did not believe that the skilled man "is
also to be assumed to be skilled in patent law". Therefore, "he would ... be entitled to
think that the patentee had good reason for limiting himself, as he obviously appeared
' Ibid.
In this case.
[19907 FSR 181 at 197.
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to have done, to a helical coil." 39 As already noted in relation to Catnic, this conclusion
is more acceptable if the claims are held not to be directed to a person who wishes to
perform the invention, but rather someone interested in designing around it.
Reference to Germany
Addressing the different outcome in the German proceedings, Mr. Justice Hoffmann
explained that the other court had failed to address the final Improver question, instead
they concluded after considering the first two issues of fact.
This is not, however, strictly the case for, as noted in Chapter VII (above), the German
court considered that the skilled addressee would interpret the coiled spring by looking
to its purpose. It was not being used as a springperse, but rather as an elastic body with
gaps to trap hair. The German reader of the specification in question would therefore
consider that the patent should be interpreted with this purpose in mind, and would
think nothing more of it. Seen in this manner it is clear that the final question is not
simply left out, it is rendered unnecessary by the legal construction of the meaning of
the claims at an earlier juncture. This approach is, in fact, entirely consistent with Catnic
itself for just as 'vertical' was interpreted as meaning 'vertical for all practical purposes',
so the helical spring of the Epi/adji device was interpreted with practical considerations
in mind by the German Court. Furthermore, by this point in time, the determination of
patent scope was, thanks to the efforts of the Supreme Court, sufficiently grounded in
the wording of the claims to overcome criticism on the basis that it did not comply with
the Protocol.
The Dissenting View
Notwithstanding the fact that Cat,iic and Improver have been the subject of sustained
criticism since their inception, their utility in marking out a test to be applied cannot be
doubted. This point alone lends credence to the argument that the decision to follow
Catnic under the new law was, in many ways, correct. We fmd support for this
statement if we compare the prevailing British position with that of Germany at the
same point in time. For if it is accepted that the act of change itself necessitates
uncertainty that contradicts the aims of the Protocol then, whilst the lower German
courts had change forced upon them by what the Supreme Court considered to be clear
Ibid.
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inconsistency with the spirit of this provision, the British judiciary were in a rather more
peculiar position.
As noted in Chapter VII, the practice of the German courts in the Third Period had led
to criticism on grounds that the scope offered by ulilising the standard of the 'general
inventive idea' and detaching protection from the wording of the claims lead to
unacceptable levels of uncertainty. Therefore any modification of this principle,
although adding uncertainty of its own, would actually provide no net increase in this
level as long as the position moved to a more objective assessment overall. The
situation in which the U.K. courts found themselves, however, was rather different. To
begin with, the period that passed between the passage of the new law contained in the
1977 Act and the first cases to reach the Court of Appeal was inordinately long when
compared, for example, to that witnessed in Germany. Furthermore, the leading
decision under the old law (i.e. Catnic) had actually been decided after the passage of the
new law, and it was generally thought to be inconceivable that the Protocol was not
within Lord Diplock's contemplation when laying down the test. In any case, the
interpretative provision was considered to add "virtually nothing" to the methods of
construction extant immediately before Catnic.41 The fact that the test was now 'fairer'
therefore cemented the view that the U.K. approach was in compliance. In addition to
these factors, the single dissent that could have affected the progress of the
Catnic/Improver questions was quickly and effectively crushed by the promotion of
Aldous, J
.
, to the Court of Appeal. As a piece of judicial intervention, this latter factor
is most significant, and is an issue to which we now direct our attention.
The Appeal in PLG
PLG Research v Ardon International42 concerned a patent for methods of producing
stretched plastic netting that required the starting material to be "substantially
umplanar". The alleged infringement used material into which grooves had been cut,
As noted above, the interim appeal in Improver v Remiigtoi was the first case dealing with claim
interpretation to reach the Court of Appeal under the new Act.
41 The reader is, once more, directed to Jacob, C/aims and Iifringement, op dt. at 67, such that: "It seems
therefore that the Protocol adds virtually nothing to our existing methods of construction. . .". See also
comments to this effect in Southco Inc. v DusFastenerEurope Ltd., 119921 RPC 299, per Purchas, U. at 312.
Also A. . Edwards v Acme Signs & Disp/qys Ltd., 119927 RPC 131 per Fox, U. at 136.
42 119957 RPC287.
318
this was accepted not to be strictly uniplanar but had been engineered to achieve the
same benefits when stretched, i.e. strong junctions and low waste. The question before
the Court was therefore whcther it could be described as "substantially uniplanar" and
thus fall within the claims.
At first instance, Aldous, J
.
, had applied Catnic, coming to the conclusion that there was
no infringement. 43 The Court of Appeal, picking up on the problems associated with
differing approaches to the construction of claims in the U.K. and Germany
(highlighted by the Bpilady litigation), suggested a radical alternative approach. Millett,
U., giving the judgment of the Court, began his discussion in traditional terms by
considering the development of U.K. law on the matter of construction. He examined
both Catnic and Improver; but then departed from 'accepted practice' and went on to
embark upon a reasonably extensive examination of German case law in this area.
During this discussion he made reference to Ion Ana'ysis, Heay Metal Oxidisation Case,
Handle Cord for Battey, discussed in Chapter VII above, and concluded that when
applying the Protocol:
the German Courts, no less than ours, insist that the scope of a patent
must be determined by its language; and, while the extent of protection goes beyond
the literal content of the claim to cover functional equivalents it does not go beyond
functional equivalents which are deducible from the wording of the c1aim."
Therefore, when considering the extent of protection, Millett, U., stated that the test
that the German courts apply is to ask whether the variant is 'deducible' from the
"wording and drawings of the claims." 45 He continued, opining that this is "not quite
the same as the third Catnic question," but is arguably more in conformity with the
Protocol, which requires a fair measure of protection for the patentee.45
As noted in Chapter VII, above, the German approach under Formstein had ostensibly
modified Third Period practice, but the substance of the test still allowed a scope of
startling similarity to that available under the pre-Protocol law. Millett is correct when
B Aldous, J's judgment is reported at f19937 FSR 197.
[19957 RPC 287 at 309.
t Ibid. This is an odd choice of phrase, and it is assumed that what was meant is that the variant is
deducible from the claims read in the light of the specification and the drawings. Indeed, this is the view
that the Court of Appeal takes of this passage in Kastner v Rk/a, [1995] RPC 585, discussed below.
f19957 RPC 287, at 309.
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he states that this is not quite the same as Catnic, but fails to appreciate that this may not
necessarily be a bad thing.
He continues, stating that Catnic was a case that concerned the common law of patents,
a law ccrpld by the approach laid down by the Protocol," 47 and that therefore it
should be "left to legal historians". This is because "if the two approaches are the same,
reference to Lord Diplock's formulation is unnecessary, while if they are different it is
dangerous". 48 These arguments, whilst superficially attractive, are somewhat misplaced.
The problem arises due to the fact that this rigid approach to the Protocol does not
correspond to either its purpose or effect. As has been noted, it was drafted in order to
guard against "extreme interpretation" of any of the official texts, 49
 and it is submitted
that it cannot be viewed as anything else. The implicit assumption in PLC is that there
is a right and a wrong path under this provision, and that as the U.K. courts err on the
side of literalism they therefore do not respect the requirement of showing fairness to
the patentee. This is exactly the same argument (viewed from the opposite side) as is
advanced by the Court of Appeal in the interim hearing in Improver v Remington; it fails
for the same reason - the Protocol is simply not that precise.
This matter aside, it is prudent to investigate the effect of the re-formulation in PLC.
The argument explicit in the case is that the Catnic questions 5° are not required and that
rather than following Lord Diplock's approach, the Court should simply apply the
Protocol. However, the only guidance that is provided relates to the application of the
third question. Therefore, we get the slighdy perverse effect of perpetuation of the
Catnic approach, albeit in modified form. 51 The modification of the final question
essentially asks whether the skilled addressee could have deduced the variant from the
wording of the claims. This is a test akin to the determination of inventive step and, in
essence, asks whether the variant is made obvious by the teaching of the patent. It is
Ibid.
48 Ibid.
See text accompanying note 10 in Chapter VII, above.
As reformulated by Hoffmann, J
. 
in Improver v Remington.
Si See Norman, Purposive Construction Revisited, op üt. at 248 for this point.
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protection by other, non-mterpretative, means - i.e. by manipulating the intrinsic scope
of the patent rather than relying on ex post facto judicial intervention. This approach
leads to claims that are not necessarily as 'tight' as those that would have been accepted
by the German Patent Office in the Third Period, where they were requited to be
drafted in a prescribed form. Therefore, as noted in relation to the Japanese patent
system,55 institutional practices operate to mitigate the otherwise harsh effects of the law
as best they can. However, what the changes suggested in PLG fail to do is to attack
the fundamental restriction in the Catnic test, the fact that the assessment is to be made
at the publication date of the patent. Thus, the position concerning pioneer inventions
is no different under the PLC test than it was before. In other words, in the area in
which the patent system is most important (according to Scherer's topology 56) there is
not only no net gain, but in reality a retrograde step taken as there is no increase in
fairness to compensate for the increase in uncertainty.57
The Reaction
It is perhaps unsurprising that less than two weeks after the judgment in PLG, Mr.
Justice Aldous refused to follow the approach of the Court of Appeal, declaring Millett,
LJ.'s new test to be obiter. 58 He came to this conclusion because of Millett's own
concession that the use of the word "substantially" in the PLC claim "imports a degree
of flexibility which precludes an exact and literal construction, and makes it unnecessary
to consider whether Lord Diplock's purposive construction was an accurate if proleptic
application of the Protocol." 59 However, it is Aldous's comment that he would be
"loathe to discard 14 years of case law unless it is certain that "purposive" construction
is not the correct approach under the Act," that really cuts to the heart of the matter.6°
The uncertainty that changing to the PLC approach would have engendered by
removing the framework of the Catnic/Improver questions was simply too much to
contemplate at this point in time.
See Chapter VIII, above.
56 Scherer, Market Structure, op it. at 443-50. See also text accompanying note 42 et seq. in Chapter V,
above.
Caused both by the 'new' test and the act of change itself.
° In .Assidoman Mu/tij'ak v The Mead corporation, [1995] RPC 321.
59 See Aesidoman, ibid. at 337, referring to PLG v Ardon, op cit. at 309.
° Assidoman, ibid.
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However, the development that cemented the demise of PLG was Mr Justice Aldous's
promotion, shortly after the decision in Assidoman, to the Court of Appeal. Therefore,
in Kasiner v RiIa,°' just 7 months after Millett's radical departure from Catnic, the now
Lord Justice Aldous was effectively able to confirm his opinion that PLG was obiter.
So Catnic lives on...
Whilst convincing arguments can be made for the shape that a patent system should
adopt to enable it to achieve the 'goals' of providing protection for
invention/innovation in the first place, this shape necessarily varies as the justifications
and rationales of patent protection vary. In addition, the economic theories discussed
in Chapters III and V, above, all suffer from criticism on the basis that they are
theoretical without evidence of applicability outside of the limited confines of the
handful of cases on which they can be seen to be based. In no instance is, or indeed
could, a general theory be pronounced. The reason for this failing is the non-Utopian
nature of the markets and contexts in which the theories are based. In no case is a law
being designed in the abstract, and changes to the status quo must take into account the
fact that the process of change will, itself, cause disruption.
Aldous's comment in Assidornan about 'discarding' case law to follow PLG really does
expose the fundamental issue. Regardless of the actual effect that the change of test
would have had, and it is submitted that the modification to the third Catnic/ Improver
question may not actually have been that great in practice, it was perceived to mark a
significant departure from the British way of doing things. Thus, the criticisms simply
came too late to make their implementation possible without causing significant
uncertainty whilst a new practice became established. The essential difference between
the British and German approaches, post-Protocol, was that the Bundesgerichtshof clearly
believed that its own Third Period jurisprudence was not in compliance with the
Protocol, so change was implemented at an early stage. This, therefore, concentrated
the uncertainty brought about by such upheaval and enabled practices surrounding the
grant to modernise in approach. To adopt the recommendations of the Court of
Appeal in PLC would have meant enduring the turmoil seventeen years late.
Additionally, as noted, the fortuitous (or unfortunate, depending on which view is
(1 [1995] RPC 585. Discussed by Cole, Kasiner v Rijla: A Historic Decision on Equivalents? [1997] EIPR 617,
and Oliver, Kastner v R.i/a: Too Far, Too Fast [19967 EIPR 28.
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taken) timing of the Catnic decision effectively precluded this turmoil in the first place.
This is the essential point on which any rational decision must have been based.
Improver Begets the 'Protocol Questions'
The years following the decision in Kastner v Rfr<Ia are relatively empty of substantive
claim interpretation cases. This is possibly because of a 'bedding down' of the opinion
that Catnic/Improver did indeed dictate the test to follow under the Protocol, however, it
may also have something to do with comments made by Lord Hoffmann in Biogen v
Medeva, that:
"Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness
involves no question of principle but is a simple matter of degree, an appellate court
should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation."62
The cases that we do see in which claim interpretation was discussed at appellate level
are, in the main, straight applications of the test and are therefore of little interest to our
investigation.63 The silence on substantive discussion of the provisions was broken,
however, by the appeal in Wheat/eji (Davina) v Dril/safe, decided in July, 2000.64
Here, in a Court consisting of Aldous, Sedley and Mance, LJJ., the approach to
infringement and claim construction was discussed in some detail. The patent itself was
relatively simple, lying in the field of mechanical engineering, this alone may have
encouraged such an investigation. The case is notable not only for the fact that it
opened up the debate and re-branded the questions (Catnic/Improver became the
'Protocol' questions), but also because it represents a subtle shift in the degree of
protection accorded to the patentee.
Wheatley vDrillsafe
The patent in question concerned apparatus for the cutting of threaded holes, in
particular in petrol tanks and other tanks bearing flammable liquids. Due to their size,
the holes were generally cut using annular 65 cutters that bore teeth on their outer edge.
The problem with this method was that the cutting rig tended to wander during use,
62 [19977 RPC1 at44.
63 i.e. Union Carbide n BP, [1999] R.P.0 409 and Scanruegt v Pe/combe, [19991 F.S.R. 786.
Reported [20017 RPC 133.




stating that it "outlaws what can be termed strict literal and also liberal interpretation
using the claims as a guideline. The correct approach is to achieve a position between
those extremes. .". In pursuing this goal, "[s]o far as the patentee is concerned it is
important that the claim should be interpreted in accordance with his intention."67
He continued, stating that the Improver questions, "better called the Protocol questions"
can be utilised as an aid in the process of assessing objectively what meaning the words
of the claim were intended to convey.
This change of name is, in itself significant as it suggests a willingness to move away
from the erstwhile imperialistic view of the scope of protection towards a more
Protocol-centric test. Furthermore, the fact that the cjuestions are categorised as "an"
aid in the process of assessing the meaning of the words in a claim intimates that there
may be other approaches that are also consistent with the Protocol. This conclusion is,
in the opinion of this author, to be applauded.
Aldous, U., then issued what is probably the most significant statement in the case:
"It is reasonable to infer, absent e.>press words to the contray, that the patentee
intended to include within his monopo/y what iin be termed immaterial variants, in the sense that
they were not material to the way the invention worked.... However, third parties
have to be considered and, therefore, they should not be held to infringe if it was clear
that such a variant was not intended to be Within the ambit of the monopoly, either
because of the words chosen or because it would be seen to have materially affected
the way the invention worked." 68 (emphasis supplied)
Therefore, whilst adhering to the form of the Protocol (nec Ca'Iflic/Iiwprezei'r) questions,
Aldous, U., provides a subtle shift in the degree of protection. As noted above, 69
 the
restriction on the objective view of the intention of the patentee laid down in Lord
Diplock's original test gives rise to one of the main areas of criticism in the decision.
The precise logic of presuming that the patentee must have meant to exclude all variants
unless this cannot have been their intention, as was the position under Catnic, was never
entirely clear. Suddenly, in Wheatlej it is swept away, and we see what could, and
perhaps should, have been done in PLC. Rather than removing the comfort of the
67 Wheatly (Davina) v Dnilsafe, op cit. at 141 (paragraphs 19 and 21 of the judgment).
68 Ibid. at 142 (paragraph 23 of the judgment).
69 See text accompanying note 12 etseq. above.
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Ccitnic/ Improver formulation, a tried-and-tested favourite of the judiciary, a presumptive
burden within it is changed and a more benevolent interpretation made possible.
Whilst accepting that the defendant's probe design did not correspond to the literal
meaning of "centre-less", Aldous, U., thought that the skilled addressee would
nevertheless believe it to fall within the scope of the patent. He reasoned that all of the
patent's teaching was directed to overcoming the problem of pre-penetration of the
tank. The description mentioned the benefits of the invention in the following terms:
"By using a centre-less hole cutter (that is a hole-cutter not having a drill for forming a
pilot hole), this early opening of the tank is obviated." 70 To read "pilot hole" as
including a blind hole that did not penetrate the tank would be to make "nonsense of
the sentence."7 ' The alternative formulation, i.e. interpreting the words "centre-less"
literally, would mean that there was no infringement, but Aldous reminds us that this is
outlawed by the Protocol.72
Therefore, when applying the 'Protocol questions' he considered that the addition of
the probe would have no material effect on the way in which the invention worked, and
that this would have been obvious to the skilled addressee at the publication date of the
patent. Therefore, moving on to the final question, whilst accepting that the "centre-
less hole cutter" was an essential feature of the claim, he believed that this phrase
should be interpreted so as to include the probe.
"The ... skilled reader would interpret the claim as excluding anything that
penetrated the tank lid before cutting had been completed. The words "centre-less
hole cutter" are not terms of art. They have been used by the patentee to distinguish
the conventional cutter ... and the prior art.....
He concluded that the answer to the Improver questions indicated that there was
infringement, however "they are only an aid to the decision which requires the claims to
be interpreted to give fair protection and reasonable certainty." Applying the Protocol
directly, Aldous, U., stated that the patent disclosed a method of creating a hole in a
tank in situ with a cutter and a tap with no pre-penetrating parts. "Fair protection would
Ibid. at 143 (paragraph 28 of the judgment.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
Ibid. at 145 (paragraph 37 of the judgment.
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enable the patentee to monopolise just that... That would also give reasonable
certainty."74
The Majority View
Despite deferring "entirely to the exposition of the law given by Aldous U.,"75
 the
majority of the Court of Appeal disagreed with his conclusions on whether there was, in
fact, infringement of the patent. Sedley, U., considered that "the critical question is in
the end one of first impression: is the appellant's device a centreless hole-cutter?" 7 ' As
it had a central drill as its locating device, he concluded that was not.
Lord Justice Mance gave the issue far lengthier consideration, but came to the same
conclusion: there was no infringement. Utilising reasoning very similar to that of
Hoffmann, J
.
, in Improver, he considered that:
". .when conceiving and describing their invention, the appellant patentees
did not contemplate the introduction of any central device, serving to centre the hole
cutter. Either the idea of a centring device which did not pierce the integrity of the
tank did not occur to them or, if it did, they put it aside for reasons which must have
seemed good at the time.... If the appellants had seen this possibility, and intended to
cover it, as a worthwhile development, I have no doubt that they would have expressed
themselves differently and made that intention clear."77
Therefore, despite accepting Lord Justice Aldous's interpretation of the law, Mance, U.,
seems to consider that the nature of the patentee's specification suggested that they had
not intended, for whatever reason, to include variants of the type employed by the
defendant within their scope of protection. Turning to the Protocol questions, he
considered that the first two should be answered in the patentee's favour. The result to
the third, however, was tainted by the fact that the appellants:
"...did not realise or consider that there was any or any workable solution,
involving the use of a centrally positioned centralising drill or device, which would
resolve the problem of penetration into the tank while at the same time avoiding the
problem of wandering... The applicants' inventiveness involved, but was limited to,
the recognition that penetration could usefully be achieved by the annular cutter."75
' Ibid. (paragraph 38 of the judgment).
Per Sedley, U., ibid. at 151. Mance, U., issues a similar statement at the beginning of his judgment on
the same page.
"' Ibid.
Ibid. at 155 (paragraphs 83 and 85 of the judgment).
78 Ibid. at 157 (paragraph 90 of the judgment).
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As Dunlop states, the "majority on the Court of Appeal believed that the patentce's
failure (which the court interpreted as being a matter of choice) to claim some broader
formulation was the overriding consideration."7'
Comment
The appeal in WIeat/ey v DrillsaJè provides clear illustration that even where a single court
is considering a patent, and therefore all of those presiding over the issues have access
to the same expert witnesses and apply the same legal tests, differences of opinion can
still arise. The majority's approach is somewhat lamentable given Lord Justice Aldous's
benevolent formulation of the main legal points; however, given the British courts' past
practice it is far from surprising.
Aldous's reversal of the presumption of intention, endorsed by the rest of the Court, is
most significant. Not only does it represent a 'U'-turn in his own erstwhile rather
conser\rative views on claim interpretation, but it also effectively manages to align U.K.
and German practice in a manner that is far more acceptable than the incomplete
formulation in PLC. By retaining the final 'Protocol' question, the British courts can be
content that certainty is respected, for the same formulation is utilised as before.
However, the answer to this question now takes into account the reality of the situation
and the fact that the patentee should only be restricted to the literal wording of their
claims where a more benevolent interpretation is clearly inconsistent with their
intention. His application of the test is also interesting as it represents a truly
purposive construction: looking at the patent from the point of view of the problem
that is to be solved.
Mance, LJ.'s approach, on the other hand, clearly follows the orthodox route. His
judgment discusses fairness in the context of certainty, so that the appellant's
'inventiveness' is seen to be • ted to a scope explicitly asked for - in this case hole
cutters without a central spindle. 8 ' The implicit argument here seems to be that to
expand the patent's effect beyond this point would be to add an uncertain degree of
" Dunlop, court ofAppea/gets to Grzbs with the Protoco/ [20037 EIPR 342, at 345.
8J i.e. it cannot have been their intention.
The reader will note the parallels between this approach and the comments of those patent attorneys
adopting what was described as the 'traditional view' in Chapter IV, above. See text accompanying note
16 in Chapter IV.
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protection, and that this would not be fair to the patentee or to third parties. Therefore,
the monopoly shadow cast by the patent should be limited to that explicitly claimed,
and no more. In this context, "if the appellants had seen [the possibility of a non-
penetrating centre spindlel... and intended to cover it, as a worthwhile development, I
have no doubt that they would have expressed themselves differently and made that
intention clear." 82 Thus, whilst deferring to Aldous, LJ.'s exposition of the law, the
majority appear to believe that, as this was an invention in a mature field of technology,
the patentee83 could easily have conceived that there might be different methods of
achieving the main innovative aim, i.e. avoiding pre-penetration of the tank. Mance,
LJ.'s approach therefore comes perilously close to assessing the invention with
hindsight and asking why the inventor did not expressly include such an obvious variant
within their scope of protection. This method views the failure to claim as being a
matter of choice, which cannot be correct, and, as Dunlop suggests, leads us to a
question that is critical to some of the most recent judgments. "What if the draftsman
could not possibly have envisaged the variant at the time of filing?"84
Recent Developments
Despite marking a significant advance in the manner in which a patent is to be
interpreted, Wheat/c3 does not address Lord Diplock's most restrictive criterion: the fact
that the patent is to be interpreted as of the date of publication. This limitation, as
noted above, operates most significantly in the field of pioneer advancements, defmed
by Scherer as representing a "spectacular technical contribution". 85 It impacts strongly
upon these inventions because at the time of their creation techniques in that area
would, by defmition, have suggested only narrow routes down which to progress. As
time goes on, and the rest of technology catches up with the advancement, other
methods of arriving at the result will inevitably be found that may fall outside of the
literal scope of the claims, but nevertheless utilise the patent's teaching. This, in
essence, is what occurred in Kirin-Arngen,86
82 Per Mance, U., in IVheatIy v Drillsafe, op cii. at 155 (paragraph 85 of the judgment).
Or at least the person drafting the patent.
See Dunlop, op cit. at 345.
5 Scherer, Market Sinicture, op cii. at 448.
8( Klnn-Agen v Hoechst Marion Rous.cei L20031 RPC31.
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Kirin-Aingen
The case concerns a patent for the manufacture of erythropoietin (EPO), a polypeptide
that functions to regulate the production of red blood cells. It claimed a method of
producing the protein utilising genetic engineering techniques whereby the DNA
sequence encoding EPO was isolated and cloned outside of the host cell before being
inserted into it for production. The Court summarised this by stating that: cIn effect
the claim is to an exogenous DNA sequence suitable for expressing EPO when
introduced into a host cell." 87 The alleged infringement utilised very different means to
achieve the same result. Rather than isolating the DNA sequence, it used a process
known as 'gene activation'. Starting with a cell in which the EPO gene was already
present but dormant, 88 'switched off' by a negative regulatory element (NRE), the
defendants' technique introduced a nucleotide sequence that effectively overrode the
NRE and 'switched on' the gene. This caused the cell to produce EPO.89
The Court considered that the defendants' process did not fall within a literal reading of
the claim because there was no "host cell", called for by the patent, due to the fact that
everything happened internally. 9° Therefore, moving on to consider whether the
process infringed under a purposive construction of the claims, it applied the Protocol
questions.
Having regard to the level of generality with which the invention was described in the
claims of the patent, the Court considered that the answer to the first question must be
'yes'. This conclusion therefore overturned the judgment of Neuberger, J
.
, at first
instance, who was of the view that the only significant variant was the use of the
activation technology and that this had no material effect on the working of the
invention. The Court of Appeal, whilst accepting that the discovery and sequencing of
the gene that produced EPO was "at the heart of the invention", refused to accept that
this was the level of generality with which the patent should be viewed. It concluded
87 Ibid. at 62 (paragraph 52 of the judgment).
88 This is the case in the majority of human cells, and for the majority of genes.
The reader will appreciate that this is a very basic description of the relevant techniques. For a more in
depth discussion see paragraph 12 of the judgment, discussing the discovery and production of EPO; and
paragraph 36 for a discussion of the defendants' tecimique.
i.e. the process was endogenous.
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that "[t]here are real differences between an isolated DNA sequence which is suitable
for use in a host cell and a DNA sequence in which the cell needs activation."1
Having answered the first Protocol question in this manner, the Court stated that it was
"not necessary to go on and consider the second question on the assumption that the
answer to the first question should be in the negative". However, as a "considerable
length of time was spent considering the judge's approach to... [the second] question,"
it deigned to comment.
The Court stated that, when answering the second question, it was important to bear in
mind that it is "designed to secure a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties."92
The judge had erred in viewing the way in which the invention worked in too broad a
manner, so that the differences between the techniques were excluded from
consideration. The essential point was that in 1984 (the filing date of the patent) the
skilled addressee would not have realised that the allegedly infringing technique would
work at all, let alone in the same way. Therefore there could be no infringement.
Comment
Utilising the filing date as the point at which the assessment is made is an interesting
development. As noted above in relation to Catnic, assessment as of the publication
date made no real sense when the aims/functions of the patent grant were taken into
consideration. Therefore, in one respect, the Court of Appeal's insistence on the filing
date is a positive step, as it aligns the determination of scope with the incentive function
of the patent. However, although on a stronger intellectual footing, assessment at this
date still unfairly prejudices pioneer innovation. The shift brought about by Aldous's
comments in Wheat/ej and the resultant modification of the presumptive burden will
simply not assist those cases in which the assessment fails at the first or second
question.
As Dunlop notes, this approach does, at least, appear to be consistent with Biogen u
Medeva, where the House of Lords held that the date at which the sufficiency of the
disclosure should be assessed is the priority date. This is because "a variant cannot fall
91 Kirin-Amen, op cit. at 62 (paragraph 52 of the judgment).
92 Ibid. at 63 (paragraph 57 of the judgment.
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within the scope of the claim if such scope would not have been supported by the
description at the filing date." 3 However, whilst this is one interpretation that can be
placed on the information function of the patent, it fails to take into account the fact
that the specification continues teaching long after it is filed. Indeed, one of the
justifications of the system is that it encourages disclosure of information that may
otherwise be kept secret?4 Isolating this teaching and effectively freezing the
information that the patent contains at the priority date represents a wholly unrealistic
approach and fails to appreciate impact that subsequent developments may have,
particularly on the scope of pioneer inventions.
Conclusion
The British approach to claim interpretation has come a long way from the pseudo-
literal constraints of the House of Lords' decisions in Van der Le/y v Bamfords' 5 and Rodi
& Wienenberger v Showell.' 6 Catnic itself played a large part in this modernisation of
approach, however, as noted, it also created a suspect legacy of narrow tests and
dubious presumptions that hindered development of the law. The subsequent
discussion of Lord Diplock's test in Improver v Remington'7 served not only to reformulate
the questions, but also to highlight some of their most restrictive criteria. In addition, it
began a process of solidification of approach that the radical view of the Court in PLC'8
simply came too late to remedy.
Lately, however, under what Turner describes as "the guise of loyalty to Catnic"9' we can
see a subtle shift in the interpretation of the patent towards more liberal construction.
In this manner, the advances made by the Court of Appeal in Wheatleji v Drillsafe'°° are,
at least in the opinion of this author, to be applauded. Yet, by themselves they are not
cause for overt celebration as there is much still to be done.
93 Dunlop, op di. at 349.
' See further, text accompanying note 124 et seq. in Chapter III.
' [1963] RPC61.
96 19697 RPC 367.
989 RPC69 (Court of Appeal, Interim); 119907 FSR 181 (Iloffmann,J., substantive hearing).
98 [19957 RPC 287.
' Turner, Pu,osii'e construction - Leer, [2001] EIPR 118 at 118.
IOU [2001] RPC 133.
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Therefore, just as the House of Lords has recently revisited the issue of recklessness
within the context of criminal damage, 101 and has overturned Lord Diplock's classic
formulation in CaIdwe//,' 2 this author respectfully submits that the time may also be ripe
for departure from the more restrictive elements of the Catnic/Improver/Protocol
questions. The main merit of the test, as interpreted, is the fact that it provides a logical
framework for the courts to adopt and as it has aged and settled down the application
has become softer without necessarily losing the degree of certainty that has been
championed as its finest facet. However, it has significant problems associated with
c fast
 moving' technologies, such as biotechnology, that appear to reflect a certain degree
of 'techno-fear' within the judiciary.
Therefore, it is suggested that Lord Diplock's utilisation of the publication date as the
date at which the relevant assessment of the scope of the patent is made should be
consigned to history. Assessment as of this date is littered with problems - not least of
which those relating to the balance that is to be struck between fairness and certainty.
The current model does not fit in well with the information function of the patent -
exalted in cases such as Biogen v Medeva103 where it will be recalled that the House of
Lords imported the notion of support into the requirement of sufficiency within
s.72(1)(c) of the 1977 Act. Neither does it adequately satisfy any of the economic
justifications that can be advanced to support the grant of the patent in the first place.
Even at its most basic level, if the patent is assumed to provide some sort of incentive
or reward to those entities investing in the costly business of innovation, then reliance
on the publication date as the date at which the patent stops teaching the skilled
addressee is absurd. The disclosure that is required as consideration for the grant keeps
performing even after it is published. As a disclosure, it creates an aura of impotence
around the invention into which no other patent can stray, yet as it stands, it is only the
shadow that the patent casts at the publication date 104 that the patentee can monopolise;
all else is lost.
101 In R v C &./lnother (Minors), [20037 UKFIL 50.
102 f19827AC341.
'° [1997] RPC 1.
104 This is the more generous formulation for, as noted, the assessment in I<irin-Amgen was made at the
filing date.
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Furthermore, the current test results in the perverse situation that the most fundamental
innovations, those in pioneer fields (that Scherer would describe as "revolutionary" and
which can be characterised as having an uncertain cost/benefit ratio), 105 receive the least
protection as the second Improver/Protocol question cannot be answered in the
affirmative. This problem is highlighted by the appeal in Kirin-Aingen,106 for whilst it
seems that the courts are reasonably comfortable with patents in the more
straightforward scientific and engineering spheres (traditional chemistry, mechanical and
electrical engineering, etc.), biotechnology still causes problems. It may well be that this
is because of the nature of the patentee in these industries,107 however one cannot
escape the feeling that the Court of Appeal is simply constrained by the current test.
By modification of the test in the manner suggested, so as to include variants made
immediately apparent to the skilled addressee at the date of infringement, these
problems would be solved. Furthermore, the courts would avoid the need for a major
shake-up of the law in this area, for all of the building blocks of a new test are already in
place. The assessment remains objective and the final Protocol question remains the
same, therefore nothing is lost in terms of certainty, yet protection is broadened to
encapsulate after-arising equivalents that are nonetheless immediately evident to the
skilled addressee. Pioneer inventions would therefore get the protection that they
rightly deserve and the yawning gap between the teaching and reward functions of the
patent is closed. Moreover, the court still has the opportunity, should the situation
dictate, to say that the allegedly infringing technology is so far changed from that
disclosed in the patent that it falls outside of its teaching and cannot therefore be
monopolised.
Indeed, this must be the interpretation that the House of Lords will approve given the
amendments to the EPC agreed at the Munich Diplomatic Conference in November
2000 and adopted by the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation
'° Scherer, Market Structure, op cit. at 443-50. See also text accompanying note 42 et seq. in Chapter V,
above.
'°° [20037 RPC31. Currently on appeal to the House of Lords.
'° The reader may recall the comments made in Chapter IV concerning the arcane nature of some
patentees' disclosures in this area.
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on 28th June 2001	 Under this agreement Article 69 and the Protocol have been
amended so that the latter now states:
"(1) For the Purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a
European patent, due account shall be taken of means which at the time of the aIIeged
infringement are equivalent to the means specified in the claims.
(2) A means shall generally be considered as being equivalent if it would be
obvious to a person skilled in the art that using such means would achieve substantially
the same result as that achieved through the means specified in the claim." (emphasis
supplied)
If the House of Lords choose to endorse the Court of Appeal's formulation rather than
adopting the revised text of the EPC then we risk Catnic-eqsue perpetuation of an
outmoded test. This would be in no-one's interests, especially given the infrequency of
appeals to this level on the issue of claim construction. However, other than changes to
the date of assessment, it would appear that the current U.K. position is in broad
compliance with the new text of the Protocol.
In short, the time has come for the U.K. courts to decide whether Britain is to be a
leader or a follower in the field of high technology. The early British experience, and
more recently that of Japan, clearly demonstrate that different scopes of protection may
be appropriate at different stages in a country's development. In the opinion of this
author, it is time for the U.K. to enter the 'Era of Intellectual Creation' as leader, and to
pre-empt the changes that will be imposed by the revisions to the EPC. The appeal to
li Article 8 of the Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (available online at:
http: / /www.europcan-pateiit-office.org/epo /dipl  conf/pdf/em00003a.pdf) states that the revised EPC
will "enter into force two years after the fifteenth Contracting State has deposited its instrument of
ratification or accession, or on the first day of the third month following the deposit of the instrument of
ratification or accession by the Contracting State taking this step as the last of all the Contracting States, if
this takes place earlier." The European Patent Office anticipated entry into force within 3 to 5 years in
June 2002, see http: / /www.european-patent-office.org/news /info /2002
 06 07 e.htm.
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the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen presents a perfect opportunity for this goal to be
1()9
achieved.
The appeal is scheduled to be heard in July 2004. It is metab1ed to last for two weeks.
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Some Final Comments
It has been the purpose of this study to explore some of the issues connected with the
determination of patent scope in the U.K. During the course of our discussion we have
searched for the purpose of the patent system, the bricks upon which it is built and
against which it may be justified. As part of our discussion we looked at the historical
factors that lead to the current British position and the perceived 'anti-monopolistic'
sentiment within the patents court. The historical account is interesting for a number
of reasons, not least in highlighting the fact that patents played a significant part in
transforming English industry during the Reign of Elizabeth I. Therefore, in historical
fact we find the first, and perhaps most important, reason for why we (as society) may
wish to allow the grant of a time limited monopoly to the creator of a new manufacture:
iii order to secure teaching of those skilled in the craft within the Realm. This is the
reason that the patent system was instigated, and it continues to be an important factor
in its utility.
When first created, however, the custom of patent grants (for it could not yet be called
anything more) was very different to that in existence today. To begin with, the system
did not discriminate bet\veen true 'inventions' (in the modern sense of the word) and
those manufactures imported from abroad: indeed, it was the latter that were specifically
targeted. The small number of patents and the clear connection with Crown also made
policing a far simpler affair. Moreover, the consideration for the grant was a great deal
more straightforward: the Crown simply required that the invention be 'worked' within
the Realm. The price of a patent has always, therefore, been disclosure, but at the
genesis of the system it was provided in very different form to that required today.
It was only when the nature of invention changed so that new manufactures were
conceived, rather than 'borrowed', by the British that we see a shift in the degree of
protection sought by the patentee, and the specification makes its appearance.
Therefore, in the period just before the Industrial Revolution, Nasmith and his ilk made
the first tentative steps towards a modern grant in which the invention is described and
the scope of protection demarcated by the patentees themselves.
The historical account of patents in the U.K. also enabled us to see some of the
problems that have dogged the system since its inception. Therefore we noted the
'odious monopolies' granted in Elizabeth's Reign, and the continuation of abuses under
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James I, that lead to the Statute of Monopolies. As we have seen, the Statute was enacted in
response to some of the more problematic grants of the day and declared all
monopolies to be contrary to the law and utterly void. 1 Patents for invention were
excused from the rigors of this ban,2 but it is clear to see where the view that they must
be narrowly construed as an exception to an otherwise outright condemnation of
monopolies originates.
The intense debate that surrounded the mobilisation of the 'A tiPt t' movement in
the midtolate19tI century provided the backdrop for a discussion of some of the
'classical' justifications of patent protection. This period in time was one of intense
dissatisfaction with the operation of the system; it was expensive, unreliable and often
seen as a barrier to the progress of industry. The debate therefore provides a valuable
'snapshot' of a point at which the grant had to be justified in order to maintain its
existence. In addition, it provides evidence of a view that rendering temporary
monopoly to the creators of new things may actually inhibit the progress of technology
by providing a disincentive to invent, due to fear of litigation. It therefore enables us to
see the other side of the coin, and begin to appreciate the effects that patent protection
may have on downstream innovation.
Therefore, in seekingrationalisation of the grant, two distinct views are seen to be in
evidence by the end of the 19th century. The first is that of the patent as a tool of
commercial leverage, as reflected in the works of Smith, Bentham, Mill and others, and
upon which most of the modern theory can be seen to be based. The second is that of
the patent as a constraint on trade, the old monopoly argument, demonstrated by
Macfie, Rogers, Grove and the other abolitionists. What is clear from the progress of
the debate is that an unregulated market was seen by the majority on both sides of the
argument to be unsuitable for the fostering of inventive activity. Where the views
differed was in the choice of the best arrangement for that encouragement. At this
point in time the legal system was ill equipped to deal with 'property' in the intangible,
and therefore restricted it as one would restrict title deeds to land; requiring the
invention to be defined accurately and precisely. This sentiment is reflected in the
words of Lord Russell in his famous dicta in E.M.I. v IJssen when stating "[w]hat is not
si of the Statute of A'Ionopo/ies. See Chapter II.
2 By s.6 of the Statute of Monopolies.
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claimed is disclaimed". 3 However, the underlying justifications for providing monopoly
protection remained constant; patents were a method of safeguarding inventors from
the pressures of competition in order that an economic reason to invent (whether it be
incentive or reward) and disclose that invention could be found.
The nature of the patentee, and invention itself, had, however, undergone significant
changes by the end of the 'Anti-Patent' debate. The image of the lone inventor was
fading, replaced by a new corporate structure of research and development. Therefore,
whilst the overriding justification for the patent system can historically be seen to be the
idea of individual encouragement, this was changing. In essence the justificatory theories
were becoming more abstract; there was a move away from focussing on invention
towards innovation. As a consequence of this shift, and also due to increasing numbers
of patents, the specification had assumed a far more central role in the grant. Thus,
s.5(5) of the Patents Act 1883 introduced a requirement that the patentee explicitly
'claim' what they consider to be their invention.
The topic of the claims was picked up in Chapter IV when we considered the process
of drafting the specification and gained insight into some of the reasons for seeking
protection in the first place. Therefore, we looked at factors that determine the intrinsic
scope of the grant, and saw the problems that face the patent attorney when creating
the document. The discussion highlighted the fact that the traditional view of the
patent may not provide an accurate measure of its effect. In particular, it emphasised
that the grant is often sought for purely economic reasons connected with getting
innovation onto the balance sheets. Therefore, it was perhaps misleading to ask what
the purpose of the patent system is before examining its effect. In other words, rather
than asking what the system aims to do, the key question may well be what does the
system actually do?
This issue was discussed in Chapter V, when we considered the effect of the patent
grant by examining some of the simple economics of supply and demand. In addition,
we looked at the patent as 'monopoly' argument, and were able to conclude that, despite
providing monopoly power, the grant is far from what may be called an 'economic
(1939)56 RPC23 at 39
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monopoly'. However, such misbranding of the effects of the patent add to the
prejudice with which it is viewed. Thus, in the same way that the monopoly rhetoric
was utilised so effectively by the abolitionists in the 'Anti-Patent' debate (discussed in
Chapter III), it still fmds use today to apparently justify a narrow scope of protection.
In this Chapter we also introduced Scherer's topology of invention as a method of
assessing the effects of various 'post-classical' theories of patent protection. However,
it was noted that, far from providing any sound appreciation of the purpose or effect of
the patent system, the various economic constructs are all lacking in certain aspects. In
particular, they all appeared to be theoretical without practical applicability, based, as
they are, on a small number of non-randonily selected cases. Therefore, by the end of
Part I of the thesis we had effectively concluded that the patent system operates as a
commercial tool and thus primarily fmds justification based on maintenance of the status
quo. This is not to say that the other theories play no part in the provision of patent
protection, but rather that once a system is in operation it is actually impossible to say
whether it operates to the net benefit or detriment of the State. Therefore, the question
of scope ceases to be one of fmding the 'best' level of protection given the justification
of the grant, and moves to be more a matter of personal choice, based on what best
suits the current technological standing of the nation. This conclusion is reinforced
when we consider the determination of scope in various States in Part II of the thesis.
Therefore, we begin to see that the 'one size fits all' approach of harmonisation, in
which developing countries have developed states' IP systems imposed upon them,
lacks intellectual rigor.
In Part II, we moved to consider the manner in which a patent's scope of protection is
determined in the world's three main Patent Office centres - namely the U.S., Japan and
Europe (picking Germany as the state for comparison). In a far more graphic manner
than the theoretical Chapters, these comparative studies highlighted the patent cannot
be viewed in isolation; it must be seen in the institutional and administrative context in
which it operates. In this context the Japanese experience is particularly enlightening as
it proves that significant progress can be made in the face of or perhaps because of
narrow protection. The patent clusters that were prevalent in Japanese practice before
reforms expanding the scope of protection often operated to the detriment of the
foreign patentee. However, the process of incremental advancement that the narrow
342
grant made possible was one of the key factors in Japan's technological explosion. Just
as early British grants encouraged importation of foreign ideas, so too the Japanese
system survived on the assimilation of overseas 'pioneer' inventive effort.
In contrast, both the German and the U.S. patent systems traditionally provided rather
broad protection; the latter by way of the doctrine of equivalents, and the former by
utilising central defmition theory and protecting the 'general inventive idea'. However,
in both cases there are restrictions on the degree of latitude with which the claims are to
be interpreted. In Germany, this came from the Patent Office's strict requirements for
the form in which the claim was to be drafted, and in the U.S. it comes from the
application of restrictive doctrines such as prosecution history estoppel. In neither case
does a beneficial construction of the claims render the interpretation too uncertain for
the underlying principles of the patent system to operate as long as the rules relating to
construction are known.
This really is the vital point evident throughout the foregoing discussion: predictability
is the key. The patent system can only achieve its desired aims and objectives, whatever
they may be, if the process is transparent. Institutional practices surrounding the grant
can, and do, operate to gain the maximum benefit from whatever principles are
currendy utilised to mark the outer bounds of protection. In Chapter IV, for example,
we saw that the majority of patent attorneys interviewed in connection with this work
approached the claims assuming that they would be interpreted in a literal sense. This
has to be correct, as it would be negligent of them (if nothing more) to rely on a
beneficial interpretation somewhere later down the line to justify cutting corners.
So Where Now?
The appeal to the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen represents a 'golden opportunity' for a
modification of the prevailing test of claim construction in the U.K. Indeed, in an
informal discussion with a leading member of the House of Lords' panel that will
preside over the case, this author was told that it was a chance to revisit all of that
"Catnic and Imp rover stuff' in quite some detail. This statement finds support in the fact
that the case is timetabled to fill a tivo-week session of the House of Lords in July 2004.












I am currently studying for the degree of PhD at the University of Bristol. The theme of my
research is the interpretation of patent claims. To complement a traditional examination of the
way in which the courts interpret patent documentation in this, and other, jurisdictions, I am
conducting an empirical exploration of the claim drafting process, from initial idea to (possible)
litigation.
Existing studies on this topic, of which there are precious few, place disproportionate emphasis
on the results of litigation and fail to fully appreciate the impact that other actors have on the
interpretation of patent claims. It is my firm belief that the judicial treatment of patent
documentation cannot be isolated in this way, my study is therefore an attempt to rectify this
popular failure and to promote further debate on this important topic.
An integral part of this research involves an investigation into the philosophy of claim drafting,
specifically:
• To what extent is claim drafting judicially, or institutionally, led, if at all?
• What thought processes are associated with the drafting of the patent? For instance:
Do inventive step or issues of novelty and prior art take precedence when drafting
a claim?
• Are different expectations and therefore procedures applicable when drafting
claims for the European Patent Office as opposed to the UK Patent Office?
• Does the possibility and probability of litigation influence drafting style?
Does the industrial category that the invention falls into affect a conceptual varia clan in
drafting style and philosophy?
Is reliance upon the precise wording of the claims the best way to protect the invention, or
would recourse to a system of functional equivalents be preferable? If so, would the
adoption of such a system of interpretation facilitate a change in drafting style? To this end,
the perceived impact that the proposed changes to Article 69 of the EPC and the Protocol
attached thereto will have on drafting procedure will be assessed.
in pursuance of this objective, I therefore wish to speak some of the actors whose input to the
patent process moulds the final interpretation of the claims. I am therefore writing to ask if it
would be possible to conduct a short interview covering the areas of interest highlighted above -
preferably in person, however if this is inconvenient then a telephone interview arranged for a
mutually convenient time would make a satisfactory substitute. It will, of course, be completely
confidential discussion (individuals and firms will be made totally unidentifiable). Please
indicate your willingness to assist me in this study by completing the attached pro-forma and
returning it in the envelope provided.
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter, your continued co operation in this study







Name and position in
firm of person completing
thisforni: (please print) 	 _____________________________________________________________________
Contactnumber:	 ________________________________________________________
1). Number of Partners in the office to which this letter has been sent - to be used for
descriptive purposes only:
2). Number of Fee Earners in the office to which this letter has been sent - to be used for
descriptive purposes only:
3). Number of offices - to be used for descriptive purposes only (please circle):
1	 2-3	 4-5	 6+
4). For the future, are you the person whom I should first approach if seeking to interview
members of your firm on the subject of claim drafting? If you are not the person, whom
should be approached? (please print)
5). Which, if any, of the following areas of technology is a specialisation of the person whom I
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